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Abstract
Description Logics (DLs) are a family of logic-based languages for formalis-
ing ontologies. They have useful computational properties allowing the de-
velopment of automated reasoning engines to infer implicit knowledge from
ontologies. However, classical DLs do not tolerate exceptions to specified
knowledge. This led to the prominent research area of nonmonotonic or de-
feasible reasoning for DLs, where most techniques were adapted from seminal
works for propositional and first-order logic.
Despite the topic’s attention in the literature, there remains no consensus
on what “sensible” defeasible reasoning means for DLs. Furthermore, there
are solid foundations for several approaches and yet no serious implementa-
tions and practical tools. In this thesis we address the aforementioned issues
in a broad sense. We identify the preferential approach, by Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor (KLM) in propositional logic, as a suitable abstract framework
for defining and studying the precepts of sensible defeasible reasoning.
We give a generalisation of KLM’s precepts, and their arguments moti-
vating them, to the DL case. We also provide several preferential algorithms
for defeasible entailment in DLs; evaluate these algorithms, and the main
alternatives in the literature, against the agreed upon precepts; extensively
test the performance of these algorithms; and ultimately consolidate our im-
plementation in a software tool called Defeasible-Inference Platform (DIP).
We found some useful entailment regimes within the preferential context
that satisfy all the KLM properties, and some that have scalable performance




An ontology is a knowledge representation artefact which, either formally or
informally, specifies a conceptual understanding of a domain of interest.
The main conceptual building blocks of ontologies are individuals (ob-
jects in the domain), concepts (classes of objects in the domain) and roles
(relationships between objects, or classes of objects, in the domain).
Description Logics (DLs) [10] are a family of logic-based languages (frag-
ments of First-order logic) traditionally used for representing ontologies.
With DLs one can formalise the aforementioned components of ontologies,
as well as specify logical relationships between them, using logical sentences
called DL axioms. DL ontologies can thus be thought of, in a sense, as sets
of DL axioms describing a domain of interest. DL ontologies are the types
we are exclusively interested in for the purposes of this thesis, and therefore,
all further references to the term ontology in this thesis allude to these.
Key features of DLs themselves which make them interesting from a prac-
tical perspective are (1) they have a precise, logic-based syntax and model-
theoretic semantics which eliminates ambiguity in represented knowledge and
(2) they are decidable, meaning that one can devise procedures for automated
inference from DL-specified knowledge, that are guaranteed to terminate.
The decidability of DLs eventually led to the development of highly-
optimised practical procedures for performing inference on-demand, often in
17
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a matter of micro seconds, for real-world application ontologies. Their success
as formalisms for representing application ontologies is attested by their ser-
vice as the logical underpinning of the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [101].
OWL is a set of languages for formalising ontologies on the Web towards the
realisation of Tim Berners-Lee’s vision of the Semantic Web [25].
OWL became a W3C recommendation for representing ontologies on the
Web in 2004, and is currently in its second major version - OWL 2 [84].
1.1 Motivation
A limitation of classical DLs is their inability to cope with exceptions. That is,
their inability to represent and reason with knowledge that is generally sound
but permits exceptions. For example, while the proposition that students
usually do not pay taxes appears to be a sound one, it is quite possible that
there are exceptional types of student who are required to pay taxes - for
example employed students.
Classical DLs will not allow this common sense reasoning because all
stated facts are considered “universally true” or infallible. Therefore, we are
only allowed to state rigid statements like “students do not pay taxes”, and
such information has to be logically reconciled with any additional informa-
tion we discover. This behaviour is certainly useful for many applications.
For example, adding to our knowledge that employed students are types
of student, classical DLs have to infer that employed students inherit the
property of general students, and thus do not pay taxes. Again, this is very
sensible reasoning provided we have no other information.
However, if we later discover that employed students are required to pay
taxes, while intuition might tell us that employed students are exceptional
students, classical DLs will have to reconcile this new information with what
we knew previously - that employed students are exempt from taxes. The
only way to logically reconcile these incompatible situations in classical DLs
is to infer that employed students do not exist. Clearly, this is not suitable
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reasoning behaviour in contexts where we would like to express generalised
(defeasible) statements and permit exceptions to these statements without
leading to logical incoherences and other incompatibilities.
Within the area of reasoning with exceptions in DLs, we have found that
there is a general scarcity of practical implementations and tools. In addi-
tion, while it is clear that not all theoretical issues have been resolved in
the majority of proposals, we believe that in many cases the foundation is
solid enough to begin practical investigations. Such practical investigations
are not meant purely for evaluating reasoning performance to complement
existing complexity results. Rather, the impetus we are advocating to ad-
dress practical issues in defeasible reasoning, is meant to lead to concrete
implementations and tools. These tools, in turn, are meant for studying the
behaviour of reasoning proposals in practical settings to gain deeper insight
into their inferential merit. User feedback from such tools would then drive
the refinement of the theoretical notions in defeasible reasoning.
In other words we highlight that, unlike in many classical logics, defeasi-
ble reasoning has no universally agreed upon definition for entailment. We
therefore believe that, while there are guidelines on what constitutes sensible
defeasible reasoning, there is not necessarily a unique notion of “sensible” for
a particular formalism. Therefore, it is ultimately up to the user to decide
what inferential behaviour suits them best in different applications.
Existing approaches to addressing exceptions in DLs have mainly de-
scended from five methodologies: Circumscription [136], Default Logic [161],
Preferential Logic [117], Autoepistemic Logic [141] and Defeasible Logic [149].
We give more detailed presentations of applicable descendents of these for-
malisms in Chapter 2. However, since Autoepistemic Logic does not address
exceptions in a direct way, and since the rule-based approach of Defeasible
Logic is quite orthogonal to the aforementioned formalisms, the descendents
of these two approaches are not given as much attention in this thesis.
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1.2 Uncertainty vs. Exceptions in Knowledge
Representation
It must be mentioned that there are a variety of “modes” of defeasibility
that can be introduced into KR formalisms. In Section 2.3 we argue that
the root cause of the need for defeasible representation is the lack of access
to complete knowledge. This incompleteness of knowledge leads to multi-
farious modes of defeasible representation. A popular term often used to
collectively refer to these modes is “uncertainty”. However, we believe that
the term “uncertainty” could be misleading if we use it to describe the notion
of defeasibility that we are interested in for this thesis.
The statements “john is either a quaker or a pacifist”, “there is a 25%
chance of snow tomorrow” and “it is possible that susan went home” all
have symptoms of uncertainty in their representations. Therefore, the term
uncertainty is quite appropriate to describe these representations.
However, for this thesis, we are interested in representing generalisations
that hold in typical, usual, normal or default circumstances, but that permit
the occurrence of exceptions. For example, we would like to be able to state
that students usually do not pay taxes or typical sushi dishes contain fish.
Upon encountering exceptions, such as employed students or vegetarian
varieties of sushi, we would still like our reasoning to be able to conclude
meaningful knowledge about sushi and students. Therefore, we do not use
the term uncertainty to describe the issue we are dealing with. Rather, we use
the term exceptions which more accurately describes our problem of focus.
1.3 Goals
The broad goal of this thesis is to select an appropriate formalism from
the literature and take the first steps towards making it practical for DLs.
We choose to extend the preferential approach [111, 117, 116], by Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor (KLM), towards this aim.
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The main reason for choosing the preferential approach is that it has a
much broader and abstract perspective on defeasible reasoning. In particular,
it pioneered the study of nonmonotonic inference from the perspective of the
consequence relations that it could induce. This led to the formulation of
a series of inference rules (called the KLM postulates) that KLM argue any
“rational” defeasible reasoning mechanism should satisfy.
We believe that such an abstract view is very helpful in developing “sound”
and “sensible” defeasible reasoning behaviour (more details are presented in
Chapter 2). In fact, one of the goals of this thesis is to motivate the logical
merit of the KLM postulates within the setting of DLs.
That is to say, we address the question: since defeasible reasoning allows
one to draw “plausible” inferences from “generally” sound knowledge, and
there are no universally agreed upon definitions for “plausible” and “general”,
what common rules of inference should any reasonable definition satisfy?
In the same thread we plan to evaluate the main existing approaches to
defeasible reasoning, as well as novel preferential algorithms introduced by
us, against these rules of inference. This would give us a clearer picture as
to the inferential character of each proposal.
Towards practically implementing preferential reasoning for DLs, we are
going to address the following general questions:
(1) Is there actually a demonstrable need for defeasible reasoning in DL-
based ontologies (in real-world application settings)? We provide quantita-
tive evidence for this because there are only anecdotal and subjective argu-
ments for this in the literature.
(2) What are some useful defeasible entailment regimes within the pref-
erential framework? (3) Which of our preferential algorithms (and the alter-
native formalisms in the literature) satisfy the KLM postulates? (4) If some
of the regimes or formalisms do not satisfy all the postulates, which ones do
they not satisfy? (5) How does the practical performance of the preferential
algorithms look? (6) Is it possible to integrate preferential reasoning algo-
rithms into existing tools for ontology development? (7) If so, how can this
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be done in a fairly unobtrusive and seamless manner? Of course, there are
many interesting sub-questions to each of the aforementioned questions, and
we explore some of these in the rest of this thesis.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives some background, logical
preliminaries and related work on defeasible reasoning for DLs.
Chapter 2, in giving a flavour for the current defeasible reasoning propos-
als in DLs, constitutes solid ground from which to compare the representa-
tional aspects of each formalism, as well as their entailment mechanisms.
In Section 2.8 we introduce the preferential reasoning approach for DLs
which constitutes the theoretical foundation of this thesis. This is because
we actually select this approach as our formalism of choice to extend towards
the pragmatic goals of this thesis. We motivate why we choose this formalism
over the others in Section 2.10.
In Chapter 3 we again take a more general perspective than just pref-
erential reasoning. There we perform an experimental evaluation to give
quantitative evidence suggesting that defeasible reasoning is indeed required
in real world application ontologies. This strengthens the anecdotal argu-
ments in the literature from the point-of-view of biology and biomedicine.
We also extend KLM’s motivational arguments for their rationality pos-
tulates by giving a generalisation of these postulates to the DL case, and
arguing for their logical merit in this setting. We show, by means of ex-
amples, that these postulates capture intuitive rules of inference that any
defeasible reasoning mechanism for DLs should satisfy.
Lehmann also argues the case for the rationality of some informal prop-
erties of inference in the propositional setting. We generalise his arguments
to the DL case also in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 gives a detailed description of five algorithmic constructions for
preferential reasoning in DLs. The chapter also makes explicit many elemen-
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tary but interesting theoretical results about these constructions. We also
give a detailed explanation as to how preferential reasoning can be reduced
to classical reasoning for DLs.
Chapter 5 evaluates our preferential reasoning algorithms, and the main
alternative formalisms of Chapter 2, against the formal KLM postulates.
This gives us a general picture of the inferential characters of the main ex-
isting defeasible reasoning approaches for DLs.
In Chapter 6 we perform a thorough performance evaluation of our pref-
erential reasoning algorithms. Since naturally occurring data is not available,
we take two approaches to sourcing data for the evaluation: a purely syn-
thetic approach, as well as a way to introduce defeasible subsumption into
existing classical ontologies.
Chapter 7 presents the implementation aspects of a tool we have devel-
oped called Defeasible-Inference Platform (DIP). The tool is integrated into
the well-known ontology editor Protégé and is able to execute all the algo-
rithms presented in Chapter 4. Finally, we give our conclusions, summaries
and directions for future work in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In order to place past work in the area into context, it seems prudent to refer
back to the motivating problem(s) which ushered investigation into so-called
nonmonotonic or defeasible logics.
One of the “holy grails” of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in general is to be
able to simulate or automate the reasoning methodology of a rational human
being. Indeed, the sub-area of AI called Knowledge Representation and
Reasoning (KRR) is directly concerned with the development of appropriate
languages (often rooted in formal logic and given a formal semantics) to
represent knowledge.
The knowledge itself usually takes its form as a set of logical sentences
describing the chosen topic of interest called a formal ontology or knowledge
base (KB for short), along with an entailment relation and accompanying
procedures for deriving inferences from this knowledge.
One of the defining characteristics of classical logics for ontology specifi-
cation is that they comply with the property of monotonicity. A monotonic
formalism enforces that addition of knowledge to the KB can only result in
additional inferences. In other words, addition of new information that con-
flicts with the old information cannot force “overriding” or ignorance of the
old information. Essentially, this property models the implicit assumption
that all facts in the KB are universally true or infallible. One can immediately
24
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see that this property is unsuitable for modelling knowledge which is sub-
ject to exceptions. Human beings are notably adept at performing rational
inference in the presence of exceptions.
Students are exempt from paying tax, unless they are not when they are
employed [72]. Sushi contains fish, unless it does not in the case of vegetarian
varieties. Birds fly, unless they do not in the case of ostriches and penguins.
From a theoretical perspective, this is the core problem that the related
approaches listed in this chapter address, including the approach that we
base our own investigation on. That is, how to enable computer systems to
perform similarly well in deriving rational inferences from knowledge, in the
presence of exceptions.
It must be noted that the list of approaches to reasoning with exceptions
given in this chapter is not an exhaustive one. Rather, these are the main (or
more well-known) approaches to this problem in the literature. For various
reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, we have chosen DLs as our formalisms to
focus on. Therefore, in this chapter, we survey only those related approaches
that address DLs.
In Section 2.1, we present the syntax and semantics of classical DLs. In
Sections 2.4 to 2.9 we give a concise account of the most popular approaches
addressing exceptions specifically within the context of DLs. We very briefly
compare these approaches in Section 2.10 (although we have a more detailed
comparison of their inferences in Chapter 5). Finally, in Section 2.11, we
very briefly mention some relevant notation, acronyms and terminology that
we adopt throughout this thesis.
2.1 Description Logics (DLs)
Description Logics [10] are a family of fragments of first-order logic that
have good computational properties (They are all decidable). DLs are used
for representing declarative knowledge about a chosen domain of interest,
while enabling automated reasoning over such knowledge to reveal implicit
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facts about the domain. DLs also form the logical underpinning of the Web
Ontology Language (OWL) which is the W3C recommended formalism for
representing ontologies on the Semantic Web [25].
Each DL offers a set of logical features which together determines the
expressive power of that particular DL, that is, its scope for representing
various types of knowledge. However, the more expressive the DL the more
computationally intensive it is to perform automated inference with it. This
trade-off between expressivity and complexity should therefore be considered
when picking the appropriate DL for a particular application.
In this thesis, our main focus will be on the well-known DLALC [175] (and
more expressive relatives), which is generally considered to be of moderate
to high expressivity.
2.1.1 Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we present the basic expressive DL ALC. ALC forms the ba-
sis, in later chapters, for our investigation into DL-extensions that are able
to handle exceptions.
Syntax of ALC
We start with a basic vocabulary: a set of concept names Nc (also called
atomic concepts), role names Nr (also called atomic roles) and individual
names Ni. Nc additionally contains the special concepts > (The top concept)
and ⊥ (The bottom concept), which we define in the next section. The core
features of ALC, namely negation (¬), conjunction (u), disjunction (t),
existential role quantification (∃) and universal role quantification (∀), can
be combined with the basic vocabulary to form complex concept expressions.
Given a concept name A ∈ Nc and a role name R ∈ Nr, the permissible
combinations to produce a complex concept C can be specified inductively by:
C ::= A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C u C | C t C | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
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To give some examples: let Human, Male, Red, Green and Blue be concept
names, and let hasChild be a role name. We can denote the set of females in
our domain by the expression Humanu¬Male using negation and conjunction.
To refer to the objects in our domain that are fathers who have at least one
daughter we can use the expression Human uMale u ∃hasChild.¬Male, which
makes use of negation, conjunction and an existential role quantifier.
In general, for concepts of the form ∃R.C, we refer to C as a role filler for
R in ∃R.C. Those people who only have sons can be captured by Human u
∀hasChild.Male, using conjunction and a universal role quantifier. Using dis-
junction, we can refer to all the objects in our domain that have a primary
colour: Red t Green t Blue.
Of course, since our concept grammar is inductively defined, we can nest
expressions as well. For example, grandparents who only have granddaugh-
ters can be captured by ∃hasChild.(∃hasChild.>) u ∀hasChild.(∀hasChild.¬Male).
In addition to the capability of forming concept expressions, the thrust
of DLs is to represent knowledge in the form of logical sentences (called
axioms) describing relationships between concept expressions. The main type
of axiom in DLs is called subsumption or inclusion. Subsumptions have the
form C v D (intuitively meaning that C is a subtype of D) where C and
D are DL concepts. In the case where we do not restrict C and D to be
concept names, we refer to such subsumptions as general concept inclusions
(GCIs). The expression C ≡ D (intuitively meaning that C is equivalent to
D) is called an equivalence statement and it abbreviates {C v D,D v C}.
Given concepts C and D, axioms of the form C ‖ D are called disjointness
axioms (intuitively capturing that C and D are disjoint or distinct).
Examples of concept inclusions include: Heart v AnatomicalOrgan,
StudenttLecturer v ∃hasAccess.Library, Dog v ∀hasClaw.NonRetractableClaw.
Respectively, these subsumptions capture that: a heart is a type of anatomi-
cal organ, if one is either a student or a lecturer (or both) then one has access
to the university library and dogs only have non-retractable claws.
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Some examples of equivalence axioms include: Pizza ≡ ∃hasPart.PizzaBase
and Lecturer ≡ ∃worksFor.University u ∃teaches.UniversityCourse. The former
captures that pizzas have pizza bases and the “other direction” is also true
i.e., things which have pizza bases are pizzas. Similarly, the latter axiom
specifies that lecturers work for some university and teach some university
course. The other direction seems intuitive as well, that is, entities who work
for a university and teach a course are lecturers. Equivalence statements
that have a concept name on one side of the symbol ≡, are sometimes called
definitions because they accomplish exactly that - defining terms in the KB
(such as Lecturer and Pizza in our examples).
Some examples of disjointness statements include Dog ‖ Cat and Male ‖
Female where, intuitively, these capture that dogs and cats (and resp. males
and females) are disjoint or distinct entities (one cannot be both). As we
shall discover later, disjointness and equivalence statements can be captured
by using subsumption and are thus just syntactic sugar for allowing syntactic
abbreviations for axioms.
Therefore, a finite set of GCIs constitutes the so-called terminological or
intensional component of an ALC knowledge base (KB) - TBox for short.
One can also assign properties to individual objects (or pairs of objects)
from the domain using so-called assertional or extensional statements. There
are two basic types of assertion: concept assertions of the form C(a) (where C
is a possibly complex ALC concept), and role assertions of the form R(a, b).
C(a) intuitively states that a is an instance of C and R(a, b) intuitively means
that a is related to b through the role R.
Some examples of ABox assertions include: Student(john) (intuitively,
john is a student) and marriedTo(john,mary) (john is married to mary). A
finite set of assertions about our domain is called an ABox which forms the
extensional component of the KB. Thus an ALC KB is a tuple (T ,A) where
T is a TBox and A is an ABox. Either the ABox or TBox (or both) may
be empty. In the next section we give the precise logical meaning of concept
expressions as well as TBox and ABox statements.
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Semantics of ALC
In keeping with Tarskian-style semantics, the “truth” of an axiom in ALC
is determined by its satisfaction in a relevant interpretation. First-order
interpretations are adopted for the semantics of DLs and hence ALC. An
ALC interpretation I is a structure 〈∆I , ·I〉 where ∆I is a non-empty set of
objects denoting the domain of discourse and ·I is a called an interpretation
function. The function maps each individual name a ∈ Ni to an element of
the domain (aI ∈ ∆I), each concept name A ∈ Nc to a subset of the domain
(AI ⊆ ∆I) and each role name R ∈ Nr to a set of ordered pairs on the
elements of the domain (RI ⊆ ∆I×∆I).
For complex concepts, ·I is defined inductively as follows: Let I be an




(C uD)I = CI ∩DI
(C tD)I = CI ∪DI
(∃R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | there is a b ∈ CI s.t. (a, b) ∈ RI}
(∀R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | for all b, (a, b) ∈ RI =⇒ b ∈ CI}
Similarly, for TBox and ABox statements, an interpretation I satisfies:
C v D if CI ⊆ DI (C is subsumed by D),
C ≡ D if CI = DI (C is equivalent to D),
C ‖ D if CI ∩DI = ∅ (C is disjoint with D),
C(a) if aI ∈ CI (a is an instance of C),
R(a, b) if (aI , bI) ∈ RI (a is related to b via R)
If an interpretation I satisfies an axiom α (written as I  α) then it is
referred to as a model for that axiom. An interpretation I is a model for a
TBox (resp. ABox) T (resp. A) if it satisfies all the axioms in T (resp. A).
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 30
These results can be written as I  T (resp. I  A). Therefore, I will be a
model for an ALC KB (T ,A) if is a model for both T and A.
2.1.2 Common Reasoning Problems
The precise syntax and semantics of DLs, together with their nice computa-
tional properties, make them amenable to automated inference. There are
three basic types of reasoning tasks for DLs namely, concept or role satisfia-
bility, KB satisfiability and the more general task of entailment.
Definition 1 (Concept and Role Satisfiability) Let K be a DL KB and
let C (resp. R) be a possibly complex concept (resp. role name). C (resp. R)
is satisfiable w.r.t. K if there is a model I for K s.t. CI 6= ∅ (resp. RI 6= ∅).
If a concept or role name is not satisfiable w.r.t. to a KB then we say it is
unsatisfiable w.r.t. the KB.




Tomato v Fruit u ∃taste.SavouryTaste,
SweetPotato v Vegetable u ∃taste.SweetTaste
The concept names Tomato and SweetPotato, in Example 1 on Page 30, are
unsatisfiable w.r.t. K. That is, one cannot construct a model for K in which
there are Tomato (or SweetPotato) objects. 2
The task of checking satisfiability in DLs can be summed up as follows: given
a KB K and a possibly complex concept C (or role name R), determine if C
(or R) is satisfiable w.r.t. K.
If there is at least one concept name or role name in a KB that is unsatis-
fiable (as is the case in K) we say that the KB is incoherent. Incoherence
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is generally considered to be an undesired or unintended situation in ontol-
ogy engineering. In most cases, appropriate debugging techniques [174] are
adopted to “repair” such consequences.
A more serious problem is if the KB is unsatisfiable (we also say that the
KB is inconsistent), which leads us to define the circumstance under which
a KB is satisfiable (or consistent).
Definition 2 (KB Satisfiability or Consistency) A DL KB K is satis-
fiable (or consistent) if it has a model.
Recall that Tomato is unsatisfiable w.r.t. K in Example 1 on Page 30. This
enforced that in all models for K there could not be any instance of tomato.
Suppose we now add the assertion Tomato(t1) to K. This enforces that in
each model for K∪{Tomato(t1)}, there should be a tomato instance referred
to as t1. This is a logical contradiction and means that there is no model for
K ∪ {Tomato(t1)}. This KB is therefore inconsistent. The DL consistency
task is principally straightforward: determine if the given KB has a model.
Finally, the most general reasoning task of DLs is that of entailment. That
is, determining if a particular ABox or TBox statement “logically follows”
from a given KB.
Definition 3 (Entailment) Given a DL KB K and a TBox (or ABox state-
ment) α, α is entailed by K, written as K |= α, if each model for K is also
a model for α.
An implicit semantic property of DLs is the open-world assumption (OWA),
which is the assumption in DLs that information contained in our KB is
incomplete. This is in contrast to the closed-world assumption (CWA) fre-
quently used in databases [160]. Consider an ALC KB (T ,A) where the
TBox T = ∅ and the ABox A =
{hasIngredient(dish1, carrot1)}. A mentions that there is a meal called dish1
which has an object called carrot1 as an ingredient. Using the CWA, one
will derive that carrot1 is the only ingredient in the dish. In fact, if we addi-
tionally add to A the assertion Vegetable(carrot1), and to our TBox T the
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axiom ∀hasIngredient.Vegetable v VegetarianDish, we can go so far as to ob-
tain (T ,A) |= VegetarianDish(dish1). On the other hand, if we use the OWA
then we cannot infer that carrot is the only ingredient of dish1. All we know
is that dish1 has carrot as one of its ingredients (it may have others that are
not yet mentioned). The OWA allows for the possibility of more ingredients
(not explicitly stated) and hence we cannot deduce VegetarianDish(dish1).
The OWA and CWA have their respective appropriate applications. DLs, as
a direct result of the semantics, employ the OWA and this has proven to be
appropriate for most DL applications. For more detailed information about
these issues, the interested reader should consult the DL Handbook [10]. The
tasks of determining concept or role satisfiability and KB consistency are very
important in the ontology engineering process. Both tasks can be reduced to
the task of entailment: a concept C is unsatisfiable w.r.t. a KB K if and only
if K |= C v ⊥ and K is inconsistent if and only if K |= > v ⊥. However,
their most common use case (in their most literal sense) is to ensure that the
ontology developed avoids becoming incoherent or inconsistent. I.e., these
tasks are generally employed in an iterative manner on the KB, after some
modifications are made to it. In contrast, the “bread and butter” of au-
tomated DL reasoning remains the derivation of implicit knowledge (called
entailments) from KBs that are both consistent and coherent.
Example 2 Consider the following KB K [8]:
∃systolic pressure.High pressure v ∃finding.Hypertension,
∃finding.Hypertension u ∃history.Hypertension v ∃risk.Myocardial infarction,
RiskyPatient ≡ ∃risk.Myocardial infarction,
systolic pressure(bob, p1), High pressure(p1),
history(bob, h1), Hypertension(h1)
In Example 2 on Page 32 we can deduce that Bob is at risk of getting a heart
attack. I.e., K |= RiskyPatient(bob). In each model for K the object referred
to as bob belongs to the extension RiskyPatient. 2
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Therefore, the problem of entailment is: given a KB K and an axiom α,
determine if K |= α. The exhaustive or brute-force approach of constructing
all possible models for K, and examining the constraints that these models
satisfy, is not viable because there are infinitely many of them.
Tableau-based algorithms avoid this näıve approach, evolving over the
years with the help of numerous optimisations to the current maturity of
having feasible performance for “on-demand” reasoning [98, 102, 103]. It
can be shown that, for some DLs, the tasks of satisfiability, consistency and
entailment can be reduced to each other.
For example, checking if K |= RiskyPatient(bob) in Example 2 on Page 32
can be accomplished by adding ¬RiskyPatient(bob) toK and checking whether
the resulting KB is consistent. If it is inconsistent then we can deduce that
K |= RiskyPatient(bob). Also, given a KB K and concepts C, D, K |= C v D
if and only if the concept C u ¬D is unsatisfiable w.r.t. K [10].
In general, the preferred reduction in practice is reducing general entail-
ment to the consistency problem. The task of consistency is concerned with
determining if there is a model for a given KB. Therefore, tableau algorithms
generally work by trying to construct models for the given KB.
Numerous implementations of such procedures for the standard DL rea-
soning tasks have been consolidated in software reasoning engines called DL
reasoners. Some of these, for example CEL [17], have specialised designs and
optimisations for low-complexity DLs, while others such as HermiT [78], are
developed for very expressive DLs. More details about reasoning in DLs can
be found in the DL Handbook [10] or other provided references.
Finally, we mention that in addition to the standard reasonings tasks
discussed earlier in this section, there are various non-standard reasoning
tasks [113] that have been developed to meet specialised requirements in the
ontology engineering setting. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of
the more prominent of these.
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Classification: A commonly used, informative representation of a KB, is
the so-called subsumption hierarchy (also known as the concept hierarchy or
taxonomy). It can be defined as the explicit representation of the subsump-
tion relationship between each pair of concept names in the KB, as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG).
Example 3 Let SM be an abbreviated concept name representing the “San
Marzano” variety of tomato. Consider the following KB:
NonVegPizza ≡ Pizza u ¬VegPizza,
ItalianPizza ≡ Pizza u ∀topping.(∃origin.Italy),
VegPizza ≡ Pizza u ¬∃topping.MeatTopping,
Pizza1 v Pizza u ∀topping.(Avocado t Ricotta t SM),
Pizza1 v ∃topping.Avocado u ∃topping.Ricotta u ∃topping.SM,
Pizza2 v Pizza u ∀topping.(Mozzarella t Prosciutto t SM),
Pizza2 v ∃topping.Mozzarella u ∃topping.Prosciutto u ∃topping.SM,
Pizza3 v Pizza u ∀topping.(Ricotta t SM),
Pizza3 v ∃topping.Ricotta u ∃topping.SM,
Prosciutto v MeatTopping u ∃origin.Italy,
Avocado v VegTopping,
SM v VegTopping u ∃origin.Italy,
Ricotta v VegTopping u ∃origin.Italy,
Mozzarella v VegTopping u ∃origin.Italy,
VegTopping v ¬MeatTopping
The task of computing the concept hierarchy is termed classification. Clas-
sification reveals the subsumption relationship between concept names to a
knowledge engineer, that might otherwise be non-obvious in its original ax-
iomatic representation. Applied to Example 3 on Page 34, we illustrate the
resulting taxonomy in Figure 2.1.
In the worst case, given the n concept names in a KB, it would take n2 − n
subsumption entailment tests to compute the hierarchy. However, in prac-



















Figure 2.1: Class hierarchy for Example 3.
tice, with the development of an enhanced traversal algorithm [13] and sub-
sequent optimisations [179, 77], in addition to novel techniques [76], one can
vastly reduce this number. Current implementations can classify a KB on
demand even if its size is in the order of hundreds of thousands of concept
names [115, 106].
Least Common Subsumer: Given a KB K and a set of concepts C =
{C1, ..., Cn}, a concept C is a common subsumer for C w.r.t. K if K |= Ci v C
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. C is a least common subsumer (LCS) for C w.r.t. K if
there is no common subsumer C ′ for C w.r.t. K s.t. K |= C ′ v C and
K 6|= C v C ′ [55, 56, 14, 7, 21].
In Example 3 on Page 34, a LCS for {Pizza2,Pizza3} is ItalianPizza, al-
though this is quite a simplistic example because we restrict ourselves to
concept names. However, in general we can compute the LCS for general
concept expressions and the LCS itself may also be a concept expression.
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Furthermore, in general, there need not exist an LCS for a given set of con-
cept descriptions. Thus the problem is a non-trivial one.
LCS computation has various applications in vivification [120, 34] and
“bottom-up” ontology development, by enriching the KB with the LCS for
a chosen set of terms and its axiomatic relationship with each of these
terms [15]. That is, explicitly representing in the KB, the most specific con-
cept descriptions which capture the common properties of the given terms.
Unification: There are various scenarios in which independent KBs make
use of the “same” terms. If some of these KBs are integrated, it is useful to
avoid redundancy in the form of term duplication.
Example 4 Consider the following concept expressions:
1. Mother u ∀child.Mother,
2. Parent u ¬Male u ∀child.(Parent u ¬Male)
Expressions 1 and 2 of Example 4 on Page 36 are meant to represent the
same concept - individuals that are mothers of only daughters who are also
mothers. However, these expressions are not logically equivalent (having the
same models), making it non-trivial to automatically determine such.
Unification [18] is the inference problem: given two concepts C, D, finding
a substitution T such that T (C) ≡ T (D), where T is a function that maps
some of the atomic concepts in C, D to an arbitrary DL concept expression.
It is easy to see that for Example 4 on Page 36, if we choose a T
which maps the atomic concept Mother in each expression to the expression
Parent u ¬Male, then this substitution unifies Expressions 1 and 2.
The idea with unification is to offer a service highlighting distinct concept
expressions in the KB which could possibly be intended to capture the same
knowledge. After integration of knowledge from different sources (indepen-
dent KBs), the likelihood of distinct concept expressions intending to capture
the same knowledge increases. KB integration is an example of a suitable
setting in which to apply unification in order to avoid redundancy.
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Explanation: In KBs with many axioms it can sometimes be difficult to
understand the specific reasons why a particular entailment holds. This prob-
lem has been a source of frustration for ontology engineers since the advent of
software ontology editors such as Protégé1, TopBraid Composer2, OntoStu-
dio3 and the NeOnToolkit4.
Justification-based explanation [94] has been the most successfully ap-
plied solution to this problem. The approach presents to the user the mini-
mal (w.r.t. set inclusion) subsets of the KB that entail the axiom in question
(called justifications), as the concise reasons for the entailment. Justifications
are sometimes called minAs [19] and MUPSes [174] in the literature. There
are three categories of algorithm (coined by Parsia et al. [151]) for computing
justifications, namely, blackbox, glassbox and hybrid algorithms.
Blackbox algorithms [94, 104] use a DL reasoning implementation purely
as an “oracle” to test entailment of the axiom in question. The basic idea is
to devise clever strategies to shrink (remove axioms from), and extend (add
axioms to) the ontology until a minimal subset that entails the relevant axiom
is reached. As mentioned, the reasoner is employed in these algorithms only
to periodically test if the entailment still holds in the progressively smaller
subsets that are devised.
The main optimisations for these procedures seek to minimise the number
of these tests which are the source of greatest complexity in the algorithms.
The main advantage of blackbox approaches is their independence of DL rea-
soning implementations, making them possible to be used in accompaniment
with any sound and complete reasoning procedure.
Glassbox approaches [174, 140], in contrast, use sophisticated labelling and
tracing techniques in the tableau construction itself to identify the minimal
information contributing to the entailment of the given axiom. There are also
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labelling tracing techniques. Since glassbox techniques require modification
of the underlying internals of the reasoner in question, they are therefore
dependent on the implementation.
Hybrid approaches, as the name suggests, try to combine strategies from
both blackbox and glassbox methods [104, 188, 112].
Repair: The area of repair in non-standard reasoning for DLs, asks the
question: we have a set of undesired or unintended entailments in our KB,
what are the “minimal” or “best” (for some definition thereof) modifications
we could make to the KB in order to no longer have these entailments?
Syntactic approaches examine the sentences in the KB in order to answer
this question. For example, whereas justifications represent the minimal
subsets of the KB that entail some axiom(s), repair is concerned with the
maximal subsets of the KB that do not entail the unintended axioms. Mini-
mality of modification to the original ontology is thus a priority in this area
which is related closely with Belief Revision [145, 68].
In addition to syntactic approaches there are also semantic approaches [118,
156] to find minimal change to the knowledge in the KB. The latter ap-
proaches define minimal change w.r.t. the models for the KB. The starting
point is usually defining a measure of distance or difference between two ar-
bitrary models and trying to minimise this distance measure between the
models for the original KB and the repaired KB which no longer entails the
relevant knowledge.
2.1.3 Trade-off between Expressivity and Complexity
As mentioned earlier, the family of DLs vary according to the set of logical
features they provide, and by extension, the worst case computational com-
plexity of their decision procedures. The spectrum of DLs can, in a broad
sense, be categorised into three groups: low, medium and high-expressivity
or complexity DLs. Such a categorisation can be subjective since it is highly
dependent on the spectrum of features required in different applications.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 39
Nevertheless, there is a general consensus in the literature on what con-
stitutes a low, medium or high expressivity DL. In this section, we discuss
popular DLs in each category, their relationship to each other in terms of
expressivity and complexity and the applications for which they are suitable.
The EL and DL-Lite families: Some prominent examples of low-complexity
or so-called “light-weight” DLs include those in the EL [9] and DL-Lite fami-
lies [5]. These formalisms provide relatively few logical features in the pursuit
of major reasoning performance, and both families are polynomial-time de-
cidable (tractable) w.r.t. the standard DL reasoning tasks.
The logic EL is a representative example of this family. Its concept lan-
guage merely consists of the top concept (>), DL conjunction (u) and exis-
tential quantifiers on roles (∃).
An obvious positive of these restricted languages is their tractability
which happens to lead to extremely good practical performance [16, 106].
The question is if one is able to capture meaningful and useful knowledge
with such a restricted logic.
There is evidence which suggests that these logics have useful applica-
tion with a case in point being that EL is the underlying language used for
representing the large-scale biomedical ontology SNOMED [57, 184, 64].
In fact, EL underscores numerous other prominent ontologies in the do-
main of life sciences, including the Gene Ontology (GO) [6] and restricted
versions of Galen [166, 159]. The necessity conditions of a drug overdose,
for example, is captured in SNOMED by the EL axiom Drug overdose v
Drug-related disorder u ∃rolegroup.(∃causative agent. Drug or medicament).
It turned out that, while EL is sufficient for representing some knowledge
in biomedical applications, it is insufficient for representing certain types of
knowledge about roles. One may wish to capture that if an anatomical organ
a is part of another anatomical organ b, then it a is also contained in b. ELH
extends EL with simple role inclusions (SRIs), represented by the letter H
for hierarchy of roles. SRIs, as an additional type of TBox axiom, capture
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subsumption relationships between atomic roles (role names).
We can represent the “part-of” and “contained-in” relationship men-
tioned earlier by the SRI partOf v containedIn. The good news is that this
additional feature comes “for free” complexity-wise because ELH remains
tractable [36]. In medical terminologies, however, it is important to be able
to represent so-called right-identity rules [150, 183, 100]. For example, in the
anatomy of the human body, we know that the femur bone is composed of
different parts or regions, namely, the head, neck and shaft. Common sense
tells us that a fracture of one of these parts of the femur can be regarded
generally as a fracture of the femur as a whole.
Example 5 Consider the following KB:




It is clear that we cannot conclude FemurFracture(fracture1) from the KB in
Example 5 on Page 40, even though this is an intuitive conclusion to make
from a common sense point of view. The problem, of course, is that DLs
cannot identify the “common sense” that if a is located in b and b is a part of c
then a should be located in c as well, because there is no special interpretation
of the location and partof relations in DLs. Nevertheless, there are possible
modelling solutions to this that do not require additional expressivity.
One possibility is to add FemurShaft as a disjunct to the first axiom in
Example 5 on Page 40. This would give us the axiom FemurFracture ≡
Fracture u ∃location.(Femur t FemurShaft). This is not a particularly elegant
solution, especially considering that one needs to add such a disjunct for
each part of the femur in order to cater for different possible sub-locations
of femur fractures. Of course, this solution would take us beyond the realm
of EL (disjunction is disallowed in EL).
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A more elegant solution could be changing the first axiom to FemurFracture
≡ Fracture u ∃location.(Femur t ∃partof.Femur). This is a respectable solu-
tion but we have to repeat this pattern of modelling in order to cater for
fractures of other bones (e.g. the tibia etc.) if we so wish. 2
Because of the frequency, in medical domains, of the kind of modelling prob-
lem in Example 5, an additional DL feature was devised called role chain-
ing [100] or role composition. The role subsumption P ◦ Q v R (read as the
composition of P and Q is subsumed by R) captures the constraint that if a
is P-related to b, which in turn is Q-related to c, then a is R-related to c.
Role chaining is not restricted to two role names as in our discussion.
An arbitrary number of role names (on the left hand side of the inclu-
sion) are allowed. Role chaining allows us to add the role inclusion (RI)
location ◦ partof v location to the KB in Example 5 on Page 40 and immedi-
ately obtain the desired conclusion FemurFracture(fracture1).
ELH together with the capability of role chaining (on the left hand side
of role subsumptions) results in the DL EL+ [17] which is supported by the
CEL implementation. It is worth mentioning that SNOMED makes use of role
chaining in a few of its axioms which technically makes it an EL+ ontology.
EL++ [9] is a further enhancement to EL+, adding the bottom concept
(⊥), nominals (singleton concepts) and concrete domains [127] (e.g. refer-
ences to numbers and strings). EL+ and EL++ remain the most prominent
variants of EL that are tractable, and the aforementioned variants of EL
form the logical underpinning of the OWL 2 EL profile.
The DL-Lite family of DLs [5] are a group of tractable logics that have
been designed with very specific application scenarios in mind. The pri-
mary applications lie in ontology-based data access (OBDA) [61, 92, 152], as
alternative formalisms for concept modelling (thereby providing automated
reasoning services for such models) [47, 35, 67, 138], information and data
integration [46, 80, 147, 139]. OBDA has been a prominent topic in DLs in
recent times. The basic idea is that we have a physical data source (usu-
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ally a relational database) and auxiliary knowledge about the application
domain pertaining to the data (in the form of a DL TBox). The task is to
answer queries about instance data while taking into account knowledge in
the TBox.
A simple example can be given concerning data about patients in a med-
ical facility. Suppose we have a database which purely stores information
about the systolic pressure readings of patients and their relatives5. A doc-
tor might obviously have knowledge about what systolic pressure readings
constitute a case of hypertension. Furthermore, she may know that a patient
who has a family history of hypertension is at risk of myocardial infarction
(getting a heart attack).
This knowledge is not contained in the database itself, but she can encode
it in a DL TBox without modifying the database, and then ask queries about
patients using the terminology in the TBox. For example, she can query the
database to find the patients at risk of getting a myocardial infarction.
Because of the specialised requirements of such applications (queries have
to be performed over very large databases relative to the number of facts in
the TBox), certain restrictions have to placed on the language of the TBox
to make reasoning efficient in such a setting. The resulting DL-Lite fam-
ily disallows all disjunction and qualifications on existential role restrictions
(∃R.C is not allowed where C 6= >) and have been proposed as reasonable
candidates for application in tasks such as OBDA.
The significance of the DL-Lite family is highlighted by the fact that it
forms the basis of the OWL 2 QL profile (a targeted set of sub-languages of
the OWL 2 standard). The QL in OWL 2 QL stands for Query Language,
alluding to the application of query answering over large data sources. For
detailed information about the DL-Lite family and applications, the reader
should consult the provided references.
5Note that this scenario is similar to that of Example 2 on Page 32, although the
knowledge expressed in that example cannot be represented in DL-Lite. An alternative
formulation of the knowledge would thus be required.
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Very Expressive DLs: We briefly discuss some of the more expressive DLs
that form the basis of the OWL 2 DL (The full language of OWL 2). In
Section 2.1.1, we have presented the moderate complexity DL ALC which
is already intractable (w.r.t. the problem of checking concept satisfiability).
TBox entailment in ALC is an exptime-complete problem [172].
Even though ALC is sufficient for accurate and relatively precise repre-
sentation of knowledge from many application domains, there are various
types of knowledge which it cannot capture.
For example, in ALC we can capture that dogs have at least one leg
(Dog v ∃hasLeg.>), but we cannot express that a dog has exactly four legs
(Dog v = 4 hasLeg.>) or that land mammals have at least two legs (Mammal
u ∀hasHabitat.Land v ≥ 2 hasLeg.>). Such features are known as number
restrictions or cardinality restrictions on roles.
Recall that SRIs cannot be expressed in ALC either. Another useful
feature pertaining to roles, absent from ALC, is called inverse roles. Inverse
roles allow one to state for example that the isIngredientOf role is the inverse
of hasIngredient (hasIngredient ≡ isIngredientOf−).
Thus by stating that hasIngredient (salad instance1, lettuce instance1)
one can immediately infer isIngredientOf (lettuce instance1, salad instance1).
If we extend ALC with all the features mentioned above (and allowing
transitivity of roles), the resulting logic is called SHIN . If, additionally,
we allow role fillers for cardinality restricted roles to be concepts other than
> (i.e., we allow number restrictions to be qualified), then we have the DL
SHIQ. Therefore, we can express that dogs have exactly two hind legs
(Dog v = 2hasLeg.HindLeg) in SHIQ.
Interestingly, in SHIN (and SHIQ), we are allowed to state expressions
that require an interpretation domain with an infinite number of elements in
order to construct models for them [103, Section 3.4]. When this is true of a
logic, then we say that it does not possess the finite model property (FMP).
Extending SHIQ with the ability to express singleton concepts called nom-
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inals (we can state {usain bolt} v Sprinter), we obtain the DL SHOIQ.
SHOIQ, together with various properties that one can enforce on roles [99],
results in the DL SROIQ which is the logical underpinning of (and the most
expressive DL supported by) the OWL 2 standard.
2.2 The Web Ontology Language (OWL)
The Web Ontology Language (specifically its latest version OWL 2) is a W3C
recommendation for representing ontologies on the Semantic Web [25]. OWL
is logically underpinned by DLs and provides additional non-logical features
such as annotations for storing meta-data about ontologies. Ontologies ex-
pressed with OWL are mostly serialised in a variety of concrete XML-based
syntaxes, such as RDF/XML, Manchester OWL and OWL/XML.
Because of its correspondence with DLs, reasoning with OWL ontologies
is accomplished by exploiting the common reasoning tasks of the underlying
DL used to express the ontology. While there are a variety of concrete syn-
taxes mentioned above for OWL, there is just one formal syntax. However,
there are two semantics: direct semantics and RDF-based semantics.
The language defined by the full OWL 2 syntax, together with direct se-
mantics is called OWL 2 DL. OWL 2 defines three profiles or sub-languages
targeted for different application settings. The categorisation is made ac-
cording to the trade-off between expressivity and computational complexity.
The three profiles are OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 QL, OWL 2 RL These languages
have been discussed in Section 2.1.3 save for OWL 2 RL.
OWL 2 RL is a profile designed to restrict the expressivity of OWL 2 to
a language that can be implemented using rule-based technologies such as
Description Logic Programs (DLPs) [87]. OWL 2 DL remains the language
of interest for our purposes of possible integration of defeasible features.
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2.3 Incomplete Knowledge
Knowledge is prone to imperfections. The primary method by which humans
obtain knowledge is through the senses, which are themselves imperfect and
limited. The limited nature of the senses necessarily leads to the acquisition
of knowledge that is incomplete in the broadest sense of the word.
The seemingly endless refinement and evolution of this incomplete knowl-
edge indicates that it is subject to change with time. Perfect knowledge, in
contrast, has to be unchanging and absolute, without need of qualification.
Unfortunately, such knowledge still eludes humanity at large.
Yet, despite the inherent incompleteness of our knowledge, we humans
have to infer things from it to accomplish various tasks, and in keeping with
this, our natural languages are enriched with vocabulary to express incom-
pleteness. We say things like “lawyers are usually dishonest”, “It is likely
that it will rain tomorrow”, “James is roughly 50 years old” etc., where the
emphasised words in these phrases allude to a lack of complete information.
Although classical logics cater for some forms of incompleteness in knowl-
edge, they are much more limited than natural languages in this regard. One
particular example of incomplete knowledge that classical logics can repre-
sent is disjunction. For example, if I flip a coin, even if I don’t know what
the outcome of this flip will be, I do know that it will either be heads or tails.
With regards to us humans, the incompleteness of our knowledge invari-
ably leads us to employ “guesswork” when explicitly representing knowledge.
Some may use all relevant information at their disposal and apply this infor-
mation sensibly to inform their guesswork, others may not.
It is the symptoms of this guesswork which indicate that we do not have
access to complete knowledge. The three main symptoms in KR are: defea-
sibility, uncertainty and subjectivity or relativity. We shall discuss these and
mention which of these we are specifically interested in for this thesis.
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2.3.1 Defeasibility
A defeasible statement is one that is potentially fallible or can be refuted
upon the discovery of more information.
Students normally don’t pay taxes, sushi usually contains fish, birds typ-
ically can fly are all sentences are all punctuated by terms which express
generalisations that are inapplicable to exceptions. For example, employed
students, vegetarian sushi and ostriches or penguins represent exceptions to
the mentioned defeasible statements. Therefore, it is sometimes useful to
ignore exceptions where possible and make generalised statements in order
to reason and derive plausible inferences from such knowledge.
However, in classical logics, there is no native machinery that allows us
to represent generalisations that admit exceptions.
2.3.2 Uncertainty
Particular types of knowledge, linked to statistical information and proba-
bilities, are expressed because of underlying uncertainty. Sentences like: “1
in 4 people will contract cancer at some point in their lives” and “there is a
60% chance that David has diabetes” represent empirically determined like-
lihoods of events happening. The computation and representation of these
likelihoods (or probabilities) are only necessary because we do not know,
a priori, all individuals who will contract cancer (or respectively, whether
David has diabetes or not).
Fortunately, this kind of representation is supported in many classical
probabilistic logics [146]. Classical logics that do not natively support prob-
abilities also cater for certain forms of uncertainty. For example, if I know
that john is either a soccer player or a tennis player, it represents a kind
of uncertainty about which category john belongs to. Of course, this kind
of uncertainty can be expressed using disjunction which is native to many
classical logics including DLs.
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2.3.3 Subjectivity or Relativity
John is “tall”, Suzie is “young” and this hotel is “cheap” are examples of
sentences which contain terms that are subjective or relative because there
are no known definitions of these terms that are absolute.Therefore, a relative
definition is adopted in order to attach meaning to these statements.
There are various extensions of classical logic (often called fuzzy log-
ics [187]) which enable one to specify subjective meanings for these terms.
In some cases, subjective terms (especially those that can be interpreted
numerically) can be defined in classical logics. For example, one can use
datatypes [144] in OWL to specify a term “adultAge” and assign it a value,
e.g. 18, which represents an objective minimum age for an adult.
This thesis is particularly concerned with addressing the specific type of de-
feasible knowledge (Section 2.3.1) in which we would like to make generalised
statements that permit exceptions. For example we would like to express that
students generally don’t pay taxes which is not falsified even upon discovering
that students who are employed in certain contexts are obliged to pay taxes.
We now analyse the state-of-the-art of various approaches in the literature
which aim to represent and reason with such knowledge.
2.4 Circumscription
Circumscription is a class of nonmonotonic logics proposed by John Mc-
Carthy in 1980 [136]. The basic aim is to be able to represent, in KR
formalisms, the presumption that something is “normal” and behaves as
expected unless otherwise specified.
2.4.1 Basic Circumscription
Consider the following version of the checkerboard example from Raymond
Reiter [164]:
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Example 6 Suppose we have a black and white checkerboard and we toss a
coin over the checkerboard. We have to model the problem of some agent
predicting where the coin will land.
Essentially, there are three possibilities in Example 6: either the coin lands on
a white square, black square or partially over both. In classical logics it is easy
to represent this knowledge using disjunction: (∀x, y) (hasCoinTossResult(x, y)
=⇒ black(y) ∨ white(y)). The problem is how classical logics interpret ex-
ceptions to this.
Suppose the coin lands on the floor, on the table next to the board, on
the moon, or anywhere else outside the boundaries of the board. The repre-
sentation becomes: (∃x, y)(hasCoinTossResult(x, y) ∧ ¬black(y) ∧ ¬white(y)).
No models for this accumulated knowledge exist.
The cases of the coin landing outside the boundaries of the checkerboard,
while possible, are exceptional and not in the “spirit” of solving the problem
at hand. We would not like the agent to consider them unless it really has
to. One way to eliminate these situations from consideration is to add them
as “qualifications” to the agent’s knowledge about the system.
That is, we can rephrase the problem as follows: if the coin is tossed over
the checkerboard and it does not land on the floor and it does not land on
the table and it does not land on the moon etc., then where does it land?
The obvious drawback of this solution is that the possible qualifications can
be endless or not known a priori. 2
Thus we require a formalism which (i) permits exceptions (unlike classical
logics), since it is possible for them to occur, and (ii) does not require one to
explicitly list such exceptions. Circumscription models the tentative assump-
tion that the information we have is complete and any additional information
that we encounter, which conflicts with what we know, can be immediately
identified as an abnormal case.
For Example 6 on Page 48, the consideration that the checkerboard is
the only place where the coin can land is our assumption of “complete” in-
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formation. The treatment of circumstances in which the coin lands outside
the checkerboard, as abnormal cases, is the heart of the circumscriptive tech-
nique.
The pioneers of the circumscriptive technique were McCarthy and Lifs-
chitz [136, 137, 121, 124], whose expositions were primarily in the setting of
first-order logic. In this thesis we are dealing exclusively with DLs, therefore
we give here the state-of-the-art of circumscription applied to DLs [32].
The main approach for introducing circumscription into DLs is what is
called Predicate Circumscription. The basic idea of the approach is to add
concept and role names (collectively, these are sometimes referred to as ab-
normality predicates) to the vocabulary of the KB. The job of the additional
concept and/or role names are to account for the abnormal or exceptional
objects in the models.
Given abnormality predicates, it is only necessary to consider those mod-
els of the KB in which the extension of these predicates are minimal (w.r.t. set
inclusion). Such models are generally known as minimal models.
The intuition behind this necessity is that we should consider the most
“normal” situations possible when making inferences, in which there are as
few exceptional cases as possible (further motivating examples are given by
Lifschitz [124] and McCarthy [137]). Indeed it is not hard to notice, then,
that circumscription will favour models in which the extensions of the ab-
normality predicates are empty (favouring situations in which there are no
exceptions). Non-empty extensions will thus only be considered if there is
evidence (information in the KB) which enforces them to be such.
In order to identify minimal models, a preference relation, <M, is defined
over all models. Suppose Nc, Nr and Ni are respectively the set of concept
names, role names and individual names representing the vocabulary of our
KB. In addition, suppose that M ⊆ Nc ∪ Nr denotes the set of predicates
we wish to minimize. An interpretation I of the KB is “preferred” over an
interpretation J (written I <M J ) [32] if:
1. ∆I = ∆J and for all a ∈ Ni, aI = aJ ;
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2. for all p ∈M, pI ⊆ pJ ;
3. there is a p ∈M such that pI ⊂ pJ ;
The first condition ensures that both models refer to the same domain, the
second and third are the main conditions requiring consideration of only those
models in which the abnormality predicates are minimal w.r.t. set inclusion.
Specifically, the second condition makes sure that the more preferred
model, I, does not interpret any minimised predicate to have more members
than the less preferred model, J .
The third requires at least one minimised predicate to have fewer members
in the more preferred model, than in the less preferred one.
In some versions of circumscription, a fourth condition is required to
define the preference relation: (4) for all p ∈ (Nc ∪ Nr)\M, pI = pJ ; This
condition enforces that the two models should interpret all other symbols
(non-minimised) in exactly the same way, in order to be comparable via the
preference relation.
This is also called fixing the extension of the selected predicates. The only
implication of including or excluding this condition is obviously the impact
on the conclusions one is able to draw, since we are generally looking at a
different set of models in each case.
If the condition is excluded, we are essentially allowing the comparison
of models (via <M) which differ in their extensions of the non-minimised
predicates. In general, when we allow this (the non-minimised predicates to
vary) then it results in the derivation of more conclusions (fewer minimal
models) and when we fix these predicates by including condition (4), then
we derive fewer conclusions (more minimal models) [32].
The decision of which predicates to minimise, fix and allow to vary is called a
circumscription pattern. It is the circumscription pattern that determines the
models we are looking at to decide entailment. Note that the non-minimised
predicates do not have to be exclusively fixed or exclusively varied (simulated
by the inclusion or exclusion of condition (4) above).
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The user is given freedom to separate the non-minimised predicates into
those he/she would like to fix and those he/she would like to allow to vary,
resulting in a refined version of condition (4).
We give an example illustrating the impact of the circumscription pattern
on the entailment relation:
Example 7 Consider the following KB:
1. Student v ¬∃receives.TaxInvoice t AbStudent
2. EmployedStudent v Student u ∃receives.TaxInvoice
Axiom 1 of Example 7 on Page 51 intuitively says that students normally do
not pay taxes (either that or they are abnormal students). Axiom 2 says that
employed students are students that are compelled to pay taxes. Intuitively
speaking, a sensible inference of this knowledge should be that employed
students are abnormal students (EmployedStudent v AbStudent) and thus it
should still be rational to additionally infer that employed students pay taxes
(Axiom 2), even though students normally don’t pay taxes (Axiom 1).
If we choose the circumscription pattern that minimises AbStudent and
fixes all other predicates in the KB, then we indeed obtain the desired
inferences mentioned above. In addition, we also obtain that abnormal
students are exactly those students who pay taxes (AbStudent ≡ Student u
∃receives.TaxInvoice).
This is all fine and well, but one may find it sensible to also assume
that exceptions to Axiom 1 are highly unlikely to the point of treating the
explicitly stated exceptions as the only exceptions. I.e., we may want to
conclude that |= AbStudent ≡ EmployedStudent.
Since Example 7 on Page 51 has only one explicitly represented excep-
tion - employed students - it should be reasonable to conclude that employed
students are the only abnormal students (leading to EmployedStudent ≡
AbStudent) until further notice. However, using the current circumscription
pattern does not yield this entailment. The following counter-model, I,
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proves this: ∆I = {a, b}, StudentI ,AbIStudent = {a}, TaxInvoiceI = {b},
receivesI = {(a, b)}, EmployedStudentI = ∅.
It is easy to see that this model minimises the extension of AbStudent, that
is, there is no model in which the extension of AbStudent is empty (smaller
than in I) while keeping the extension of all the other predicates the same
as in I. But I does not satisfy the axiom AbStudent v EmployedStudent and
therefore cannot satisfy EmployedStudent ≡ AbStudent.
A solution is to change the circumscription pattern. We find that allowing
receives and TaxInvoice to vary (fixing the remainder of the predicates) gives
us the additional inference we desire - EmployedStudent ≡ AbStudent. We
can see that, using this pattern, the interpretation I mentioned earlier is no
longer a minimal model for our KB. One possible minimal model is J :
∆J = {a}, StudentJ = {a}, EmployedStudentJ = AbJStudent = TaxInvoice
J
= receivesJ = ∅ and it is obvious that J  EmployedStudent ≡ AbStudent.
Of course, it may also be sensible in some applications to assume that
exceptional things (e.g. employed students) do not exist unless it is explicitly
stated that they do. Indeed this is in keeping with the mandate of the
circumscription discussed in Example 6 on Page 48. This would mean that we
should be able to conclude EmployedStudent ≡ AbStudent ≡ ⊥ from Example 7
on Page 51.
However, we can only achieve this by also allowing EmployedStudent to
vary. Doing so, and then introducing an employed student into the mix by
adding the assertion EmployedStudent(john), results in the intuitive conclu-
sion EmployedStudent ≡ AbStudent ≡ {john}. For more information about this
latter presumption in circumscription see Section 2.4.3. 2
2.4.2 Prioritised Circumscription
Up to now, we have only considered the case of introducing a single ab-
normality predicate into the KB. Of course, circumscription allows for an
arbitrary number of abnormality predicates to be introduced and minimised
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during reasoning. Suppose we introduce another abnormality predicate into
our knowledge, we obtain the following KB:
Example 8 Consider the following KB:
1. Student v ¬∃receives.TaxInvoice t AbStudent
2. EmployedStudent v Student u ∃receives.TaxInvoice t AbEmployedStudent
3. EmployedStudentParent v EmployedStudent u ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)
Minimising AbStudent and AbEmployedStudent, allowing receives and TaxInvoice to
vary and fixing the remainder of the predicates in Example 8 on Page 53, has
the consequence that we can derive neither of the axioms EmployedStudent v
∃receives.TaxInvoice nor EmployedStudent v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice). Essen-
tially, this is because circumscription cannot decisively prefer which abnor-
mality predicate (AbStudent or AbEmployedStudent) to apply to a given object.
That is, the models in which AbStudent and AbEmployedStudent are minimised,
are mutually exclusive. If there are no situations in which both predicates
are minimal w.r.t. all the models, then one has to “prefer” one situation over
the other in order to derive one of the conclusions mentioned above.
The question is how this preference is determined among an arbitrary
number of abnormality predicates. In the case of Example 8 on Page 53, we
only have two minimised predicates and it is argued that the more intuitive
conclusion to draw would be EmployedStudent v ∃receives.TaxInvoice (i.e.,
preferring to minimise AbEmployedStudent over AbStudent).
Intuitively speaking, this choice simulates the reasoning paradigm that:
given a student who is employed, one would prefer to assign to the student
the properties in the KB which are most specifically applicable to employed
students (Axiom 2), and therefore assume that this student is not an abnor-
mal employed student (minimising AbEmployedStudent).
This would be in contrast to preferring to assume that the student is
not abnormal (minimising AbStudent) and being able to assign attributes of a
general student (Axiom 1) to them, but enforcing that the student must be
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an abnormal employed student so as not to clash with Axiom 2. 2
The specificity approach to prioritisation discussed in Example 8 on Page 53
is quite sensible because it starts at the most specific information that we
know about an object and starts to “generalise” (attribute more general
properties to the object) and stops when there a conflict or contradiction
is reached. In fact, to emulate this behaviour with a general number of
abnormality predicates, it has been recommended that the preference relation
(<min) over the predicates should mirror the classical concept hierarchy of
the KB [12].
That is, more generally, if KB |= X v Y then AbX <min AbY (Minimising
AbX should be preferred over minimising AbY). In addition, since the sub-
sumption hierarchy is a partial order on the concept names in the KB, the
preferences over minimised predicates is also usually a partial order [32].
Using the above approach models a kind of defeasible inheritance or over-
riding strategy in the reasoning process. The preference relation over the
minimised predicates, if respecting the concept hierarchy of the KB, also
simulates an intuitive semantic notion: the more specific the category being
considered, the more unlikely it is to have exceptions.
In general, however, the preferences over minimised predicates is left up
to the user (ontology developer) in circumscription and becomes an extra
component of the circumscription pattern of a KB.
2.4.3 Grounded Circumscription
Grounded circumscription [178] introduces a localised version of the closed
world assumption (CWA) [160] to circumscription, by only allowing individ-
uals explicitly mentioned in the KB to appear in the extension of minimised
predicates. This kind of circumscription is applied in situations where as-
sumption of complete information is appropriate in making inferences. That
is, where a kind of CWA is suitable.
Such an assumption is useful in certain applications such as matchmaking
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in web services [85]. A scenario is also given by the conclusion EmployedStudent
≡ AbStudent ≡ {john} in Example 7 on Page 51.
2.4.4 Complexity Considerations
Circumscription has been studied in the context of first-order logics [136,
137, 121, 124] and propositional logics [65, 45] as far back as 1980, but apart
from Brewka [38] and Cadoli, Donini and Schaerf [44], it was only in the last
two decades that serious interest arose in tackling DLs.
Bonatti, Wolter and Lutz established initial complexity results in 2006 [32]
and 2009 [33] by showing that circumscription in ALCIO and ALCQO are
decidable (both in NExpEXP) with some preconditions (binary predicates must
be allowed to vary). It is also shown that the complexity decreases signifi-
cantly (to NPNEXP) if there are bounds placed on the number of minimised
and fixed predicates.
More recently, attention was turned to determine the decidability of cir-
cumscription in DLs that do not have the finite model property. Bonatti et
al. [27] show that DL-LiteF and ALCFI, even though they do not have this
property, are both decidable (when using certain reasonable circumscription
patterns).
For less expressive DLs such as EL-variants [9] and the DL-Lite family [5],
there have been similar complexity investigations [28, 29, 31]. However, since
we are primarily interested in handling exceptions in DLs of ALC or higher
expressivity, we focus on the complexity of circumscription in such cases.
In general, practical implementations and performance results for circum-
scription in DLs is not well represented in the literature. Grimm, Hitzler,
Krisnadhi and Sengupta [86, 178] give tableau algorithms for computing cir-
cumscription in variants of ALC. However, implementations and evaluations
thereof are not documented in great detail.
In fact, in general, the absence of comprehensive empirical investigations
into the practical performance of circumscription for DLs is a major problem.
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2.4.5 Discussion
Circumscription, although being one of the more mature proposals for deal-
ing with exceptions in DLs, is not without its limitations. One issue is its
inherent limitation in dealing with disjunctive information. Depending on
how we model knowledge, we can get counter-intuitive results.
Disjunction: Recall Example 6 on Page 48. Given a coin tossed over
a black-and-white checkerboard, circumscription was able to model that
the coin should land either on a white block or on a black block on the
board and not anywhere else. In DLs, a possible formalisation could be
represented by the axiom: CoinToss v (= 1 landsOn.BlackSquare) t (=
1 landsOn.WhiteSquare).
If we minimise the role landsOn, we eliminate the possibility of the coin
landing on the floor or the moon etc. because the models for these relevant
scenarios are not minimal w.r.t. landsOn (w.r.t. set inclusion). But, for the
same reason, we also obtain the undesired consequence that models in which
the coin lands (partially) on both a black and white square are not permitted.
One might ask if a different modelling choice could solve the problem.
The following formalisation avoids the problem of interpreting the disjunction
exclusively: CoinTossResult v BlackSquare t WhiteSquare t AbCoinTossResult, if
minimising the predicate AbCoinTossResult. But, this formalisation also permits
counter-intuitive possibilities like the coin landing partially on a black (or
white) square and partially on the moon (or any other surface)!
Of course, if one had the expressivity of number restrictions then we could
actually formalise the coin toss in DLs without even having to resort to cir-
cumscription: CoinTossv (= 1landsOn.BlackSquare t= 1landsOn.WhiteSquare)
u ∀landsOn.(BlackSquare tWhiteSquare). This formalisation would not per-
mit models in which the coin lands outside the checkerboard bounds and will
permit models in which the coin lands on both a black and white square.
Nevertheless, in general, the behaviour of circumscription in the presence
of disjunctive information is still a significant limitation. Fortunately, a so-
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lution is proposed by Eiter et al. [65] called theory curbing. Theory curbing
addresses the issue by not only permitting minimal models, but also the least
upper bound models of these minimal models.
In our coin toss example, even though models in which the coin lands
on both a black and white square are not minimal, they are “least upper
bound” models for the minimal models such that they interpret the disjunc-
tive information inclusively. Therefore such models are also considered in
the circumscription. For more detailed information about the approach, the
interested reader should consult the provided reference above.
Another drawback to circumscription, from a user perspective, is con-
cerning the circumscription pattern.
Circumscription Pattern: As explained in Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3, the
circumscriptive pattern is integral to determining the inferences one is able
to draw from the given knowledge. In fact, it also affects the computational
complexity (and in many cases, decidability) of circumscription. In most
cases, the user is entirely responsible for deciding the circumscription pattern.
While leaving the pattern up to the user provides flexibility in reasoning, we
argue that it can unnecessarily complicate matters.
Even if the circumscription pattern could be partially suggested, fully
suggested or automated by the reasoning engine, it is not clear how one
could formalise this. That is, to date, a formal methodology for determining
reasonable circumscription patterns in practice has not yet been developed.
This leads us to other issues with the current complexity and implementation
landscape of circumscription in DLs.
Complexity and Implementation: Even though there are various expres-
sive DLs for which circumscription is decidable (see Section 2.4.4), these re-
sults are dependent on restrictions to the circumscription pattern. Of course,
even though decidability is reached, this is not a guarantee of good perfor-
mance in practice. Furthermore, in most cases the complexity of circum-
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scription is substantially higher than the complexity of standard reasoning
in the underlying DL.
To compound matters, even though we know of notable implementations
and performance evaluations of circumscription in DLs (by Piero Bonatti and
colleagues as well as Pascal Hitzler and colleagues), these implementations
and evaluations remain unpublished to a large extent.
2.5 Default Reasoning
In 1980, within the setting of first order logic, Raymond Reiter [161] presented
a formalism for encoding so-called defaults. Defaults, intuitively speaking,
enable the representation of the plausible conditions under which a conclusion
(first order sentence) could be entailed by a first order theory (KB).
2.5.1 Basic Default Logic
A general default is of the form α:β
γ
where α, β and γ are respectively the
prerequisite, justification and consequent of the default. Defaults can be read
as “if α holds and it is consistent to assume that β holds, then γ plausibly
holds (i.e., we can believe γ)”.
The phrase “consistent to assume that” is the critical part of the defi-
nition of a default and is given a formalisation by Reiter in his work. The
following example of a default, Student(x):¬TaxPayer(x)¬TaxPayer(x) , encodes that, given a gen-
eral student x, if it is consistent to assume that x does not pay taxes, then
it is plausible to conclude that it doesn’t.
Defaults of the form α:β
β
, like the above example, are called normal de-
faults. Those that contain free variables in α, β or γ are known as open
defaults, while those that don’t are called closed defaults.
Formally, a default KB is a pair 〈W ,D〉, whereW is a finite set of first order
sentences, and D a finite set of defaults of the form discussed. For each
default δ = α:β
γ
s.t. δ ∈ D, Reiter explains that one can conclude γ from the
KB (written 〈W ,D〉 ` γ) if ¬β cannot be deduced from W together with
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the other defaults in D. A more formal inductive definition is given in his
exposition [161, Theorem 2.1].
Reiter envisaged the primary use-case for his defaults as “meta-rules”
that one can apply to a first order KB to compute plausible extensions for it.
Indeed it is shown that there could be multiple extensions for a given default
KB because defaults can “interact” with each other.
Consider the default theory 〈W ,D〉 whereW = {EmployedStudent(x) =⇒





There are two extensions of 〈W ,D〉 that are incompatible. In one, we
deduce that john is a student and apply the first default deriving that john
is not a tax payer - the formula ¬TaxPayer(john), and in the other, we notice
that john is an employed student and apply the second default deriving that
john is a tax payer - TaxPayer(john).
Reiter showed that the case of multiple extensions implies that there
are clashes or undesired interaction between defaults [161, Corollary 3.4].
Furthermore, he showed that for general defaults there is a possibility of a
default theory to have no extension. This result led him to restrict his view
of practically applicable defaults to normal defaults. Indeed most, but not
all [165], naturally occurring examples of defaults are normal ones.
It is important to note that Reiter intended his formalism for deriving
plausible beliefs. That is, for a sentence to be logically deducible in default
logic, there need only be at least one extension in which it appears - the so-
called credulous approach. This is in opposition to the skeptical approach of
other nonmonotonic logics which require the formula to be in all extensions.
Applied to the student and employed student example above, default logic
states that john being a tax payer is a plausible inference to make from the
KB, and one can choose to pursue this line of reasoning when continuing to
derive more beliefs. Nevertheless, it is also plausible to derive that john is
not a tax payer since there is an extension to prove this as well. The user
ultimately decides which option to adopt further. We now turn our attention
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to defaults applied to DLs.
2.5.2 Defaults Embedded in Description Logics
In the 90s, Baader and Hollunder attempted to embed Reiter’s defaults into
terminological formalisms (DLs) [11]. They consider the case where 〈W ,D〉
represents a default theory in whichW is a DL (ALCF in their investigation)
KB and D is a finite set of open defaults.
In Reiter’s treatment of open defaults, Skolemization is needed to make im-
plicit individuals (introduced through existential quantification) explicit in
the theory. To see why this is necessary, we give an example for the DL case:
Example 9 Let 〈W ,D〉 = 〈{∃hasFriend.Student(john)}, {Student:¬EmployedPerson¬EmployedPerson ,
Student:∃hasFriend.Student
∃hasFriend.Student }〉 be a default theory.
In Example 9 on Page 60, without an individual in our theory known to be a
student, our defaults’ prerequisite conditions are not met and the rules cannot
“fire” to derive plausible inferences about students. However, the existential
role quantifiers in W and D do introduce implicit student individuals into
our theory.
The idea is to make these individuals explicit in the KB so that default
reasoning can give the desired inferences. The way we accomplish this is
through skolemization, i.e., the introduction of skolem functions to act as
placeholder terms for the implicit individuals. See Reiter’s’ exposition [161,
Section 7] for details of how the functions are defined.
SkolemizingW , we obtainW ′ = {hasFriend(john, lily), Student(lily)} (by
introducing the skolem constant lily). We also have to introduce a unary
skolem function for the consequent of the default with existential quantifiers.
We can derive that lily is unemployed: ¬EmployedPerson(lily), and that john
has a friend who is unemployed: (∃hasFriend. ¬EmployedPerson)(john).
We can also derive that john has a friend, who has a friend that is a
student (∃hasFriend. ∃hasFriend.Student) (john). 2
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Even though Skolemization helps to derive inferences that might otherwise
have been lost, it is not without its problems. In particular, Skolemization
can lead to strange and counter-intuitive inferences [11]:
Example 10 Let 〈W ,D〉 = 〈{(∃hasSpouse.Woman t Bachelor)(john),
hasSpouse(john, sarah), Woman(sarah)}, { :¬Woman¬Woman }〉 be a default theory.
In order to identify the individuals that the default :¬Woman¬Woman can be applied to,
we have to skolemize the ABox assertions. Skolemizing ∃hasSpouse.Woman
gives us two additional assertions: hasSpouse(john, david) and Woman(david).
Semantically, this narrows down our view to those interpretations of our
ABox in which john has a spouse named david and david is a woman. But,
because of the disjunction in (∃hasSpouse.WomantBachelor)(john), we find
that it is perfectly acceptable for david not to be a woman in a model of our
extended ABox.
Therefore, the “woman” default can fire and we can derive ¬Woman(david)
and therefore, in order to satisfy (∃hasSpouse.Woman t Bachelor)(john) we
have to accept that john is a bachelor - Bachelor(john), even though there
is clear evidence in the ABox that he has a female spouse (sarah is a spouse
of john and she is a woman). 2
The problem in Example 10 on Page 61 is caused by not keeping track of
what the skolem terms represent in the translated formulae. David Poole
offers a solution to keep track of the skolem translation [154] using Hilbert’s
ε-symbol.
However, skolemization has other types of counter-intuitive inferences [11]:
Example 11 Consider the two ABoxes: A1 = {(∃R.(A u B))(a)} and A2 =
{(∃R.(A u B))(a), (∃R.A)(a)} and their skolemised versions, A′1 = {R(a, b),
(A u B)(b)} and A′2 = {R(a, c), (A uB)(c),R(a, d),A(d)}.
Notice that A1 is logically equivalent to A2. Given an open default {A:¬B¬B },
we can apply it to the individual d in A′2 to obtain ¬B(d) and, hence,
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(∃R.¬B)(a). However, this is not a consequence of A′1 (even though A1
and A2 are logically equivalent). 2
Lifschitz [122] adopts a model-theoretic approach to open defaults which
avoids the problems caused by Skolemization. Unfortunately, his approach
is not easily amenable to algorithmic construction. Moreover, there are “un-
expected” inferences obtained in this approach for some special cases (see
Section 3 of the work by Baader and Hollunder [11]).
On the other hand, considering the proposal of Baader and Hollunder,
even without the problems of Skolemization, computing extensions for theo-
ries for a finite W and D still leads to undecidability [11, Section 4].
The authors therefore propose a restricted semantics in which defaults are
only applied to explicitly mentioned individuals in the ABox. The obvious
limitation is that one will not be able to derive some desired inferences, such
as those discussed in Example 9 on Page 60. The good news is that with
this restriction, decidability of computing extensions is retained and various
algorithms have been presented to this end [11, Section 5].
One such algorithm is implemented by Kolovski, Parsia and Katz [108] in
the OWL reasoner Pellet [182] and shown to have reasonable performance.
Despite the overall bleak outlook for defaults (in terms of being suitable
for practical use), there are some who felt that the representation part of the
formalism is very intuitive and still appropriate for integration into logics
such as DLs. This persistence led to the recent work by Sengupta, Hitzler
and Janowicz [177], who provided a new semantics for normal defaults.
Their resulting new notion of defaults (called free defaults) can be applied
to implicit individuals while still retaining decidability, improving on the
approach by Baader and Hollunder [11].
Another important issue surrounding defaults is the non-native treatment
of specificity. Consider the following example:
Example 12 LetW = {EmployedStudent v Student,EmployedStudent(john),
(EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>)(sarah)} and D =





We obtain that john and sarah are plausibly tax payers, and also plausibly
not tax payers. Since sarah and john are both general students and also
employed students (with sarah even being a more specific type of employed
student that has a child), it should be reasonable to prefer applying the more
specific defaults to them.
That is, the defaults whose prerequisites most specifically characterise
them. This would mean that the third default would be preferred to apply
to sarah to derive that sarah is not a tax payer, and the second default
would be preferred to apply to john to derive that he is a tax payer.
Extensions determined by applying the other defaults to these individuals
should, arguably, be ignored. 2
It is widely accepted that respecting specificity (of the kind exhibited in
Example 12 on Page 62) should, in general, be a native attribute of defeasible
reasoning formalisms. Since this property is not native to Reiter’s default
logic, there have been attempts to introduce appropriate versions of priorities
on defaults that are taken into account when computing extensions [39, 37,
40, 12].
The approach by Baader and Hollunder [12], and those by Brewka [40],
are the most compelling proposals to date for handling specificity and pri-
orities in defaults. In general, priorities may be specified arbitrarily in these
approaches, i.e., left up to the user to decide. However, the priority ordering
on defaults induced by specificity of knowledge in W , is advocated as an
implicit presumption in reasoning.
Reiter’s original formalism also natively endorses transitivity, which leads
to undesired inferential behaviour [165]. If we have defaults expressing that
university students are usually adults (UniversityStudent:Adult
Adult
), and that adults
are usually employed (Adult:EmployedPerson
EmployedPerson
), then default reasoning admits the
conclusion that university students are usually employed. That is, if we had
an ABox assertion UniversityStudent(john) in our theory, then the theory can
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be extended to include EmployedPerson(john).
Reiter proposes a solution to block transitivity by explicitly rewriting
defaults to break the transitive links between them [165]. For our university





The obvious issue with this solution is that it causes the introduction of
non-normal defaults, that is, defaults that do not share the nice computa-
tional properties that normal defaults do. For example, there is no guarantee
that default theories with non-normal defaults will have an extension [161].
Fortunately, in many cases, Reiter’s rewritings can avoid the introduction of
non-normal defaults.
2.5.3 Discussion
While Reiter’s default logic is very intuitive from a representational point-
of-view, his formalism is not practically useful “out-of-the-box”. Much of
the formalism has had to be significantly revised in subsequent work to be
suitable for DLs and to retain decidability. Some other relevant limitations
include the following:
Computational Complexity and Performance: Decidability is not a
guarantee of good practical performance. While many modifications to de-
fault logic are made to ensure decidability, there are very few attempts at
proving tighter bounds on computational complexity. Moreover, implemen-
tation of default logic has a very sparse representation in the literature.
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one contemporary
implementation by Kolovski, Parsia and Katz [108] with reasonable perfor-
mance. Yet, since their work, there has been a definite wane in implemen-
tation and development of tools for representing Reiter-style defaults in DL-
based ontologies. Hence, defaults have not been practically embraced, and
thus, its expected practical performance in ontology development settings
remains unclear.
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Semantics: At the inception of default logic, Reiter himself admits that
a significant drawback to the proposal is that it lacked a model theory.
Lukaszewicz [126] later attempted to fill this gap and Etherington [66] built
upon his foundation. Delgrande, Shaub and Jackson [60] use the foundation
of Etherington and Lukaszewicz to define completely novel variants of default
logic, modifying what they deem are unintuitive aspects of the formalism.
While these efforts are all noble additions to the default logic thread in
defeasible reasoning, we argue that the kind of semantics they present are
not instructive as to the meaning of default rules themselves. That is, a
semantics in which we can interpret the meaning of a default rule in some
interpretation or model structure, is not given. Indeed it is perhaps a difficult
task to accomplish this seeing as defaults are encoded as inference rules.
We argue that this situation leads to the following unpleasant consequence
of default reasoning research. That is, there is no general consensus on which
variant (or combinations thereof) of Reiter’s logic is the most suitable as a
general nonmonotonic formalism. The picture is even more fuzzy in the
context of DLs. Beyond the target of decidability (which has been met by
various modifications to default logic), the semantic characterisation of the
inferences that defaults give has not been standardised.
2.6 Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Fail-
ure (MKNF)
In the early 90s, Donini et al. [62] introduced epistemic operators, similar to
those presented in Autoepistemic Logic [142], into terminological languages
(the ancestors of DLs). This was in response to motivations by those such as
Reiter [163], Lifschitz [123] and Levesque [119] that terminological languages
should have epistemic querying capabilities. That is, viewing a KB as a set
of statements about an external world, one should be able to pose queries
about the external world that the KB is representing, as well as about what
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the KB itself knows about the external world.
A simple example is given using KB = {(∃owns.Dog)(susan),Dog v Pet}
which represents that susan owns at least one dog, and that dogs are pets.
One can ask the obvious query KB |= (∃owns.Pet)(susan)? (“does susan
own a pet?”) and obtain the obvious answer “YES”. However, one cannot
ask queries of the form KB |= (∃Kowns.KPet)(susan)? (“is there something
known to be owned by susan and known to be a pet?”), to which the system
should respond “NO” because there is no such evidence in KB.
2.6.1 DLs of MKNF
Current DLs of MKNF [63, 107] enrich standard DLs with two epistemic
operators on concepts, namely, K and A. The operator K (called the mini-
mal knowledge operator) can be used in front of a concept C to obtain KC,
which intuitively represents all those objects which are known to be C’s. In
contrast, the operator A represents a negation as failure [54] modality which
differs from K. The concept AC intuitively represents all those objects which
can be assumed to be C’s.
In order to capture default-like statements, AC is used with a negation in
front of it as in ¬AC, which represents the objects that cannot be assumed
to be C’s (notice the close correspondence with the meaning of a justification
in a default presented in Section 2.5). In fact, the default Student:¬TaxPayer¬TaxPayer can
be encoded in the following DL axiom using the MKNF modalities discussed:
KStudent u ¬ATaxPayer v ¬TaxPayer.
Despite the similarities between MKNF and default logic, MKNF remains
a more general formalism in which one can encode defaults [110] and possi-
bly embed and study other nonmonotonic formalisms [125, 63]. In order to
encode so-called “minimal knowledge” and the “default-like assumption” of
negation as failure, the semantics of DLs with MKNF is built upon a more
general interpretation structure 〈I,M,N〉 where I = 〈∆, ·I〉 is a standard
DL interpretation and M, N are sets of standard DL interpretations.
We state the concept language of ALC with MKNF (ALCKNF) [63, Sec-
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tion 2.2] here. Given a concept name A and role name R, one can define the
concept language of ALCKNF as:
C ::= A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C u C | C t C | ∃R.C | ∀R.C | KC | AC
ALCKNF allows one to use the epistemic operators on roles as well which
gives us the role language:
S ::= R | KR | AR
The semantics is analogous to that of standard DLs until we get to concepts
(and roles) that include the epistemic operators. Atomic concepts and atomic
roles are interpreted in I analogous to standard DLs. That is, for a given
concept name A and role name R, AI,M,N = AI and RI,M,N = RI . For the




(C uD)I,M,N = CI,M,N ∩DI,M,N
(C tD)I,M,N = CI,M,N ∪DI,M,N
(∃R.C)I,M,N = {a ∈ ∆ | there is a b ∈ CI,M,N s.t. (a, b) ∈ RI,M,N}
(∀R.C)I,M,N = {a ∈ ∆ | for all b, (a, b) ∈ RI,M,N =⇒ b ∈ CI,M,N}
It is apparent that the above definition does not capture novel semantics
and is analogous to standard DLs. However, when we interpret concepts
(and roles) containing epistemic operators, we notice the first references to
the sets M and N . Intuitively, M and N are introduced to interpret the
minimal knowledge and negation as failure notions on concepts (hence the
assigned letters to name these sets):









That is, (KC)I,M,N denotes the intersection of the C’s in each interpretation
of the given “minimal knowledge” set of interpretations M (the key is that
the interpretation domain ∆ is fixed across interpretations). (AC)I,M,N is
interpreted analogously, but on the “negation as failure” set of interpretations
N . The meaning of “minimal knowledge” and “negation as failure”, as well
as the difference between K and A, in this context, becomes more clear when
we define what constitutes a model for an ALCKNF KB.
The axiom language of ALCKNF is the same as that of ALC. We have
subsumptions in the TBox and concept and role assertions in the ABox.
Satisfaction in an interpretation 〈I,M,N〉 is analogous to standard DLs.
We say that an axiom α is satisfied in a structure 〈M,N〉 if α is satisfied
in 〈I,M,N〉 for each I ∈ M. We extend this satisfaction definition to
TBoxes, ABoxes and, more generally, to ALCKNF KBs in an analogous way
to standard DLs. We now define a model for an ALCKNF KB:
Definition 4 (Model for ALCKNF KB) Let K be an ALCKNF KB. A
set of interpretations M is a model for K if the structure 〈M,M〉 satisfies
K and, for each set of interpretations M′ ⊃M,〈M′,M〉 does not satisfy K.
Therefore, Definition 4 on Page 68 enforces a notion of maximality to the set
of interpretations that satisfy the KB. Coupled with the interpretation of K
and A defined above, we can see that KC intuitively captures the C’s that
we know to be present in each (and every) interpretation that satisfies our
knowledge. One can see that this maximisation of the set of interpretations
that satisfy our knowledge actually captures a notion of minimal knowledge
about C’s.
Recall that one can encode defaults in DLs of MKNF. For example, one can
represent the information that “by default, students do not pay taxes” using
the axiom KStudent u ¬ATaxPayer v ¬TaxPayer. This MKNF encoding
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intuitively means “if something is known to be a student and it cannot be
assumed to be a tax payer, then it is not a tax payer”.
The semantics of DLs with MKNF state that “known to be” means ap-
pearing in all applicable interpretations, and that “cannot be assumed to be”
means there is at least one applicable interpretation in which this assumption
is false. An employed student introduced in the KB who does pay taxes will
then be interpreted as conflicting with the ¬ATaxPayer predicate, and thus
be allowed to retain its tax paying property.
When translating prerequisite-free defaults into MKNF axioms, a new
concept has to be introduced into the translation [63, Section 3.1] to align
with the semantics of Baader et al. [11] (recall that, in the latter work of
Baader et al., defaults are only applied to individuals explicitly mentioned
in the ABox to avoid counter-intuitive inferences).
In addition to default representation, DLs with MKNF are useful for
representing integrity constraints [163]. Integrity constraints are statements
about what the KB should know (what it is required to know). For example,
one can add the integrity constraint KEmployee v AMale t AFemale [63,
Example 3.2] to a KB indicating that “any known employees should be known
to be either male or female”. This constraint will then force inconsistency of
the KB if an employee is added without explicitly mentioning their gender.
In summary, linking up with our philosophy on imperfect knowledge (Sec-
tion 2.3), we recall that incompleteness is unfortunately a general property
of knowledge. Since DLs with MKNF try to model this incompleteness more
abstractly than other approaches to defeasible reasoning, by distinguishing
between general constraints and explicitly known facts, they are, representa-
tionally speaking, very powerful formalisms for reasoning with exceptions.
2.6.2 Discussion
DLs with MKNF are indeed very expressive formalisms and add a new di-
mension to knowledge representation and reasoning with DLs. However, as
we now discuss, it seems that “with great power comes great complexity”.
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Computational Complexity: In order to obtain decidable reasoning for
ALCKNF , Donini et al. [63, Section 4] adopted the strategy of reducing
reasoning in ALCKNF to reasoning in ALC. They tried to show that one can
represent the models for anALCKNF KB by a finite set ofALC KBs, in which
case reasoning can be executed on the latter and thus inherit decidability.
However, they found that such a representation does not exist in gen-
eral. Instead they identified a restricted subset of ALCKNF KBs for which
such representations exist. While this subset might capture a large sub-
set of realistic KBs, it definitely omits other perfectly reasonable ones (see
Definitions 4.2 and 4.11 in their exposition [63] which give the criteria for
representable KBs). Even accepting these restrictions, though, a first upper
bound for complexity is identified as 3expspace [63, Section 4.3] which is
discouraging when compared with other defeasible reasoning approaches.
Representational Complexity: We also argue that, from the perspec-
tive of an ontology engineer, the usage of epistemic features in DLs has the
potential to be cognitively complex. It can be argued that the operators
themselves are intuitively simple to understand and, considering there are
just two extra operators, it is not a major departure from the feature set of
standard DLs.
However, in some cases it may lead to cognitive burden in modelling.
Specifically, it is sometimes unclear which operator, K or A should be used.
For example, it is unclear whether the integrity constraint KEmployee v
AMale tAFemale is equivalent to KEmployee v KMale tKFemale.
2.7 Defeasible Logic
Defeasible logic is a formalism consolidated by Donald Nute [149] sharing sim-
ilar core ideas to that of John Pollock concerning defeasible reasoning [153].
The key representational elements of the logic are default-like sentences called
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defeasible rules (one can also represent counterpart strict rules), as well as
specialised rules called defeaters which specify conditions under which defea-
sible rules may be overridden.
In order to better understand the intuition behind these constructs, it is
helpful to consider the philosophical underpinnings of defeasible logic. An
important perspective that both Pollock and Nute take in their treatises is
that whenever we represent knowledge as logical sentences, we have implicit
justifications for “believing” these statements that we write down. They
explain that some of these reasons are “conclusive” whereas others aren’t.
This allows one to draw a distinction between strict rules whose justifications
are all conclusive, and defeasible rules that have some inconclusive ones.
2.7.1 Basic Defeasible Logic
Defeasible logic is generally built upon propositional logic but can, in princi-
ple, be built upon richer languages. A defeasible logic theory or KB consists
of five components: a set of facts, a set of defeasible rules, a set of strict
rules, a set of defeaters and a priority relation (an acyclic and transitive
partial order in most formalisations) among defeasible rules.
Facts are statements about the domain represented by a literal (e.g. “john
is a student” represented by Student(john)). A defeasible (resp. strict) rule
r has the form r : A(r) =⇒ B(r) (resp. r : A(r) → B(r)) consisting of its
unique label r. A(r) is called the antecedent or body of r and represents a
set of literals and B(r) is a single literal called the consequent or head of r.
Rules may have no body but they always have a head.
An example of a defeasible rule is “Employed students generally pay
taxes” written as EmployedStudent(x) =⇒ TaxPayer(x). An example of
a strict rule is “All students have a student ID” written as Student(x) →
hasID(x). Defeaters, as mentioned earlier, are caveats that can prevent the
application of rules. Hence, it is important to note that defeaters do not aid
in drawing conclusions, rather, they are used to prevent some. Similar to
rules, they have the form A(r) ; B(r) where A(r) is called the antecedent
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or body of r and represents a set of literals and B(r) is a single literal called
the consequent or head of r.
Defeaters are required to have both a head and a body. An example of
a defeater is “Employed students who are actually university teaching as-
sistants might not be obliged to pay taxes” written as EmployedStudent(x),
TeachingAssistant(x) ; ¬TaxPayer(x). We also may need to specify priorities
among rules. For example, given rules r1 : Student(x) =⇒ ¬TaxPayer(x),
r2 : EmployedStudent(x) → Student(x) and r3 : EmployedStudent(x) =⇒
TaxPayer(x), and a fact f1 : EmployedStudent(john), there is a conflict
between r1 and r3 when applied to f1. If we apply r1 then we derive
¬TaxPayer(john), while applying r3 gives us the contradictory conclusion
TaxPayer(john). It makes sense to prefer applying r3 over r1 since r3 is
applied to the more specific information about john (that he is employed).
We can specify this preference using r3 > r1.
Just like default logic, defeasible logic follows a fixed-point construction
in deriving inferences. Recall that the inference mechanism of default logic
worked by applying default rules in an arbitrary order to derive extensions.
During the application of rules in a particular ordering, other rules may
become blocked and a fixed point is reached when no other rules can be
applied. The goal is to compute all such fixed points or extensions of the
given KB, or sometimes to just determine if a given formula appears in any
of these extensions.
In defeasible logics, the inference mechanism is, in principle, slightly dif-
ferent because of the added defeater constructors. Additionally, given a
propositional atom q and a defeasible logic KB K, we have four different
types of conclusions one can draw about q: (1) “+∆q” which means that q
is definitely provable from K (i.e., purely from the facts and strict rules) (2)
“−∆q” which means that q can be shown to not be definitely provable from
K (3) “+δq” which means that q is defeasibly provable from K and (4) “−δq”
which means that q can be shown to not be defeasibly provable from K.
Conclusions are thus meta-theoretical statements about provability and
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not part of the language of defeasible logic. Suppose we are given a defeasible
logic theory K = 〈F,R,D,>〉 where F is the set of facts, R is the set of rules
(both defeasible and strict), D is the set of defeaters and > is the priority
relation onD. Then the first two (strict) conclusion types are derived through
the following inference rules:
• +∆q: q can be definitely proved from K if either q ∈ F or there is a
strict rule r ∈ R with q as the head and, for all antecedent atoms a in
r, a can be definitely proved from K.
• −∆q: q can be shown to not be definitely provable from K if q 6∈ F and
for each strict rule r ∈ R with q as the head, there is an antecedent
atom a in r s.t. a can be shown to not be definitely provable from K.
The two rules have recursive definitions with a straightforward meaning (the
terminating case of recursion is when we find compatible knowledge in our
fact base). The first rule says that we can definitely prove q if it is already
contained in our fact base, or it appears as the consequent of a strict rule
whose antecedents are all either satisfied or, when recursing on strict rules
who have these antecedents as consequents, we eventually reach a termination
point with all antecedents of a strict rule present in our fact base.
The second rule is just the complement of the first rule: we can show
that q is not definitely provable from K if it is not satisfied (not in our fact
base) and for each strict rule in which q is the consequent there is at least one
antecedent a in this rule that is not satisfied (not in our fact base) or, if all
antecedents a are satisfied for some rules, then we recurse on these by taking
those rules with a as consequent, examining their antecedents to eventually
terminate when we find an antecedent that is not in the fact base.
The two defeasible inference rules are more complex considering that we
have to take into account defeaters (we have to consider “opposing” chains
of reasoning) and priority relations among rules. As we shall see, these rules
also “interact” or “depend” on each other.
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• +δq: q is defeasibly provable from K if either +∆q w.r.t. K, or (1)
there is a rule r ∈ R (defeasible or strict) with q as the consequent and
for each antecedent a of r, +δa w.r.t. K, and (2) −∆(¬q) w.r.t. K, and
for each s ∈ R∪D s.t. ¬q is the consequent of s, either (3a) there is an
antecedent a of s such that −δa w.r.t. K or (3b) there is a rule t ∈ R
(defeasible or strict) with q as the consequent s.t. for each antecedent
a of t, +δa w.r.t. K and t has priority over s (t > s).
• −δq: q can be shown to not be defeasibly provable from K if −∆q
w.r.t. K and (1) for each rule r ∈ R (defeasible or strict) with q as
consequent, there is an antecedent a of r s.t. −δa w.r.t. K, or (2)
+∆(¬q) w.r.t. K, or there is an s ∈ R ∪D s.t. ¬q is the consequent of
s such that (3a) for each antecedent a of s, +δa w.r.t. K and (3b) for
each t ∈ R (defeasible or strict) with q as the consequent, either there
is an antecedent a of t s.t. −δa w.r.t. K or t does not have priority over
s (t 6 >s).
We run through the inference rule +δq and skip discussion on −δq (the
latter is just the negation of the former). Firstly, if q is definitely provable
(derivable purely from the strict rules and facts) then it is intuitive that the
additional defeasible rules and defeaters should not interfere with this. That
is, it is intuitive to infer that it q is (defeasibly) provable even considering the
additional defeasible constructors as well.
Now supposing that we are given a defeasible logic KB K from which we
cannot derive q purely from the strict information. This means we have to
argue based on the defeasible information. Let us suppose that there are
no “attacks” on concluding q using the defeasible rules. Then, Point (1) of
the definition for +δq says that, considering the defeasible rules with q as a
consequent, if we can find one whose antecedents are all defeasibly provable
(at this point in the inductive definition, defeasibly provable here reduces to
the termination case of definitely provable) then we can conclude that q is
also defeasibly provable.
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Now one has to consider possible “attacks” on concluding q. Point (2)
has to eliminate the attack which forces us to definitely prove ¬q (from the
strict information only) because this would clearly contradict with defeasibly
proving q. In addition, we have to consider all the possible defeasible rules
and defeaters that could possibly lead us to prove ¬q.
This is done in Point (3) and in order to endorse q we need to ensure
that, for each defeasible rule with ¬q in the head (allowing us to conclude
¬q), either: (a) there is an antecedent of such a rule that is not defeasibly
provable (here we refer to the complementary rule −δq whose terminating
case is −∆q), or (b) there is another defeasible rule whose head is q (allowing
us to conclude q) and it has higher priority then the one leading us to the
contradictory case ¬q.
We have given a very brief presentation of the mechanics of defeasible logic
including its language constructs and inference mechanism. More recently, a
very interesting investigation in defeasible logic by Antoniou et al. [3] revealed
that much of the constructs in defeasible logic are “syntactic sugar”. That
is, these constructs do not add any expressive power to the logic.
The authors found that for any well-formed defeasible logic KB (the pri-
ority relation is acyclic and only defined on rules with conflicting or com-
plementary heads), the KB can be reduced purely to a set of strict and
defeasible rules (absorbing the facts, defeaters and priority relation). There-
fore, representationally speaking, this logic closely resembles default logic
when restricted to normal defaults.
The main advantage of formalisms resembling that of defeasible logic are
its low computational complexity. It is been shown to have linear complexity
in the size of the defeasible logic theory [131]. However, the price that we
pay for such efficiency is that defeasible logic embodies a relatively “shallow”
reasoning paradigm, especially when compared to logics such as DLs. There-
fore, there will be some desirable intuitive inferences that defeasible logic will
be too weak to capture. Since our formalisms of interest are DLs, we have
to discuss the state-of-the-art in combining defeasible logic with DLs.
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2.7.2 Combining Defeasible and Description Logics
Defeasible logic was originally designed as a proof-theoretic rule system with
a propositional base language used for antecedents and consequents in rules.
In terms of semantics, such characterisations (which came in a variety of
flavours [82, 130]) came much later in the development.
Thus defeasible logic, in principle, may be superimposed over a formal-
ism such as Description Logic. There have been various approaches that
accomplish this [1, 81, 195].
Wang et al. [195] and Antoniou et al. [1] took similar approaches by
proposing to place defeasible logic rules “on top of” a DL ontology. In the
rules one is allowed to express dl-literals (literals representing references to
concepts in the underlying ontology) only in the antecedent of rules. Essen-
tially, the inference mechanism follows the same structure as presented in
Section 2.7.1 but when we have to check provability of antecedents that are
dl-literals (representing DL concepts), this is done using a DL reasoner with
respect to the underlying ontology. Thus, an applicable DL reasoner needs
to be embedded in the defeasible logic reasoner.
The approach by Governatori [81] appears a more natural combination
of defeasible logic with DLs. The set of ABox statements in the DL KB
constitutes the facts in a defeasible logic theory, the subsumptions are trans-
lated into strict rules and defeasibility is introduced by adding standard
defeasible rules to the theory. A KB in this hybrid theory has the structure
K = 〈A, T , R,>〉 where A is an ABox, T is a TBox, R is a set of defeasible
rules and > is the priority relation among the rules in R.
Governatori chooses ALC− to be the logic for A and T . This restricted
version of ALC omits existential role restrictions from consideration. There-
fore, since the only additional constructs over propositional logic that need to
be considered are universal role restrictions, he formulates additional infer-
ence rules (four types mirroring those presented in Section 2.7.1) for deriving
knowledge of the form (∀R.C)(a) where R is a role name, C is a concept
and a is an individual. In particular, only explicitly mentioned individuals
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in A are considered in the inference mechanisms. The defeasible rule types
are defined as follows:
• +δ(∀R.C)(a): “all a’s R-successors are C’s” is defeasibly provable from
K if for each individual b mentioned in A, either −δR(a, b) (see speci-
fication of −δq in Section 2.7.1), or +δC(b) (see specification of +δq in
Section 2.7.1).
• −δ(∀R.C)(a): “all a’s R-successors are C’s” can be shown to not be
defeasibly provable from K if there is an individual b mentioned in A
s.t. +δR(a, b) and −δC(b).
Notice that the rules above loosely simulate the semantics of universal role
restrictions in DLs. Pothipruk and Governatori [155] later extend this ap-
proach to allow expression of existential restrictions in the KB but they do
not formulate inference rules for defeasible derivation of such information. In
summary, the combination of defeasible logic and DLs follows the basic model
of placing rules on top of an underlying DL ontology and using the inference
mechanisms of defeasible logic to draw conclusions using these rules.
The structure of rules and the inference mechanisms have to be modified
to take into account the additional richness of DLs and some restrictions
need to be placed on the expressive power of the combined system in order
to prevent counterintuitive inclusions.
Representationally speaking, defeasible logic appears to have a close re-
semblance with default logic. However, Antoniou et al. [2] show that a fairly
representative version of defeasible logic can be embedded in default logic,
suggesting that default logic may be a more general and inferentially powerful
formalism. Still, standard defeasible logic remains the most computationally
efficient nonmonotonic formalism in recent years, having a linear worst case
complexity in the size of the defeasible theory.
In addition to the presented integration efforts with DLs, defeasible logic
has also been applied in various other settings. Most notably in logic program-
ming [4] for which, it can be argued, it is more naturally suited. Even though
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defeasible logic was not designed with a formal semantics in mind, various
semantics have been proposed subsequently. An argumentation-theoretic se-
mantics has been proposed by Governatori et al. [82] and a model-theoretic
semantics has been presented by Maher [130].
2.7.3 Discussion
Even though the combinations of defeasible logic and DLs attempt to closely
model the semantics of DLs in inference rules (e.g. for universal role restric-
tions), the resulting mechanism falls short in a number of ways from the
inferential power of DLs. This is because the inference rules alone cannot
make use of the richness of the DL and therefore the combined approach
inherits the same inferential weaknesses of standard defeasible logic.
Here is a simple instance of this weakness: given the set of DL subsump-
tions {C v D,¬C v D} (where C and D are DL concepts) one would be
able to conclude, using DL reasoning, that > v D (everything in the domain
is a D). However, translating this set into the corresponding strict rules
in {C → D,¬C → D} (where C and D are literals) we find that, using
defeasible logic, one cannot derive D (+∆D).
We have mentioned an extension of this approach [155] which allows ex-
pression of existential restrictions in rules. However, there is no accompa-
nying mechanism for deriving relevant inferences from these. In DLs, for
example, given the TBox {Student v ¬Employed} and the following ABox
{(∃hasFriend.Student)(john)}, one would be able to conclude that “john has
a friend who is not employed” ((∃hasFriend.¬Employed)(john)). However,
in the translation to defeasible logic we have the rule r : Student(x) →
¬Employed(x) and the ABox {(∃hasFriend.Student)(john)} from which we
cannot derive the inference that +∆(∃hasFriend.¬Employed)(john) because
there is no applicable inference rule.
In summary, defeasible logic was, by design, intended to be very com-
putationally efficient. As a result, its overt proof-theoretic flavour placed
much emphasis on justifying inference through proof strategy and argument.
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In the end, the investigation of enriching its language of antecedents and
consequents, and taking such structure into account during inference, re-
mains under-developed. Finally, this has led to a more “shallow” reasoning
paradigm relative to other approaches.
2.8 Preferential Reasoning
In the late 80s to early 90s, Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM) [111,
117, 116] took to studying nonmonotonic reasoning from the standpoint of
the consequence relations that it should induce. This was quite a different
perspective from which to proceed when compared to many other approaches
to defeasible reasoning.
The basic motivation for this is that nonmonotonic formalisms define
approaches for deriving plausible inferences when knowledge is considered
imperfect (see Section 2.3), and since there may be various notions of plau-
sibility that one can define, there may be multiple definitions for entailment.
KLM argued that, even though there can be multiple notions of plausibility,
the consequence relations that each notion induces should at least satisfy
some basic logical properties in order to be called “rational” entailment.
In other words, they defined a standard for “rational” nonmonotonic en-
tailment [117, Section 3], so that future nonmonotonic formalisms can be
evaluated against this standard to understand their logical merit.
The resulting preferential approach, as it is often called, is this general
framework that we choose as the basis for our entire investigation in this
thesis. Throughout this thesis, unless otherwise stated, when we refer to
the term preferential, we are referring to the general framework introduced
by KLM to investigate defeasible reasoning. In the normal cases we refer to
this general framework by the phrases: “preferential approach”, “preferential
framework” or “preferential context” etc.
We motivate fully in Section 2.10 why we choose the preferential ap-
proach, over the other candidates presented in this chapter, towards the goals
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of this thesis. For now, we start by giving a basic overview of the preferential
approach in the context of propositional logic. Thereafter, in Section 2.8.2,
we discuss the state-of-the-art in efforts to generalise this approach to DLs.
Section 2.8.2 is particularly important because it serves as the theoretical
basis of the work presented in this thesis.
2.8.1 Propositional Foundations
Nonmonotonic reasoning, as the name suggests, does not, in general, sat-
isfy the logical property of monotonicity. While there may also be various
other logical properties that nonmonotonic reasoning does not satisfy, KLM
diverted the focus by studying nonmonotonic reasoning from the perspec-
tive of the consequence relations it induces [111], in order to identify logical
properties that it should actually satisfy.
Their initial characterisations of nonmonotonic consequence relations con-
sidered KBs represented in classical propositional logic [111]. That is, given
a KB of sentences represented in classical propositional logic, the idea was to
characterise “suitable” nonmonotonic entailment relations to be able to con-
clude what classical propositional sentences would follow from this KB. The
suitability of the entailment relations was determined by investigating the
logical properties that they should satisfy. This can be seen as a meta-level
approach for introducing nonmonotonic reasoning into propositional logic.
However, KLM later took a different approach to introducing nonmono-
tonic reasoning in propositional logic. In this later work [117], the idea was
to enrich propositional logic with a kind of “defeasible implication” (i.e., a
connective on the object level), and then given a KB represented in the new
logic, to agree upon logical properties that this connective should satisfy, in
order to induce suitable nonmonotonic entailment relations for the new logic.
This perspective can be seen as an object-level approach for introducing non-
monotonic reasoning into propositional logic and is the one that we explore
further in this thesis.
In this latter investigation, KLM introduce a new connective |∼ into
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propositional logic called conditional implication (also called defeasible im-
plication). The intended, intuitive meaning of the sentence p |∼ q is that p
usually implies q, where p and q are classical propositional formulas. They
use conditional KBs to encode knowledge about the domain of interest.
Definition 5 (Conditional KB) A conditional KB is a pair 〈TPL,DPL〉
where TPL is a finite set of classical propositional formulas and DPL is a
finite set of conditional implications.
Within this context, they agreed on a series of logical postulates (called the
KLM postulates) that they argue the connective |∼ should satisfy if it is
to induce suitable nonmonotonic consequence relations [117, Section 3]. We
restate the properties below for completeness:
(Ref) α |∼ α (LLE) |= α↔ β, α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
(And)
α |∼ β, α |∼ γ
α |∼ β ∧ γ
(Or)
α |∼ γ, β |∼ γ
α ∨ β |∼ γ
(RW)
α |∼ β, |= β → γ
α |∼ γ
(CM)
α |∼ β, α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
(RM)
α |∼ γ, α 6|∼ ¬β
α ∧ β |∼ γ
The property (Ref) stands for Reflexivity and it obviously captures that
α should be plausibly derivable from itself. (LLE) stands for Left Logical
Equivalence and captures that if α and β are indistinguishable, and γ can
be plausibly derived from α, then γ should be plausibly derivable from β as
well. The (And) postulate endorses that β∧γ is plausibly derivable from α if
both β and γ are plausibly derivable from α separately. The (Or) postulate
says that γ is plausibly derivable from α ∨ β if it is plausibly derivable from
α and β separately.
(RW) stands for Right Weakening and captures that if β is plausibly deriv-
able from α and γ is classically derivable from β, then γ is plausibly derivable
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from α (notice that Right Weakening captures a kind of transitivity property
for |∼). The properties of Cautious Monotonicity (CM) and Rational Mono-
tonicity (RM) are perhaps the most interesting of the postulates because they
concern weakened versions of the property of Classical Monotonicity. Obvi-
ously, we would not like |∼ to satisfy classical monotonicity (because we are
interested in defining nonmonotonic consequence relations), but if it did, it
would satisfy the following property:
(M)
α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
(M) says that if γ is plausibly derivable from α, then γ is plausibly derivable
from α∧β for any formula β (whatever additional information I have, it can-
not force me to retract my conclusions). Monotonicity enforces cumulative
knowledge. That is, one can only build upon existing knowledge and cannot
retract old knowledge. Cautious Monotonicity weakens classical monotonic-
ity by stating that if I can plausibly derive γ from α, I can plausibly derive
γ from α ∧ β provided that I can also plausibly derive γ from β separately.
Rational Monotonicity is a related property which weakens classical mono-
tonicity by endorsing α ∧ β |∼ γ if γ is plausibly derivable from α and one
cannot plausibly derive ¬β from α. Both (CM) and (RM), then, define some
extra safety conditions under which we can endorse cumulative knowledge.
At this point, while we have described the postulates that the connective
|∼ should satisfy, we have not discussed how it is possible to evaluate a
particular consequence relation against these postulates to determine if it
satisfies them or not.
It is clear that given a KB K = {α1 |∼ β1, . . . , αn |∼ βn}, there are in
general many closures of K. That is, there are many supersets K′ of K that
satisfy the KLM postulates. For example given a particular K′ I can evaluate
whether it satisfies the (And) rule by verifying for each α1 |∼ β1 ∈ K′ and
α1 |∼ β2 ∈ K′ that α1 |∼ β1 ∧ β2 ∈ K′. We motivate why any nonmonotonic
DL should satisfy the KLM postulates in Chapter 3.
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With an aim towards defining “rational” entailment regimes for nonmono-
tonic formalisms, KLM use the term rational consequence relation to refer
to a consequence relation that satisfies all the KLM postulates. They also
identified the most “conservative” rational consequence relation, that is, the
one endorsing the fewest (positive) plausible inferences. They coined this
relation the Rational Closure [117, Section 5] and provided a model-theoretic
description of Rational Closure using a “preference” style of semantics based
on the proposal by Yoav Shoham [180].
KLM also define entailment regimes based on consequence relations that
satisfy all the KLM postulates except for RM, such as Preferential entail-
ment [117, Definition 2.8] and Ranked entailment [117, Section 4]6. However,
considering the pragmatic goals of this thesis, these proposals are not suit-
able to consider because they define consequence relations which are mono-
tonic [117, Sections 2.4 and 4.2], and therefore defeats the purpose of a
defeasible reasoning paradigm which has to be able to revise knowledge.
Therefore, for this thesis, we focus on Rational Closure as a starting
point for developing practical systems for defeasible reasoning in the context
of DLs. The semantic foundation of preferential reasoning, and hence Ra-
tional Closure, rests on the notion of a ranked interpretation [117, Definition
3.8] (and we present a generalisation of this definition, for DLs, in the next
section). KLM also precisely define what an exception [117, Definition 2.20]
is, in terms of ranked interpretations, and we present a generalisation of this
definition in the next section for DLs. The notion of exception will prove to
be central to, and of vital importance for, generalising the KLM algorithm for
computing Rational Closure to the DL setting. It also proves to be essential
for giving novel (but related) algorithms for computing defeasible entailment
in the preferential framework for DLs.
6It was demonstrated by KLM that the notions of preferential entailment and ranked
entailment are actually identical [117, Section 4.2]
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2.8.2 Description Logic Foundations
In this section we present the state-of-the-art when it comes to the theoreti-
cal foundation of preferential reasoning in DLs (or, equivalently, preferential
DLs). All relevant definitions and characterisations are adapted from the
work of Giordano et al. [71] and Britz et al. [41].
In preferential DLs, a new kind of subsumption relation @∼ is employed
in the language. Using @∼ , one can formulate subsumption statements of the
form C @∼D called defeasible subsumption statements or just defeasible sub-
sumptions, where C and D are classical ALC concepts. C @∼D is read as “C
is usually subsumed by D”. For our purposes, since we are interested in ALC,
our base language consists of the standard concept and axiom language for
ALC (Section 2.1.1) together with defeasible subsumption. Now, in order to
interpret defeasible subsumption statements we have to enrich the semantics
for classical DLs.
In classical DLs [10], the semantics is built upon first order interpreta-
tions. These interpretations vary on the elements which appear in the inter-
pretation domain (∆I) and the manner in which we assign terms to these
elements (and pairs of these elements in the case of roles) - defined by an
interpretation function (·I). In the preferential context, an additional compo-
nent on which the interpretations can vary, is introduced. This component
represents the manner in which we can order the elements of the domain,
using a modular ordering7 (≺I).
Definition 6 (Modular Order) Given a set X, a relation ≺ ⊆ X ×X is
modular if there is an ordering function o : X −→ N s.t. for every x, y ∈ X,
x ≺ y if and only if o(x) < o(y).
7Historically, this ordering started out as a partial order as a theoretical exercise and
led to the definition of preferential interpretations. Later, KLM defined the notion of
ranked interpretation which considered totally ordered, well-founded sets (those having a
minimal element) to which to map the elements of the domain, defining a “ranking” or
total order on the elements. In this thesis, we do not take such a general stance, we pick
a specific well-founded set - the natural numbers - to define our ranked interpretations.
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Intuitively, the ordering on domain elements can be seen to reflect the “typ-
icality” or “normality” of the element w.r.t. all possible properties that it
can possess. We elaborate more on this later in this section. Interpretations
whose ordering on domain elements respects Definition 6 on Page 84, are
known as ranked interpretations [117].
Definition 7 (Ranked Interpretation) A ranked interpretation is a struc-
ture R := 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, where 〈∆R, ·R〉 is a DL interpretation (which we
denote by IR and refer to as the classical interpretation associated with R),
and ≺R is a modular ordering on ∆R.8
Modular orderings allow us to “rank” the elements in the domain by assigning
a natural number to each element representing their “level” in the model.
However, function o in Definition 6 on Page 84 still allows for “levels” in our
ranked interpretation that do not contain any elements.
For example, let S = {x1, x2, x3, x4} be a set of elements, and let ≺
be a modular ordering on the elements of S defined s.t. x1 ≺ x2, x2 ≺ x4
and x1 ≺ x3. Then we can define an ordering function o (as described in
Definition 6 on Page 84) s.t. o(x1) = 0, o(x2) = 2, o(x3) = 2 and o(x4) = 4
which respects ≺. Notice that we have no elements in S on level 1 and level
3 of our ordering. In order to remedy this situation we define the rank of
a domain element in a ranked interpretation using a ranking function which
eliminates these empty levels:
Definition 8 (Rank of a Domain Element) Let R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 be a
ranked interpretation, the rank of an element x ∈ ∆R, denoted by rkR(x), is
the length of the chain x0 ≺R . . . ≺R x where x0 is any minimal element in
the ordering ≺R.
We can also refer to the top-most (highest) rank in a ranked interpretation:
8Given X ⊆ ∆R, we denote the set {x ∈ X | for every y ∈ X, y 6≺R x} with min≺R(X).
Intuitively, min≺R(X) denotes the most “typical” elements of X. That is, the elements in
X that are the most minimal in the partial ordering.
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Definition 9 (Maximal Rank) Given a ranked interpretationR, the max-
imal rank (denoted by max(R)) of R is rkR(x) for some x ∈ ∆R s.t. there
is no y 6= x s.t. y ∈ ∆R and rkR(y) > rkR(x). Similarly, given a non-
empty set of ranked interpretations R = {R1, ...,Rn} where n > 0, the
maximal rank for R, denoted by max(R), is the largest number in the set
{max(R1), ...,max(Rn)}.
We point out that the bottom-most or lowest rank of any ranked interpre-
tation is always 0 unless otherwise stated. We sometimes refer to this rank
as the minimal rank of a ranked interpretation. Given the definition of the
rank of an element in a ranked interpretation, we can also define the rank of
a concept in a ranked interpretation as follows.
Definition 10 (Rank of a Concept in a Ranked Interpretation)
Given a ranked interpretation R, and a concept C, let RC = {rkR(x) | x ∈
CR}. Then, the rank of C w.r.t. R (denoted by rkR(C)) is the smallest
number in RC. If CR = ∅ then we say that C has no rank w.r.t. R or
equivalently that C has infinite rank w.r.t. R (denoted by rkR(C) =∞).
Given the semantic foundation we have laid, we can interpret defeasible sub-
sumption statements of the form C @∼D (see Figure 2.2 for a graphical rep-
resentation) using ranked interpretations. Technically, C @∼D is satisfied in
a ranked interpretation R if min≺R(CR) ⊆ DR (see Definition 7 on Page 85)
and we denote this by R  C @∼D. We also say that R is a ranked model for
C @∼D (analogous to the classical DL case).
We can also interpret classical DL subsumptions C v D in ranked inter-
pretations in the usual way. That is, a ranked interpretationR = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R
〉 satisfies a subsumption C v D if 〈∆R, ·R〉 satisfies it, and we denote this by
R  C v D (R is a ranked model for C v D). One can construct defeasible
KBs consisting of both classical and defeasible DL subsumptions.






〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉  C @∼D
Figure 2.2: Satisfaction of a defeasible subsumption by a ranked interpretation.
Definition 11 (Defeasible KB)
A defeasible KB is a structure 〈T ,D〉 where T is a (possibly empty) finite
set of classical DL subsumptions, and D is a (possibly empty) finite set of
ALC defeasible subsumptions (called a defeasible TBox or DTBox).
We can extend satisfaction in a ranked interpretation to defeasible KBs as
well. A defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 is satisfied by a ranked interpretation R if R
satisfies each subsumption in T ∪D. In such cases we say that R is a ranked
model for 〈T ,D〉. Based on Definition 10 on Page 86 we can extend the
notion of the rank of a concept to the context of a defeasible KB.
Definition 12 (Rank of a Concept w.r.t. a Defeasible KB)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a concept C, let R be the set of all ranked
models for 〈T ,D〉 and let RC = {rkR(C) | R ∈ R}. Then, the rank of C
w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 (denoted by rk〈T ,D〉s(C)) is the smallest number in RC.
As discussed earlier, there is no unique version of entailment for nonmono-
tonic formalisms in general. Some formalisms such as Circumscription even
give the user of the reasoning system a degree of control in defining entail-
ment by supplying a circumscription pattern. In the preferential context we
also have multiple possible entailment proposals. Indeed, it can be argued
that different proposals can be suitable for different applications. Before
we explore this issue, we define the notion of entailment in the preferential
context that is analogous to classical DL entailment.
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Recall that classical DLs consider all models for a given classical KB in
order to define entailment. The analogous proposal in the preferential context
is to consider what follows in all ranked models for the given defeasible KB.
This version of entailment is called ranked entailment and is a generalisation
of ranked entailment in the propositional setting [117, Section 4].
Definition 13 (Ranked Entailment) Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and
a defeasible subsumption C @∼D, C @∼D is ranked entailed by 〈T ,D〉, written
as 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼D, if each ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 is also a ranked model
for C @∼D.
It turns out that ranked entailment is monotonic in the DL case as well [41,
Section 4], and this results in an entailment regime which is unsuitable for
defeasible reasoning which is supposed to be able to retract old knowledge.
However, before we explore the problem of defining appropriate versions of
entailment for preferential DLs, we have to formalise the central principle of
exception in this context, since this thesis is concerned with DL reasoning in
the presence of exceptions.
We recall that, in contrast to a standard DL subsumption C v D, which
we read as “all C’s are D’s”, the reading of the defeasible subsumption C @∼D,
is that “the most typical C’s are D’s” (see Definition 7 on Page 85 and accom-
panying footnote). It is the ordering on elements in a ranked interpretation
that allows us to isolate typical elements. The semantic paradigm which this
approach captures is very intuitive because it is one which we as humans
often employ (albeit in an implicit way). Consider the following example:
Example 13 Suppose that Bob and John are mechanics. If we don’t have
any other information then as humans we may implicitly regard Bob and John
as typical mechanics and assign to them properties that a typical mechanic
may possess. For example we may conclude that Bob and John both work in
a workshop. However, we may later discover that, while Bob works from a
workshop, John is actually a mobile mechanic and only repairs machinery at
the clients premises - which means he does not work from a workshop. One
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may say that Bob is more typical than John w.r.t. the property of possessing
a workshop. What this means is that John is more exceptional than Bob
w.r.t. the same property. But what if we consider a different property of a
typical mechanic? We may consider a typical mechanic to have one or more
types of machinery that they specialise in. If we find that John indeed has
a specialisation in motorboats but that Bob does not have a specialisation
in any specific equipment types then we implicitly consider John to be more
typical than Bob in this context. 2
Example 13 on Page 88 raises an often asked question about typicality in the
context of ranked interpretations: given a ranked interpretation, what is the
motivation for its chosen typicality ordering of domain elements? It is an
interesting question because when it comes to the components of a standard
first order interpretation, it is not often motivated why one would choose a
particular interpretation domain rather than another.
Similarly, it is also seldom motivated why one would assign (or not assign)
a specific term from our vocabulary to an element of the domain. However,
when it comes to typicality orderings, a motivation for a particular ordering
choice is often demanded.
The preferential DLs that we consider give the following explanation:
given two elements x and y in some interpretation domain of a ranked inter-
pretation, if we choose to interpret x as less exceptional (more typical) than
y (written x ≺ y), we mean that we assume that there is a function or black-
box that is able to consider every conceivable property of x and y, aggregate
the exceptionality of x and y w.r.t. these properties, and in the end assign a
natural number to x and y representing their “degree of exceptionality”.
Thus x ≺ y (x is less exceptional than y) if the degree of exceptional-
ity of x is less than that of y. Essentially, the typicality orderings can vary
across ranked interpretations because evaluating typicality w.r.t. all conceiv-
able properties could be a subjective task.
Returning to Example 13 on Page 88, we show how the framework of
ranked interpretations handles multiple conflicting typicality orderings. If
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we only had the constraint in our KB that typical mechanics work in a work-
shop (Mechanic @∼ ∃hasWorkshop.>) then, assuming that Bob is a prototypical
mechanic i.e., Bob ∈ min≺R(Mechanic
R) for some ranked model R for our
knowledge, then John has to be considered more exceptional (higher in the
ordering) than Bob in R.
Let us suppose that this is not the case. That is, perhaps Bob is considered
more exceptional than John, or they are considered equally exceptional. If
they are equally exceptional then we have a conflict with our knowledge,
because this tells us that John is also a typical mechanic and should possess
a workshop (whereas Example 13 on Page 88 tells us otherwise). If our
ordering dictates that Bob is more exceptional than John, then we have a
conflict with our assumption that Bob is a prototypical mechanic because it
means that John is lower down in our ordering.
Essentially, this means that the ranked interpretations whose ordering
functions dictate that John and Bob are equally exceptional, or that Bob is
more exceptional than John, are incompatible with our knowledge.
Similarly, if we only had the constraint that typical mechanics have a
specialisation (Mechanic @∼ ∃hasSpecialisation.>) then Bob is more exceptional
than John (assuming John is a prototypical mechanic). But what if we have to
satisfy both constraints? Suppose our background knowledge is that typical
mechanics work in workshops and that typical mechanics have at least one



























Figure 2.3: Multiple valid typicality orderings of ranked interpretations.
It is clear that if our background knowledge about mechanics is correct, then
there must exist at least one typical mechanic who satisfies both our con-
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straints. If there isn’t, then we would be in a logically incoherent situation
and would have to revise or retract our statements (if no typical mechanics
exist then no mechanics exist). Since Example 13 on Page 88 makes mention
only of Bob and John, and both these individuals are missing one of the re-
quired properties, we have to conclude that there must be a third individual.
Let’s call him Andy and he is a very typical mechanic i.e. he possesses both
required properties by working in a workshop and specialising in automobiles.
Both Bob and John can then be seen as exceptional w.r.t. the prototypical
mechanic Andy. But how do we decide who is more exceptional between
Bob and John? The answer is that we don’t have to because Andy satisfies
our knowledge; Bob and John are exceptional to Andy so the exceptionality
distinction between them does not matter. The typicality orderings in the
ranked models (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 2.3 are all valid for our knowledge
and so we have to consider all of them.
A strong advantage of preferential logics is the behaviour represented in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 where the ranked interpretations satisfy that the most
typical C’s (lowest in the ordering) are also D’s, but still allows some C’s
that are not as typical (higher up in the ordering) to not be D’s. This is the
ability to gracefully cope with exceptions - which is something that standard
DLs cannot.
Many fields such as biology and medicine deal with information which
holds in general but is fallible under exceptional circumstances. Given this
setting, biologists and medical professionals still have to draw conclusions and
make decisions based upon this information. Preferential DLs are developed
for applications of this kind. This leads us to a formal definition for concept
exceptionality in preferential DLs, which is a straightforward generalisation of
the definition given by KLM in the propositional case [117, Definition 2.20].
Definition 14 (Concept Exceptionality) Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉
and a concept C, C is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 if 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. Each
subsumption C @∼D ∈ D (for any concept D) is also said to be exceptional
w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
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That is, a concept C is exceptional w.r.t. a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 if there
is no ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is an element x on the most
typical (bottom-most) level of the model that also belongs to CR (the most
typical elements in our models are not C’s). This intuitively captures that
C’s cannot be considered “prototypical” or “stereotypical” in any sense in
our models. Consider the following example.
Example 14 Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB where:
T = {MobileMechanic v Mechanic,GeneralMechanic v Mechanic} and
D = {Mechanic @∼ ∃hasWorkshop.>,Mechanic @∼ ∃hasSpecialisation.>,
MobileMechanic @∼ ¬∃hasWorkshop.>,GeneralMechanic @∼ ¬∃hasSpecialisation.>}
It is easy to see that one cannot “realise” a MobileMechanic or GeneralMechanic
object on the bottom level of a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. In other words, the
concepts MobileMechanic and GeneralMechanic are exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
This behaviour is intuitive because these concepts can be seen as exceptional
types of Mechanic that do not possess all the properties that one would typ-
ically associate with the latter. 2
We now define concept unsatisfiability in the context of preferential DLs. The
definition is analogous to the one for classical DLs. Interestingly, concept
unsatisfiability in this context also characterises a special case of concept
exceptionality.
Definition 15 (Ranked Concept Unsatisfiability) Given an ALC de-
feasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and an ALC concept C, C is ranked unsatisfiable w.r.t.
〈T ,D〉 if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥. We refer to C as totally exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
Notice that if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥ then 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. That is, total excep-
tionality is logically stronger than exceptionality. Also, total exceptionality
(or equivalently ranked unsatisfiability) is analogous to classical unsatisfia-
bility. This is easy to see because C @∼⊥ says that typical C’s do not exist,
which corresponds to saying that C’s do not exist (it is straightforward to see
that for any ranked interpretation R, R  C @∼⊥ if and only if R  C v ⊥).
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On the other hand, > @∼ ¬C is logically weaker. It allows C’s to exist
but prescribes that the most typical things in our domain are not C’s. We
would like to draw a distinction between exceptionality and its special case of
total exceptionality. The need to distinguish between these will become more
apparent when we present algorithms for computing defeasible entailment in
Chapter 4. Hence, separating out the totally exceptional cases we can refer
to concepts that are normally exceptional.
Definition 16 (Concept Normal Exceptionality)
Given an ALC defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and an ALC concept C, C is nor-
mally exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 if C is exceptional but not totally exceptional
w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
We have presented an overview of the semantic foundation for preferential
reasoning in DLs. Linking up with the pragmatic goals of this thesis, which
is to build practical reasoning systems upon this foundation, we have to give
an overview on the state-of-the-art in this regard.
2.8.3 Rational Closure for Description Logics
Recall that ranked entailment (Definition 13 on Page 88), in the DL setting,
is monotonic and therefore unsuitable for defeasible reasoning. However, in
the propositional setting, KLM presented the landmark entailment regime for
preferential reasoning, Rational Closure, which is not monotonic and enjoys
some elegant mathematical properties [117, Section 5].
Furthermore, KLM argue that Rational Closure is the most conservative
notion of nonmonotonic entailment that can be considered rational [117,
Thesis 1.1]. That is, a rational nonmonotonic formalism may endorse more
inferences than Rational Closure but it should at least endorse all Rational
Closure’s inferences.
Because of this, the main efforts to generalise preferential reasoning to
DLs have converged on generalising the definition of Rational Closure to
DLs. Indeed, this is probably the best starting point for defining defeasible
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entailment in preferential DLs. KLM give several definitions for Rational
Closure in their seminal work, in terms of rational consequence relations [117,
Definition 5.7], ranked model semantics [117, Section 5.7] and the rank of a
(propositional) formula w.r.t. a conditional KB [117, Theorem 5.17].
The main efforts to characterise Rational Closure for DLs opted to gen-
eralise the definition based on the rank of a formula. Giordano et al. [71,
Definition 21] and Britz et al. [41, Definition 14] generalise the rank of a
propositional formula to the rank of a concept in DLs but w.r.t. a defeasi-
ble KB (recall that Definition 10 on Page 86 is a definition w.r.t. a ranked
interpretation).
Since KLM formulated their definition operationally (because the seman-
tic perspective was not their initial angle of investigation), the definitions of
Giordano et al. [71, Definition 21] and Britz et al. [41, Definition 14] mirror
this convention. Before we restate this definition we have to define the notions
of exceptional subset [71, Definition 19] and exceptional subset sequence [71,
Definition 20] of a defeasible KB.
Definition 17 (Exceptional Subset) Let K = 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB.
Then, the exceptional subset of K (denoted by E(K)) is defined as 〈T ,Dexc〉
where Dexc = {C @∼D ∈ D | C is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉}.
Definition 17 on Page 94 allows us to define a sequence of exceptional subsets
of a defeasible KB.
Definition 18 (Exceptional Subset Sequence)
Given a defeasible KB K = 〈T ,D〉, the exceptional subset sequence of K is
the sequence E0, E1, ..., En (n ≥ 0) where E0 = K and Ei = E(Ei−1) for
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Informally, we start with the original KB E0 and obtain the set of all defea-
sible subsumptions in E0 that are exceptional. This subset will constitute
E1 and we recurse on E1 to obtain E2 and so on. The process is executed
until we reach a fixed point in which one of two things will happen for some
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i: (1) Ei = Ei−1 (all the subsumptions in Ei are exceptional) or (2) Ei = ∅
(none of the subsumptions in Ei are exceptional). Given this exceptional-
ity sequence we can give an operational definition for the rank of a concept
(corresponding with the semantic one given in Definition 12 on Page 87) as
follows [71, Definition 21].
Definition 19 (Rank of a Concept w.r.t. a Defeasible KB)
Given a concept C, a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and its exceptional subset se-
quence E = {E0, . . . , En}. Then, the rank of C w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 (denoted by
rk〈T ,D〉p(C)) is the smallest 0 ≤ i ≤ n s.t. C is not exceptional w.r.t. Ei. If
C is exceptional w.r.t. Ei for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n then C has infinite rank denoted
by rk〈T ,D〉p(C) =∞.
The correspondence between the semantic definition (Definition 12 on Page 87)
and procedural definition (Definition 19 on Page 95) for the rank of a con-
cept has been shown by Giordano et al. [71, Proposition 13]. Therefore, the
following definition for Rational Closure (agreed upon by current generali-
sations of preferential reasoning for DLs), is actually a semantic definition
(see the work by Giordano et al. [71, Definition 22] and of Britz et al. [41,
Definition 15]).
Definition 20 (Rational Closure of a Defeasible KB) Given a defea-
sible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a defeasible subsumption C @∼D, C @∼D is in the Ratio-
nal Closure of 〈T ,D〉 (denoted by 〈T ,D〉 |=rational C @∼D) if rk〈T ,D〉s(C) <
rk〈T ,D〉s(C u ¬D) or rk〈T ,D〉s(C) =∞.
While Definition 20 on Page 95 arguably captures an intuitive and reasonable
form of entailment in the preferential context, it is still recommended to study
its characterisation in terms of ranked models in detail, in order to determine
its logical merit.
Recall that ranked entailment (i.e., all ranked models for our KB) was too
strong a notion of entailment. Rational Closure, then, narrows its view to
a subset of these models. It is important to note that this subset is not
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some arbitrary one, and indeed, upon studying Rational Closure from other
perspectives (such as its consequence relation and its definition in terms of
the rank of a concept) one can appreciate that its model-theoretic charac-
terisation would, at the very least, be interesting if not suitable as a general
entailment regime. The current DL versions of Rational Closure point to a
characterisation in terms of minimal ranked models [71, Definition 25] similar
to the propositional case [117, Section 5.7].
Minimal ranked models are defined by placing a partial ordering on the
ranked models for the KB - this is in addition to the partial ordering on
the elements of the domain (see Figure 2.4 for an example). The minimal
〈T ,D〉 = 〈∅, {C @∼D}〉
I: c,d¬c,d ≺ J : c,d
¬c,d
I is a minimal ranked model for 〈T ,D〉
Figure 2.4: Ordering ranked models in pursuit of the minimal ones.
ranked models in the partial order are those in which there is no element of
the domain that can be moved to a more typical level in the strata (i.e. if it
can be moved, then it is not possible without violating at least one axiom in
the KB). We adapt the definition for minimal ranked models here from the
work of Giordano et al. [71].
Definition 21 (Minimal Ranked Model) Let R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 and R′
= 〈∆R′, ·R′, ≺R′〉 be two ranked interpretations. We say that R is more
preferred than R′ if:
- ∆R = ∆R
′
,
- ·R = ·R′,
- for each x ∈ ∆R, rkR(x) ≤ rkR′(x) and there is a y ∈ ∆R s.t. rkR(y) <
rkR′(y).
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Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉, we say that
R is a minimal ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 if there is no other ranked model R′
for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. R′ is more preferred than R.
Further to Definition 21 on Page 96, Giordano et al. [71, Theorem 7] show
that there is a minimal ranked model R that is canonical [71, Definition 24
and Definition 25] for each consistent ALC defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, that defines
Rational Closure. That is, R  C @∼D if and only if 〈T ,D〉 |=rational C @∼D.
In fact, Giordano et al. show that there always exists such a canonical
ranked model for any consistent ALC defeasible KB and there will always
be more than one of these. Nevertheless, they showed that any one of these
models is sufficient to characterise Rational Closure. We are going to repeat
the definition of minimal canonical ranked model here, since it is essential
for characterising Rational Closure in ALC. However, before we do this, we
introduce some new terms.
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a query axiom δ = C @∼D, we refer to
the set of all concepts and subconcepts occurring in 〈T ,D〉 and δ, together
with their negations, as the concept universe for 〈T ,D〉 and δ (always denoted
by C〈T ,D〉,δ). Given the notion of concept universe, we can define the subsets
of C〈T ,D〉,δ that are compatible with 〈T ,D〉.
Definition 22 (Compatible Concepts for a Defeasible KB)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB and let δ = C @∼D be a query axiom. Then,
{C1, . . . , Cn} ⊆ C〈T ,D〉,δ is compatible with 〈T ,D〉 if 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C1 u C2 u
. . . u Cn v ⊥.
Definition 22 on Page 97 leads us to a succinct definition for a minimal
canonical ranked model for some defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉.
Definition 23 (Minimal Canonical Ranked Model) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a de-
feasible KB and R be a minimal ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. Then, R is
a minimal canonical ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 if for each compatible subset
{C1, . . . , Cn} ⊆ C〈T ,D〉,δ, there is an x ∈ (C1 u C2 u . . . u Cn)R.
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Giordano et al. [71, Theorem 7] have shown that the Rational Closure of
each ALC defeasible KB, that has a ranked model, can be characterised by
a single canonical ranked model. The semantics for Rational Closure is then
defined by this minimal canonical ranked model.
From a pragmatic perspective, the first attempt at a procedure for com-
puting a defeasible entailment regime similar to Rational Closure (in the
DL case) was the effort of Casini and Straccia [51] for ALC. A substantial
advantage of this syntactic procedure was that it was composed entirely of
classical DL entailment checks. In contrast, Giordano et al. [75] present a
tableau calculus for constructing ranked models in their preferential exten-
sion of ALC, however, both these constructions do not compute exactly the
notion of Rational Closure we define in Definition 20 on Page 95.
Notwithstanding, all existing procedures for computing Rational Closure
in the literature, that are based on classical DL decision steps, are variants of
the syntactic procedure by Casini and Straccia. In fact, an updated variant
of this procedure is presented in Chapter 4 together with some alternative
forms of defeasible entailment for preferential DLs.
2.8.4 Rational Extensions of an ABox
In the literature for preferential DLs, the general arc has been to first “lift”
the theoretical foundation of KLM, from the propositional setting, to DLs.
Thereafter, the next step is to characterise and develop algorithms for Ratio-
nal Closure for the TBox (i.e., TBoxes that contain defeasible subsumptions)
and finally, to address entailment for ABoxes. Because of the difference in
structure of DLs (over classical propositional logic), ABox approaches lead
to a unique set of challenges.
In these approaches the task is to consider an extended notion of de-
feasible KB (we extend the structure 〈T ,D〉 to 〈T ,D,A〉 i.e., including a
classical ABox A) and to define what defeasible entailment means in this
context. That is, for the two main types of assertions C(a) and R(a, b) in
ALC, we have to define defeasible counterparts for these assertions so that we
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can ask if a presumably can fall under the concept C (in the former assertion)
and if a is presumably related to b via R (in the latter), from 〈T ,D,A〉.
Giordano et al. [71, Section 3.3] and Casini et al. [50] presented both se-
mantic definitions and algorithmic constructions, based on these definitions,
for ABox Rational Closure in ALC. The basic intuition behind these efforts
is to consider the individuals mentioned in the ABox as typical as possible
(considering those ranked models in which the objects referred to by the
mentioned individual names are as low down as possible in the ordering).
A positive attribute of the semantics is that it has a similar flavour to the
semantics for TBoxes mentioned in the previous section and thus inherits
some attractive properties of the latter.
It can also be shown that the worst-case computational complexity of
their ABox procedure is the same as for TBox entailment [50, Proposition 3].
Although, upon an analysis of the algorithms in relation to one another, and
having experience of the nature and size of ABoxes in real-world ontologies,
it is expected that ABox entailment would not perform as well, in practice,
as the TBox procedures it is based on.
Despite the presence of a foundation for reasoning with ABoxes, there are
still some gaps to be filled in the area. The issue of how to handle implicit
individuals in the ABox, for example, arises in this context as well (echoing
the situation in default reasoning - see Example 9 on Page 60). We refer
the reader to the provided references for more detailed information about
preferential reasoning for ABoxes. We remind the reader that the primary
concern of this thesis is a practical foundation for preferential reasoning with
TBoxes. Therefore, we do not explore ABox entailment any further in this
thesis.
2.8.5 Discussion
Because of its relative immaturity to other forms of defeasible reasoning in
DLs, the preferential approach (and specifically its suitability for defeasible
reasoning in DLs) requires more investigation. As we have discussed in this
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section, the preferential approach is a framework for defeasible reasoning.
The framework can be used for a variety of purposes: to study the logical
merit of nonmonotonic formalisms, to compare nonmonotonic formalisms
from the standpoint of their consequence relations and, of course, to build
entailment proposals on top of the framework (there is not just one notion
of entailment in the preferential framework).
Rational Closure defines a very useful defeasible entailment regime for
DLs and is, in our view, just as strong a candidate for TBox defeasible rea-
soning as any other defeasible formalism in the literature (if not superior in
some respects). However, for some situations where more adventurous rea-
soning is required, its inferential behaviour can be viewed as slightly weak.
Nevertheless, even in such settings, it is a suitable starting point from which
to investigate more adventurous entailment regimes for preferential DLs.
Alternatives to Rational Closure: In the efforts to lift the preferential
framework to DLs, Rational Closure was the first notion of entailment to be
lifted to the DL case. This is indeed very reasonable since Rational Closure
is the most conservative notion enjoying all the desirable KLM properties.
However, in some settings a more adventurous reasoning behaviour is re-
quired and Rational Closure can sometimes be too skeptical to give back
some of these more adventurous inferences. We give more detail about this
issue in Chapter 4.
Application to Inexpressive DLs: Another hindrance to the acceptance
of preferential DLs is that they have only been sparsely applied to low-
complexity DLs [70, 53] where the motivation for investigation is to identify
fragments of DLs that will yield tractable preferential reasoning.
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2.9 Overriding
One of the more recent approaches to defeasible reasoning is the work by
Bonatti et al. [27] on giving a semantics for “overriding” in DLs. The ap-
proach is unique because it is targetted specifically at DLs. Their semantics
for overriding is actually a lightweight framework for extending an arbitrary
DL, say DL, with the ability to represent and reason with so-called defeasible
inclusions (DIs for short). The resulting extensions are called DLN .
From a representational point-of-view, the formalism is similar to prefer-
ential reasoning in the sense that we have two types of terminological axiom:
strict subsumptions and defeasible subsumptions. In overriding the authors
introduce a notion of DI (of the form C vn D) that is similar in style to
defeasible subsumption in the Preferential context.
The intended intuitive meaning of C vn D is “C’s are normally also D’s,
unless otherwise stated”. Bonatti et al. go on to define a unique notion of
entailment for DLN KBs and thus DIs have a unique intuitive meaning which
closely resembles that of Reiter’s defaults [161].
In the preferential case (Section 2.8), even though we had a single se-
mantics for defeasible subsumption, the intuitive interpretation of such sub-
sumptions can change based on which ranked model(s) we choose to define
entailment. That is, its intuitive interpretation can change from a skeptical
notion (typical C’s are D’s) in the case of Rational Closure, to a credu-
lous notion (C’s are D’s unless I explicitly know otherwise) in the case of
Lexicographic Closure.
Syntactically speaking, the only difference between a particular DL and
DLN is that the latter introduces a new concept name NC into the vocabulary
for each DL concept C. The idea behind these names is to refer to the normal
instances of a particular concept. That is, a DLN interpretation I is a DL
interpretation in which NCI ⊆ CI for every DL concept C.
Semantically speaking, satisfaction of strict subsumptions (of the form C
v D ) in a DLN interpretation is defined analogously to the classical DL
case. Entailment is also defined analogously to the DL case. That is, the
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sentences satisfied in each DLN model for a KB K, are what logically follow
from K. Bonatti et al. denote the subset of strict subsumptions in K with S
and a model for S ⊆ K is called a pre-model for K.
The essential difference in DLN , of course, is the definition for satisfaction
of a DI in a DLN interpretation. Recall that all approaches to dealing with
exceptions in KR formalisms must address two key issues. The first is to
define exception in their context and define a mechanism for dealing with an
exception to some default or defeasible information. The second is to define
a mechanism to specify and deal with priorities among default sentences that
conflict with each other.
In overriding these issues are dealt with by specifying the conditions un-
der which some DI can be safely overridden by a normality concept. The
normality concept then basically represents an exception to the DI. If we
ignore priorities among DIs for the time being (i.e., assuming all DIs have
equal priority), then a DI C vn D is overridden by a normality concept NX
in an interpretation I (w.r.t. a KB K) if each pre-model J for K is s.t. either:
1. there is an x ∈ NXJ s.t. x ∈ (C u ¬D)J or,
2. NXJ = ∅
For example, givenK = { EmployedStudentv Student, Studentvn ¬(∃receives.
TaxInvoice) }, one can observe that Student vn ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) is
not overridden by the normality concept NEmployedStudent because we can
construct a pre-model J of K s.t. for each x ∈ NEmployedStudentJ , x ∈
(¬Student t ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice))J and NEmployedStudentJ 6= ∅.
However, adding EmployedStudent v ∃receives.TaxInvoice to K causes the
DI Student vn ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) to be overridden by NEmployedStudent
in each model for K because we cannot construct such a pre-model of K.
Things become a little more involved when we introduce priorities among
DIs. A priority relation ≺ is a strict partial order on the DIs in a KB.
Although this relation can be user-specified we restrict our attention to re-
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lations determined by specificity [27, Page 11]: C1 vn D1 ≺ C2 vn D2 if and
only if |= C1 v C2 and 6|= C2 v C1.
For example, let K = { EmployedStudent v Student, Student vn ¬(∃receives.
TaxInvoice), EmployedStudent vn ∃receives.TaxInvoice, EmployedStudent u
Parent v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) }. K contains two defaults where the one
with antecedent EmployedStudent has higher priority than the one with an-
tecedent Student (according to specificity).
When taking into consideration priorities among DIs, we have to intro-
duce a third condition to characterise overriding. The full conditions are
now provided in the following definition reformulated from Bonatti et al. [27,
Definition 1, p12]:
Definition 24 (Overriding) A DI C vn D is overridden by a normality
concept NX in an interpretation I (w.r.t. a KB K) if each pre-model J for
K is s.t. either:
1. there is an x ∈ NXJ s.t. x ∈ (C u ¬D)J or,
2. NXJ = ∅ or,
3. there is a DI C1 vn D1 ≺ C vn D s.t. { NW | for each x ∈ NW I,
x ∈ (¬C1 tD1)I } \ { NY | C1 vn D1 is overridden in NY w.r.t. I }
6⊆ { NZ | for each x ∈ NZJ , x ∈ (¬C1 tD1)J }.
Note that Definition 24 on Page 103 is recursive (condition 3 recursively
refers to overriding). Intuitively, condition 3 ensures that higher priority
DIs are satisfied unless they are explicitly overridden. Very informally, the
set { NW | for each x ∈ NW I , x ∈ (¬C1 t D1)I } represents the set of
normality concepts that do not represent exceptions w.r.t. C1 vn D1 in I; {
NY | C1 vn D1 is overridden in NY w.r.t. I } represents the set of normality
concepts that explicitly override C1 vn D1 in I and { NZ | for each x ∈
NZJ , x ∈ (¬C1tD1)J } represents the set of all normality concepts that do
not represent exceptions w.r.t. C1 vn D1 in a pre-model J for K.
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For example, given the KB K = { EmployedStudent v Student, Student
vn ¬(∃receives. TaxInvoice), EmployedStudent vn ∃receives. TaxInvoice },
we can verify using Definition 24 on Page 103 that NStudent does not over-
ride Student vn ¬(∃receives. TaxInvoice) or EmployedStudent vn ∃receives.
TaxInvoice in all DLN interpretations I. We can also verify in the same way
that NEmployedStudent does override Student vn ¬(∃receives. TaxInvoice)
in some interpretations (recall EmployedStudent vn ∃receives.TaxInvoice ≺
Student vn ¬(∃receives. TaxInvoice) according to specificity).
Satisfaction of a DI in a DLN interpretation I is defined in terms of
overriding. We restate the definition here [27, Definition 2, p15]:
Definition 25 (DI Satisfaction) A DI C vn D is satisfied in an interpre-
tation I if each normality concept NX is either satisfied in I (for each x ∈
NXI, x ∈ (¬C tD)I) or NX overrides C vn D in I.
Given the semantic foundation, entailment for DLN is defined analogously
to classical entailment: a model for a DLN KB K is a model for each of
its DIs and strict subsumptions and we can derive a DI δ from K if and
only if each model for K is a model for δ (written as K |≈ δ). Bonatti et
al. [27] also give a syntactic procedure for deriving DIs from DLN KBs. For
pragmatic reasons, the procedure is restricted to KBs that do not contain
normality concepts of the form NC because reasoning with such cases must
take into account the infinitely many normality concepts in the language.
The worst case complexity for performing DI inference in ALCN is exptime-
complete (i.e., the worst case complexity of the underlying classical DL is
not increased).
2.9.1 Discussion
Overriding is a fairly recent proposal for defeasible reasoning in DLs. The
mechanism has been designed as a lightweight framework for extending any
classical DL to be able to represent and reason with DIs. There are a number
of strengths and weaknesses with this framework. Some strengths include
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that it can be reduced to classical DL entailment under some restrictions
on the KB and query, reasoning is tractable for some low-complexity DLs,
the worst case complexity is not increased when extending a variety of DLs
ranging from ALC to SHIQ and there are implementations and performance
evaluations for low-complexity DLs.
Some weaknesses are that the language is perhaps too permissive which
results in restrictions having to be placed on the vocabulary of KBs in order
to guarantee certain desirable practical properties and to devise procedures.
This also leads to the observation that the semantic characterisation of the
DLN framework is perhaps not as conceptually elegant as other formalisms
such as default logic, circumscription and preferential reasoning.
As we shall also see in Chapter 5, overriding does not define a “rational”
entailment relation (according to KLMs notion of rationality). This places
some doubt over its inferential merit even though, in many representative
examples in the literature, it gives back the intuitively desired inferences.
2.10 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter we have discussed the evolution of various approaches to
defeasible reasoning and their contemporary application to DLs. We notice
that some proposals, such as circumscription, MKNF, preferential reasoning
and overriding, proposed new semantics and constructs in the object language
to deal with exceptions.
Other approaches such as default and defeasible logic opted to take a rule-
based (or argumentation-based) approach. MKNF did not plan to address
exceptions in a direct manner, rather, it addressed a more general underlying
problem which perhaps leads to exceptions in many circumstances. Its high
computational complexity remains a significant drawback.
Circumscription enjoys an intuitive semantics and is well studied in the
literature especially with respect to computational complexity. Unfortu-
nately, the computational results are not encouraging and, while there are
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reasonable implementations, there are not many practically viable ones for
DLs. In addition, allowing full flexibility in the circumscription pattern is
perhaps too permissive if we want formalisms whose consequence relations
can be characterised to some degree using formal postulates.
Defeasible subsumption (preferential reasoning), defeasible rules (defeasi-
ble logic), defaults (default logic) and DIs (overriding) have a close relation-
ship in terms of what they intuitively want to represent. Even though default
and defeasible logics have various proposals for semantics, they suffer from
instability in terms of agreeing upon an interpretive model-theoretic seman-
tics. We argue that this fact contributes to some of the problems with these
formalisms such as counterintuitive conclusions and odd theoretical results
(e.g. general default theories do not have to have extensions [161]).
The preferential approach and overriding are much more clear than de-
fault and defeasible logic from a semantic perspective. Although, practical
algorithms and implementations are just starting to emerge in the literature
for the former proposals. It is clear, then, that all approaches to defeasible
reasoning in DLs have their strengths and weaknesses.
In selecting a suitable formalism for practical development in this thesis,
we have to agree on certain requirements for practical defeasible reasoning
in DLs. We advocate the following broad requirements: (i) the formalism
should have an intuitive representation, (ii) its inferential character must be
“sensible”, (iii) its complexity of reasoning must not be too much higher
than the underlying classical DL it is extending and (iv) it must be fairly
simple to implement and integrate into modern ontology editing systems.
In keeping with this philosophy, we have provisionally accepted the pref-
erential reasoning approach as the most viable candidate to address. This
is because the notion of defeasible subsumption is a representationally sim-
ple and intuitive construct. It is also the only extra expressivity added to
DLs. Since preferential reasonings were historically developed first from the
perspective of consequence relations, the formalisation of the inference mech-
anisms and semantics came later.
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We believe this is a good thing. It gives a more abstract perspective of
defeasible reasoning behaviour and allows one to debate on the intuition and
merit of logical postulates, prior to formalising details of semantics and en-
tailment. A major advantage to preferential reasoning is its full reduction to
classical DL entailment. That is, if we extend any DL to be able to represent
defeasible subsumption, we can use any sound and complete reasoning im-
plementation for the underlying classical DL to perform defeasible inference
over the added feature of defeasible subsumption.
This independence of reasoning implementation is a very positive aspect
for a number of reasons and is a particularly strong advantage over most
other defeasible reasoning approaches to DLs. It means that existing DL
reasoners can be used off-the-shelf to perform defeasible inference and that
existing tools for ontology editing and reasoning are not difficult to extend
to be able to support defeasible inference (see Chapter 7).
2.11 Notation and Conventions
In this thesis we use the terms ontology and knowledge base (KB) inter-
changeably. We sometimes refer to the “classical counterpart” or “classical
translation” of a defeasible subsumption C @∼D or, respectively, set of defea-
sible subsumptions { C1 @∼D1, . . ., Cn @∼Dn }. These refer to the classical




From a practical and empirical perspective, the state-of-the-art of defeasible
reasoning research for DLs is not yet mature. One goal of this thesis is to
make some headway in this area (at least for the preferential approach) to
show that some formalisms are suitable for practical implementation and use
in modern ontology editing systems (even in their current state).
In this chapter we address two issues with defeasible reasoning for DLs:
(i) the lack of quantitative evidence for the need of defeasible reasoning in
DLs and (ii) the lack of a standard for the inferential “shape” of defeasible
reasoning in DLs. For (i), while there has been anecdotal evidence in the
literature which suggests a need for the representation of defeasible informa-
tion in real world ontologies, to the best of our knowledge there has been no
empirical work published to confirm or refute this. Therefore, we start off
by conducting a rudimentary empirical analysis of real-world ontologies to
give prima facie evidence supporting that there is, in fact, a general need for
representing defeasible knowledge.
Similarly, for (ii), there has been no investigation and standardisation
of which syntactic inference rules, satisfied by classical DL inference, should
be inherited by defeasible DL inference. We generalise the KLM formal
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properties from the preferential reasoning setting in DLs, and motivate why
these properties should be satisfied by any defeasible notion of subsumption
(i.e. notion of default) for nonmonotonic extensions of DLs. We also discuss
some semi-formal structural properties that we motivate should be satisfied
by any defeasible entailment relation for DLs. We conclude with a discussion
about some gaps that need to be filled.
3.1 Need for Defeasible Description Logics
One cannot deny that there has been a solid plea in the literature for the capa-
bility of representing defeasible information using formal KR languages [158,
186, 93, 176].
The general argument indicates that classical KR languages are limited
when it comes to representing defeasible statements. Examples are used,
predominantly from the areas of biology and biomedicine, to motivate that
it would certainly be useful and desirable if KR formalisms were enriched to
be able to express information that is fallible w.r.t. exceptions.
Yet, for all the purported need for defeasible representation, there seems
to be no empirical evaluation of real world ontologies establishing this as an
irrevocable fact.
Here we conduct a rudimentary evaluation to uncover some quantitative
evidence which would indicate more clearly whether there is a need for defea-
sible reasoning. As one can imagine, there are a multitude of ways in which
to conduct this evaluation.
One obvious approach could be centered on a kind of user study, gath-
ering experiential information from the ontology engineer or domain expert
(the users of such systems). Such a study would certainly be fruitful in
giving indication of the need for defeasible reasoning but we instead take a
contrasting “bottom-up” approach since it is simpler to conduct and would
nevertheless give adequate preliminary indication of the need for defeasible
reasoning (that can be corroborated by future user studies).
CHAPTER 3. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 110
We conduct a lexical analysis of ontology documents (explained in Sec-
tion 3.1.2) to identify some symptoms indicating a need for defeasible repre-
sentation.
3.1.1 Dataset
A key requirement of the data that we conduct our evaluation on, is variety
(since we wish to draw conclusions about the general need for defeasible
reasoning in real world ontologies). Ideally we would like to use ontologies
that are diverse in terms of domain (regardless of their structural properties).
The Manchester OWL Repository (MOWLRep) [135] is an initiative con-
cerned with building a framework for sharing OWL ontology datasets for use
in OWL empirical research. The main motivation behind the framework is to
provide data that is diverse and not biased for any particular experimental
application, thus hopefully making results more significant and extrapola-
tions more accurate.
We obtain a recent snapshot of MOWLRep for our evaluation here (as
well as in Chapter 6). MOWLRep itself currently consists of three main
ontology datasets: the Bioportal corpus of ontologies1, the Oxford Ontology
Library (OOL)2 and the Manchester OWL Corpus (MOWLCorp)3.
Whereas Bioportal and OOL are generally well known and established
corpora in the OWL community, MOWLCorp [132] is the culmination of
a recent OWL ontology curation effort by researchers at the University of
Manchester. The ontologies in this latter corpus were obtained through so-
phisticated web crawls and filtration techniques.
In our 2014 snapshot of MOWLRep, there are 344 ontologies in the Bio-
portal subset, 793 ontologies in the OOL subset and 20, 996 ontologies in the
MOWLCorp subset. In terms of the average ontology metrics (such as ontol-
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little bearing on this kind of evaluation (we do, however, give such metrics
in our evaluation in Chapter 6 where these characteristics become relevant).
3.1.2 Experiment Setup
The Web Ontology Language does not natively support the expression of
defeasible information. What this effectively means is that any (logic-based)
axioms expressed in OWL ontologies are interpreted as universally true state-
ments about the particular application domain being described.
For the most part, this assumption is an acceptable one to make, but
in certain domains it is unsuitable because there may be exceptions to the
axiom. In domains where defeasible statements are more obviously required,
users may still (either advertently or inadvertently) indicate that defeasible
representation is needed through non-logical metadata constructs in OWL.
In this investigation we focus on OWL Annotations and the string rep-
resentations of entities (concept, individual and role names) in the OWL
ontology document to inform whether defeasible reasoning is either implic-
itly or explicitly called for.
OWL Annotations: The OWL 2 standard includes constructs in the lan-
guage called OWL annotations (also called OWL annotation axioms) which
can be added to ontologies to hold meta data descriptions of the ontology.
Most often, these annotation axioms are used in a very similar way to com-
puter programming comments. In other words, they are used to annotate
the different parts of the ontology with natural language descriptions of the
concepts, roles and axioms in the ontology, together with their utility.
OWL annotations can be attached to any entity (concept, role, individual
and axiom) in the ontology. In addition, one can attach multiple annotations
per entity. Figure 3.1 gives an example of annotation usage in an ontology
of MOWLRep indicating a need for defeasible representation.
When we mean that a particular symptom in an ontology “indicates a need
for defeasible representation”, we do not necessarily mean that the ontology
engineer intended defeasible representation from the start. What we mean is
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Figure 3.1: An ontology in MOWLRep loaded into the graphical ontology editor Protégé
contains a class name which has an annotation indicating the need for defeasible repre-
sentation.
that their chosen representation most likely is a counter-measure or “work-
around” for the fact that defeasible representation is not supported in OWL.
In other words, using a suitable defeasible representation (for example
defeasible subsumption) one may be able to capture the intended meaning of
their representation in a more natural way. In fact, the modelling behaviour
in Figure 3.1 is a common strategy to work around the lack of defeasible
reasoning support. That is, the engineer creates separate classes to refer to
the canonical entities of a particular type and the exceptional entities of that
type. This strategy is actually embodied in a standardised ontology design
pattern (ODP) [186, Section 5.2].
Entity String Representations: logic, as a study of deductive processes, is
concerned with the “form” of propositions and not in their string represen-
tations (or the natural language meanings that we attach to these string
representations). Therefore, from the point of view of deductive inference,
the sentences EmployedStudent v Student are C v D are indistinguishable.
Of course, since OWL ontologies are also meant for transmission and
interpretation among humans, we need to know what the symbols in our
ontology represent in the real world on a lower level than their algebraic
semantics. Therefore, we often use natural language terms (for the concept,
role and individual names in our ontology) to refer to things we are describing.
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We therefore look for clues in the lexical representation of concept and role
names in the ontology to indicate where the engineer wished to indicate de-
feasible information. For example, encountering an axiom like TypicalStudent
v ¬∃receives.TaxInvoice may indicate that the engineer would prefer a more
natural representation of the axiom using defeasible subsumption: Student
@∼ ¬∃receives.TaxInvoice.
Hence we conduct a straightforward string matching procedure on each
class, role and individual name (as well as annotations) in the ontologies of
MOWLRep. We specifically search for string expressions containing terms
that are related in natural language meaning to “exceptions”, “typicality”,
“abnormality” etc. We make use of both synonym and antonym terms to
get adequate coverage of the cases. In many cases we only need to search for
the “root” word e.g. “normal” and we automatically detect cases where the
words “normally” and “abnormal” occur.
The following list is exhaustive w.r.t. the root expressions that we search
for in the terms of the ontologies:
- “normal”, “abnormal”.
- “typical”, “atypical”, “prototypical”.
- “standard”, “non-standard”, “nonstandard”.
- “regular”, “irregular”.
- “except” (includes “exception” and “exceptional”).
- “usual”, “unusual”.
- “conventional”, “unconventional”.
- “canonical”, “non-canonical”, “noncanonical”.
- “anomalous”, “anomaly”.
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When searching the concept, role and individual names in the ontology, we
want to ensure that we detect accurate cases such as “normalStudent” and
“typicalMammalianCell”. We also want to eliminate “false” hits for e.g. “nor-
mals” and “standards” (referring to vector normals in linear algebra and rel-
ative conventions respectively). Therefore, we add such cases manually as
exceptions to ignore in our search list of expressions.
We also ensure that we search only for cases where our root expressions
are not suffixes in the term. We conjecture that it is far more likely to be
a false hit when the root expression occurs as a suffix of the term. This
is because ontology engineers often adopt the convention of using nouns as
concept names. Since our root expressions are all adjectives, they would most
likely precede a noun in natural language grammar.
This strategy eliminates false hits such as “highStandard” and “longNor-
mal”. In our evaluation we found that the root expressions usually occur as
adverbs in role names (for e.g. “usuallyComposedOf” and “typicallyLocate-
dIn”). Figure 3.2 gives some examples of names in ontologies indicating need
of defeasible representation.
To summarise our methodology, we search for our root expressions in each
ontology document in MOWLRep. If an ontology contains a hit (an entity
contains the given expression either in a name or annotation) then we regard
the ontology as a successful hit. We count the number of ontologies that are
successful hits in MOWLRep.
3.1.3 Results and Discussion
Since our evaluation is of a rudimentary nature, the results can be accurately
summarised in the single table of Figure 3.3.
It is interesting to note the considerable percentage of ontologies of Bio-
Portal and OOL that contain hits (22% and 27% respectively). Also, it is
interesting that the ontologies of BioPortal do not contain any hits what-
soever in annotations. The numbers, we conjecture, suggest that there is a
significant need for defeasible representation in OWL ontologies. We have to
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(a) An ontology about operating systems in MOWLRep indicating the
need for defeasible constructs.
(b) An ontology describing aspects about use cases containing a role name
which indicates need of defeasible expression.
Figure 3.2: Ontologies in MOWLRep loaded into the graphical ontology editor Protégé
containing names indicating the need for defeasible representation.
point out to the reader that there are factors in our evaluation which may
incorrectly inflate this significance. But there are also factors which may
incorrectly deflate this claimed significance.
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Figure 3.3: Results for evaluation: “String” column indicates ontologies which contained
hits only in string names, “Annotations” column indicates ontologies which contained
hits only in annotations, “Both” column indicates ontologies which contained hits both in
string names and annotations.
A successful hit in our evaluation does not state unequivocally that there
is a definite need for defeasible representation in that ontology. There are
perhaps some hits for which this is not the case. However, we claim that in
most cases the hits connote a need for defeasible reasoning support (although
we defer a deeper analysis giving evidence for this). On the other hand
there are factors in the data which could understate the need for defeasible
reasoning. The most important one is that contemporary ontology engineers
may have learned to avoid modelling choices leading to symptoms displaying
a need for defeasible reasoning.
That is, because defeasible reasoning support is not available, work arounds
are created to model exceptions in alternative ways that do not require de-
feasible representation. In fact, conventions such as abiding by monotonic
knowledge representation [24, Page 9], and design patterns to model excep-
tions, have been developed to address this [186, Section 5.2].
Therefore, even though our evaluation is by no means a comprehensive
indicator that defeasible reasoning support is needed in OWL, the results add
some numerical value to the anecdotal examples in the literature motivating
the need for defeasible reasoning. Hence, in summary, we believe that the
numbers of our evaluation, together with the pleas in the literature, are
sufficient grounds from which to claim that the need for defeasible reasoning
in OWL is significant.
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3.2 Inferential Character
At their core, classical logics all have a universally agreed upon character to
them: usually they consist of a language (a set of symbols) that may be com-
bined using specified syntactical and grammatical rules to form propositions
(logical sentences), together with some semantic machinery for interpreting
the meaning of these sentences in some model theory.
One unifying characteristic of classical logics with a model-theoretic se-
mantics is that entailment from a set of propositions (logical theory) is defined
as what holds in all models of the theory. However, as we know, classical logic
did not, historically speaking, start out with fully formed model theories.
Rather, there was simply a syntax for representing propositions. Entail-
ment was defined by formulated inference rules (born from the furnace of
hotly contested philosophical debate). Of course, Alfred Tarski then paved
the way for model theories with his definition for the logical truth of a propo-
sition relative to its satisfaction in a relevant “interpretation”.
Therefore, if we are concerned with what propositions follow from theories
expressed in classical logics, then we can study the question both from the
perspective of their model theories, and from the perspective of the properties
(inference rules) that these model theories actually obey.
Now there is an argument that, in the case of defeasible extensions to
classical formalisms, it is desirable to retain as many of these properties as
possible. I.e., the argument goes that the inferential character of defeasible
(or nonmonotonic) formalisms should only deviate from classical formalisms
where necessary in order to effectively take into account the exceptions.
KLM discussed which properties to retain for nonmonotonic inference
(specifically in the context of propositional logic) and agreed upon the ones
we recapped in Section 2.8.1. Reformulating these properties for the DL case
is a straightforward affair [42, Definition 2] but explicit motivation for why
they should be satisfied in this setting is still missing in the literature.
We address this concisely in the following subsections by using real world
examples to indicate why it is sensible for defeasible reasoning mechanisms
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in DLs to satisfy these properties.
3.2.1 Formal Properties
We recap here the formal properties that should be satisfied by rational
nonmonotonic consequence relations interpreted in the context of DLs [42,
Definition 2]. While it has been argued by KLM that these properties should
be satisfied by nonmonotonic extensions of propositional logic, it has not
been sufficiently argued in the DL case.
Here we motivate with examples that it is sensible to require that these
properties be satisfied for nonmonotonic extensions of DLs as well. It is
important to note that we do not claim that these are the only properties
that should be satisfied by nonmonotonic extensions of DLs. Rather, we
recommend that these are the minimal properties that should be satisfied in
order to be called rational.
Of course, motivation of abstract properties of this nature in logic is a
philosophical matter. Hence, there are likely to be various competing per-
spectives to our own about these properties. Our general view is that we
are confident in the integrity of these properties as minimal requirements
of a rational nonmonotonic reasoning behaviour, but, at the same time, we
are open to possible variants of these properties. That is, if there are any
disagreements with these properties, it is more likely that they could be re-
solved with fairly minor modifications to the properties, rather than entirely
omitting any of them as requirements of rational nonmonotonic inference.
The properties we are discussing pertain to a notion of defeasible conse-
quence with respect to DLs. “Consequence” here can be interpreted on both
the object and entailment levels. As we know, in classical DLs, subsumption
defines the main notion of consequence (between DL concepts) on the object
level. Therefore, the properties we are going to present essentially define a
class of notions of (defeasible) subsumption (i.e., exactly those which satisfy
the properties themselves).
We define a defeasible conditional relation ; (a placeholder for our var-
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ious possible notions of subsumption) as a binary relation on the concept
language for ALC. We recommend that any ; should satisfy the following
seven properties (the KLM properties) where C, D and E represent ALC
concepts:
(Ref) C ; C (LLE)
|= C ≡ D, C ; E
D ; E
(And)
C ; D, C ; E
C ; D u E
(Or)
C ; E, D ; E
C tD ; E
(RW)
C ; D, |= D v E
C ; E
(CM)
C ; D, C ; E
C uD ; E
(RM)
C ; E, C 6; ¬D
C uD ; E
One possible reading of the sentence C ; D is “D is plausibly derivable from
C”. In this sense, C ; D can be thought of as a general form for default
statements in DLs. We can either directly substitute or interpret default
statements from specific defeasible DL formalisms in this more general de-
fault form to evaluate the particular formalism against the above postulates.
We discuss the merit of any such notion of defeasible subsumption abiding
by these properties below, together with some motivating examples for the
context of DLs.
Reflexivity (Ref): The reflexivity property is quite uncontentious and intu-
itive. Since ; is considered here as a relation between ALC concepts, we
have to consider the semantics of concepts when interpreting this property.
Obviously, we know that classical subsumption respects (Ref) because a set is
always a (nonstrict) subset of itself. However, classical subsumption is mono-
tonic and is therefore not a relevant interpretation of ; for our purposes. ;
has to be interpreted as a defeasible notion of subsumption.
An important agreement to make is our natural language reading of ;,
i.e., the intuitive notion of defeasible consequence that this relation is in-
tended to capture on the object level. Given a conditional sentence C ; D
where C and D are ALC concepts we choose the reading “usually, objects
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having the property C also have the property D”. It is clear, given this read-
ing, that (Ref) is a sensible constraint to satisfy for defeasible inference in
DLs. In fact, “usually, objects having the property C also have the property
C” is a tautological statement4 no matter our interpretation of usually.
Left Logical Equivalence (LLE): Left logical equivalence holds that, if two
sets are logically indistinguishable (contain the same elements), then either
set will share the same “default” properties.
For example, consider the concepts Student and Person u ∃enrolledIn.
EducationalInstitution representing the set of all students and the set of all
persons that are enrolled at some educational institution, respectively.
If the aforementioned concepts actually refer to the same set of objects
from the domain of discourse, and it is further known that students usually
don’t pay taxes, then nothing is preventing us from concluding that persons
who are enrolled at educational institutions also usually don’t pay taxes.
This is, of course, all predicated on the fact that we accept the constraint
|= Student ≡ Person u ∃enrolledIn. EducationalInstitution. That is, exceptions
are not permitted to this equivalence.
It then makes sense to attribute the properties typically associated with
Student, to Person u ∃enrolledIn.EducationalInstitution as well, since these are
just distinct names for describing the same set of entities in the domain.
(And): If it is known that Swedes are usually tall, and it is also known that
Swedes are usually blonde, (And) endorses the conclusion that Swedes are
usually both tall and blonde.
A description more reminiscent of the concept semantics of DLs is that: if
we can usually attribute the property of tallness and blondeness to the same
group of entities in the domain, then there appears to be no rational reason
to prevent both properties to be attributed simultaneously to the group.
In other words, no matter our formalisation of “usually”, we talk here
about two typical (although independent) properties of the same group (i.e.,
Swedes), and if we are willing to defeasibly attribute these properties to
4Note the hint at supraclassicality in the statement.
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Swedes independently, then it makes sense to attribute them simultaneously
to this group.
(Or): If it is known that Swedes are usually tall, and it is also known in-
dependently that basketball players are usually tall, (Or) endorses that a
group of entities consisting of either Swedes or basketball players (or both)
are usually tall as well.
If we interpret this rule in the setting of propositional logic, it implies
that if independent premises lead to the same defeasible conclusion then
their disjunction is still sufficient to entail that conclusion. Essentially this
property defines a compelling condition under which a specific generalisation
or inductive inference can be made.
In other words, if I can attribute a default property to a number of (pos-
sibly disjoint) sets of these entities, then I can attribute the default property
to the union of these sets of entities. This is a fairly straightforward and
intuitive property to retain from classical logic.
Right weakening (RW): If it is known that mechanics are usually male, and
that males infallibly have a Y -chromosome, then (RW) will endorse the con-
clusion that mechanics usually have a Y -chromosome. In other words, it
makes sense to attribute to the typical properties of a group, all its univer-
sally true meta-properties.
An alternative description is that if I am ready to attach a plausible
attribute to a group of entities, then I should also be ready to attach to these
entities all strict (universally true) conclusions from this plausible attribute.
(RW) actually defines a property which is similar to transitivity for ;
even though it is not the natural translation of classical transitivity. A nat-
ural translation of the classical transitivity property for ; is:
(Trans)
C ; D, D ; E
C ; E
However, endorsement of (Trans) is perilous because, in the propositional
case, KLM have showed that, in the presence of (Ref), (LLE), (RW), (And),
(Or), (CM), (Trans) is equivalent to monotonicity [111] and, by application
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of these aforementioned properties, it can easily be shown that this result
generalises to the DL case as well.
Of course, transitivity would not be a useful property to endorse for de-
feasible consequence because, for example, if high school dropouts are usually
adults, and adults are usually employed, one should not necessarily conclude
that high school dropouts are usually employed [165, Section 2]. In one par-
ticular interpretation of usually, this example alludes to the problem with
accepting (Trans). That is, just because I believe that high school dropouts
are usually adults, it does not mean that I believe that they are typical
adults. It may be that they are abnormal sorts of adults (w.r.t. to some
attribute). Therefore, the next statement: adults are usually employed, may
lose the transitive link with the first statement because we may be implicitly
referring to typical adults in the second statement.
Cautious Monotonicity (CM): The last two properties we discuss are perhaps
the most interesting and significant ones when it comes to defining defeasible
inference mechanisms. This is because these properties simulate “weaker”
forms of monotonicity.
In other words, the idea here is that just because we do not want defeasible
inference mechanisms to be monotonic in general (indeed that is the very
property we want to avoid in general), it shouldn’t mean that we should not
abide by some “cumulative reasoning” properties.
Classical monotonicity says that: “in all circumstances, all facts stated
before still have to hold and peacefully coexist with new facts as they come
to light”. In other words, in this case reasoning is always cumulative.
However, just because we do not want cumulativity to hold all of the time,
it does not mean that it is not a reasonable inferential behaviour in some
circumstances. Cautious monotonicity (and later Rational monotonicity)
are proposals for isolated circumstances in which monotonic (or cumulative)
reasoning behaviour is perhaps still sensible to inform defeasible consequence.
While C ; E is sufficient grounds for (M) to be able to endorse CuD ;
E (for any D), (CM) is more “cautious” by only allowing D’s that can be
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plausibly derived from C. For example, one may accept that cakes are usually
delicious, and whereas this is sufficient information for (M) to conclude that
cakes made with rotten eggs are also usually delicious, (CM) will only allow
one to draw this conclusion if rotten eggs are a typical property of cakes
(which, as we know, they are not).
To give a positive example for (CM): if we accept that cakes are usually
delicious, then (CM) will accept that cakes containing sugar are also usually
delicious because the property of containing sugar can be plausibly attributed
to cakes themselves (i.e., cakes usually contain sugar).
Rational Monotonicity (RM): Rational monotonicity is inferentially stronger
(more permissive) than (CM). That is, (RM) poses weaker premises than
(CM) from which one can make the same cumulative inference. It holds
that given C ; E (E is plausibly derivable from C), as long as one cannot
plausibly derive the negation of D from C, then adding D to our knowledge
does not affect our plausibility of deriving E.
To use the cake example, if we know that cakes are usually delicious,
and we cannot say that cakes usually don’t contain salt (there may indeed
be recipes of cakes that contain a smidge of salt), then it is reasonable to
conclude that cakes containing salt are usually delicious.
Essentially, there is no indication in our premises that the ingredient of
salt is “abnormal” in cakes, and therefore, its presence in cakes shouldn’t
affect what plausible inferences we can draw about cakes in general.
It is worth mentioning that (RM) is slightly different in form to the afore-
mentioned properties in that it is a “negative” property. That is, it talks
about things that we don’t know in addition to what we know in its premises,
whereas the other properties only discuss what we do know.
This latter aspect of (RM) becomes more significant in Section 3.2.2 when
we discuss some semi-formal properties of nonmonotonic inference.
In conclusion, w.r.t. the properties discussed above, KLM recommend
that they be satisfied by any nonmonotonic ; that is to be considered “ra-
tional” and we agree with this view. Again, this is not to say that we believe
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these are the only properties that such a relation should obey, but rather
that these are the minimal properties to respect.
Indeed our main argument, from the examples we have given, is that
there seems to be no reason not to obey any of these properties. Hence, if
any nonmonotonic consequence relation for DLs does not obey one or more
of these properties, it is likely to diminish the logical merit of this relation
(at least somewhat).
It is also worth mentioning that some of the properties mentioned in this
section are actually derived from other more elementary properties which are
documented in the literature [111]. In other words, satisfaction of certain
combinations of these elementary properties may imply satisfaction of one of
the properties discussed here.
3.2.2 Semi-Formal Properties
Although we have motivated that the logical properties in Section 3.2.1
should be satisfied by nonmonotonic extensions for DLs, it may make sense
for these extensions to satisfy additional logical properties as well. There has
been some interesting work (in the setting of propositional logic) to identify
some of these properties and also relate them to the existing ones [26].
Yet, beyond the realm of formal properties, there appear to be other
“inferential rules” that seem very reasonable to obey but are difficult to
describe in a formal sense. Such rules can, however, be explained intuitively.
Daniel Lehmann discussed five such rules in his exposition of Lexicographic
Closure for a defeasible extension of propositional logic [116].
We now discuss these properties in the context of DLs and motivate their
applicability in defining rational defeasible entailment regimes.
Presumption of typicality: Given concepts C, D, E and the premise C ; E,
supposing that C ; ¬D is not endorsed, we have to accept C u D ; E
according to (RM). However, if C ; ¬D is endorsed, we can either accept
or not accept C uD ; E. Either option is consistent with (RM).
Presumption of typicality prefers to endorse cumulativity unless there is
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compelling evidence not to. That is, we prefer to endorse C uD ; E. For
DLs this means that we should be ready to treat any subclass of entities
of some more general class as typical members of this class, unless there is
explicit evidence to the contrary.
For example, suppose we know of a student named John, and we also
know that students usually don’t pay taxes. Assuming we have no other
information, we must endorse that it is plausible that John does not pay
taxes. If we later find out that John is employed then we should still endorse
that John plausibly does not pay taxes, because we do not know anything
about employed students which differentiates them from typical students.
In other words, given our information, there is nothing to suggest that
employed students are exceptional. This is the idea behind presumption of
typicality: presume that we are in a typical situation unless there is evidence
to the contrary. An example of such evidence for our example is, of course,
finding out that employed students are usually obliged to pay taxes. In such
a case we would realise that employed students are exceptional w.r.t. typical
students (because they conflict w.r.t. the property of paying taxes).
This is clearly a very reasonable property to endorse for defeasible in-
ference in a variety of situations. Not accepting this property would define
a more cautious or skeptical reasoning behaviour which may be desirable
in certain settings. However, if a more adventurous reasoning behaviour is
required, then presumption of typicality is a sensible rule to obey.
Presumption of independence: Presumption of independence takes a step
further from presumption of typicality. If I know that students usually don’t
pay taxes (Student ; ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)) but I also know that students
are usually not married (Student ; ¬(∃marriedTo.Person)), then should I
accept the conclusion that students who are married usually don’t pay taxes
(Student u ∃marriedTo.Person ; (¬∃receives.TaxInvoice))?
One argument is that we shouldn’t accept this conclusion because if stu-
dents are usually not married, it means that married students refer to an
atypical subclass of students, and it therefore seems reasonable in some sense
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to be cautious in transferring the property of not paying taxes to these stu-
dents. However, presumption of independence endorses the conclusion that
married students usually don’t pay taxes. The argument for this is obvi-
ously that matrimonial matters and tax paying status are independent of
each other (from an intuitive perspective).
Yet another reading of this property can be: if no relationship is specified
between two classes of entities (representing default properties) then one can
presume that there is none. Therefore, just because a student is married, if
there is no evidence to suggest it, one should not assume that it affects their
tax paying status.
Priority to typicality: Sometimes the conclusions of presumption of indepen-
dence and presumption of typicality conflict with each other. The question
arises: which rule should we prefer in such circumstances?
Daniel Lehmann argues in the propositional case that one should give
preference to presumption of typicality. We agree with this view in the DL
case as well and motivate with an example.
Suppose we know that students generally don’t pay taxes. Suppose we
also know that students who are employed generally do pay taxes. Presump-
tion of typicality endorses the conclusion that students who are employed
and have children generally do pay taxes, because there is no other infor-
mation forcing us to derive that students who are employed generally don’t
have children (i.e., that employed students who have children are abnormal
employed students).
However, applying presumption of independence, we can derive that stu-
dents who are employed and have children generally do pay taxes (same as
above), as well as, the conclusion that students who are employed and have
children generally do not pay taxes.
The former conclusion is derived because we presume that the properties
of having children and tax paying status are independent. The latter conclu-
sion is derived because we presume that being employed and having children
is independent of tax paying status. Since it is clear that accepting both the
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above conclusions is contradictory, we have to pick just one.
We therefore look to presumption of typicality to resolve the conflict
and accept whatever conclusion that this rule endorses. Presumption of
typicality cannot lead to the dichotomous conclusions that presumption of
independence can sometimes lead to, because the rule purely inherits the
properties of the typical members of the given antecedent class (and these
properties themselves will be consistent w.r.t. each other).
Respect for specificity: One may usually attribute some property to a general
class of objects, but, if some property of a subclass of these objects clashes
with the property attributed to the general class, then what should we do?
Should we prefer to “override” the property of the general class (i.e., prefer
information that is more specific) or should we prefer to retain the property
of the general class (i.e., reject the more specific information)?
Students usually don’t pay taxes, employed students are more specific
types of students and they usually do pay taxes. Even more specific than
employed students are those employed students who have children (they may
receive tax exemptions based on their situation). Note the violation of mono-
tonicity in this reasoning behaviour.
In other words, if I wish to draw some conclusion about the tax paying
status of a particular student, I should prefer to use the maximum knowledge
(the most specific knowledge) available about this student in order to inform
my conclusion. In this connection, we humans tend to regard inferences made
using more specific information about the premise, to be more sound than
inferences made using less (more general) information about the premise.
This is certainly rational behaviour and harks back to what we said about
incomplete knowledge in Section 2.3. That is, having incomplete knowledge
about a situation is often the very circumstance forcing us to make defeasible
statements in the first place. As the saying goes, “knowledge is power”, and
the more (reliable) knowledge we have about a situation, the more we should
trust the inferences drawn about it.
In other words, more specific information about a situation is more infor-
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mation about it and would thus lead to more sound inferences about it.
Avoidance of junk: This property simply says that we should endorse the
least number of conclusions that are induced by the formal and semi-formal
properties on a starting set of premises. In other words, among all the
consequence relations satisfying all the properties, the ones we should choose
are those that are smallest (according to set inclusion).
3.3 Discussion
In this chapter we started off by giving quantitative evidence suggesting that
the need for defeasible representation in DL-based ontologies is significant.
We also motivated the main inferential properties that one should retain from
classical logics when moving to the defeasible case (for DLs).
While we argued for the minimal properties that defeasible mechanisms
should satisfy, there remains work to be done in studying properties that are
related to the aforementioned ones and comparing them in terms of inferential
strength a la Bezzazi, Makinson and Pérez [26].
There may also be novel semi-formal properties that one could introduce
to inform defeasible consequence in DLs. In this chapter we focused purely
on generalising Lehmann’s arguments for his five properties, in the propo-
sitional setting, to DLs. Another important issue is the formalisation of
Lehmann’s semi-formal properties. We hold that if such properties could not
be formalised in some way (even under certain restrictions or assumptions),
then their usefulness in defining sensible defeasible entailment is very limited
because we cannot definitively prove if a formalism actually satisfies them.
Investigations are also needed to establish performance requirements of
defeasible reasoning in DLs. Of course, once defeasible formalisms are adopted
and integrated into ontology editing tools, there will be more data from which
to extrapolate projections about this required performance.
Any comments thus far on performance can only be speculative in nature,
because there can be no strong indication of how much longer one should be
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willing to wait for defeasible inference over classical inference.
Just as classical DLs have a series of popular standard and non-standard
reasoning tasks which users most often utilise to gain insight into their ontolo-
gies and attached data, defeasible DLs are yet to establish the most pertinent
standard and non-standard reasoning tasks for this setting.
We foresee that it is not just a straightforward reformulation of analo-
gous reasoning tasks for the defeasible context. Principles such as concept
unsatisfiability and ontology inconsistency would invariably have different
meanings in the defeasible context. Non-standard tasks such as classification
would also need to be reformulated and redefined for the defeasible case (if
these are actually interesting reasoning problems in the new context).
Finally, there may be other novel reasoning problems that are unique
to the defeasible case. For example, one may want to calculate the list of
exceptions (exceptional entities) in an ontology of defeasible statements. One
may also require to compute the hierarchy of exceptions (the exceptions-to-
exceptions taxonomy) of the ontology.
Such considerations need to be investigated and formalised, if need be,
in order to pave the way for integration and development of defeasible rep-




This chapter introduces algorithms for computing various notions of defea-
sible entailment within the context of preferential DLs. Each form of en-
tailment mentioned herein has its respective strengths and weaknesses, and
we discuss these when we present each proposal. A substantial advantage
to our algorithms are that they reduce to a series of classical DL entailment
checks, and hence, we start off this chapter by explaining how this reduction
works and why it is possible. We then establish an algorithm for deciding if
a defeasible subsumption is in the Rational Closure of a defeasible KB.
Section 2.8.2 explained that Rational Closure is the only known ratio-
nal consequence relation that exhibits both syntax-independence and a clear
model-theoretic definition. The remainder of the algorithms in this chapter
compute syntax-dependent variants of Rational Closure, which serve as alter-
natives to its cautious reasoning paradigm. While these algorithms all follow
the basic structure of the Rational Closure algorithm, they all have significant
differences from this basic structure. For each algorithm, we demonstrate the
computational complexity, termination, soundness and completeness.
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4.1 Exceptionality to Classical Entailment
The central notion of reasoning with DLs that express defeasible subsump-
tion is concept exceptionality (Definition 14 on Page 91). Firstly, we recall
that concept exceptionality induces an a priori ordering on the defeasible
subsumptions in a defeasible KB. This ordering is determined by the de-
gree of exceptionality of the defeasible subsumptions in the KB, and Defini-
tions 17 and 18 allude to a procedure for computing this ordering. We will
present such a procedure later in the chapter and the reader will notice that
it forms the core of all our presented algorithms for deciding defeasible en-
tailment. For now, we prove some foundational properties of ranked models
which are useful to demonstrate how verification of concept exceptionality
can be accomplished using classical DL entailment.
4.1.1 Disjoint Union of Ranked Interpretations
In this section we generalise the definition of disjoint union of interpreta-
tions [109, Lemma 11], [10, Theorem 5.12], [168, Section 6.7] from classical
DLs to preferential DLs. We show that, in the preferential case, we have two
notions of disjoint union (DU for short) of ranked interpretations. We also
prove some properties of these constructions which are useful in the sequel.
We start off by recalling the definition of disjoint union of interpretations in
the classical DL case.
Definition 26 (DU of Interpretations) Let K be a classical DL TBox
and I = {I1, ..., In} a finite set of interpretations s.t. ∆I1 , . . . ,∆In are pair-
wise disjoint. Then, the disjoint union of each Ii in I (denoted by I =
⊎
I )
is defined as I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 where ∆I =
n⋃
i=1







RIi for any concept name A (resp. role name R).
It turns out that, for ALC, the disjoint union of an arbitrary set of models
for a TBox is also a model for the TBox. This is known as the disjoint union
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model property and is a well known result in the literature [109, Lemma
11], [128], [10, Theorem 5.12], [168, Section 6.7], although we restate it here.
Lemma 1 (DU of Models are Models) Given an ALC TBox K, a finite
set of models I for K (all of whose domains are pairwise disjoint) and
I =
⊎
I , then I  K.
A direct proof for Lemma 1 on Page 132 is elusive in the DL literature.
However, it is known that DLs have a close correspondence with Modal Log-
ics [172, 173, 58] and there is an indirect proof in this setting [59, Lemma
4.2] that can be adapted for Lemma 1.
Now, in the preferential case, we wish to define a similar notion of dis-
joint union but for ranked interpretations. Because of the stratification of the
domain elements in ranked interpretations, one can define two notions of dis-
joint union: horizontal and vertical disjoint union of ranked interpretations.
Loosely speaking, a horizontal disjoint union of ranked interpretations places
the candidate ranked interpretations “side-by-side” next to each other when
taking their union, while a vertical disjoint union of ranked interpretations
“piles” the ranked interpretations one-by-one on top of each other.
Definition 27 (Horizontal DU of Ranked Interpretations)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a finite set of ranked interpretations R =
{R1, ...,Rn} for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. ∆R1 , . . . ,∆Rn are pairwise disjoint, the horizon-
tal disjoint union of each ranked interpretation in R (denoted by R =  R)
is defined as R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 where ∆R =
n⋃
i=1
∆Ri, ·R is defined s.t. AR =
n⋃
i=1
ARi and RR =
n⋃
i=1
RRi for any concept name A (resp. role name R),
and ≺R is defined s.t. the rank of each element x ∈ ∆R is the same as
its rank in its “original” ranked interpretation. That is, for each x ∈ ∆R,
rkR(x) = rkRi(x) if and only if x ∈ ∆Ri for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
It is clear that Definition 27 on Page 132 closely mirrors Definition 26 on
Page 131 except that, in addition, we have to handle the ordering component
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of ranked interpretations in Definition 27. We prove that the disjoint union
model property extends to the horizontal disjoint union of ranked models as
well.
Lemma 2 (Horizontal DU of Ranked Models are Ranked Models)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, a finite set of ranked models R for 〈T ,D〉
(all of whose domains are pairwise disjoint) and R = R, then R  〈T ,D〉.
Proof: The proof is quite straightforward and would be analogous to a proof
(in the DL case) for Lemma 1 on Page 132. Notice from Definition 27
on Page 132 that we are not altering the interpretation of the elements in
the combined ranked interpretation (i.e., they inherit their interpretation
from their originating ranked model). In addition, we notice that for each
C @∼D ∈ D, rkR(C) = min{rkR1(C), ..., rkRn(C)}. In other words, the rank
of the left hand side (LHS) concept C of each defeasible subsumption (in the
combined ranked interpretation) will be the minimal value from the ranks of
C in each constituent ranked model. By definition of ranked model, the min-
imal C objects in this constituent model will have to satisfy D and therefore
will satisfy D in the combined interpretation as well. See Figure 4.1 for a
graphical representation of the proof strategy. 2
We can also define a notion of vertical disjoint union of ranked interpre-
tations. Informally, we place ranked interpretations one-by-one “on top of
each other”. These kinds of constructions differ significantly from horizon-
tal disjoint unions of ranked interpretations because we have to redefine the
ranks of elements of the domain (we cannot preserve the rank of elements
in their originating interpretations as we did previously). Because the se-
quence in which we combine the ranked interpretations will affect the rank
of the elements in the domain, we assume an ordering on the given ranked
interpretations. That is, we have to specify the order in which we pile the
interpretations on top of each other.












Figure 4.1: Graphical illustration of constructing the horizontal disjoint union of ranked
interpretations R1, ..., Rn to form R.
Definition 28 (Vertical DU of Ranked Interpretations) We let 〈T ,D〉
be a defeasible KB and R = {R1, ...,Rn} a finite ordered set of ranked
interpretations s.t. ∆R1 , . . . ,∆Rn are pairwise disjoint, the vertical disjoint
union of each ranked interpretation in R (denoted by R =  R or R =
R1 ... Rn) is defined as R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 where ∆R =
n⋃
i=1
∆Ri, ·R is de-
fined s.t. AR =
n⋃
i=1
ARi and RR =
n⋃
i=1
RRi for any concept name A (resp. role
name R), and ≺R is defined s.t. for each x ∈ ∆R ∩∆R1, rkR(x) = rkR1(x)
and for each x′ ∈ ∆R∩∆Ri, rkR(x′) = (max(R1)+...+max(Ri−1))+rkRi(x′)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 28 on Page 133 is analogous to Definition 27 on Page 132 except for
the treatment of the ranks of elements of the interpretation domain. Taking
the simple case of combining just two ranked interpretations, we keep the
ranks, say 0 to k, of the first ranked interpretation R1 the same. Then, when
we add the second ranked interpretation R2, we set the rank of the elements
in the first “level” of R2 to k + 1 and those in the second rank to k + 2
etc. (max(R1) + rkR2(x)). We can also prove that the disjoint union model
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property extends to the vertical disjoint union of ranked models.
Lemma 3 (Vertical DU of Ranked Models are Ranked Models)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, a finite ordered set of ranked models R for
〈T ,D〉 (all of whose domains are pairwise disjoint) and R = R, then
R  〈T ,D〉.
Proof: We prove the simplest case of combining two ranked models and then,
by induction, the result extends to the general case. Let R1 and R2 be two
ranked models for 〈T ,D〉 and letR = R1R2 be their vertical disjoint union.
Suppose thatR 6 〈T ,D〉. This means that for some C @∼D ∈ D, R 6 C @∼D.
This, in turn, means that there is an x ∈ min≺R(CR)∩ (¬D)R. Picking such
an x we can show that there are only two cases. Either x ∈ (C u ¬D)R1 or
x ∈ (C u ¬D)R2 because x, by Definition 28 on Page 133, has exactly one
ranked interpretation from which it can originate.
Case 1: x ∈ (C u ¬D)R1 . Assume that x 6∈ min≺R1 (C
R1), this means that
there is a y ∈ CR1 s.t. rkR1(y) < rkR1(x). We pick a minimal such y, i.e.,
s.t. there is no z ∈ CR1 s.t. rkR1(z) < rkR1(y). Therefore, y ∈ min≺R1 (C
R1).
But ∆R1 ⊆ ∆R and thus we know that x, y ∈ ∆R. In addition, CR = CR1 ∪
CR2 because of Definition 28 on Page 133 and therefore x, y ∈ CR. Because
the interpretation R2 is placed “on top of” R1 it means that the elements of
R1 are lower than the elements of R2 in the combined interpretation R. And
because y ∈ min≺R1 (C
R1), it must be the case that y ∈ min≺R(CR) (there is
no element of R that is more minimal than y, satisfying the same property).
But this means that x is not a minimal element of CR (x 6∈ min≺R(CR))
because y is more minimal than x. This is a contradiction with our earlier
observation that x ∈ min≺R(CR) ∩ (¬D)R.
Case 2: x ∈ (C u ¬D)R2 . Assume that x 6∈ min≺R2 (C
R2), this means that
there is a y ∈ CR2 s.t. rkR2(y) < rkR2(x). We pick a minimal such y, i.e.,
s.t. there is no z ∈ CR2 s.t. rkR2(z) < rkR2(y). Therefore, y ∈ min≺R2 (C
R2).
It is important to note that there can be no C’s in R1 because otherwise
it would not be possible that the C’s in the “top” interpretation R2 can be
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minimal w.r.t. R. Therefore, y must be a minimal element C w.r.t. R. Just
like Case 1, we have that x is not a minimal element of CR (x 6∈ min≺R(CR))
anymore, because y is more minimal than x. Therefore, we have a contra-
diction with the assumption that x ∈ min≺R(CR) ∩ (¬D)R.
Therefore our supposition that R 6 〈T ,D〉 is false and we accept that
R  〈T ,D〉. 2
4.1.2 Exceptionality in Terms of Unsatisfiability
Recall that a concept C is exceptional w.r.t. a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 if
〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. It turns out that if our language is propositional (even
restricting the ALC concept language defined in Section 2.1.1 to boolean
operators and connectives), then checking exceptionality of C w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉
corresponds to checking (un)satisfiability of C (in a classical sense) w.r.t. the
classical counterpart of 〈T ,D〉 [117, Lemma 5.21 and Corollary 5.22]. Here
we take propositional ALC to define the following concept language:
C ::= A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C u C | C t C
As we can see, this language is a subset of the full concept language for ALC
given in Section 2.1.1. We take the semantics of propositional ALC to be
analogously defined to standard ALC (but restricted to the above vocab-
ulary). Returning to the relationship between concept unsatisfiability and
concept exceptionality, we restate the lemma showing their correspondence:
Lemma 4 (Exceptionality vs. Unsatisfiability in Propositional ALC)
〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C if and only if T ∪D′ |= > v ¬C for any finite 〈T ,D〉 and
C represented in propositional ALC.
It is fairly straightforward to see that the introduction of roles in full ALC
causes this correspondence to be broken:
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Proposition 1 (Exceptionality vs. Unsatisfiability in ALC) 〈T ,D〉 |=r
> @∼ ¬C if and only if T ∪ D′ |= > v ¬C for any finite 〈T ,D〉 and C repre-
sented in ALC.
“ =⇒ ”: The contrapositive is: If T ∪ D′ 6|= C v ⊥ then 〈T ,D〉 6|=r > @∼ ¬C.
There is a model I for T ∪ D′ s.t. there is an x ∈ CI . We can see that I
can be considered a ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 where ∆R = ∆I , ·I = ·R
and ≺R:= rk : ∆R → {0}. We have to show that (i) R is a ranked model
for 〈T ,D〉 and (ii) that xR is such that xR ∈ min≺R(∆R) and xR ∈ CR.
For (i), we can see that R satisfies each X @∼ Y ∈ D because I satisfies each
X v Y ∈ D′, ·I = ·R and min≺R(XR) ⊆ XI . For (ii), it is clear that
xR ∈ CR because ·I = ·R and x ∈ CI . It is also clear that xR ∈ min≺R(∆R)
because rk(xR) = 0.
“ ⇐= ”: (counter-example) let T = ∅, D = {> @∼ ¬X,C @∼ ∃R.X} then,
T ∪D′ |= > v ¬C but 〈T ,D〉 6|=r > @∼ ¬C because, considering the following
ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 , where ∆R = {a, b}, CR = {a}, XR = {b},
RR = {(a, b)}, rk(a) = 0 and rk(b) = 1, R 6 > @∼ ¬C. 2
The fact that exceptionality doesn’t correspond with unsatisfiability in full
ALC is actually a positive consequence of the semantics of defeasible sub-
sumption and exceptionality. In the counter-example to Proposition 1 on
Page 137, the unsatisfiability of C is “caused” by the unsatisfiability of X
(w.r.t. T ∪D′). This is justifiably intuitive because: “if all C’s have at least
one relationship to some X but there are no X’s then there cannot be any
C’s either”.
W.r.t. exceptionality, however, the exceptionality of X is not propagated
to C (w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉). This is also justifiably intuitive because: “if X’s are
exceptional and C’s have at least one relationship to some X then it doesn’t
mean that C is exceptional”. That is, just because I am related to someone
who is exceptional doesn’t necessarily mean that I am exceptional as well.
While this behaviour bodes well for an intuitive semantics, the issue with
roles that we highlighted above means that we still have the problem of re-
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ducing exceptionality to classical DL entailment for full ALC (and any DL
with roles). However, we do have some useful information from Proposition 1
on Page 137. That is, we know that the “left to right” direction of the cor-
respondence does hold. This tells us that exceptionality is logically stronger
than (classical) unsatisfiability. In other words, we know that exceptionality
characterises a certain kind of unsatisfiability.
The counter-model pattern R for Proposition 1 on Page 137, illustrated
in Figure 4.2, seems to suggest that unsatisfiabilities caused directly by a role





〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 6 > @∼ ¬C
Figure 4.2: Intuitive semantics: exceptionality is not propagated through roles for the
counter-example in Proposition 1.
Thus our general claim is: exceptionality corresponds to “propositional un-
satisfiability” in ALC. The remainder of this section is concerned with for-
malising “propositional unsatisfiability” for ALC and proving this claim.
Intuitively speaking, what we mean by propositional unsatisfiability is
that we exclude cases where the unsatisfiability of a concept is derived di-
rectly from the unsatisfiability of a role filler in the KB (like the counter-
example illustrated in Figure 4.2).
There is evidence in support of our claim because we notice that unsatisfi-
ability and exceptionality correspond in the propositional case (Lemma 4 on
Page 136), and therefore, it must be the case that the issue with roles is the
only barrier to a correspondence for ALC because all the non-propositional
features of ALC concern roles.
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In order to exclude from consideration all those unsatisfiabilities caused
by roles, we need a way of “localising” our view to individual objects in an
interpretation domain without placing constraints from the KB on its neigh-
bourhood (all other objects in the interpretation domain which are related to
the given object via some role). We use materialisation and internalisation
(well known in the context of propositional logic) to achieve this:
Definition 29 (Materialisation) The materialisation of a classical DL sub-
sumption C v D (resp. defeasible DL subsumption C @∼D) is ¬C tD. The
materialisation of a set of classical DL subsumptions T (resp. defeasible DL
subsumptions D) is the set consisting of the materialisations for each sub-
sumption in T (resp. D). We denote the materialisation of a subsumption
α by mat(α), and the materialisation of a set of subsumptions K by mat(K).
Definition 29 on Page 139 is central to defining the internalisation of a KB:
Definition 30 (Internalisation) Let K be a set of DL subsumptions (each
of which is either classical or defeasible), the internalisation of K is defined
as:
d
mat(K). We denote the internalisation of K by the concept CK.
The notion of internalisation allows us to isolate our view to objects in an in-
terpretation without placing constraints on its neighbourhood. For example,
given the KB 〈T ,D〉 in the counter-example to Proposition 1 on Page 137,
we have that C is not exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 but yet C is unsatisfiable
w.r.t. T ∪ D. This unsatisfiability is caused directly by the role filler for
R being unsatisfiable. We would like to exclude these kinds of cases from
consideration when characterising exceptionality for ALC.
The good news is that when we internalise our knowledge to obtain CT ∪D′ ,
we indeed exclude these cases because we find that 6|= CT ∪D′ v ¬C1. The
1Note that, in the propositional case, a classical KB and its internalised form corre-
spond exactly in terms of their entailments. Indeed, this is the deduction theorem for
propositional logics [91, 69, 189]. Our results are based on the fact that the deduction
theorem does not generalise to ALC as illustrated by our examples.
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statement |= CT ∪D′ v ¬C means that the axiom CT ∪D′ v ¬C is logically
valid (or satisfied) in any interpretation for CT ∪D′ and C and, therefore,
because we have that 6|= CT ∪D′ v ¬C, we know that there is an object z s.t.
z ∈ (CT ∪D′)I ∩ CI for some classical interpretation I.
We give a simple example I for which this is the case: ∆I = {a, b},
XI = {b}, CI = {a} and RI = {(a, b)}. It is clear that (CT ∪D′)I = {a}.
It is clear that internalisation, and the accompanying validity approach,
does not place constraints on the neighbourhood of the object being consid-
ered. For example, in our interpretation I above, we see that the object b is
in the neighbourhood of a and belongs to the concept XI . However, it is not
possible for such a b to exist in a model for T ∪D′ since > v ¬X appears in
T ∪D′ and this constraint enforces that each object in each model for T ∪D′
cannot belong to the interpretation of X.
In particular from this approach, we notice that neighbourhood objects
are allowed to violate any axiom in our defeasible KB (either in T or D′).
However, this behaviour does not accurately reflect the ranked model seman-
tics of exceptionality. That is, it can be shown that given any 〈T ,D〉, each
ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 is s.t. for each z ∈ ∆R, z ∈ (CT )R. The following
lemma demonstrates this.
Lemma 5 (Ranked Models Classically Satisfy T ) Let R be a ranked
model for some defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉. Let I be the classical DL interpretation
〈∆I , ·I〉 such that ∆I = ∆R and ·I = ·R. Then I is a model for T .
Proof: We know that R  T because R  〈T ,D〉. Assume that I is not a
model for T . Therefore, there is a C v D ∈ T s.t. there is an x ∈ CI and
x 6∈ DI . This must mean that x ∈ CR and x 6∈ DR because ∆I = ∆R and
·I = ·R. But this is a contradiction with R  T . Therefore, I  T . 2
Lemma 5 on Page 140 shows that every element in a ranked model for a
defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 must satisfy each axiom in T . Therefore, applied to
our context of internalising knowledge from the defeasible KB, it should only
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be the defeasible subsumptions in the KB that can be violated by exceptional
objects (whereas our classical subsumptions should not be violated).
The following example illustrates this: let T = {A v ∃R.B,∃R.X v
¬C,B v X} and D = {B @∼ ¬C,> @∼ A t B}. We can see that C is ex-
ceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 but that 6|= CT ∪D′ v ¬C. The following interpreta-
tion I demonstrates that the latter validity does not hold: ∆I = {a, b},
AI = CI = {a}, BI = {b}, XI = ∅ and RI = {(a, b)}. It is clear that b is
allowed to violate the axiom B v X and this is what causes us to lose the
validity |= CT ∪D′ v ¬C.
Thus, we investigate the approach of internalising purely the defeasible
subsumptions contained in D. We arrive at a formal definition for proposi-
tional unsatisfiability for preferential ALC (and preferential DLs in general):
Definition 31 (Propositional Unsatisfiability for Preferential DLs)
Let T ∪ D′ be the classical counterpart of a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, and C a
concept, C is propositionally unsatisfiable w.r.t. T ∪ D′ if T |= CD′ v ¬C.
Given Definition 31 on Page 141, we now formalise our claim about the cor-
respondence between exceptionality and propositional unsatisfiability. Even
though this claim turns out to be false, it is not as a result of some deficiency
in Definition 31. Rather, it is that propositional unsatisfiability is slightly too
weak to capture exceptionality in full ALC. It actually turns out that there
is a special kind of exceptionality (captured in Definition 15 on Page 92)
called total exceptionality which can be propagated through roles.
Proposition 2 Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB and C a concept. Then, C
is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 if and only if C is propositionally unsatisfiable
w.r.t. T ∪ D′.
“ =⇒ ” (counter-example) T = {X v Y }, D = {X @∼ ¬Y,C @∼ ∃R.X}.
〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C but T 6|= CD′ v ¬C. 2
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The counter-example for Proposition 2 on Page 141 illustrates the occurrence
of totally exceptional LHS concepts of defeasible subsumptions. That is, in
the example, the concept X is totally exceptional w.r.t. the KB.
We have argued in Section 2.8.2 that these kinds of concepts are usually
the result of modelling errors in ontology development because it represents
a form of logical incoherence (see Definition 15 on Page 92). This is essen-
tially the representation of defeasible information which actually “behaves”
as strict information to cause logical incoherence.
For example, the axioms C @∼⊥ and C v ⊥ have the same ranked models.
Therefore, representing C @∼⊥ in the DTBox is actually the same as represent-
ing C v ⊥ in the TBox. Hence, in the above example, the axiom X @∼ ¬Y
is masquerading as defeasible information whereas it should be treated as
strict information since 〈T ,D〉 = 〈{X v Y }, {X @∼ ¬Y,C @∼ ∃R.X}〉 is ranked
equivalent to 〈T̂ , D̂〉 = 〈{X v Y,X v ¬Y }, {C @∼ ∃R.X}〉 (both KBs have
the same ranked models).
Unfortunately, it appears that there is no (declarative) reduction to clas-
sical DL entailment for total exceptionality. However, we will show in Sec-
tion 4.2 that there is a useful operational reduction. We now show that
eliminating the case of total exceptionality (and only this case), gives us a
clean and declarative reduction to classical DL entailment for exceptionality.
We restrict ourselves to 〈T ,D〉’s in which each LHS concept of the sub-
sumptions in D are not totally exceptional. We define such 〈T ,D〉’s as left
hand side coherent (LHS-coherent):
Definition 32 (LHS-coherent) A defeasible KB, 〈T ,D〉, is LHS-coherent
if C is not totally exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 for each C @∼D ∈ D. 〈T ,D〉 is
LHS-incoherent if it is not LHS-coherent.
This leads to a positive result and reduction to classical DL entailment for
exceptionality:
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Theorem 1 (Reducing Exceptionality to Classical DL Entailment)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 which is LHS-coherent, and a concept C, C
is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 if and only if C is propositionally unsatisfiable
w.r.t. T ∪ D′.
Proof: We replace the above statement by its contraposition:
T 6|= CD′ v ¬C if and only if 〈T ,D〉 6|=r > @∼ ¬C.
“ =⇒ ” We pick a model I of T s.t. there exists an x ∈ (CD′)I ∩CI . We will
show that we can construct a ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 from the informa-
tion in I s.t. there is a y ∈ min≺R(∆R)∩CR corresponding to the element x
in ∆I . Our strategy is as follows: we know that 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent so we
know that for each X @∼ Y ∈ D there is a ranked model RX for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. XR
is non-empty. We pick such a ranked model RX for each X @∼ Y ∈ D and let
R be the set containing these models and only these models (i.e.,
⋃
{RX} for
each X @∼ Y ∈ D). We obtain the horizontal disjoint union of these models
R〈T ,D〉 = R (Definition 27 on Page 132). Lemma 2 on Page 133 tells us that
R〈T ,D〉 is a model for 〈T ,D〉. But we also know that I can be considered as a
ranked interpretation RI for 〈T ,D〉 where ∆RI = ∆I , ·RI = ·I , rkRI(z) = 1
for each z ∈ ∆RI\{x} and rkRI(x) = 0. Let R = R〈T ,D〉RI (we place RI
on top of R〈T ,D〉). We make one slight modification to the ranking function
of R. That is, we set rkR(x) = 0 (we push x to the bottom level of R).
It is clear that every element of ∆R satisfies T because we have taken the
disjoint unions of interpretations and we have not changed the interpretation
function for R. It is clear that each element of ∆R satisfies D because the
most minimal X objects (for each X @∼ Y ∈ D) in R satisfy D because R〈T ,D〉
is a model for 〈T ,D〉. We also note that x ∈ CRD′ and so x also satisfies D.
“ ⇐= ” There exists a ranked model, R, such that R  〈T ,D〉 and there
exists an x ∈ CR s.t. rkR(x) = 0. We have to show that there exists a model
I for T such that there exists a y ∈ CD′I ∩ CI . We define an interpretation
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I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 s.t. ∆I = ∆R and ·I = ·R. From Lemma 5 on Page 140 we
know that I  T . We select the element y ∈ ∆I s.t. y = x. All we need to
prove is that y ∈ CD′I . Let us assume that y 6∈ CD′I . This means that there
exists a X @∼ Y ∈ D such that y ∈ XI and y 6∈ Y I . This must mean that
the corresponding x in ∆R is an exceptional element of XR and therefore it
cannot reside on the bottom-most level of R. That is, this is a contradiction
with the fact that rkR(x) = 0. Therefore y ∈ CD′I . 2
We now have an understanding of how exceptionality can be reduced to
classical DL reasoning. In the next section we will show an interesting and
useful a priori ordering of axioms in a defeasible KB based on exceptionality.
Furthermore, we present an algorithm for computing this a priori ordering for
a given defeasible KB. As we shall see, this precompiled view of a defeasible
KB is required for all the defeasible entailment algorithms that we present
in this Chapter (Section 4.3 onwards).
4.2 Ranking of a Defeasible Knowledge Base
As we saw in Chapter 2 there are various approaches for permitting excep-
tions in DL reasoning. It becomes apparent in the presentation of these
approaches that there are some basic issues, with regards to exceptions, that
all such approaches should address. One of these issues is that there must be
some way of handling priorities among defeasible statements in the formalism
under consideration.
Most of the presented approaches in Chapter 2 (except for Rational Clo-
sure and similar entailment regimes) choose to fully “externalise” the priority
relation among defeasible statements. That is, they choose to fully hand over
the specification of this relation to the ontology engineer. While this may give
desirable flexibility to the user to decide which information should override
other information, we argue that this relation should not be completely arbi-
trary. Indeed, many of the proponents of these formalisms agree on specificity
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as one property that should always be satisfied by this relation.
For example, if students usually don’t pay taxes and employed students
usually do pay taxes then, assuming we want to draw inferences about the
tax paying status of students in general, we can apply the first “default”
to conclude that students usually don’t pay taxes. This is certainly the
most reasonable inference to make if we have no other information. On
the other hand, suppose we want to draw generalised inference about the
tax paying status of employed students, then both above defaults become
applicable (employed students are also students). However, applying both
defaults leads to the contradictory situation that employed students pay taxes
and don’t pay taxes.
Clearly one would rather prefer applying the default that takes into ac-
count the most specific (and therefore the most complete) knowledge relevant
to the query. That is, if we are asking about general students it should be
safe to conclude that they generally don’t pay taxes (applying the first de-
fault). Whereas, if we are asking about employed students, knowledge about
employed students specifically should take precedence over knowledge about
more general students (if there is a clash with applying both defaults).
Bonatti et al. [27] characterise priority relations on defaults that are de-
fined by specificity: let K = S ∪D be a finite knowledge base of DIs (D) and
SIs (S). Then the priority relation among the DIs in D (which we denote
by ≺) is defined by specificity if: for any δ1 = C1 vn D1 and δ2 = C2 vn D2
s.t. δ1, δ2 ∈ D, δ1 ≺ δ2 (it is preferred to apply δ1 over δ2) if and only if
S |= C1 v C2 and S 6|= C2 v C1.
The above version of specificity intuitively says that δ1 has a higher prior-
ity than δ2 if and only if C1 is more specific than C2 (according to the strict
information in the KB). We note that it is possible to define several variants
of this property depending on which approach to defeasible reasoning we are
dealing with. For example, we may not want the priority relation to be de-
fined by specificity (this might be too strong). However, we may just want
our priority relation to respect specificity. In other words, the “right-to-left”
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direction of the above definition by Bonatti et al. [27] may be enforced (but
not the other direction). We may also choose to involve the defeasible infor-
mation (in addition to the strict information) when determining specificity.
In fact, we define such a variant at the end of this section for the preferential
reasoning context.
It can be convincingly argued that, at the very least, some version of speci-
ficity should be satisfied by the priority relation on defaults. Interestingly,
preferential reasoning mechanisms such as Rational Closure (see Section 2.8)
abide by this philosophy. We will show in this section, and more broadly
in this chapter, that such approaches presume that specificity should be re-
spected. That is, the property of specificity is “internalised” in the semantics
of Rational Closure and similar constructions.
In fact, the first step in all the procedures we present in this chapter
(including Rational Closure) is to compute the ordering on the defeasible
subsumptions in the defeasible KB. It is possible to compute the ordering
because it is induced by exceptionality (see Definition 14 on Page 91). Con-
sider the following example:












Intuitively speaking, the information represented in Example 15 on Page 146
is that employed students are types of students, students usually aren’t
obliged to pay taxes, employed students usually are obliged, and employed
students who are parents usually aren’t obliged again.
This example illustrates that employed students are exceptional types of
students (w.r.t. paying taxes), and employed students who are parents are ex-
ceptional types of employed students (again w.r.t. paying taxes). Informally
then, we can build an “exceptionality chain” from the antecedent concepts in
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the defeasible subsumptions of 〈T ,D〉. That is, we can conceive of the chain
Student ≺〈T ,D〉 EmployedStudent ≺〈T ,D〉 EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> rep-
resenting the fact that students are the least exceptional entities in 〈T ,D〉,
employed students are exceptional students, and employed students that are
parents are exceptional employed students.
Using the semantics of exceptionality and defeasible subsumption, we can
confirm the correctness of this chain. It is easy to see that one can “realise”
or instantiate a Student object on the bottom-most level of a ranked model
for 〈T ,D〉 (Student is not exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉). One cannot expect
EmployedStudent objects to be able to reside on the bottom-most level as
well because it would lead to a contradictory situation (EmployedStudent is
exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉). Therefore, the lowest level that these objects can
occur on is the second-level of a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. Similarly, the
lowest possible level for EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> objects is the third
level of a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉.
Example 15 on Page 146 demonstrates that we can compute an ordering
of the antecedent concepts of the defeasible subsumptions in a defeasible KB.
Recall that from Definition 14 on Page 91, exceptionality of an antecedent
concept of a subsumption extends to the subsumption as a whole. Therefore,
we can order sentences in our KB according to degree of exceptionality.
We observe that while Student is not exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 in Exam-
ple 15 on Page 146, both EmployedStudent and EmployedStudentu∃hasChild.>
are exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉. However, notice that if we ignore the constraint
about general students in 〈T ,D〉 (Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)), then
EmployedStudentu∃hasChild.> still remains exceptional w.r.t. the remainder
constraints. EmployedStudent, however, is no longer exceptional.
Informally, this behaviour illustrates that EmployedStudent is exceptional
w.r.t. the properties of a general student (removing constraints about gen-
eral students allows one to consider employed students as prototypically nor-
mal and unexceptional). In contrast, EmployedStudentu∃hasChild.> remains
exceptional w.r.t. the remaining constraints about employed students (the
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former don’t pay taxes while the latter do). However, we notice that em-
ployed students that are parents are consistent with the properties of general
students (both of them don’t pay taxes), and therefore removing constraints
about general students does not impact on their exceptionality.
In summary, the “exception-to-exception” ordering of a defeasible KB,
as described above, can be computed using an iterative procedure. The pro-
cedure includes a core sub-routine (called Exceptional) to capture all the
exceptional subsumptions from a given set of defeasible subsumptions (see
Definition 17 on Page 94). Note that in this section, we first concentrate
on LHS-coherent KBs 〈T ,D〉 (see Definition 32 on Page 142). Recall that
LHS-coherent KBs are those where the LHS concepts of all defeasible sub-
sumptions are s.t. 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C @∼⊥. Later in this section we will address
general 〈T ,D〉’s that are possibly LHS-incoherent.
Procedure Exceptional(T , E)
Input: A set of strict subsumptions T and a set of defeasible
subsumptions E s.t. T ∪ E is LHS-coherent.
Output: Eexc ⊆ E such that Eexc is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪ E
1 Eexc := ∅;
2 foreach C @∼D ∈ E do
3 if T |= CE v ¬C then
4 Eexc := Eexc ∪ {C @∼D};
5 return Eexc;
Note that CE in Line 3 represents the internalisation of the set E (see Defi-
nition 30 on Page 139) and the entailment check T |= CE v ¬C represents
the reduction to classical DL entailment for checking exceptionality of C
w.r.t. T ∪ E (see Theorem 1 on Page 143). Observing this entailment check
we note that T (the strict subsumptions) can also contribute to the excep-
tionality of a concept and, therefore, we take this information into account
when computing the exceptional subsumptions of a given set.
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It is clear that Procedure Exceptional on Page 148 terminates because E
is finite. Its soundness (all the elements of Eexc are exceptional w.r.t. E)
follows from the soundness of our reduction of exceptionality to classical DL
entailment (see Theorem 1 on Page 143). We use 〈T ,D〉 from Example 15
on Page 146 to illustrate the behaviour of Procedure Exceptional:








EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)

〉




EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)
}
2
In Example 16 on Page 149 we see that EmployedStudent and EmployedStudent
u ∃hasChild.> are the only known antecedent concepts that are exceptional
w.r.t. 〈T , E〉. Therefore, we move the defeasible subsumptions in which they
occur on the LHS to the exceptional set Eexc.
Example 16 on Page 149 shows that one can recursively apply Proce-
dure Exceptional on Page 148 to obtain the exceptionality sequence (see
Definition 18 on Page 94) of a defeasible KB. From this exceptionality se-
quence we can determine the ranking of a defeasible KB.
Definition 33 (Ranking of a Defeasible KB) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasi-
ble KB, then the ranking for 〈T ,D〉 is a sequence of subsets D0, . . . ,Dn of
D s.t. for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, for each C @∼D ∈ Di, rk〈T ,D〉p(C) = i (see Defini-
tion 19 on Page 95).
Definition 33 on Page 149 characterises an ordering of the defeasible sub-
sumptions in the KB according to the rank of their antecedent concepts
which, in turn, is determined by their degree of exceptionality.
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We will show now that there is only one minor difference between the
ranking of a defeasible KB and its exceptionality sequence, from the per-
spective of their operational definitions. That is, when we move to the next
subset in the sequence, the ranking “cuts” the exceptional axioms from the
previous subset and “pastes” them into the next subset, whereas the excep-
tionality sequence “copies” these axioms into the next subset in the sequence.
The procedure that we now present for computing the ranking of a defea-
sible KB is based on Procedure Exceptional on Page 148. We first consider
the case where the input defeasible KB is LHS-coherent (see Definition 32
on Page 142) and later address general defeasible KBs.
Procedure ComputeRankingA(〈T ,D〉)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉.
Output: The ranking R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} for 〈T ,D〉.
1 R:=∅;
2 E0 := D;
3 E1 := Exceptional(T , E0);
4 i := 0;
5 while Ei+1 6= ∅ do
6 i := i + 1;
7 Ei+1 := Exceptional(T , Ei);
8 for j = 1 to i do
9 Dj−1 := Ej−1 \ Ej;
10 R := R ∪ {Dj−1};
11 return R;
Observe that Lines 1 to 7 of Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 com-
pute the exceptionality sequence for 〈T ,D〉 and Lines 8 to 10 do the “cut-
ting” and “pasting”, as described above, to arrive at the ranking for 〈T ,D〉.
We briefly illustrate the behaviour of Procedure ComputeRankingA with an
example.
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EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)

〉




















Thereafter, executing Lines 8 to 10 on this sequence we obtain the ranking:
D0 = { Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) },
D1 = { EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice },
D2 = { EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) }
2
We have to show that Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 actually
terminates and that it is sound (i.e., the computed ranking corresponds with
its semantic definition). Notice that to show termination we have to show
that the condition on Line 5 is actually falsified at some point. That is, we
should obtain an i s.t. Ei+1 = ∅. To show this, it is sufficient to demonstrate
that Ei+1 becomes smaller with every iteration of the while loop.
Formally, this amounts to demonstrating that: Ei+1 ⊂ Ei for each 0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1. Observe that it can never be the case that Ei+1 ⊃ Ei for any such i
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because the procedures are only retaining the exceptional items from some set
in the next set of the sequence (the procedure does not add any information
to the set). Therefore, the only other possibility which contradicts with what
we have to prove is Ei+1 = Ei for some i. Intuitively this case means that all
axioms in the given set are exceptional w.r.t. the given defeasible KB. The
following lemma helps to prove that this is impossible.
Lemma 6 (Ei+1 6= Ei for LHS-coherent KBs) Given a defeasible KB
〈T ,D〉, if 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent then there is a C @∼D ∈ D s.t.
〈T ,D〉 6|=r > @∼ ¬C.
Proof: Suppose that 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent and, contrary to the lemma
statement, that for each C @∼D ∈ D s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. We proceed by
trying to derive a contradiction from this. For each C @∼D ∈ D we pick a
ranked model RC for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is an x ∈ CRC (we know that such
ranked models exist because 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent). Now, we take the
horizontal union of these ranked models R = RC (see Definition 27 on
Page 132). R is also a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 by Lemma 2 on Page 133.
We pick a C @∼D ∈ D s.t. rkR(C) = min{rkR(X) | X @∼ Y ∈ D} (there must
be a minimal rank because of the modular ordering on the elements of ranked
models). Now, we pick an element y ∈ min≺R(CR). From our supposition
we know that C is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 and therefore, rkR(y) > 0. How-
ever, notice that the minimality of y’s rank suggests that y 6∈ (X u¬Y )R for
each X @∼ Y ∈ D. That is, it is the most minimal element in R that belongs
to any XR s.t. X @∼ Y ∈ D. We also know that there is no element z on the
bottom-most rank of R s.t. z ∈ XR for some X @∼ Y ∈ D (because all the
axioms in D are exceptional). However, this implies that the rank of y is not
minimal w.r.t. each ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. In other words, we can “push”
y to the bottom-most rank in R (let rkR(y) = 0). All other things equal,
the modified R will still be a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 because it does not
violate any axiom in D as described earlier. However, the resulting modified
R is now s.t. R 6 > @∼ ¬C. Therefore, our supposition is false. That is, we
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have found a ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 and a C @∼D ∈ D s.t. R 6 > @∼ ¬C.
2
Notice that Lemma 6 on Page 152 proves that Ei+1 ⊂ Ei for i = 0. In other
words, we have proven that because E0 is LHS-coherent (as stipulated in
our procedure), it is guaranteed to contain non-exceptional axioms. Hence,
because such axioms are removed from E0 when moving to E1, E1 is guaranteed
to be smaller than E0. It is easy to see, by induction, that this holds for
0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 because of monotonicity of classical reasoning (our procedure
is reduced to classical entailment). That is, if Ei is LHS-coherent, then Ei+1 is
LHS-coherent (removing axioms cannot cause us to gain LHS-incoherence).
The soundness for Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 has been
shown in an independent effort to our own [71, Proposition 13]. Essentially,
this result shows the correspondence between the semantic (Definition 12 on
Page 87) and procedural (Definition 19 on Page 95) definitions for the rank
of a concept. We rephrase their proof statement here to make it clear to the
reader what was required to be shown using our own terminology.
Lemma 7 (Soundness of Procedure ComputeRankingA) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a
LHS-coherent defeasible KB and R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its computed ranking
(according to Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150). Then, C @∼D ∈ Di
if and only if rk〈T ,D〉s(C) = i for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
We now turn our attention to general defeasible KBs. That is, we per-
mit the possibility that the KB is not LHS-coherent. Recall from Defini-
tions 15 and 32 that a LHS-incoherent KB 〈T ,D〉 is s.t. C is ranked unsat-
isfiable w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 for some C @∼D ∈ D.
It turns out that LHS-incoherent KBs cannot be handled purely by the
standard ranking procedure (Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150).
That is, a modification of this procedure is required. The reason for this
relates to the semantics of defeasible subsumption and specifically to the
semantics of ranked unsatisfiability of a concept.
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We recall that C @∼⊥ and C v ⊥ have the same ranked models (i.e., they
are ranked equivalent axioms). It is easy to see, then, that one can encode
the latter classical subsumption using purely defeasible subsumptions. For
example, the set {C @∼D,C @∼ ¬D} encodes the same information as C @∼⊥
and, therefore, C v ⊥ (which is also equivalent to {C v D,C v ¬D}).
While this behaviour is acceptable (and arguably intuitive) from a se-
mantic perspective, it turns out to be problematic when reducing total ex-
ceptionality to classical DL entailment (see Proposition 2 on Page 141). It
is actually not too difficult to notice why this is the case. We recall from
Section 4.1 that our reduction of exceptionality to classical DL entailment
treats the strict information T and the defeasible information D differently.
That is, T is applied as “global” constraints in the ranked models and D is
applied “locally” to objects in the models (ignoring neighbourhood objects).
It is clear then, that if we represent information such as {C @∼D,C @∼ ¬D}
in our KB (i.e., strict information that is just masquerading as defeasible
information), then we would not treat these constraints globally in our re-
duction as they should be. Of course, this may in turn lead to incorrect
inferences. The phenomenon that {C @∼D,C @∼ ¬D} is actually equivalent to
{C v D,C v ¬D} is called hidden strict information. It has been shown in
Section 4.1 that hidden strict information is a side-effect that can only occur
in LHS-incoherent defeasible KBs.
We recall that the “right-to-left” direction of the proof for Theorem 1
(our reduction of exceptionality to classical entailment) on Page 143 holds
for general 〈T ,D〉’s (not just LHS-coherent ones) and therefore, the reduction
stated in Theorem 1 is sound for exceptionality w.r.t. general 〈T ,D〉’s but it
is incomplete for these cases. That is, the “left-to-right” direction does not
hold for general 〈T ,D〉’s.
This is the reason why we cannot, in general, use our reduction to pinpoint
all the exceptions in a LHS-incoherent KB (using Procedure ComputeRankingA
on Page 150). However, we will show that, by performing some additional
operations in Procedure ComputeRankingA, and using the same classical re-
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duction we have presented, we can still pinpoint all the exceptions in such
KBs. Before we give this complete procedure, we present an example to show
the incompleteness of our reduction when applied to LHS-incoherent KBs.
Consider the following example adapted from Proposition 2 on Page 141.











In Example 18 on Page 155, notice that, from a semantic perspective, both
Fruit and DessertPizza are totally exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉. This means we
should obtain that both these concepts are exceptional using our reduction
to classical entailment. That is, we should obtain both T |= CD′ v ¬Fruit
and T |= CD′ v ¬DessertPizza.
However, while we do have the former entailment, we do not have the
latter, and we will construct a model for T to show this later in this example.
Why do we get the former entailment, though? We observe that T effectively
tells us that all Fruit objects are not PizzaTopping objects. On the other hand,
the first statement in D tells us that typical Fruit objects are PizzaTopping
objects. Clearly this is an incompatible situation and the result is that we
will not find Fruit objects anywhere in any ranked model for our knowledge.
Therefore, we notice that it would be equivalent to replace Fruit @∼
PizzaTopping with Fruit v PizzaTopping (i.e., with its strict counterpart).
This effectively means we can remove the former statement from D and
add its classical counterpart (the latter statement) to T . In other words,
Fruit @∼ PizzaTopping is actually hiding its strict behaviour, or more eloquently,
its strict behaviour is not “visible” to our reduction.
Consider the following model I for T . I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 s.t. ∆I = {a, b},
DessertI = {b}, PizzaToppingI = {a}, FruitI = {b}, DessertPizzaI = {a}
and hasToppingI = {(a, b)}. It is easy to see that a ∈ CID′ and therefore
T 6|= CD′ v ¬DessertPizza.
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Notice also that because of the non-globalisation of the constraint Fruit
@∼ PizzaTopping, Fruit objects are allowed to exist in the neighbourhood
of a. That is, b is allowed to belong to FruitI . The end result is that the
defeasibility of Fruit @∼ PizzaTopping actually “masks” the total exceptionality
of DessertPizza.
Example 18 on Page 155 shows the incompleteness of our reduction of
exceptionality to classical entailment for general 〈T ,D〉’s. Unfortunately,
there seems to be no such reduction that is declarative. Fortunately, there is
an operational approach to cater for these cases using our existing reduction
for LHS-coherent 〈T ,D〉’s.
To convey the intuition of this procedure, consider the KB in Example 18
on Page 155. T |= CD′ v ¬Fruit but T 6|= CD′ v ¬DessertPizza (even though
DessertPizza is totally exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉). We also observed that
it is equivalent to remove Fruit @∼ PizzaTopping from D and add its classical
counterpart to T (it is strict information parading as defeasible information).









It is straightforward to see that Fruit v ⊥ follows classically from T ∗. Since
strict information must be satisfied globally, it implies that, even after addi-
tionally considering the defeasible information in D∗, there will not be any
Fruit objects in any ranked model for the composite KB.
Now, it is interesting to observe that if we apply our reduction to check if
DessertPizza is exceptional w.r.t. this modified KB (where all the hidden strict
information is filtered into T ), we finally obtain T ∗ |= CD∗ v ¬DessertPizza.
This behaviour tells us informally that we can apply our exceptionality re-
duction recursively on a defeasible KB to filter the hidden strict information
into the TBox. It can be shown that eventually a point is reached where the
incrementally modified defeasible KB becomes LHS-coherent, in which case
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the procedure reduces to the same behaviour as Procedure ComputeRankingA
on Page 150. Pseudocode of our general ranking procedure is given in Pro-
cedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157.
Procedure ComputeRankingB(〈T ,D〉)
Input: A defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉.
Output: 〈T ∗,D∗〉 (version of 〈T ,D〉 in which all hidden strict
information in D is moved to T ) and the ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} for 〈T ,D〉.




5 i := 0;
6 E0 := D∗;
7 E1 := Exceptional(T ∗, E0);
8 while Ei+1 6= Ei do
9 i := i + 1;
10 Ei+1 := Exceptional(T ∗, Ei);
11 D∗∞ := Ei;
12 D∗ := D∗ \ D∗∞;
13 T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C v D | C @∼D ∈ D∗∞};
14 until D∗∞ = ∅;
15 for j = 1 to i do
16 Dj−1 := Ej−1 \ Ej;
17 R := R ∪ {Dj−1};
18 return 〈T ∗,D∗〉,R;
Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 differs from the more basic Pro-
cedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 mainly at Line 8 and Lines 11 − 13.
Line 8 introduces a new termination condition for the computation of the
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exceptionality subset sequence. Recall that in Procedure ComputeRankingA
(at Line 5) the sequence terminates when none of the axioms in the given
set are exceptional. I.e., the next set in the sequence will be empty. How-
ever, when the defeasible KB is LHS-incoherent then there is another possible
termination condition. I.e., that all the axioms in a given set are exceptional.
A very simple example is the set {C @∼D,C @∼ ¬D}. That is, if Proce-
dure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 encounters such a set, it clearly denotes
a fixed point (an indication that all axioms in this set are totally exceptional).
When such a point is reached, we remove these hidden strict axioms from
D (Line 12) and add their strict counterparts to T (Line 13). We have to
repeatedly execute the exceptionality subset sequence procedure (Lines 4-14)
whenever we have to transfer hidden strict information to the TBox. Eventu-
ally, the KB becomes LHS-coherent which means it does not contain totally
exceptional axioms (Line 14).
After all hidden strict axioms are filtered out of D, the algorithm works
the same as Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150. We return the rank-
ing as well as the modified defeasible KB (with the hidden strict axioms
now in T ). It is easy to verify that executing Procedure ComputeRankingB









We have to show that Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 terminates.
Essentially, we have to show that the while loop and the repeat loop ter-
minate. It is fairly straightforward to see that there are only two cases:
(1) 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent, in which case termination of the while loop fol-
lows immediately from our arguments for Procedure ComputeRankingA on
Page 150. In addition, from the same arguments we know that termination
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happens when Ei = ∅ for some i. This means that D∗∞ = ∅ (Line 11) and
then we terminate the repeat loop because of Line 14.
(2) the other case is when 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-incoherent. If there is no i
for which Ei = ∅ it means that the exceptionality subsets have stopped
decreasing in size so that Ei = Ei+1 6= ∅ for some i and therefore the while
loop terminates. To show that the repeat loop terminates for this case,
observe that the fixed point axioms are removed from D∗ (Line 12) and we
recurse on this smaller D∗ (Line 6). Since D is finite we have to reach the
point where Ej is empty for some j > i.
Observe that the additional operations in Procedure ComputeRankingB on
Page 157 are only introduced to handle hidden strict information. Hidden
strict information, in turn, is ranked unsatisfiable information. We notice
that, by definition, ranked unsatisfiable information has infinite rank (see
Definitions 10 and 12). This is the motivation for the choice of symbol D∗∞
representing the set of hidden strict subsumptions.
Note that Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 transfers all such
information to the TBox. From a semantic perspective, it is clear that such
behaviour cannot influence the rank of ranked satisfiable information in the
KB (because C @∼⊥ is ranked equivalent to C v ⊥). Finally, we observe
that, apart from the infinite rank information, Procedure ComputeRankingB
on Page 157 treats the remainder information in the same way as Proce-
dure ComputeRankingA on Page 150.
The arguments expressed above give credibility to the claim that the
soundness of Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 transfers over to the
context of Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 as well. However, this
can also be formally demonstrated by the following lemma.
Lemma 8 (Soundness of Procedure ComputeRankingB) Given a
LHS-incoherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, for each C @∼D ∈ D, C @∼D ∈ D∗∞ (for
some D∗∞ during iteration of the repeat loop of Procedure ComputeRankingB
on Page 157) if and only if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥.
Proof: “ =⇒ ” We have to show that if C @∼D ∈ D∗∞ for some D∗∞ during ex-
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ecution of Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157, then 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥.
It is clear that D∗∞ is the fixed point set in which all axioms are exceptional
w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 (Line 11). If we take the contrapositive of Lemma 6 on Page 152
we find that D∗∞ is LHS-incoherent and therefore 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥.
“⇐= ” We have to show that for each C @∼D ∈ D, if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥ then
C @∼D ∈ D∗∞ for some D∗∞ during execution of Procedure ComputeRankingB
on Page 157. Informally, what we have to show is that, even though we
know that our reduction is incomplete for general 〈T ,D〉’s (see Example 18 on
Page 155), it will eventually still capture all the hidden strict information (by
recursive application of Lines 4− 14). If this was not the case, it entails that
there is a C @∼D ∈ D s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥ but for each D∗∞ in the execution
of Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157, C @∼D 6∈ D∗∞. It is easy to
see then that upon termination of Procedure ComputeRankingB we have a
〈T ∗,D∗〉 s.t. for each C @∼D ∈ D∗ s.t. 〈T ∗,D∗〉 |=r C @∼⊥, T ∗ 6|= CD∗ v ¬C
(our reduction fails to recognise the exceptionality of C). We will show that
this is impossible.
I.e., we pick a C @∼D ∈ D∗ s.t. 〈T ∗,D∗〉 |=r C @∼⊥. We know that
T ∗ 6|= CD∗ v ¬C (our reduction fails to recognise the exceptionality of C).
But Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157 also partitions the KB into
a ranking D0, . . . ,Dn. Therefore, because our reduction has “missed” the
total exceptionality of C, there will be some 0 ≤ i ≤ n s.t. C @∼D ∈ Di,
T ∗ ∪ Di |=r > @∼ ¬C and for each X @∼ Y ∈ Di, T ∗ 6|= CDi v ¬X. We pick a
model IX for T ∗ for each X @∼ Y ∈ Di s.t. there is an x ∈ (CDi uX)IX . We
take the disjoint union (Definition 26 on Page 131) of these models to obtain
I =
⊎
IX for each X @∼ Y ∈ Di. By Lemma 1 on Page 132 we know that I
is a model for T ∗.
Now, let R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 be a ranked interpretation s.t. ∆R = ∆I , ·R = ·I
and ≺R is defined s.t. for each x ∈ CRDi , rkR(x) = 0, and, for each y 6∈ C
R
Di ,
rkR(y) = 1. We have to show that R  T ∗ ∪ Di. It is clear that R  T ∗
because ∆R = ∆I , ·R = ·I and I  T ∗. Assume that R 6 Di. This
implies that there is a X @∼ Y ∈ Di s.t. R 6 X @∼ Y . This means there is a
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z ∈ (X u ¬Y )R s.t. there is no z′ ≺R z s.t. z′ ∈ XR. There are two cases:
Case 1: rkR(z) = 0. This case is clearly impossible because z ∈ CRDi which
implies that z ∈ (¬X t Y )R.
Case 2: rkR(z) = 1. This implies that there is no z
′ ∈ XR s.t. rkR(z′) = 0.
But by definition of R (and I), there exists a y ∈ (CRDi uX)
R. By definition
of ≺R, rkR(y) = 0. This is a contradiction with z′.
Therefore, we have shown that R  T ∗ ∪ Di. But we also know that there
is an y ∈ (CRDi u C)
R s.t. rkR(y) = 0. This is clearly in contradiction with
our earlier finding that T ∗ ∪Di |=r > @∼ ¬C. Therefore, we have proven that
if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼⊥ then C @∼D ∈ D∗∞ for some D∗∞ during the execution of
Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157. 2
We now discuss the phenomenon of hidden strict information from the user
perspective. It must be stressed that our view is that hidden strict informa-
tion is a symptom of poor knowledge engineering choices. That is, we believe
it is a result of ontology modelling errors. We note that such axioms are to-
tally exceptional, which is equivalent to saying that their antecedents are
ranked unsatisfiable. Preferential unsatisfiability itself is analogously defined
to classical DL unsatisfiability. There is a general consensus in the literature
that classical DL unsatisfiability is, in most cases, an erroneous situation and
the result of incorrect ontology design choices. Therefore, this argument can
be inherited by the case of ranked unsatisfiability as well.
In fact, we argue that ranked unsatisfiability is even stronger evidence
for poor design choices than classical unsatisfiability. Informally, this can be
explained by observing that, while there are multifarious causes for classical
unsatisfiability, the reason for ranked unsatisfiability is comparatively more
focused. That is, it is a caused by conflicts between defeasible information
of the same priority or degree of exceptionality. We give some examples:
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EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)

2
It is clear from the KB in Example 19 on Page 162 that EmployedStudent
and EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> are both classically unsatisfiable w.r.t. K.
That is, no objects belonging to these concepts can occur in any standard DL
model for K. Translating all the axioms in K to their defeasible counterparts




EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)

We note that K′ is LHS-coherent, which means that neither EmployedStudent
nor EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> are ranked unsatisfiable w.r.t. K′. How-
ever, both these concepts are normally exceptional w.r.t. K′. Even though
they are exceptional, objects that belong to these concepts can be reconciled
in a ranked model for K′. We have the freedom to spread these objects across
the levels of the ranked model if they cannot peacefully co-exist on the same












Again we find that C and D are classically unsatisfiable w.r.t. K and, in
contrast, neither is ranked unsatisfiable w.r.t. K′. In fact, C is not even
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normally exceptional w.r.t. K′. The semantics of ranked models allows the
power to reconcile the defeasible axioms by spreading C and D objects across
the levels of the ranked models. As we shall see in the next three example
KBs, ranked unsatisfiability is arrived at when we force incompatibility in











Notice that in K we have a very crude manner of enforcing that C is classically
unsatisfiable. That is, there is a direct conflict in the “definition” of the
concept C given in K. It is not an indirect conflict in the sense that there
is a sub-concept of C whose definition conflicts with that of C. Therefore,
we find that this carries over to the defeasible translation K′ because here
C is ranked unsatisfiable. If we allow that there be strict axioms in our













In the KBs above we allow the defeasible translation K′ to retain a strict
axiom - Dessert v ¬PizzaTopping. We find that Fruit is classically unsatis-
fiable w.r.t. K and also ranked unsatisfiable w.r.t. K′. There is a conflict in
the definition of Fruit, i.e., that Fruit is enforced to belong to PizzaTopping
and its complement. Fruit is enforced to belong to ¬PizzaTopping because we
know that Fruit @∼ Dessert, Dessert v ¬PizzaTopping and by application of
the Right Weakening KLM postulate we arrive at Fruit @∼ ¬PizzaTopping.
We can even extend the above example to include roles, reiterating that
ranked unsatisfiability can be propagated through roles. We add the axiom
DessertPizza v ∃hasTopping.Fruit to the above KBs to obtain.















The classical unsatisfiability of Fruit (w.r.t. K) is retained in the above ex-
ample. In addition we find that DessertPizza is also unsatisfiable w.r.t. K.
When moving over to the defeasible translation K′, we find that both Fruit
and DessertPizza are also ranked unsatisfiable. That is, knowing that we
cannot realise Fruit objects in a ranked model of the knowledge, if we enforce
that DessertPizza objects have relations to Fruit objects, then DessertPizza
objects cannot exist either. This behaviour closely resembles the behaviour
in classical DLs (i.e., the classical unsatisfiability of a concept can propagate
through roles).
To summarise our discussion about the logical merit of hidden strict in-
formation, we maintain that it is an indication of errors in the ontology
engineering process. In the framework of ranked model semantics, we note
that it corresponds to conflicts in defeasible subsumptions of the same prior-
ity and, given an example such as {C @∼D,C @∼ ¬D}, the framework does not
attempt to choose between accepting C @∼D and C @∼ ¬D from an inference
perspective. Rather, the framework treats this situation as a form of logical
incoherence (it is the same as accepting {C v D,C v ¬D}) and leaves this
to be debugged by the ontology engineer if desired. This philosophy aligns
with other approaches such as the one by Bonatti et al [27, Example 1] for
overriding in DLs (see Section 2.9).
To conclude this section on the ranking of a defeasible KB, we demon-
strate two important properties of this ranking. The first is that the ranking
respects the property of specificity, and the second is that it is possible for the
ranking to be refined further by user input if desired. We will make the latter
property more precise at the end of this section. For now we demonstrate
that the ranking respects specificity. The proof statement is represented in
the following lemma. Notice that this captures a more powerful version of
specificity based on defeasible subsumption.
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Lemma 9 (Ranking Respects Specificity) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB.
Then, for each pair of defeasible subsumptions C1 @∼D1, C2 @∼D2 ∈ D, if
〈T ,D〉 |=r C1 @∼ C2 and 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C2 @∼ C1 then rk〈T ,D〉s(C1) ≥ rk〈T ,D〉s(C2).
Proof: Suppose there exists a pair of subsumptions C1 @∼D1, C2 @∼D2 ∈ D
s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r C1 @∼ C2, 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C2 @∼ C1 and, in contrast to the consequent
of Lemma 9 on Page 165, rk〈T ,D〉s(C1) < rk〈T ,D〉s(C2). We pick a ranked
model R for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. rkR(C1) = rk〈T ,D〉s(C1). Notice that picking an ele-
ment x ∈ min≺R(CR1 ) we know that x ∈ CR2 (〈T ,D〉 |=r C1 @∼ C2). But then
it follows from this that rkR(C2) ≤ rkR(C1) which means that rk〈T ,D〉s(C2) ≤
rk〈T ,D〉s(C1) which contradicts with rk〈T ,D〉s(C1) < rk〈T ,D〉s(C2). 2
Observe that Lemma 9 on Page 165 defines specificity of knowledge w.r.t. de-
feasible subsumption as well (as opposed to purely strict information like
Bonatti et al. [27, Page 11] do). Thus, a desirable property of the ranking is
that it will not only satisfy specificity induced by defeasible subsumption, but
also specificity induced by strict information (strict subsumption is logically
stronger than defeasible subsumption). In other words, T |= C v D =⇒
〈T ,D〉 |=r C v D =⇒ 〈T ,D〉 |=r C @∼D. Consider the following examples.








In Example 20 on Page 165, employed students are more specific than gen-
eral students (induced by the strict subsumption in T ). Of course, the rank-
ing respects this specificity relationship because rk〈T ,D〉s(EmployedStudent) =
rk〈T ,D〉s(Student). Note that the reason why they can share the same rank is
that there is no information in 〈T ,D〉 which forces one to consider any of the
concepts as exceptional. Now, if we add such information to our knowledge
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Again, employed students are more specific than general students (induced by
the strict subsumption in T ). In addition, notice that EmployedStudent is ex-
ceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 so the ranking ensures that rk〈T ,D〉s(EmployedStudent) >
rk〈T ,D〉s(Student). Now, consider the case where our strict subsumption is









Again, the ranking preserves rk〈T ,D〉s(EmployedStudent) > rk〈T ,D〉s(Student)
because it respects specificity induced by defeasible subsumption. This is
arguably quite intuitive because there is no information precluding us from
doing so. However, it is perhaps not intuitive for EmployedStudent @∼ Student
to be represented defeasibly. One would imagine that all employed students
are students. That is, it does not make sense to weaken such a statement to
say that just the typical employed students are students.
We now demonstrate that, if it is desirable to the user, the ranking can
be modified (under some restriction), while still preserving properties such














EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent

Applying the ranking procedure (Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157)
to 〈T ,D〉 we obtain the ranking:















EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent
}
{D0,D1,D2} represents the exceptionality ranking of 〈T ,D〉. It is impor-
tant to understand that this ranking is induced by exceptionality (of the
antecedent concepts of the subsumptions in D). Preferential reasoning en-
tailment regimes generally use this base ranking to aid in deciding entailment
(details are presented in subsequent sections of this chapter). However, the
ranking can be refined if desired by the user. Informally, this refinement is
a re-assignment of ranking values to each sentence in D. Of course, in order
to guarantee the elegant mathematical properties of the intended entailment
regime, there needs to be a restriction on how the ranking may be modi-
fied. Before we describe this restriction we define a general refinement of a
ranking.
Definition 34 (General Ranking Refinement) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasi-
ble KB and R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its ranking. Then, a general refinement for R
is a set R′ = {D′0, . . . ,D′m} s.t. D0 ∪ . . . ∪ Dn = D′0 ∪ . . . ∪ D′m and m ≥ n.
Now we have to define the conditions under which a refinement of a ranking
will still preserve the desirable properties of rational consequence relations
(when used in the computation of inference).
Definition 35 (Safe Ranking Refinement)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . . , Dn} its ranking and R′ =
{D′0, . . . ,D′m} a general ranking refinement for R. Then, R′ is a safe ranking
refinement for R if: for each pair of axioms C1 @∼D1 ∈ Di,D′k and C2 @∼D2 ∈
Dj,D′l (where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n and 0 ≤ k, l ≤ m), if i > j then k > l.
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Informally, Definition 35 on Page 167 says that a safe ranking refinement pre-
serves the relative ranks of sentences that do not have the same rank. In other
words, a meaningful safe refinement for R tries to re-assign ranks to sentences
that are of the same rank. For example, a user may decide that the original
ranking {D0,D1,D2} in the above example is too coarse for her. That is, she
may decide that employed students’ tax paying property is more important
than whether they are self sponsored or not. Therefore, she can “split” the
rank D1 into two sub-ranks: {EmployedStudent @∼ SelfSponsoredStudent} and
the other (higher sub-rank) {EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice}. The



















EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent
}
Of course, similar refinements can be made for D0 and D3. Notice that such
refinements will result in rankings that respect the exceptionality-induced
ranking. In other words this means that, according to the original ranking,
if a concept C1 is more exceptional than a concept D1, then in the refined
ranking C1 will still have a higher rank than D1. In contrast, we may have the
case where our original ranking stipulates that two concepts C2 and D2 have
equal exceptionality (appear in the same rank), but in the refined ranking
we are allowed to make a distinction between them (we can specify that C2
has a higher rank than D2 or vice versa). The important thing to observe is
that this refinement is not motivated by exceptionality, but would be defined
by other user-centered desiderata. We have thus given a presentation of the
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major details and intuitions pertaining to the ranking of a defeasible KB.
We reiterate that this ranking is the backbone of all entailment regimes,
presented in this chapter, for deciding inference in the preferential context.
Arguably the most important of these (at least from a theoretical perspective)
is the most conservative rational consequence relation called Rational Closure
which we discuss in the next section.
4.3 Rational Closure
It was shown by KLM that Rational Closure is the most conservative ra-
tional consequence relation. By “most conservative” we mean “gives back
the fewest positive entailments”, where a positive entailment is one of the
form 〈T ,D〉 |=rational C @∼D (as opposed to a negative entailment of the form
〈T ,D〉 6|=rational C @∼D). Given the semantic definition of Rational Closure
(Definition 20 on Page 95), as well as a procedure for computing the rank of
a concept w.r.t. a defeasible KB, it is straightforward to give an algorithmic
characterisation for Rational Closure.
That is, given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and a query axiom C @∼D, to decide
if C @∼D is in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉 we need to compute the ranks
of C and C u ¬D w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉. Notice that this corresponds to identifying
where to place C and C u ¬D in the exceptionality ranking R for 〈T ,D〉.
Then, from Definition 20 on Page 95, it is straightforward that C @∼D is
in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉 if the rank of C is strictly less than the rank
of C u ¬D (informally, if the objects of C u ¬D are more exceptional than
objects of C). We start off by giving a pseudocode procedure for computing
the rank of an arbitrary concept in a given ranking R for some defeasible KB.
Recall that Procedure ComputeRankingA on Page 150 is used to compute the
rank of LHS concepts of defeasible subsumptions in the KB. Also, recall that
this procedure actually depends on Procedure Exceptional on Page 148
(which computes the exceptionality subset sequence). Hence, our procedure
here is just a modification of Procedure Exceptional to compute the rank
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of an arbitrary concept (one that does not necessarily appear in the KB).
Procedure Rank(〈T ,D〉,R,C)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} and a concept C.
Output: The natural number value representing the rank of C
w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
1 i:=0;
2 while T |= CDn∪...∪Di v ¬C do
3 if i = n then
4 return ∞;
5 i := i + 1;
6 return i;
The critical thing to notice about Procedure Rank on Page 170 is that it
only accepts LHS-coherent 〈T ,D〉’s as input. The reason why we only need
to consider LHS-coherent KBs is that, after the computation of the ranking
for a general defeasible KB, all the hidden strict inclusions are moved to the
TBox (see Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157). The modified KB
(where all hidden strict information is moved to the TBox) is then returned
by Procedure ComputeRankingB (see Line 18 of the procedure). This KB is,
by definition, LHS-coherent and thus we only need to consider these KBs.
It is clear that the procedure terminates when i = n (Line 3 − 4). No-
tice that T |= CDn v ¬C (Line 2) represents the case where C is totally
exceptional. Since the procedure closely follows the ranking procedures in
Section 4.2, the soundness (the computed rank of the concept corresponds
with the semantic notion of the rank of a concept) follows from our arguments
in that section. Now that we are able to compute the rank of a concept, the
procedure to compute Rational Closure is a straightforward characterisation
of its semantic definition.
Because Procedure RationalClosureA on Page 171 closely follows the se-
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Procedure RationalClosureA(〈T ,D〉,R,δ)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} and a defeasible subsumption δ = C @∼D.
Output: true if δ is in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉, false
otherwise.
1 if Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) <
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D) or Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) =∞ then
2 return true;
3 return false;
mantic definition of Rational Closure, and the procedural and semantic defi-
nitions for the rank of a concept correspond (see Section 4.2), it is clear that
the procedure is sound. Here’s an example to illustrate its behaviour:










The ranking R for 〈T ,D〉 in Example 21 on Page 171 is the sequence of
subsets of D:
D0 = {Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)},
D1 = {EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice}
Suppose we want to verify if the axioms Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice and EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>
@∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) are in the Rational Closure for 〈T ,D〉. It is
straightforward to determine:
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, Student) = 0,
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R,EmployedStudent) = 1,
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R,EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>) = 1
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In addition, we can determine that:
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, Student u ∃receives.TaxInvoice) = 1,
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R,EmployedStudent u ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)) = ∞,
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R,EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> u ∃receives.TaxInvoice) = 1
Therefore we can conclude that axioms Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)
and EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice are in the Rational Closure of
〈T ,D〉, while EmployedStudentu∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) is not.
While Procedure RationalClosureA on Page 171 is straightforward and
amenable to practical implementation, it is not the most efficient algorithmic
characterisation for Rational Closure. We will give an alternative character-
isation which, from a practical perspective, is computationally less intensive.
However, before we give this procedure we must introduce a new term.
Definition 36 (C-compatible) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible
KB, R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its ranking and C a concept. Now, let R′ ⊆ R be a
sequence of subsets Dn,Dn−1, . . . ,Di where 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, R′ (resp. C⋃R′)
is C-compatible w.r.t. R if T ∪Dn ∪Dn−1 ∪ . . .∪ Di 6|=r > @∼ ¬C. If there is
no j < i s.t. T ∪Dn∪Dn−1∪ . . .∪ Dj 6|=r > @∼ ¬C then we say R′ (resp. C⋃R′)
is maximally C-compatible w.r.t. R.
Informally, Definition 36 on Page 172 describes the maximal amount of
knowledge in the ranking (while respecting its ordering) that does not enforce
exceptionality of a given concept. Notice that an immediate consequence of
this, is the following lemma.
Lemma 10 (Rank and Maximal Compatibility Correspondence)
Given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} and a concept
C. Then, Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = i if and only if {Dn, . . . ,Di} is maximally
C-compatible w.r.t. R for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given Definition 36 on Page 172 and Lemma 10 on Page 172, we can give an
intuitive description of our alternative procedure for Rational Closure in the
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following way: given a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking R and a query axiom
C @∼D, to determine if C @∼D is in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉 all we have
to do is (1) identify the maximal C-compatible subset of R and (2) look in
all classical models for T , if those objects that satisfy (the internalisation
of) the C-compatible subset of R and C, also satisfy D. Then C @∼D is
in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉, otherwise not. We have consolidated the
mechanics of the algorithm described above in Procedure RationalClosureB
on Page 173.
Procedure RationalClosureB(〈T ,D〉,R,δ)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} and a defeasible subsumption δ = C @∼D.
Output: true if δ is in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉, false
otherwise.
1 i := Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C);
2 if i =∞ then
3 return T |= C v D;
4 else
5 return T |= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D;
Therefore, Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173 works by progressively
(or incrementally) ignoring facts in our KB, starting with the least excep-
tional (or least specific), until we reach a point where our knowledge allows
us to consider the antecedent of our query axiom as prototypical. There-
after, we check if the consequent is a property of this antecedent w.r.t. the
remaining knowledge. Consider the student and employed student example:










The ranking R for 〈T ,D〉 in Example 22 on Page 173 is the sequence of
subsets of D:
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D0 = {Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)},
D1 = {EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice}
Suppose that we want to verify if axioms Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice and EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>
@∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) are in the Rational Closure for 〈T ,D〉. It is
straightforward to determine, for each query antecedent C, the maximal
C-compatible subsets of R.
{D0,D1,D2} is maximally Student-compatible,
{D1,D2} is maximally EmployedStudent-compatible,
{D1,D2} is maximally (EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>)-compatible
It is easy to see that Line 1 of Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173
is responsible for determining the maximal C-compatibility. Thereafter, we
can execute classical DL reasoning to answer our queries (Line 5):
T |= CD2∪D1∪D0 u Student v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
T |= CD2∪D1 u EmployedStudent v ∃receives.TaxInvoice,
T 6|= CD2∪D1 u EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)
Therefore we can conclude that the axioms Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)
and EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice are in the Rational Closure of
〈T ,D〉, while EmployedStudentu∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) is not.
Notice that Rational Closure reasoning (Procedure RationalClosureA
and RationalClosureB), in the case where the antecedent concept of our
query is not exceptional, looks at all objects in our models for T which
satisfy all our defeasible subsumptions and the antecedent of our query. If
the consequent of our query is satisfied by each of these objects then we can
infer that the query axiom is in the Rational Closure of our KB2.
2Recall from Section 4.1 that the internalisation mechanism is only necessary to allow
the role neighbourhood of an object to violate defeasible subsumptions in ALC. Because
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We now show that Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173 corresponds to
Procedure RationalClosureA (they give back the same entailments). Note
that showing this correspondence proves termination and soundness for Pro-
cedure RationalClosureB. We first prove the case where the antecedent of
our query does not have infinite rank (according to both procedures) and
then later address the infinite rank case. Lemma 11 on Page 175 shows that
if C @∼D is in the Rational Closure using Procedure RationalClosureA then
it will be in the Rational Closure using Procedure RationalClosureB.
Lemma 11 (RationalClosureA vs. RationalClosureB, =⇒ )
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, its ranking R = {D0, . . . ,Dn},
C @∼D a query axiom and i, j natural numbers s.t. i = Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C)
and j = Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u¬D). If i < j then T |= CDn∪...∪Di uC v D for
each 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: We have to show that if i < j then T |= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D. Assume
i < j but T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D. We try to derive a contradiction. The
latter statement implies that there is a classical model I for T s.t. there is an
x ∈ (CDn∪...∪Di uC)I s.t. x 6∈ DI . But, because we know that i < j it implies
that C u ¬D would still be exceptional w.r.t. T ∪ Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di (it would
only become non-exceptional w.r.t. T ∪Dn ∪ . . .∪Dj where Dn ∪ . . .∪Dj ⊆
Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di). Therefore, T |= CDn∪...∪Di v ¬(C u ¬D). This is clearly in
contradiction with our model I for T . Therefore, T |= CDn∪...∪Di uC v D.2
Now, we have to show that if C @∼D is in the Rational Closure according to
Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173 then it will also be in the Rational
Closure according to Procedure RationalClosureA on Page 171.
we don’t have roles in propositional languages, Rational Closure is inferentially indistin-
guishable from classical reasoning in the case where the antecedent concept of our query is
not exceptional w.r.t. our KB. This seems to be a very reasonable and desirable paradigm
for many applications of defeasible reasoning.
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Lemma 12 (RationalClosureA vs. RationalClosureB, ⇐= )
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, C @∼D a query axiom and i
the lowest natural number s.t. T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di v ¬C (according to Procedure
RationalClosureB). Then, if T |= CDn∪...∪DiuC v D then Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C)
< Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D).
Proof: We have to show that if T |= CDn∪...∪DiuC v D then Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C)
< Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D). Assume that T |= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D but that
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) 6< Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D). There are two cases:
Case 1: Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D). We know that
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = i because of Lemma 10 on Page 172. Because of our
assumption that Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D), we can in-
fer that Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D) = i. But this would imply that T 6|=
CDn∪...∪Di v ¬(Cu¬D). This, in turn, means that there is a classical model I
for T s.t. there is an x ∈ (CDn∪...∪Di)I s.t. x ∈ CI and x 6∈ DI . This is clearly
in contradiction with our original assumption that T |= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D.
Therefore, Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) 6= Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D).
Case 2: Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) > Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D). Notice that the
term Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) defines the lowest number i s.t. T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di v
¬C. Hence Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D) = j where j < i. This implies that
T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj v ¬(C u ¬D) where Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di ⊂ Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Dj. By
definition of Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C), i is the lowest number s.t. C is not ex-
ceptional w.r.t. the ranking. Therefore, because i > j, C is still excep-
tional w.r.t. Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Dj. In other words, T |= CDn∪...∪Dj v ¬C. This
is clearly in contradiction with T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj v ¬(C u ¬D). Therefore,
Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) 6> Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C u ¬D).
We now turn our attention to the case where Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = ∞.
We have to show, for any defeasible KB, that if Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C) = ∞
(according to Procedure Rank on Page 170), then T |= C v D (Line 3 of Pro-
cedure RationalClosureB). This is straightforward to see from Lines 1− 3
of Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173. The converse also holds by
monotonicity of classical entailment. 2
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In terms of the worst-case computational complexity of computing Ratio-
nal Closure for ALC defeasible KBs, observe that we first need to compute
the ranking of the KB (see Procedure ComputeRankingB on Page 157). No-
tice that, in the worst case, we do n exceptionality checks to determine E1,
where n is the number of axioms in E0. In the worst case, only one axiom
would not be exceptional in E0. If all of them are exceptional then we have
a fixed point and we stop, therefore it cannot be the worst case. Similarly,
if none of them are exceptional then our ranking only has one rank and we
stop, so this cannot be the worst case either. Hence, to determine E2 we
would have to do n− 1 exceptionality checks and for E3, n− 2 checks, and so
on. The result is a quadratic number of exceptionality checks (classical ALC
entailment checks) in the number of defeasible subsumptions in the KB.
After computing the ranking, one could use either of the aforementioned
procedures for computing Rational Closure (Procedure RationalClosureA
or RationalClosureB). It is clear that, in the worst case for these proce-
dures, we have n + 1 classical entailment checks where n is the number of
ranks in the computed ranking of the KB. Thus we have a linear number
of operations for these procedures. To compute the ranking itself requires
a quadratic number of exceptionality checks in the size of D (if the KB
is LHS-coherent). Notice that in the general case (when the KB is LHS-
incoherent) we have to perform these quadratic number of checks each time
we reach a fixed point with totally exceptional axioms. In the worst case,
at each of these fixed points we will have one axiom from D moved to T .
Thus we will have to perform the quadratic number of exceptionality checks
n times (where n is the size of D). This gives a cubic complexity n3 for
the full ranking procedure. Therefore, in total we have a linear number of
operations in the size of the ranking, with a cubic number of operations
(in the number of defeasible subsumptions) to compute the ranking, on top
of the decision procedure for classical ALC (which is in exptime). The
result is thus a procedure that still terminates in exptime. Therefore, Ra-
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tional Closure for ALC (with defeasible subsumption) is not in a higher
complexity class than classical entailment for classical ALC. One can also
observe that Procedure RationalClosureB on Page 173 is likely to be less
computationally intensive in practice, than Procedure RationalClosureA on
Page 171. The reason is that Procedure RationalClosureB only requires to
compute the rank for the antecedent concept of our query. Whereas, Proce-
dure RationalClosureA requires to compute the ranks of two concepts.
To conclude this section we show that, although Rational Closure may be
useful for a variety of applications, it sometimes cautious to draw inferences
that may be useful in other applications. Consider the following example:














EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent

2
Applying the ranking procedure (Procedure ComputeRankingB) to the 〈T ,D〉















EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent
}
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In Example 23 on Page 178 EmployedStudent @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary is not
in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉. However, there is a reasonable argument
that a more adventurous (yet still sensible) reasoning paradigm should en-
dorse this conclusion. The issue is that Rational Closure defines a reasoning
paradigm which roughly corresponds to: “I will only conclude something if
I have conclusive evidence to do so”. In other words, if something is excep-
tional according to Rational Closure, Rational Closure will only allow it to
inherit properties enforced by axioms of the same degree of exceptionality.
Hence, employed students are not allowed to inherit the property of having
access to a university library from general students.
Similar behaviour dictates that employed students who have children (as
well as employed students who work for a university) do not have access to a
university library, when it seems reasonable (using adventurous reasoning),
to conclude that they do. Analogously, adventurous reasoning should be
able to conclude that employed students that have children usually are self
sponsored, because this is a typical property of employed students. By the
same token, our knowledge does not preclude us from inferring that employed
students who work for a university are obliged to pay taxes.
Our arguments boil down to the fact that there are no constraints which
prevent one from making the above inferences, therefore, a more adventur-
ous reasoning methodology could permit them. For example, just because
employed students are exceptional, an adventurous reasoning paradigm may
argue that the reason why they are exceptional is related to their tax pay-
ing property (irrelevant to the property of having access to a library), and
therefore one may conclude that they have access to a library.
Example 23 on Page 178 demonstrates that Rational Closure defines a
more skeptical or cautious reasoning paradigm in the presence of exceptions.
This does not mean that Rational Closure is not useful. Rather, it is recom-
mended for applications where this reasoning paradigm is more suitable. We
stated a case for more adventurous reasoning that may be used to conclude
more inferences than those that are endorsed by Rational Closure. Such a
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paradigm is motivated by the fact that there are no constraints which prevent
the endorsement of these conclusions. In other words, one may be interested
in a reasoning paradigm which is roughly closer to: “I will assume that some-
thing can be inferred, unless there is explicit knowledge to the contrary”.
This latter paradigm is one that lies on the opposite side of the spectrum
to Rational Closure. It can be seen as a venturous extension to Rational
Closure’s skeptical entailment regime. In the next section we present a ra-
tional consequence relation which defines such a reasoning paradigm. It is
an adaptation to DLs of the presumptive reasoning paradigm, developed by
Daniel Lehmann [116], called the Lexicographic Closure.
4.4 Lexicographic Closure
The Lexicographic Closure (LC) of a defeasible KB defines an entailment
regime that represents a venturous extension to Rational Closure’s skeptical
inference. That is, LC will give back all the positive inferences that Rational
Closure gives but it will also give back additional inferences. Nevertheless,
LC remains a rational consequence relation satisfying all the KLM postulates.
As we will see later, LC is a syntax-dependent construction.
More specifically, if the goal is to derive the maximal number of positive
inferences, LC favours finer granularity of axioms in the KB construction.
That is, given two defeasible KBs K1 and K2 which are logically equivalent
(having the same ranked models), supposing that the granularity of knowl-
edge in K2 is finer than that of K1, then it is possible that LC will give more
positive inferences for K2 than for K1. We demonstrate this property with
examples at the end of this section.
We first provide a semantics for Lexicographic Closure which is actually
an incremental adaptation of the semantics of Rational Closure based on
its canonical model construction. This semantic characterisation is also a
generalisation of the one given by Daniel Lehmann for the propositional
case [116]. Thereafter, we provide an algorithmic construction of LC based
CHAPTER 4. ALGORITHMS FOR DEFEASIBLE REASONING 181
on the one by Casini and Straccia [52] and prove the correspondence with its
semantics.
4.4.1 Semantics
Given an ALC defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, we will define a minimal canonical
model for 〈T ,D〉 and propose this model as the base for characterising a
semantics for Lexicographic Closure. We saw that Rational Closure can be
characterised by a single minimal canonical model for 〈T ,D〉 (see Defini-
tion 23 on Page 97). For brevity, we shall refer to this model as the Rational
Closure defining model (RCDM for short) for a defeasible KB. Intuitively, we
propose a refinement of this model in which we modify only the ordering on
the elements in the domain.
Recall from the end of Section 4.2, that in order to guarantee the com-
putation of a rational consequence relation, the exceptionality ranking of
the KB should be respected. Nevertheless, we demonstrated that it was
still possible to refine the ranking by distinguishing between sentences of the
same rank. Of course, this description is from the algorithmic perspective.
From the model-theoretic perspective, such a refinement can be perceived in
a ranked model for the KB, as distinguishing between objects of the domain
that have the same rank.
The semantics we propose for Lexicographic Closure adopts this view.
Though the question still remains: what criteria do we use to distinguish
between objects of the same rank? In principle, there is a multitude of
criteria to choose from. However, for Lexicographic Closure we choose to
focus on the number of sentences that are classically satisfied by an object
in a ranked model.
As we saw with Rational Closure, algorithmically speaking, the nonmono-
tonic nature of the reasoning mechanism is realised through ignorance of
knowledge that is inconsistent with the query being asked. Intuitively, using
the maximal amount of knowledge at our disposal should, in general, lead to
more accurate inferences. Therefore, the idea is to ignore the least amount of
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knowledge as possible. The intuition behind counting the sentences that are
classically satisfied by an object in a ranked model, is to arrive at a refined
ranking of objects in the domain taking into account this factor. This idea,
in turn, hopefully leads to a semantics that could allow us to retain more
sentences algorithmically. Consider the following example.












For brevity and readability, we use symbols S, E, U and T to refer to the
concept names Student, EmployedStudent, UniversityLibrary and TaxInvoice re-
spectively in Example 24 on Page 182. Similarly, we use the abbreviations
acc. and rec. to refer to the role names access and receives respectively. Con-
sider the following ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉.















Figure 4.3: Non-refined ranked model for KB of Example 24.
We can encode the model in Figure 4.3 as R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 where ∆R =
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, SR = {x1, x3, x4}, ER = {x3, x4}, UR = {x2}, TR =
{x5, x6}, acc.R = {(x1, x2), (x3, x2)} and rec.R = {(x3, x6), (x4, x5)}. rkR(x1) =
0, rkR(x2) = rkR(x3) = rkR(x4) = 1 and rkR(x5) = rkR(x6) = 2.
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Given this representation, we can observe that R 6 E @∼ ∃acc.U even
though it makes intuitive sense to be able to infer E @∼ ∃acc.U from our KB.
In other words, there is no information in my KB that prevents me from
inferring that employed students have access to a university library. The
reason whyR does not satisfy this axiom is that x4 violates it. In other words
x4 6∈ (¬E t ∃acc.U)R (x4 is not in the materialised concept representing the
axiom E @∼ ∃acc.U). Observe that if we look at the materialised concept for
each defeasible subsumption in the KB, we can determine the number of these
materialised concepts that each object in ∆R satisfies. These numbers are
3, 3, 2, 1, 3, 3 for x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6 respectively. Now, even though x3 and
x4 (and x2) have the same rank, it is possible to consider x3 more “normal”
in a sense than x4 because x3 satisfies more materialised concepts from the
KB than x4.
More precisely, we can refine the second rank (rank 1) of R to include
three sub-ranks. The most typical of these sub-ranks would include element
x2 since it satisfies the most materialised concepts (i.e., three). The second,
higher sub-rank would include element x3 because it satisfies two materi-
alised concepts. Finally, x4 would be present in the highest sub-rank because
it satisfies just one materialised concept. This refined ranked model R′ is
depicted below. Note that we do not need to consider the subsumptions in
T because every object in a ranked model has to satisfy the applicable mate-
rialised concepts for T , while this is not necessarily the case for the defeasible
subsumptions, as we have demonstrated.
Considering R′ in Figure 4.4 it is easy to verify that R′  E @∼ ∃acc.U , which
captures our earlier intuition about employed students having access to a
university library.
Essentially, Example 24 on Page 182 presents the basic idea of the se-
mantic paradigm we want to capture with Lexicographic Closure. What
remains is to formalise the construction in Example 24 and give a concrete
semantic definition for Lexicographic Closure. The first step is to define the
lexicographic ordering on the objects in a ranked model for a defeasible KB.
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Figure 4.4: Refined ranked model for KB of Example 24.
Definition 37 (Cardinality Ordering) We let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent
defeasible KB, R a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 and x ∈ ∆R. The cardinality
rank of x in R w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉, denoted by lrkR(x), is the natural number
defined by the cardinality of the following set {C @∼D ∈ D | x ∈ (¬C tD)R}.
The cardinality ordering for R w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉, denoted by ≺lexiR, is a total
pre-order on the elements of ∆R defined by the function lrk w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
That is, for any two elements x and y in ∆R, x ≺lexiR y if and only if lrkR(x)
< lrkR(y).
Informally, Definition 37 on Page 183 assigns a natural number to each ele-
ment in the domain that represents the number of defeasible subsumptions
that it satisfies in the KB 〈T ,D〉. As we demonstrated in Example 24 on
Page 182, the idea is to use the ordering defined by a standard ranked model
as a base and, for the objects which have the same rank, we can refine their
ranks by taking the lexicographic ordering over these two orderings (see Def-
inition 38 on Page 185).
Since it was shown that, for ALC, Rational Closure can be characterised
by a single canonical ranked model for any consistent KB 〈T ,D〉, we can
build the semantics of Lexicographic Closure upon this model. We will now
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define a ranked model that is a “lexicographic refinement” of this model.
This model, which we call the Lexicographic Closure defining model (LCDM)
for 〈T ,D〉, will be the base-point for defining Lexicographic Closure.
Definition 38 (Lexicographic Closure Defining Model) Let 〈T ,D〉 be
a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 the RCDM for 〈T ,D〉.
The Lexicographic Closure defining model (LCDM) for 〈T ,D〉 is defined as
R′ = 〈∆R′ , ·R′ ,≺R′〉 where ∆R
′
= ∆R, ·R′ = ·R and ≺R′ is defined on ∆R
′
as follows: for each (a, b) ∈ ∆R′ ×∆R′, a ≺R′ b if a ≺R b or a ≺lexiR b.
It is easy to see that, given that the RCDM exists for some 〈T ,D〉, the
LCDM (Definition 38 on Page 185) also exists for 〈T ,D〉. From the definition
of LCDM it is straightforward to show that Lexicographic Closure is an
inferential extension of Rational Closure. That is, we will now show that
Lexicographic Closure gives back all the positive inferences that Rational
Closure gives (and possibly others).
Lemma 13 (Lexicographic Closure Extends Rational Closure)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R the RCDM for 〈T ,D〉 and
R′ the LCDM 〈T ,D〉. Then, if R  C @∼D then R′  C @∼D for any C @∼D.
Proof: Assume that R  C @∼D. Of course we know that R and R′ only dif-
fer in the ordering on the domain elements (that is, ∆R = ∆R
′
and ·R = ·R′).
It is also apparent from the definition of lexicographic refinement on the or-
dering that min≺R′ (C
R′) ⊆ min≺R(CR). Therefore R′  C @∼D. 2
Given the notion of LCDM, we can define Lexicographic Closure in an anal-
ogous way to Rational Closure (Definition 20 on Page 95).
Definition 39 (Lexicographic Closure of a Defeasible KB) Given a de-
feasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its LCDM R and a defeasible subsumption C @∼D, C @∼D
is in the Lexicographic Closure of 〈T ,D〉 (denoted by 〈T ,D〉 |=lexico C @∼D)
if rkR(C) < rkR(C u ¬D) or rkR(C) =∞.
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Thus we have given a semantics for Lexicographic Closure by adapting the
intuitions of Daniel Lehmann [116] in the propositional setting, to the DL
case. In the next section we give a procedure for computing Lexicographic
Closure and prove its correspondence with the semantics proposed in this
section.
4.4.2 Procedure
In the DL case, there has been very little work on defining Lexicographic
Closure (in the sense of Daniel Lehmann [116]). The only known applica-
tion to DLs is the procedure developed by Casini and Straccia [52]. In this
section we devise a variant of this procedure which aligns with the semantic
foundation of preferential DLs (as delineated in Section 2.8) as well as with
the semantics for Lexicographic Closure proposed in the previous section.
The lexicographic refinement of the ordering on objects of a ranked model
(Definition 37 on Page 183) manifests itself, on the level of sentences in the
KB, as a refinement of the ordering on these sentences (the exceptionality
ordering). Consider the following example.












The KB in Example 25 on Page 186 is the same as the one in Example 24
on Page 182. In the latter example we showed that the ordering on the
objects in a ranked model can be refined to reflect the number of sentences
in the KB that each object satisfies (classically). On the level of sentences,
and specifically with regards to the ranking of a defeasible KB, we advocate
that sentences with the same rank can be distinguished using the tool of
lexicographic ordering mentioned in Section 4.4.1. It is easy to see that the
ranking for 〈T ,D〉 is:











Now, imagine that our query is concerning employed students. That is, our
query is of the form EmployedStudent @∼X for some concept X. It is straight-
forward to see that, in order to find the maximal EmployedStudent-compatible
information in the ranking, Rational Closure will eliminate all information
in D0. Intuitively, some might argue that this is too “drastic”. That is, even
though it is reasonable to eliminate Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) (be-
cause it is contributing to the exceptionality of the concept EmployedStudent),
it is not as reasonable to eliminate Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary. This
is because the latter information has nothing to do with the exceptionality
of EmployedStudent.
Therefore, one can view this elimination behaviour of Rational Closure as
quite “coarse”. The idea behind Lexicographic Closure, from an algorithmic
perspective, is to take a “fine-grained” approach to this elimination of infor-
mation. Recall that the goal is to determine the maximally C-compatible
subset of the ranking (for a concept C). Therefore, instead of removing
“whole ranks” at a time to arrive at this set, Lexicographic Closure starts by
removing a single axiom from the lowest rank (there are k ways to do this
if k is the number of axioms in the particular rank). If this is not sufficient
to ensure C-compatibility we try to remove two axioms from the rank (to
borrow a phrase from combinatorics, there are “k choose 2” ways to do this).
This procedure continues until we have C-compatibility. If we have elimi-
nated all k axioms from the rank then we move to the next rank and so on.
It is not difficult to see that we have a combinatorial explosion of operations
in the size of the ranks.
Applied to our example KB, we notice that there are only two axioms in
D0 and so we have a simple case. We have to try removing a single axiom from
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D0. There are two ways to do this because there are only two axioms. Remov-
ing Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary does not result in EmployedStudent-
compatibility, however, removing Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) does.










From this ranking we can infer EmployedStudent @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary
follows from T ∪D0 ∪D1. Although this is simplistic example, we can easily
extend this notion for the case where we have k axioms in the rank. How-
ever, before we demonstrate the general case, we will state what it means
to take the conjunction (which we denote by ∧), or disjunction (which we
denote by ∨), of a set of DL axioms. In actuality, when refer to the con-
junction (resp. disjunction) of axioms, we are in fact referring to the con-
junction (resp. disjunction) of their materialised counterpart concepts (see
Definition 29 on Page 139). That is, the conjunction of the axioms C1 @∼D1
and C2 @∼D2 is actually the conjunction of their materialised counterpart con-
cepts ¬C1tD1 and ¬C2tD2 respectively. In other words, their conjunction
is the concept (¬C1 tD1) u (¬C2 tD2). Similarly, the disjunction of these
axioms is the concept (¬C1 tD1) t (¬C2 tD2).
Consider the case of three axioms: i.e., let D′0 be the first rank in some
ranking for a defeasible KB. And assume that D′0 contains three axioms
α1, α2 and α3. Logically speaking, Lexicographic Closure will first check
if α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 (the combination of all three constraints, together with the
rest of the knowledge in the ranking) enforces exceptionality of the query.
If it does, then it will check if (α1 ∧ α2) ∨ (α1 ∧ α2) ∨ (α2 ∧ α3) enforces
exceptionality (all combinations of two of the three constraints). If it does,
then it will check if α1 ∨ α2 ∨ α3 enforces exceptionality (all combinations of
one constraint). If it does, then it will eliminate α1, α2 and α3 and proceed
to D′1 and repeat the process.
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Observe that the Lexicographic Closure procedure follows the same basic
iteration as the Rational Closure procedure. The main difference is that, dur-
ing the phase of identifying C-compatibility, the procedure replaces the ax-
ioms in a rank (i.e., the “conjunction of the axioms” in the set) with progres-
sively “weakened” versions of this information until we reach C-compatibility.
The discussion following Example 25 on Page 186 gives a general intuition
behind the Lexicographic Closure algorithm that we are going to propose.
However, we now need to formalise this procedure. The first step is to define
the “lexicographic refinement” of an exceptionality ranking for a defeasible
KB. Recall from Example 25 that we need to enumerate all ways of removing
1 ≤ k ≤ n axioms from a rank (set of axioms of size n) of the exceptionality
ranking. We accomplish this by referring to the powerset of the rank, and
to the cardinalities of the sets appearing in this powerset. We can thus
define the Lexicographicalisation of an exceptionality ranking for use in the
Lexicographic Closure procedure.
Definition 40 (Lexicographicalisation of a Ranking) Consider a LHS-
coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, let R = {D0, . . ., Dn} be its ranking, let P(X)
(resp. |X|) denote the powerset (resp. cardinality) of an arbitrary set of el-
ements X. Then, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the Lexicographicalisation of Di is a
sequence of collections D ′i = {D′1, . . . ,D′m} (m = |Di|) s.t. for 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
D′k = {S ∈ P(Di) | |S| = k}. R′ = {D ′0, . . . ,D ′n} is called the Lexicographi-
calisation of the ranking R, where D ′i is the Lexicographicalisation of Di ∈ R
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given a standard rank Di of size n, Definition 40 on Page 189 allows us to
refer to all subsets of Di of size 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In effect, this allows us to
enumerate all ways of removing k axioms from the rank, which we can use
in our procedure for computing Lexicographic Closure. For example, given
a rank Di = {α1, α2, α3, α4, α5} where each αi is an axiom, we can calculate
the Lexicographicalisation D ′i for Di as the sequence of collections:
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D′1 = {{α1}, {α2}, {α3}, {α4}, {α5}},
D′2 = {{α1, α2}, {α1, α3}, {α1, α4}, {α1, α5}, {α2, α3},
{α2, α4}, {α2, α5}, {α3, α4}, {α3, α5}, {α4, α5}},
D′3 = {{α1, α2, α3}, {α1, α2, α4}, {α1, α2, α5}, {α1, α3, α4}, {α1, α3, α5},
{α1, α4, α5}, {α2, α3, α4}, {α2, α3, α5}, {α2, α4, α5}, {α3, α4, α5}},
D′4 = {{α1, α2, α3, α4}, {α1, α2, α3, α5}, {α1, α2, α4, α5}, {α1, α3, α4, α5}, {α2, α3, α4, α5}},
D′5 = {{α1, α2, α3, α4, α5}}
In particular, notice that for any Di and its Lexicographicalisation D ′i =
{D′1, . . . ,D′m} where m = |Di|, D′1 will be a collection of singleton sets (each
set corresponds to an axiom from Di), and D′m will be a singleton collection
consisting of the set Di and only Di. Again, we reiterate that D′k (for 1 ≤ k ≤
m) represents an enumeration of “all ways of removing k axioms from a set of
m axioms”. Depending on how we use these sets, the dual of this statement
could apply (i.e., it could also mean “all ways of retaining (or preserving) k
axioms from a set of m axioms”).
Now, we mention an important aspect of the lexicographic procedure which
leads to a simple optimisation. We notice that we do not need to consider
the Lexicographicalisation of each rank in the ranking. That is, Rational
Closure is too coarse in determining maximal C-compatibility (using Proce-
dure Rank). In other words, in the last step of this procedure, when we are
eliminating the last rank from the ranking that is contributing to the ex-
ceptionality of C, there are possibly some irrelevant axioms in this last rank
which we should keep. I.e., this is where the notion of Lexicographicalisation
comes in. To take a fine-grained look at this problematic rank of the ranking.
Definition 41 (Problematic Rank) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defea-
sible KB, R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its ranking, C @∼D a query and {Di, . . . ,Dn}
the maximal C-compatible subset of R w.r.t. C @∼D (w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉), where
0 ≤ i ≤ n. If i > 0 then the problematic rank w.r.t. C @∼D (w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉) is
the set Di−1. If i = 0 then the problematic rank is the empty set.
In other words, the problematic rank is the last rank thrown out by the
procedure which computes maximal C-compatibility. Given that we have for-
malised the main differences of the Lexicographic Closure procedure (w.r.t. the
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Rational Closure procedure) we are in a position to present a procedure for
computing the construction. However, before we do so, we introduce some
foundational definitions.
Recall that Rational Closure coarsely eliminates “whole ranks” in or-
der to arrive at C-compatibility for the query. Given a standard ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} for some KB 〈T ,D〉 and a query C @∼D, suppose that
R′ = {Dn, . . . ,D2} is maximally C-compatible for 〈T ,D〉. This means
that D1 is the problematic rank for 〈T ,D〉 which, in turn, means that
{Dn, . . . ,D2,D1} is not C-compatible for 〈T ,D〉. Therefore, according to
Lexicographic Closure, it may be too strong to eliminate the whole of the
problematic rank D1. That is, perhaps it is just some of the axioms in D1 that
are problematic and need to be eliminated. In order to have a finer-grained
view of D1 we need to look at its Lexicographicalisation (Definition 40 on
Page 189). In particular, the goal is to locate the maximal amount of in-
formation from D1 that we can retain. This information is defined by the
lexicographically additive concept (LAC) for the problematic rank w.r.t. R′
and C.
Definition 42 (Lexicographically Additive Concept) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a
LHS-coherent defeasible KB, C @∼D a query, R
′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} the maximal
C-compatible subset of the ranking {D0, . . . ,Dn}, and D ′i−1{D′1, . . . ,D′m} the
Lexicographicalisation of the problematic rank Di−1. Let k be the largest num-
ber s.t. 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 and T 6|= C⋃R′ u (⊔ CS∈D′k) v ¬C. Then, the concept
(
⊔
CS∈D′k) is known as the lexicographically additive concept (LAC) for Di−1
w.r.t. R′ and C. D′k is called the lexicographically additive subset (LAS) of
Di−1 w.r.t. R′ and C.
The LAC simply represents the maximal knowledge from the problematic
rank which is still compatible with the query. Notice that 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
and not 1 ≤ k ≤ m. This is because if k = m then it implies that we are
keeping allm axioms from the problematic rank. It is clear that this shouldn’t
be allowed because the maximal C-compatible subset is {Dn, . . . ,Di} and
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therefore {Dn, . . . ,Di,Di−1} will not be C-compatible. Given the definition
of LAC, that maximal C-compatibility is defined in terms of exceptionality,
and that exceptionality is reducible to classical DL entailment (Theorem 1
on Page 143), we can formulate a description of Lexicographic Closure in
terms of classical DL entailment.
Definition 43 (Lexicographic Closure w.r.t. Classical Entailment)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, C @∼D a query, R′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di}
the maximal C-compatible subset of its ranking {D0, . . . ,Dn}, and CR′ the
LAC for Di−1 w.r.t. R′ and C. Then, C @∼D is in the Lexicographic Closure
of 〈T ,D〉 if T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D.
Now we can give the pseudocode algorithm for computing Lexicographic Clo-
sure. The algorithm is composed of Procedure LexicographicClosureA and
a sub-procedure LAC. The latter sub-procedure is responsible for computing
the LAC for the given antecedent of the query, while the former consolidates
all relevant components of the procedure (as described in Definition 43 on
Page 192).
We reiterate that {Dn, . . . ,Di,Di−1} is not C-compatible and so we can-
not keep all axioms from Di−1, we have to remove at least one. Therefore
we assign k = m − 1 (keep m − 1 of the m axioms in Di−1) on Line 1 of
Procedure LAC, instead of assigning k = m. If k reaches 0 (Line 4 of Pro-
cedure LAC) then it corresponds to the case of not keeping any axioms from
Di−1 which means the LAC should, theoretically speaking, be the empty
concept ⊥. However, as we shall see later, we use the LAC in the Lex-
icographic Closure procedure by taking its conjunction with the maximal
C-compatible concept for the ranking. Of course the conjunction of any con-
cept with the ⊥ concept will return ⊥ and this is not the behaviour we
want to capture. Rather, we would like Lexicographic Closure to revert to
using only the standard maximal C-compatible concept for the ranking, if
it cannot find any information to keep from Di−1. Therefore, we assign the
> concept to the LAC for this case. In other words, the conjunction of >
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Procedure LAC(〈T ,D〉,δ,R′,D ′i−1)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, a query δ = C @∼D, the
maximal C-compatible subset R′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} of the
ranking {D0, . . . ,Dn} (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), and the
Lexicographicalisation D ′i−1 = {D′1, . . . ,D′m} for the
problematic rank Di−1.
Output: LAC for Di−1 w.r.t. R′ and C.
1 k := m - 1;
2 while T |= C⋃R′ u (⊔ CS∈D′k) v ¬C do
3 k := k - 1;





with the maximal C-compatible concept for the ranking will return the latter
concept. Given this sub-procedure for computing the LAC, we can devise a
non-näıve algorithm (although still having substantial headroom for optimi-
sation) for computing Lexicographic Closure. The pseudocode is represented
in Procedure LexicographicClosureA.
Procedure LexicographicClosureA works by first finding the standard
rank of the antecedent of our query (and corresponding maximal C-compatible
subset of the ranking). This is done in Line 1 using Procedure Rank. Notice
that this behaviour is analogous to the Rational Closure procedure. The
departure point is Lines 2 − 3 which take care of some special cases. The
first is the case where i = 0. This means that the antecedent concept is not
exceptional and therefore we check entailment w.r.t. all the knowledge (we do
not need to eliminate any axioms). The same can be said of the case where
the problematic rank just has a single axiom. In the latter case, there is only
one way to repair the exceptionality of C, and that is to remove the single
axiom. This leaves us with the standard maximal C-compatible concept.
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Procedure LexicographicClosureA(〈T ,D〉,R,R′,δ)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn}, a query δ = C @∼D, the problematic rank
Di−1 and its Lexicographicalisation D ′i−1 = {D′1, . . . ,D′m}.
Output: true if δ is in the Lexicographic Closure of 〈T ,D〉, false
otherwise.
1 i := Rank(〈T ,D〉, R, C);
2 if i = 0 or |Di−1| = 1 then
3 return T |= CDn∪...∪Di u C v D;
4 else
5 CR′ = LAC(〈T ,D〉, δ, {Dn, . . . ,Di},D ′i−1);
6 return T |= CDn∪...∪Di u CR′ u C v D;
If the special cases do not apply, we are left with the core case in Lines 4−
6: the antecedent concept is exceptional and the problematic rank has more
than one axiom. Sub-procedure LAC is used to “fine-comb” through the prob-
lematic rank Di−1. Starting with keeping m− 1 axioms from Di−1 (remem-
ber we cannot keep all m because {Dn, . . . ,Di,Di−1} is not C-compatible
w.r.t. R), if this does not give C-compatibility then we keep m − 2 axioms
and so on. We terminate when we reach C-compatibility or when k = 0 (we
cannot keep any axioms). Consider the following example:












EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent

2
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Applying Procedure ComputeRankingB to 〈T ,D〉 in Example 26 on Page 194















EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent
}
Notice that EmployedStudent @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary is not in the Rational
Closure of 〈T ,D〉. However, applying Procedure LexicographicClosureA
to this query and KB gives the maximal EmployedStudent-compatible subset
of the ranking as {D2,D1}, the problematic rank is D0. D′k on Line 6 of Pro-
cedure LAC is calculated as { { Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) }, { Student
@∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary }, { Student @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent } }. There-
fore, on Line 5 of Procedure LexicographicClosureA, (
⊔
CS∈D′k) = CR′ =
(¬Studentt¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)) t (¬Studentt ∃access.UniversityLibrary)
t (¬Studentt¬SelfSponsoredStudent). We observe that the middle disjunct is
“compatible” with EmployedStudent and therefore T |= CDn∪...∪Di u (
⊔
CS∈D′k)
u EmployedStudent v ∃access.UniversityLibrary.
Similar behaviour reveals that employed students who have children (as
well as employed students who work for a university) can inherit the property
of having access to a university library from general students, because of the
fine-grained behaviour of Lexicographic Closure. We can also derive that
employed students who have children are usually self sponsored, because this
is a typical property of employed students. Another useful inference, that
employed students who work for a university are obliged to pay taxes, can
be made using Lexicographic Closure.
Hence, Lexicographic Closure does not inherit the inferential caution of
Rational Closure described in Example 23 on Page 178.
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We have to show that Procedure LexicographicClosureA terminates, and
that it corresponds with the semantics presented in Section 4.4.1 (i.e., that
the procedure is sound and complete). Termination is trivial to show because
Procedure Rank and Sub-procedure LAC both terminate. The former has been
shown earlier in this chapter, the latter can be extrapolated from Lines 3− 5
of Sub-procedure LAC.
Soundness and completeness for Procedure LexicographicClosureA can
be shown by demonstrating that Definitions 39 and 43 on Pages 185 and
192 for Lexicographic Closure actually correspond. Before we do so, we
prove some intermediate results. The first result shows that incoherence
of a concept, w.r.t. a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, can only be caused by strict
information. This means that, considering that 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent (all
strict information is surely in T ), then incoherence of a concept can only be
caused by T itself. Recall also that the case of a concept being incoherent
w.r.t. a defeasible KB corresponds exactly to the concept having infinite
rank. The following proves the result just discussed (and has been proven
independently as well [41]).
Lemma 14 (Strict Facts are Responsible for Incoherence) Let 〈T ,D〉
be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB and C a concept. Then, T |= C v ⊥ if and
only if 〈T ,D〉 |=r C v ⊥.
Proof: The contrapositive is 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C v ⊥ if and only if T 6|= C v ⊥.
“ =⇒ ” Assume 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C v ⊥. This implies that there is a ranked
model R for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is an x ∈ CR. Let I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 s.t. ∆I = ∆R
and ·I = ·R. Assume that I 6 T . This means there is an X v Y ∈ T
s.t. I 6 X v Y which, in turn, implies that there is a y ∈ XI s.t. y 6∈ Y I .
But this implies that R 6 X v Y because ∆R = ∆I and ·R = ·I . We reach
a contradiction with R  T and therefore, I  T and it is clear that there
is a z ∈ CI corresponding to x ∈ CR. Hence, T 6|= C v ⊥.
“ ⇐= ” Assume that T 6|= C v ⊥. This means there is a model I for T
s.t. there is an x ∈ CI . We also know that 〈T ,D〉 is LHS-coherent which
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implies that 〈T ,D〉 6|=r X v ⊥ for each X @∼ Y ∈ D. This obviously tells
us that there is a ranked model RX for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. RX 6 X v ⊥ for each
X @∼ Y ∈ D. We pick such an RX for each X @∼ Y ∈ D. Observe that, for
each RX , by virtue of having an element y ∈ XRX , there must be a min-
imal such element y′ ∈ XRX . This implies that y′ will satisfy X @∼ Y ∈ D.
We will refer to this observation later in the proof. For now, we take the
horizontal disjoint union (Definition 27 on Page 132) of each RX to obtain
R′. From Lemma 2 on Page 133 we know that R′  〈T ,D〉. However, we
do not know of any element in ∆R
′
that belongs to CR
′
which is the goal
of this proof. But we do know that there is an element x ∈ CI . Thus we
plan to augment the ranked model R′ with this information about I. We
define a ranked interpretation from the information in I. That is, we define
RI = 〈∆RI , ·RI ,≺RI〉 s.t. ∆RI = ∆I , ·RI = ·I and ≺RI s.t. rkRI(w) = 0 for
each w ∈ ∆RI . Now, we take the vertical disjoint union (Definition 28 on
Page 133) of R′ and RI (i.e., the construction R′RI) to obtain R′′. Since,
by definition, we know there is an element of CR
′′
, the crux is to show that
R′′ is a ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. It is easy to show that R′′  T because
R′  T , RI  T , ∆R
′′
= ∆R
′ ∪∆RI and ·R′′ = ·R′
⊎
·RI (Definition 28 on
Page 133). To understand that R′′  D it is sufficient to observe that any
element of the topmost rank of R′′ (i.e., the elements inherited from RI)
satisfies D vacuously. This is because for any such element z, if z ∈ XR′′
for some X @∼ Y ∈ D then z 6∈ min≺R′′ (X
R′′). This is because of the con-
struction of R′ which guarantees that there is an element of XR′ for each
X @∼ Y ∈ D. And, because these elements are all of lower rank than z, z will
always satisfy D. Therefore, R′′  〈T ,D〉 and there is a z′ ∈ CR′′ . Hence,
〈T ,D〉 6|=r C v ⊥. 2
The second result demonstrates that the minimal elements of a concept in
the LCDM correspond exactly with those elements of the concept that satisfy
the most number of subsumptions (materialised concepts) in the KB.
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Lemma 15 (Minimality vs. Maximal Compatibility and LAC)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R its LCDM, C @∼D a query,
R′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} maximal C-compatible subset of its ranking {D0, . . . ,Dn},
and CR′ the LAC for Di−1 w.r.t. R′ and C. Then, x ∈ min≺R(CR) if and
only if x ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R for any x.
Proof: “ =⇒ ” Assume that x ∈ min≺R(CR). Suppose the consequent
of our proof statement holds (i.e., that x ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R). Then,
by definition of C⋃R′ = CDn∪...∪Di and CR′ = (⊔ CS∈D′k), we know that the
number of subsumptions X @∼ Y ∈ D that x “satisfies” (see Definition 37 on
Page 183) is defined as: the number of subsumptions in Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di plus
the number of subsumptions in any S ∈ D′k. We will refer to this number
as nsx. Hence, nsx = |Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di| + |S| for any S ∈ D′k. Now, assume
that the consequent of our proof statement does not hold. I.e., assume that
x 6∈ (C⋃R′uCR′uC)R. This means that either (1) there is an X @∼ Y ∈ Dj for
some Dj ∈ R′ s.t. x ∈ (X u¬Y )R, or (2) x 6∈ (
⊔
CS∈D′k)
R (or both). In either
case, it will mean that nsx < |Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di| + |S| for any S ∈ D′k. Because
we know that x is a minimal element of C in R, we know that there is no
y ∈ CR s.t. y ≺R x. By definition of ≺R (see Definition 38 on Page 185),
we know that (i) there is no such y s.t. y is lower than x in the RCDM
Rrational for 〈T ,D〉 and (ii) there is no such y s.t. nsy > nsx. Observe that,
by definition of maximal C-compatible set (Definition 36), our reduction to
classical entailment for concept exceptionality (Theorem 1 on Page 143),
and LAC (Definition 42) that T 6|= C⋃R′ u CR′ v ¬C. Which is logically
equivalent to saying that T 6|= C⋃R′ uCR′ uC v ⊥. This means that there is
a classical model I for T s.t. there is an element x ∈ (C⋃R′uCR′uC)I . From
Lemma 14 on Page 196 we can derive that 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v ⊥.
This implies that there is a ranked model R′ for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is an
element z ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R′ . This last piece of information, together
with the definition of minimal canonical ranked model, tells us that there is
a z′ ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R. That is, there is a representative element in R
for each element in each standard ranked model for 〈T ,D〉. But this would
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mean that nsz′ > nsx. We arrive at a contradiction with (ii). Therefore we
have shown that x ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R.
“⇐= ” Assume that x ∈ (C⋃R′ uCR′ uC)R. Let Rrational be the RCDM for
〈T ,D〉. By definition of maximal C-compatible subset Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di (Defi-
nition 36 on Page 172) and our reduction to classical entailment for concept
exceptionality (Theorem 1 on Page 143), we know that 〈T ,Dn∪ . . .∪Di〉 6|=r
> @∼ ¬C, and that it is the smallest i for which this is possible. This tells
us that the rank of C w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 (and also w.r.t. Rrational) is i. That is,
rk〈T ,D〉 = rkRrational = i. Therefore, it is easy to see that x is a minimal ele-
ment of C in Rrational because Rrational is a minimal ranked model. The goal
is to show that after the lexicographic refinement of the ordering for Rrational,
x will remain a minimal element of C. By definition of CR′ = (
⊔
CS∈D′k) we
see that |Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di| + |S| for any S ∈ D′k is the maximal number of
subsumptions in D that an element of C can satisfy. Therefore x satisfies
the maximal number of subsumptions that any C can satisfy. Hence, accord-
ing the Lexicographic refinement of the ordering (Definition 37 on Page 183),
which favours (“pushes down”) elements that satisfy more subsumptions from
D, x has to be a minimal element of C w.r.t. R. That is, x ∈ min≺R(CR).2
We can now move on to showing that our reduction to classical entailment
for Lexicographic Closure, given by Procedure LexicographicClosureA on
Page 194 and Definition 43 on Page 192, corresponds with our presented
semantics for it (Definition 39 on Page 185). We formulate the following
lemma to capture what we have to show.
Lemma 16 (Definitions 39 and 43 correspond) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-
coherent defeasible KB, R its LCDM, C @∼D a query, R′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} the
maximal C-compatible subset of its ranking {D0, . . . ,Dn}, and CR′ the LAC
for Di−1 w.r.t. R′ and C. Then, T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D if and only if
〈T ,D〉 |=lexico C @∼D.
Proof: “ =⇒ ” We have to show that if T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D then
〈T ,D〉 |=lexico C @∼D. Since |=lexico is defined in terms of the LCDM R, we
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have to show that if T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D then R  C @∼D. Assume
that T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D but that R 6 C @∼D. This means that there
is an element x ∈ min≺R(CR) s.t. x 6∈ DR. From Lemma 15 on Page 198 we
know that x ∈ (C⋃R′uCR′uC)R. We obviously know that R  T . However,
even stripping away the ordering component of R we are left with a classical
interpretation I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 s.t. ∆I = ∆R, ·I = ·R and, therefore, I  T .
But, by our initial assumption that T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D (each model
for T satisfies C⋃R′ uCR′ uC v D), it follows that I  C⋃R′ uCR′ uC v D.
But we know that x ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)I (because x ∈ (C⋃R′ u CR′ u C)R,
∆I = ∆R and ·I = ·R) and x 6∈ DI (again because x 6∈ DR, ∆I = ∆R and
·I = ·R). This is clearly a contradiction with I  C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D.
Therefore, R  C @∼D.
“⇐= ” We have to show that if R  C @∼D then T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D.
Assume that R  C @∼D but T 6|= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D. This is logically
equivalent to saying that T 6|= C⋃R′uCR′uCu¬D v ⊥. From Lemma 14 on
Page 196 we know that 〈T ,D〉 6|=r C⋃R′uCR′uCu¬D v ⊥. Therefore, there
is a ranked model R′ for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is a y ∈ (C⋃R′ uCR′ uC u ¬D)R′ .
This tells us that there is a y′ ∈ (C⋃R′ uCR′ uCu¬D)R by definition of min-
imal canonical ranked model (that is, there is a representative element in R
for each element in each standard ranked model for 〈T ,D〉). From Lemma 15
on Page 198 we know that y′ ∈ min≺R(CR) and we arrive at a contradiction
with R  C @∼D because y′ 6∈ DR. Hence, T |= C⋃R′ u CR′ u C v D. 2
An analysis of Procedure LexicographicClosureA reveals that the worst-
case computational complexity is increased from exptime-complete (for
classical ALC) to 2-exptime-complete (double exponential time). This
can be demonstrated by observing that, in the worst case, our input defea-
sible KB will only contain defeasible axioms (i.e., T = ∅). Therefore, to
identify the LAC we need to compute an exponential number of subsets of
size k of a set of n elements (where n is the size of the problematic rank).
I.e., the number of disjuncts in the LAC would be exponential in the size of
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the problematic rank. This exponentially-sized input for the ALC decision
procedure, together with the exponential number of operations required (in
the worst case) in the decision procedure itself, results in the 2-exptime-
complete complexity for Lexicographic Closure.
4.4.3 Discussion
We have given a semantics and procedure for computing the Lexicographic
Closure of a defeasible KB. We have shown the correspondence between its
ranked model semantics and its reduction to classical entailment. We have
also demonstrated that Lexicographic Closure is an inferential extension of
Rational Closure. Intuitively, Rational Closure defines a cautious inference
mechanism (“I will only infer something if there is explicit evidence which
proves it”) and Lexicographic Closure defines the credulous counterpart to
this: “I will infer something as long as there is no evidence to the contrary”.
We foresee that both inference mechanisms should have applicability in a vari-
ety of contexts. Perhaps Lexicographic Closure may be suitable for more real-
world applications than Rational Closure because the latter may be viewed as
defining an inference relation that is too cautious. We conclude this section
by mentioning two aspects of Lexicographic Closure that point to possible
variants which may also prove useful. The first aspect is that Lexicographic
Closure is syntax-dependent. That is, performing Lexicographic Closure in-
ference on two logically equivalent KBs (having the same ranked models but
that are syntactically different) may yield different inferences. Consider the
example:
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Applying Procedure ComputeRankingB to 〈T ,D〉 in Example 27 on Page 201
we obtain the ranking:
D0 =
{









It is straightforward to verify that Lexicographic Closure does not give the
intuitive inference that employed students have access to a university li-
brary. Recall from Example 26 on Page 194 that we obtained this infer-
ence with a logically equivalent KB. In that example, the axiom Student @∼
¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) u ∃access.UniversityLibrary was represented in a more
fine-grained manner. I.e., this axiom was “split” into the two axioms Student
@∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) and Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary. Lexico-
graphic Closure thus favours finer-grained representation of axioms in terms
of giving back the most number of positive inferences.
The behaviour of Lexicographic Closure in Example 27 on Page 201 sug-
gests possible variants of the procedure to catch these hidden inferences.
That is, one could define possible normal forms for the KB which could “break
axioms apart” into irreducible components, from which Lexicographic Clo-
sure would then be able to capture the hidden inferences. There have been
numerous efforts concerning normal forms themselves in DLs, for applications
other than the one we propose. One such related contribution is the work
of Horridge, Parsia and Sattler [96] on laconic and precise justifications [94].
We anticipate that similar methods, to those used in this work, may be used
to address the syntax sensitivity of Lexicographic Closure.
Finally, observing the behaviour of the Lexicographic Closure procedure,
we notice that it defines an agnostic or näıve attitude towards identifying the
maximal C-compatible knowledge. That is, it does not discriminate between
the axioms to determine which ones contribute (and which ones don’t) to the
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exceptionality of the query antecedent. In other words, Lexicographic Clo-
sure defines a brute force approach to determining maximal C-compatibility,
even though Procedure LexicographicClosureA is not a fully näıve proce-
dure. Because of this behaviour, it is likely that Lexicographic Closure may
not perform very efficiently in practice. Prima facie, an obvious solution is
to identify heuristics to prune away many of the irrelevant axioms to the
exceptionality in question. We now discuss a class of inference procedures
related to Rational and Lexicographic Closure that adopt this approach.
4.5 Relevant Closure
As we demonstrated in Section 4.3, the Rational Closure is quite coarse in
removing axioms from the ranking in order to reach C-compatibility. In
fact, Rational Closure may eliminate axioms that are irrelevant to the ex-
ceptionality of the query antecedent. In the previous section we showed that
Lexicographic Closure will not exhibit this behaviour. Rather, Lexicographic
Closure is extremely näıve when its comes to eliminating axioms from the
ranking that are irrelevant to the exceptionality of the query. It will eliminate
a single axiom at a time until it reaches C-compatibility and so it is not in
danger of eliminating irrelevant axioms. However, this brute force approach
may prove to be inefficient from the perspective of reasoning performance.
In this section we present a class of reasoning procedures, called the Rel-
evant Closures [48], that define a notion of relevance for axioms w.r.t. the
exceptionality of the query antecedent. For all classes of Relevant Closure,
relevance is defined in terms of justifications [94, 20]. A justification for an
axiom that is entailed from a KB is a minimal subset (w.r.t. set inclusion) of
the KB that entails the given axiom. In general there may be multiple justifi-
cations for an entailment. There has been extensive research into computing
justifications for entailments in DL-based ontologies, and computing them
efficiently [105, 94, 20]. Drawing from this work, we assume the existence
of a black-box function called AllJusts(〈T ,D〉, C) to compute the set of all
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justifications for C being exceptional w.r.t. a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉. We give
specialised definitions for justification and function AllJusts(〈T ,D〉, C) for
our purposes here.
Definition 44 (Justification for Exceptionality) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-
coherent defeasible KB and C a concept s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. Then a
justification for 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C is a set D′ ⊆ D s.t. 〈T ,D′〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C
and there is no D′′ ⊂ D′ s.t. 〈T ,D′′〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. D′ is also called a C-
justification w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
From this given definition of justification in our context of exceptionality, we
can define AllJusts(〈T ,D〉, C) as the function which returns the set of all C-
justifications w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. Since there are numerous optimised
algorithms for AllJusts(〈T ,D〉, C) in the literature we do not give a novel
one here. In our subsequent algorithms for Relevant Closure, we assume the
use of one of these existing procedures for computing all justifications.
In the remainder of this section we introduce three instances of the class
of Relevant Closures. The first is known as Basic Relevant Closure (BRelC
for short), the second as Minimal Relevant Closure (MRelC for short) and the
third as Lexicographically-Relevant Closure (LRelC for short). Although all
these constructions subscribe to a notion of relevance rooted in justifications,
they differ slightly in how they apply justifications to identify maximal C-
compatibility. We shall now focus on explicating the first instance of Relevant
Closure called the Basic Relevant Closure.
Basic Relevant Closure defines the relevant axioms of 〈T ,D〉 w.r.t. the ex-
ceptionality of C, as those that appear in some C-justification for 〈T ,D〉 |=r
> @∼ ¬C. I.e., the following definition of relevance is adopted.
Definition 45 (Relevance and C-basis) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent
defeasible KB, C a concept s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C, and J = AllJusts
(〈T ,D〉, C) = {J1, . . . ,Jn}. Then, the C-basis for 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C is
the set J1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jn. An axiom α ∈ D is relevant for 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C if
α ∈ J1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jn.
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That is, Basic Relevant Closure views any axiom appearing in a C-justification
as relevant to the exceptionality of C. The basic idea, then, is to only elim-
inate axioms that appear in this set from the ranking when identifying the
maximal C-compatible set. In order to capture this new behaviour, we will
introduce an adaptation (to the case of Basic Relevant Closure) of the notion
of maximal C-compatibility (Definition 36 on Page 172). We call this notion
maximally-relevant C-compatibility.
Definition 46 (Maximally-relevant C-compatibility) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a
LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its ranking, C @∼D a query
s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C, and C the C-basis w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C. Now,
let R′ be a sequence of subsets D′0, . . . ,D′i where D′j = Dj\C for 0 ≤ j ≤ i
and let R′′ ⊂ R be the sequence of subsets Di+1, . . . ,Dn. Then, R′ ∪ R′′
(resp. C⋃(R′∪R′′)) is maximally-relevant C-compatible w.r.t. R if T ∪Dn∪. . .∪
D′i∪. . .∪D′0 6|=r > @∼ ¬C and there is no k < i s.t. T ∪Dn∪. . .∪D′k∪. . .∪D′0 6|=r
> @∼ ¬C.
Intuitively, the maximally-relevant C-compatible set of a ranking charac-
terises a procedure for computing maximal C-compatibility, where at each
step we only consider eliminating relevant axioms from the ranking (i.e., those
in Dj ∩ C ). We can now easily formalise Basic Relevant Closure in terms of
classical entailment.
Definition 47 (Basic Relevant Closure of a Defeasible KB)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its ranking,
C @∼D a query, and R
′ the maximally-relevant C-compatible subset of R.
Then, C @∼D is in the Basic Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉 if T |= C⋃R′uC v D.
We do not give a ranked model semantics here for Basic Relevant Closure.
One of the reasons is that Basic Relevant Closure does not characterise a
rational consequence relation. That is, it does not satisfy some of the KLM
postulates and therefore a ranked model semantics is, perhaps, less inter-
esting for such a consequence relation. Even though this is an unfortunate
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theoretical result, it does not detract from Basic Relevant Closure possibly
having useful applications. We will give more detail about this in Chapter 5.
In fact, in that chapter we show that most defeasible reasoning formalisms
mentioned in this thesis do not natively characterise rational consequence
relations.
For now we still have to provide a procedure for Basic Relevant Closure.
Just like Lexicographic Closure, we use the same basic template of the Ra-
tional Closure algorithm but substitute our augmented notion of maximal C-
compatibility. Pseudocode is presented in Procedure BasicRelevantClosure.
Procedure BasicRelevantClosure(〈T ,D〉,R,C ,δ)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn}, the C-basis C , and a query δ = C @∼D.
Output: true if δ is in the Basic Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉, false
otherwise.
1 i := 0;
2 R′′ := R;
3 while T |= C⋃R′′ v ¬C do
4 if i = n then
5 return T |= C v D;
6 R′′ := R′′\(Di ∩ C );
7 i := i + 1;
8 return T |= C⋃R′′ u C v D;
Procedure BasicRelevantClosure works by following the same basic se-
quence of Rational Closure, except, at each stage where axioms are eliminated
from the ranking, only relevant axioms are eliminated (Line 6). Observe that
we never have to eliminate any other axioms because they are irrelevant to the
exceptionality of the query. I.e., the axioms in D\C are always retained (see
Line 3). We illustrate the behaviour of Procedure BasicRelevantClosure
with an example.
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Example 28 Consider the following defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉:
T =
{




2. Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
3. Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary,
4. Student @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent,
5. EmployedStudent @∼ SelfSponsoredStudent,
6. EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice,
7. EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
8. EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent

2
Applying Procedure ComputeRankingB to 〈T ,D〉 in Example 28 on Page 206
we obtain the ranking:
D0 =

2. Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
3. Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary,




5. EmployedStudent @∼ SelfSponsoredStudent,





7. EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
8. EmployedStudent u ∃worksFor.University @∼ ¬SelfSponsoredStudent
}
Suppose our query is the axiom EmployedStudent @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary.
The EmployedStudent-justifications are {1, 2, 6} and {1, 4, 5}. Therefore, the
EmployedStudent-basis is {1, 2, 4, 5, 6}. On the first iteration of the while
loop in Procedure BasicRelevantClosure we eliminate Axiom 2 and Ax-
iom 4. We do not need to eliminate any more axioms because we have
EmployedStudent-compatibility. It is easy to see that EmployedStudent @∼
∃access.UniversityLibrary is indeed in the Basic Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉.
Recall that Rational Closure would not give back this inference. So BRelC
does not have the same inferential caution that Rational Closure has.
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However, Basic Relevant Closure can also be seen to be too “coarse” in
its elimination of axioms. Observe that EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼
SelfSponsoredStudent cannot be inferred. But it seems intuitive to be able to
conclude this seeing as EmployedStudent @∼ SelfSponsoredStudent, and there is
nothing which precludes one from inferring that employed students who also
have children are usually self sponsored. The reason for this caution is that
Basic Relevant Closure does not distinguish among the axioms appearing
in the EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-basis, when eliminating them from a
particular rank. I.e., it removes all such axioms from that rank.
In our example the EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-justifications are J1 =
{1, 2, 6}, J2 = {1, 4, 5} and J3 = {6, 7}. The EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-
basis is therefore {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7}. On the first iteration of the while loop in
the procedure we remove Axiom 2 and Axiom 4 as usual. As a matter of
interest, notice that Axioms 2 and Axiom 4 are the lowest ranked axioms
in J1 and J2 respectively. On the second iteration we will remove both
Axiom 5 and Axiom 6 from the ranking (because they both appear in the
EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-basis). However, notice that Axiom 5 is not
the lowest ranked axiom in any EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-justification.
Recalling that Rational Closure removes axioms in order from lowest
ranked to higher ranked, intuition tells us that applying a similar behaviour
to Relevant Closures would give more sound inferences. That is, perhaps we
should choose our EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-basis as the lowest ranked
axioms from each of the EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.>-justifications. In
fact, this behaviour allows us to infer EmployedStudent u ∃hasChild.> @∼
SelfSponsoredStudent from our example because we will not remove Axiom 5
from D1 (only Axiom 6 will be removed).
Because of the finite number of ranks, Procedure BasicRelevantClosure
will terminate (n is finite). The soundness and completeness (correspondence
with Definition 47 on Page 205) follows straightforwardly by noticing that
C⋃R′′ (Line 8 of Procedure BasicRelevantClosure on Page 206 corresponds
exactly with C⋃R′ in Definition 47 on Page 205 and C⋃(R′∪R′′) in Definition 46
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on Page 205. The computational complexity of Basic Relevant Closure in-
creases to 2-exptime-complete just like Lexicographic Closure. This is
because we require computation of all C-justifications which has been shown
to require an exponential number of entailment checks in the number of
defeasible subsumptions in the KB [94]. Specifically, computation of all jus-
tifications is accomplished by constructing a hitting set tree [162] where each
node in the tree is labelled with a justification for the entailment in question.
The basic procedure for constructing this graph assumes that we have a
procedure or black-box for computing one justification for the entailment in
question. Using such a procedure we generate the root node of the tree. Then,
for each axiom α in the label of this node, we construct an edge (labelled
with α) from the root to a newly constructed node, say n. The label for a
node n will then be a new justification for the entailment generated using
our black-box procedure, with the input ontology minus all the axioms on
the path (labels on the sequence of edges from the root node) to n. If the
entailment no longer holds at some node n then that branch of the tree is
“closed” with the terminating label ‘x’. The construction is complete when
all leaves of the tree are labelled with ‘x’.
From the above construction we notice that when none of the justifi-
cations overlap (or share any elements) this number of nodes in this tree
grows exponentially in the worst case (in the number of justifications for the
entailment).
Returning to Example 28 on Page 206, recall that we discussed a slightly
different notion of relevance that one could define in terms of C-justifications.
That is, we could restrict ourselves to the lowest ranked axioms in each C-
justification (as opposed to keeping them all). This would give us a principled
and finer-grained behaviour when eliminating axioms from the ranking. This
is the philosophy adopted by the second instance of Relevant Closure, called
Minimal Relevant Closure. The Minimal Relevant Closure procedure follows
the same structure as that of Basic Relevant Closure. The only difference is
in its notion of relevance which is based on the minimally ranked axioms in
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the C-justifications. This notion of relevance is defined by minimal-relevance
and minimal C-basis .
Definition 48 (Minimal Relevance and Minimal C-basis) Let 〈T ,D〉
be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, C a concept s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C, and
J = AllJusts(〈T ,D〉, C) = {J1, . . . ,Jn}. Then, the minimal C-basis for
〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C is the set J ′1 ∪ . . . ∪ J ′n where J ′i = {α ∈ Ji | there
is no α′ ∈ Ji s.t. rk〈T ,D〉(α′) < rk〈T ,D〉(α)}. An axiom β ∈ D is minimally
relevant for 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C if β ∈ J ′1 ∪ . . . ∪ J ′n.
Given this new notion of relevance, the maximally-relevant C-compatible
subset of the ranking (Definition 46 on Page 205) is analogously defined for
Minimal Relevant Closure. The only difference is that instead of C-basis
in Definition 46, we use the notion of minimal C-basis (Definition 48 on
Page 210). The same can be said of the definition for Minimal Relevant
Closure in terms of classical entailment. It is analogous to Basic Relevant
Closure. The only difference being that the notion of relevance subscribed
to is defined by minimal C-basis which, in turn, defines a slightly different
notion of maximally-relevant C-compatibility. Therefore, the pseudocode
below is given for completeness even though it is virtually the same as Pro-
cedure BasicRelevantClosure on Page 206. The only difference is that the
minimal C-basis is supplied as input (rather than the standard C-basis).
Termination, soundness and completeness for MinimalRelevantClosure
on Page 211 follow the same arguments as Procedure BasicRelevantClosure
on Page 206. Furthermore, the computational complexity, yet again, remains
2-exptime-complete as is the case for Basic Relevant Closure because we
do not do any additional operations. I.e., we only restrict ourselves to a
subset of the C-basis based on the ranks of the axioms (which can be “read-
off” directly from R). As we have shown in Example 28 on Page 206, Minimal
Relevant Closure is less cautious than Basic Relevant Closure and captures
inferences that Basic Relevant Closure cannot. In other words, Minimal
Relevant Closure is an inferential extension of Basic Relevant Closure. We
demonstrate this below.
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Procedure MinimalRelevantClosure(〈T ,D〉,R,C ,δ)
Input: A LHS-coherent defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, its ranking
R = {D0, . . . ,Dn}, the minimal C-basis C , and a query
δ = C @∼D.
Output: true if δ is in the Minimal Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉, false
otherwise.
1 i := 0;
2 R′′ := R;
3 while T |= C⋃R′′ v ¬C do
4 if i = n then
5 return T |= C v D;
6 R′′ := R′′\(Di ∩ C );
7 i := i + 1;
8 return T |= C⋃R′′ u C v D;
Lemma 17 (MRelC Extends BRelC) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent de-
feasible KB and C @∼D a query. Then, if C @∼D is in the Basic Relevant
Closure of 〈T ,D〉 then C @∼D is in the Minimal Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉.
Proof: We pick a C @∼D in the Basic Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉. Let C be
the C-basis w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 and Cmin the minimal C-basis w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉. It is
clear by their definitions (Definition 45 on Page 204 and 48 on Page 210)
that Cmin ⊆ C . Notice that, by Definition 46 on Page 205, the maximally
relevant C-compatible subset defined in terms of the minimal C-basis - Cmin,
will be a superset of the maximally relevant C-compatible subset defined in
terms of the standard C-basis - C . By monotonicity of classical entailment
and Definition 47 on Page 205 it follows that C @∼D has to be in the Minimal
Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉. 2
We will not give a ranked model semantics for Minimal Relevant Closure
either because it is not a rational consequence relation. However, at this
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point, the reader may enquire about the significance or logical merit of the
Relevant Closures since they are not rational consequence relations. What
we can say is that Basic and Minimal Relevant Closures do not satisfy all
the KLM postulates but they do satisfy most of the foundational ones which
may give credence to their logical merit. We will give more details about the
satisfaction of postulates in Chapter 5. For now we can link Basic Relevant
Closure to Rational Closure in terms of inferential power [48, Proposition 2].
Lemma 18 (BRelC Extends Rational Closure) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-
coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} its ranking, C @∼D a query and C
is the C-basis w.r.t. R. If C @∼D is in the Rational Closure of 〈T ,D〉 then
C @∼D is in the Basic Relevant Closure of 〈T ,D〉.
Proof: We know from Lemmas 11 and 12 that: C @∼D is in the Rational
Closure of 〈T ,D〉 if and only if T |= C⋃MC u C v D, where MC is the
maximally C-compatible subset of R (see Definition 36 on Page 172). We
also know from Definition 47 on Page 205 that C @∼D is in the Basic Relevant
Closure of 〈T ,D〉 if and only if T |= C⋃MRC u C v D where MRC is the
maximally-relevant C-compatible subset of R (see Definition 46 on Page 205).
The crux of this proof is to show that MC ⊆MRC and by monotonicity of
classical entailment the result stated in this lemma would follow immediately.
Observe that the special case where C is not exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 implies
that C = ∅ and this culminates in a case where MC = MRC. It is clear that
in such a case, Rational Closure and Basic Relevant Closure will correspond.
We instead focus on the core case where C is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉.
We begin by unpacking the definitions of MC and MRC. MC is the set
Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di where 0 ≤ i ≤ n is the smallest number s.t. T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di v
¬C. MRC is the set Dn ∪ . . . ∪Dj+1 ∪D′j ∪ . . . ∪D′0 where 0 ≤ j ≤ n is the
smallest number s.t. T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj+1∪D′j∪...∪D′0 v ¬C (where D
′
k = Dk\C for
0 ≤ k ≤ n). There are three cases:
Case 1: i = j. By definition of MRC we know that T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj+1∪D′j∪...∪D′0
v ¬C. This means that T |= CDn∪...∪Dj∪D′j−1∪...∪D′0 v ¬C. Because of our
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assumption in this case that i = j and that T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di v ¬C (by def-
inition of MC), we know that T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj v ¬C. Therefore, it must
be the case that T 6|= CDn∪...∪D′j v ¬C because of classical monotonicity
and the fact that D′j ⊆ Dj (D′j = Di\C ). Hence, there must exist an
α ∈ D′j−1 ∪ . . . ∪ D′0 s.t. α ∈ C (so that we can obtain a C-justification
in T ∪ Dn ∪ . . .Dj+1 ∪ D′j ∪ . . . ∪ D′0). But this is impossible because, by
definition of D′k we know that there is no α ∈ D′j−1 ∪ . . . ∪ D′0 s.t. α ∈ C .
Hence, we arrive at a contradiction.
Case 2: i < j. By definition of MC we know that T 6|= CDn∪...∪Di v ¬C.
But from i < j we also know that Dn ∪ . . .∪Dj ⊆ Dn ∪ . . .∪Di. By classical
monotonicity this means that T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj v ¬C. This also means that
T 6|= CDn∪...∪D′j v ¬C because D
′
j ⊆ Dj (by definition of D′k for 0 ≤ k ≤ n).
By definition of MRC it is clear that T |= CDn∪...∪Dj∪D′j−1∪...D′0 v ¬C (this
is because j is the smallest number s.t. T 6|= CDn∪...∪Dj+1∪D′j∪...D′0 v ¬C).
Therefore, there must exist an α ∈ D′j−1 ∪ . . . ∪ D′0 s.t. α ∈ C (in order to
obtain a C-justification in Dn∪. . .∪Dj∪D′j−1∪. . .D′0). But this is impossible
by definition of D′k for 0 ≤ k ≤ n. Hence, we arrive at a contradiction.
Case 3: i > j. This is the only possible case. By definition we have MC
= Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di and MRC = Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Dj+1 ∪ D′j ∪ . . .D′0. And because
of our assumption that i > j it is clear that i ≥ j + 1 and therefore that
Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Di ⊆ Dn ∪ . . . ∪ Dj+1 ∪ D′j ∪ . . .D′0 (and hence MC ⊆ MRC). 2
In other words, Lemma 18 on Page 212 says that Basic Relevant Closure is
inferentially stronger than Rational Closure and from Lemma 17 on Page 211
we know that Minimal Relevant Closure is inferentially stronger than Basic
Relevant Closure. Of course, the right to left directions of these statements
will not hold in general. Therefore, since Rational Closure has a solid and
well-motivated characterisation both semantically and proof-theoretically, its
inferential relationship with Basic and Minimal Relevant Closure provides
good argument in favour of the sensibility of the latter constructions (as
useful defeasible reasoning methodologies).
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We will now discuss the last known instance of Relevant Closure called
the Lexicographically-Relevant Closure. This instance of Relevant Closure
gets its name from the fact that it is actually a possible optimisation for
computing Lexicographic Closure, using the notion of relevance adopted by
Relevant Closures. Consider the following example.
Example 29 Consider the following defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉:
T =
{
1. GradStudent v Student,





3. Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
4. Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary,
5. Student @∼ ¬(∃assigned.OfficeSpace),
6. Student @∼ ∃takes.Course,
7. ResearchStudent @∼ ¬(∃takes.Course),
8. ResearchStudent @∼ ∃assigned.OfficeSpace

2
Applying Procedure ComputeRankingB to 〈T ,D〉 in Example 29 on Page 214
we obtain the ranking:
D0 =

3. Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice),
4. Student @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary,
5. Student @∼ ¬(∃assigned.OfficeSpace),




7. ResearchStudent @∼ ¬(∃takes.Course),
8. ResearchStudent @∼ ∃assigned.OfficeSpace
}
Suppose our query is the axiom ResearchStudent @∼ ∃access.UniversityLibrary.
Lexicographic Closure will answer affirmatively to this query. The maxi-
mal ResearchStudent-compatible subset of the ranking is D1. The LAC for
ResearchStudent w.r.t. the ranking is (
d
{3, 4}) t (
d





{4, 5}) t (
d
{4, 6}) t (
d
{5, 6}). In other words, all ways of keeping two
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axioms from D0 results in maximal ResearchStudent-compatibility. It is easy
to see that the first disjunct of the LAC is compatible with ResearchStudent
(together with D1) and therefore the LAC as a whole is compatible with
ResearchStudent. However, note that according to Procedure LAC, we have to
perform two operations to arrive at the LAC. That is, we first have to com-
pute all ways of keeping three axioms and check if this is compatible with
ResearchStudent. It turns out that this is not the case, therefore we have to
compute all ways of keeping two axioms (which is compatible). Hence, there
will be a large number of such iterations when the size of the problematic
rank is large.
Recall that, for this procedure, if our problematic rank has n axioms then
we require at most n− 1 combinatorial computations to arrive at the LAC.
To avoid a potential bottleneck in performance, and assuming that one has
computed the C-basis for our query, we can make use of it to avoid many
of the iterations of Procedure LAC. In this case the ResearchStudent-basis
C = {5, 6, 7, 8} (remember that we assume Axioms 1 and 2 are background
knowledge since they are strict, and therefore cannot be altered or elimi-
nated). How many iterations can we avoid at the very least? Well, we can
observe that D0\C will return the set of axioms from D0 that do not appear
in a ResearchStudent-justification, and this means that these axioms are ir-
relevant to the exceptionality of ResearchStudent. In other words, we know
we always have to keep these axioms and hence we save |D0\C | iterations.
Therefore, we only have to perform Procedure LAC on the set D0 ∩ C with
D0\C (the irrelevant axioms) as background knowledge at each step.
Applied to our example we notice that D0\C = {3, 4} and so we will
always keep these axioms. We then apply Procedure LAC with D0∩C = {5, 6}
as the problematic rank (with {3, 4} included in our background knowledge at
each step). We try all ways of keeping one axiom from this set which cannot
be achieved since both Axiom 5 and 6 are sufficient to cause exceptionality
of ResearchStudent (together with D1). Therefore, we have to eliminate both
Axiom 5 and 6 to obtain ResearchStudent-compatibility. We thus use only
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one combinatorial computation for calculating the LAC, as opposed to two
without the helpful C-basis optimisation. Note that in the worst case for
our example, we would have required three combinatorial computations to
derive the LAC (|D0| = 4).
Of course, we need to formalise our description of Lexicographically-
Relevant Closure given in the above discussion. The definition and procedure
for this closure will be analogous to those for Lexicographic Closure (see Defi-
nition 43 on Page 192 and Procedure LexicographicClosureA on Page 194).
The only difference is that Lexicographically-Relevant Closure will conform
to a slightly different notion of LAC (see Definition 42 on Page 191). We
call this new notion the lexicographically-relevant additive concept (LRAC for
short).
Definition 49 (Lexicographically Relevant Additive Concept)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its rank-
ing, C @∼D a query, R
′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} the maximal C-compatible subset of
R, C the C-basis for 〈T ,D〉, Drelevant = Di−1 ∩ C , Dirrelevant = Di−1\C
and Drelevant = {D′1, . . . ,D′m} the Lexicographicalisation of Drelevant. Let k
be the largest number s.t. 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 and T 6|= C⋃R′ u (CDirrelevant) u
(
⊔
CS∈D′k) v ¬C. Then, the concept (CDirrelevant)u (
⊔
CS∈D′k) is known as the
lexicographically-relevant additive concept (LRAC) for C w.r.t. R. D′k is
called the lexicographically-relevant additive subset (LRAS) of R w.r.t. C.
The attentive reader will notice that showing the exact correspondence be-
tween LAC and LRAC proves that Lexicographically-Relevant Closure and
Lexicographic Closure characterise the same inferences. Lexicographically-
Relevant Closure is thus a potential optimisation for computing Lexico-
graphic Closure. However, in order to show the correspondence between
the LAC and LRAC, we have to unpack their definitions which are admit-
tedly quite dense. We shall restrict our attention to the notions of LAS and
LRAS described in the Definitions for LAC and LRAC. The reason is that
we wish to strip away the internalisation mechanism of LAC and LRAC to
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make our proofs easier to follow. The crux of the matter is then to show that
the LAS and LRAS correspond exactly. Our strategy for showing this is to
represent the computation of the LAS and LRAS as tree problems and show
that the solutions of these problems correspond exactly.
Definition 50 (Lexicographic-tree) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defea-
sible KB and R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its ranking. A Lexicographic-tree for
the problematic rank Di−1 is an edge-labelled and node-labelled tree T =
〈N,E,Ln, Le〉 where N is a set of nodes, E is a set of edges, Ln is a node
labelling function and Le is an edge labelling function s.t.:
1. Ln : N → P(Di−1) where P(Di−1) is the powerset of Di−1 and Le : E →
Di−1.
2. The root node r ∈ N of T is s.t. Ln(r) = Di−1.
3. For each n1, n2 ∈ N , there is an edge en1→n2 ∈ E from n1 to n2 if
Ln(n2) ⊂ Ln(n1) and there is no n3 ∈ N s.t. Ln(n2) ⊂ Ln(n3) ⊂ Ln(n1).
4. For each en1→n2 ∈ E, Le(en1→n2) = Ln(n1)\Ln(n2).
5. For some n ∈ N , Path(n) denotes the set of edge labels from r to n.
Notice that the label of each edge in T represents a single axiom from Di−1.
We also point out that Ln(n1) = Ln(r)\Path(n1) for any n1 ∈ N . Finally,
observe that T has a single leaf node l s.t. Ln(l) = ∅.
Therefore, Definition 50 on Page 217 describes a tree in which the root node
corresponds to the full set of axioms in the problematic rank Di−1. For each
axiom α ∈ Di−1 we can remove α from this set to obtain a subset of Di−1
which will represent a new node in the tree. For each of these subsets, in
turn, we can remove a single axiom from them to obtain subsets of these and
so on. We can follow this construction until we have a node for each axiom in
Di−1 (i.e., each such node is labelled with a singleton set containing a unique
axiom from Di−1). Finally, each of these latter nodes will have an edge to
the empty set node l.
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If we let Di−1 = {α1, α2, α3, α4} (that is, Di−1 contains four axioms) then
the Lexicographic-tree T for Di−1 is depicted in Figure 4.5.
∅
{α1} {α2} {α3} {α4}
{α1, α2}{α1, α3}{α1, α4} {α2, α3}{α2, α4}{α3, α4}
{α1, α2, α3}{α1, α2, α4} {α1, α3, α4}{α2, α3, α4}








α4 α1α3 α1α2 α1
α4α3α2α1
Figure 4.5: Lexicographic-tree for a general problematic rank Di−1 = {α1, α2, α3, α4}.
Given the definition of a Lexicographic-tree, we can characterise the problems
of identifying the LAS and LRAS in terms of tree traversal problems w.r.t. the
Lexicographic-tree. Informally, the perspective is that we can traverse the
tree (visit each node) starting from the root node and work towards the leaf
node. At each point in the traversal (i.e., at each node) we try to add the
label of the node (a subset of Di−1) to the maximal C-compatible subset of
the ranking. Of course, adding the label of the root node to the maximal C-
compatible subset of the ranking will cause C to be exceptional (because Di−1
is the problematic rank). Therefore, we have to continue visiting the children
of the root node in a breadth-first fashion. Traversing the tree from the root
upwards (i.e., from the largest subsets to the smallest subsets) ensures we
will find a maximal subset.
We have depicted the tree in Figure 4.5 in a structured way. I.e., we
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have placed the problematic rank (root node) at the bottom of the picture,
and all subsets of this rank are placed in “levels” above this node in the
picture, in decreasing order of size. Therefore, we can actually assign a
number to each level in the picture representing the size of the subsets in
that level. Considering this levelled-structure to the tree, starting at the
root node begins at level k = |Di−1|, we add the associated knowledge Ln(r)
to the ranking and test exceptionality of C. If C is still exceptional we move
to level k − 1 (to the children of the root node whose subsets are of size
k− 1). We then process the labels of each of these children in the same way,
one-by-one and in a breadth-first manner.
If at least one of these subsets (when added to the ranking) do not enforce
C to be exceptional, then this will be a maximally C-compatible subset of
the problematic rank. In other words, if the current level in the tree is k,
then we have identified a way of keeping k axioms from the problematic rank.
Therefore, we have indirectly identified the LAS because it will constitute the
set of all subsets of size k (i.e., those of equal size to the identified maximal
C-compatible ones). However, if none of the children represent C-compatible
subsets, then we move to a higher level in the tree etc.
Therefore, in essence, the task is to find a minimal path to a node n
in the tree s.t. the label of n represents a maximal subset of Di−1 that is
compatible with C (when combined with the maximal C-compatible subset
of the ranking). Thereafter, the LAS will be the set of all node labels in
the tree that have equal size to n. To formalise this, we give a definition
for maximally compatible node (the node at the end of the minimal path as
discussed) and LAS (a revised definition w.r.t. a Lexicographic-tree).
Definition 51 (Maximally Compatible Node and LAS) Let 〈T ,D〉 be
a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its ranking, C @∼D a
query, R′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} the maximal C-compatible subset of R, and let
T = 〈N,E,Ln, Le〉 be the Lexicographic-tree for Di−1. Then a node n1 ∈ N
is maximally compatible for Di−1 w.r.t. C if T 6|= C⋃R′ u CLn(n1) v ¬C and
there is no n2 ∈ N s.t. Path(n2) ⊂ Path(n1) and T 6|= C⋃R′ u CLn(n2) v ¬C.
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The LAS for T w.r.t. R′ and C is the set D′ = {Ln(n2) | n2 ∈ N and
|Ln(n2)| = |Ln(n1)|}.
Definition 51 on Page 219 confirms that a maximally compatible node n in
a Lexicographic-tree is (1) a node whose label is compatible with the query
antecedent C, and (2) has the shortest path from the root of any node that
satisfies (1). It also confirms that the LAS is the set of labels (subsets) in the
Lexicographic-tree where each is of equal size to the label of the maximally
compatible node(s) in the tree.
Now we have to define a notion of LRAS w.r.t. a Lexicographic-tree.
Recall that the LRAS restricts our view to the C-basis (union of all C-
justifications) when eliminating axioms from the problematic rank. There-
fore, in this case, when traversing the Lexicographic-tree we will only consider
paths to nodes n′ s.t:
- Di−1\C ⊆ Ln(n′) (the irrelevant axioms are always retained).
- Path(n′) ⊆ C (we are only interested in nodes that contain subsets of C ).
The maximally compatible nodes that we find in this context will be called
maximally-relevant compatible nodes and the LRAS will be defined in terms
of such nodes.
Definition 52 (Maximally-Relevant Compatible Node and LRAS)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its ranking,
C @∼D a query, R
′ = {Dn, . . . ,Di} the maximal C-compatible subset of R,
T = 〈N,E,Ln, Le〉 the Lexicographic-tree for Di−1, and C the C-basis for
〈T ,D〉. Then a node n1 ∈ N is maximally-relevant compatible for Di−1
w.r.t. C if:
1. Di−1\C ⊆ Ln(n1).
2. Path(n1) ⊆ C .
3. T 6|= C⋃R′ u CLn(n1) v ¬C.
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4. There is no n2 ∈ N s.t. Path(n2) ⊂ Path(n1) and T 6|= C⋃R′ u CLn(n2) v
¬C.
The LRAS for T w.r.t. R′ and C is D′ = {Ln(n3) | n3 ∈ N and |Ln(n3)| =
|Ln(n1)|}.
Finally, we can show the LAS and LRAS correspond by demonstrating
that in any Lexicographic-tree there is a maximally compatible node n and
maximally-relevant compatible node n′ s.t. n = n′.
Lemma 19 (LAS and LRAS Correspond) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent
defeasible KB, R = {D0, . . ., Dn} its ranking, C @∼D a query, C the C-basis
for 〈T ,D〉, and T = 〈N,E,Ln, Le〉 the Lexicographic-tree for Di−1. Then,
there is a maximally compatible node n ∈ N and maximally-relevant compat-
ible node n′ ∈ N (w.r.t. C) s.t. n = n′.
Proof: We first show an intermediate result: that there is a maximally com-
patible node n1 ∈ N s.t. Path(n1) ⊆ C . Suppose there is no such node. It
implies that for each maximally compatible node n1 ∈ N , there is an ele-
ment x ∈ Path(n1) s.t. x 6∈ C . It is straightforward to see that this would
contradict with the definition of justification and the definition of maximally
compatible node. This is because we can easily choose a node n2 ∈ N
s.t. Ln(n2) = Ln(n1) ∪ {x ∈ Path(n1) | x 6∈ C }. It is clear that Ln(n2) is
compatible with C because we have only added axioms to Ln(n1) that are ir-
relevant to the exceptionality of C. This causes a contradiction with n1 being
a maximally compatible node because Ln(n1) ⊂ Ln(n2). Therefore, we have
proven that there is a maximally compatible node n1 ∈ N s.t. Path(n1) ⊆ C .
Now, we have to show that n1 is also a maximally-relevant node in T w.r.t. C.
It is clear that n1 complies with Requirements 2, 3 and 4 of Definition 52 (by
Definition 51 on Page 219). What remains to be shown is that n1 complies
with Requirement 1. I.e., we have to show that Di−1\C ⊆ Ln(n1). This is
quite straightforward to see because, by definition of Lexicographic-tree we
know that Ln(n1) = Di−1\Path(n1). We have also shown that Path(n1) ⊆ C
and therefore it immediately follows that Di−1\C ⊆ Ln(n1). Therefore, n1 is
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a maximally-relevant compatible node for T w.r.t. C. 2
Lemma 19 on Page 221 clearly shows that the LAS and LRAS will be equal
for any Lexicographic-tree because the maximally compatible and maximally-
relevant compatible nodes are the same. Adding the internalisation mecha-
nism back to the fold it follows immediately that the LAC and LRAC also cor-
respond. Finally, this result proves that Lexicographically-Relevant Closure
and Lexicographic Closure correspond. This means that Lexicographically-
Relevant Closure is a potentially optimised way in which to compute Lexi-
cographic Closure.
It must be mentioned that we have presented just three instances of Rel-
evant Closure. Indeed these are the only investigated notions of Relevant
Closure at present. As we have stated earlier, Relevant Closure defines nu-
merous inference procedures because, based on the relevance notion of justi-
fications, there are numerous ways to use axioms in justifications to “repair”
the exceptionality of the entailment. In other words, for Basic, Minimal
and Lexicographically-Relevant Closures we have employed just three pos-
sible ways. In theory, there are other “repair” approaches in this class to
investigate. Some may have more logical merit than others. Nevertheless,
knowledge of these gaps in Relevant Closure research remains impetus for
future work.
4.6 Optimisations
In this fairly brief section we demonstrate some results which suggest useful
optimisations for the procedures discussed in Sections 4.3 to 4.5. The first
result is an interesting relationship between a defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 and its
classical counterpart T ∪ D′. The result was actually shown in the left to
right direction of the “proof” for Proposition 1 on Page 137. However, we
give a more explicit and intuitive representation here for this context.
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Lemma 20 (Exceptionality Implies Classical Unsatisfiability)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB and T ∪D′ its classical counter-
part. If C is exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉, then C is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T ∪ D′
for any concept C.
Modern DL reasoners are highly optimised to check satisfiability or unsatisfi-
ability of concepts [182, 191, 90]. Therefore, if we want to verify if a concept
is exceptional or not, we can, as an approximation first check if it is unsat-
isfiable w.r.t. the classical counterpart of the KB (because it can only be
exceptional if it is unsatisfiable). This would almost certainly save many ex-
ceptionality checks on satisfiable concepts seeing as, in practice, the number
of satisfiable concepts vastly outweigh the number of unsatisfiable concepts
in real-world ontologies. Therefore, to identify all the exceptional concepts
in the KB, we can first identify all the unsatisfiable concepts first to vastly
narrow the search space, and then recurse on this much smaller set to iden-
tify the exceptional concepts using the reduction mentioned in Theorem 1 on
Page 143. This optimisation is applicable for the computation of the ranking
and for deciding entailment using a preferential reasoning paradigm.
On a related note, we saw in Lemma 9 on Page 165 that the ranking
of a defeasible KB respects specificity. This result leads to another possible
optimisation for computation of the ranking which informally states: “all
subclasses of exceptional things are exceptional”. More formally:
Lemma 21 (Exceptionality Propagates Through Subsumption) Let
〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB and C1 a concept s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r
> @∼ ¬C1. Then, for any concept C2 s.t. T |= C2 v C1, 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C2.
Proof: Suppose that 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C1 and there is a concept C2 s.t. T |=
C2 v C1 but that 〈T ,D〉 6|=r > @∼ ¬C2. Therefore, there is a ranked model
R for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. there is an x ∈ C2R and rkR(x) = 0. Let I ′ = 〈∆I
′
, ·I′〉
be a classical interpretation s.t. ∆I
′
= ∆R and ·I′ = ·R. We know that
I ′  T because R  T , ∆I′ = ∆R and ·I′ = ·R. But from our assump-
tion that T |= C2 v C1 it follows that I ′  C2 v C1. This means that





. But this must mean that xR ∈ C1R because ∆I
′
= ∆R
and ·I′ = ·R. This means that R 6 > @∼ ¬C1 which is a contradiction with
〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C1. Therefore, 〈T ,D〉 |=r > @∼ ¬C2. 2
The result of Lemma 21 on Page 223 allows us to infer that a concept is
exceptional if we know it is more specific than a known exceptional concept
(using syntactic, heuristic or other techniques). This optimisation can be
used in numerous applications of defeasible reasoning. It should be partic-
ularly useful when updating the ranking of a KB after it is incrementally
modified (axioms are added or removed). This would allow one to avoid
recomputing the entire ranking from scratch after the KB is modified.
In fact, Lemma 21 on Page 223 hints at another useful result for incre-
mental update of the ranking. Loosely speaking, it identifies that “subsets
of exceptional things are at least as exceptional as these things”. That is,
the following lemma concerning the ranks of more specific concepts holds.
Lemma 22 (Degree of Exceptionality Respects Subsumption)
Let 〈T ,D〉 be a LHS-coherent defeasible KB and C1 a concept s.t. 〈T ,D〉 |=r
> @∼ ¬C1. Then, for any concept C2 s.t. T |= C2 v C1, rk〈T ,D〉(C2) ≥
rk〈T ,D〉(C1).
Proof: Suppose that rk〈T ,D〉(C2) < rk〈T ,D〉(C1). By definition of rk〈T ,D〉 we
know there is a ranked model R for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. rkR(C2) = i and there
is no other ranked model for 〈T ,D〉 where the rank of C2 is lower than i.
The same can be said of C1. We pick this relevant ranked model R′ for
C1. We pick an x ∈ min≺R(C2R). From T |= C2 v C1 we know that
x ∈ C1R. But this means that rkR(C2) ≥ rkR′(C1) which is a contradiction
with rk〈T ,D〉(C2) < rk〈T ,D〉(C1). Therefore, rk〈T ,D〉(C2) ≥ rk〈T ,D〉(C1). 2
Lemma 22 on Page 224 says that concepts that are more specific than some
exceptional concept are at least as exceptional as this concept. It is a very
straightforward result but very useful to avoid näıve recomputation of the
ranking when the KB is incrementally modified.
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Recall that in Section 4.5, the presented Relevant Closures require com-
putation of justifications in order to avoid removing irrelevant or unnecessary
axioms to the exceptionality in question. This is certainly one way to avoid
unnecessary entailment checks. However, justification finding is a compu-
tationally complex task and standard DL reasoning tasks need to be used
(or modified in the case of glassbox approaches) to pinpoint them. There is
another approach to prune away irrelevant axioms to the exceptionality that
does not require DL reasoning. This approach uses the principle of module
for a KB w.r.t. a signature (set of terms from the KB) [83, 170]. Intuitively,
a module of a KB w.r.t. a signature is a small subset of the ontology which
preserves the meaning of the terms in the signature.
The topic of modularisation of ontologies is a broad and involved research
area. For our purposes, we are interested in applying the techniques of mod-
ularisation to prune away irrelevant axioms in the ranking (without using
reasoning). So for our context, the signature of interest would be the set of
terms used in our reasoning query. Intuitively, what we want to do is extract
a module of our KB that eliminates as many irrelevant axioms as possible,
but at the same time not eliminating any axioms that contribute to the ex-
ceptionality of the query. Therefore we are interested in modules which have
two properties: (1) they should preserve all justifications for all entailments
that can be formed over the signature of our query. I.e., the module should
retain all axioms relevant to our query. And (2) the module should be as
small as possible (the module should exclude as many axioms as possible to
reduce entailment checks and increase the performance).
So-called star locality-based modules [170] satisfy both of these properties.
However, since we are in the context of defeasible reasoning, and modular-
isation is predominantly developed for classical reasoning systems, one may
ask if the property of preserving all justifications for all entailments over the
given signature actually translates to the defeasible case. The answer is yes
because we have shown extensively that defeasible reasoning (in ALC) can
be reduced to classical DL entailment.
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4.7 Syntactic Sugar
We recall from Section 2 when we introduced DLs, that one can express
useful abbreviations (concise syntactic forms) for subsumption statements.
We call such abbreviations “syntactic sugar” because they do not add to the
expressivity of DLs but just offer more concise (and sometimes more intuitive)
representations of certain semantic relationships. The main ones we have
discussed for classical DLs are equivalence and disjointness statements.
For example, the equivalence statement Man ≡ Person uMale (men and
persons who are male refer to the same objects in the domain) is an abbre-
viation for the two subsumptions Man v PersonuMale and PersonuMale v
Man. That is to say, the two subsumptions and the equivalence statement
have the same models (i.e., they are satisfied in the same interpretations).
Similarly, the disjointness statement Man ‖ Woman (the set of objects in
the domain referred to as men, and the set referred to as woman, are dis-
joint) is an abbreviation for the subsumption ManuWoman v ⊥. Of course,
these correspondences are a convenient result of the semantics that DLs have
assigned to the constructs of subsumption, equivalence and disjointness.
The questions now are: is it useful and intuitive to be able to talk about
defeasible versions of equivalence and disjointness and, if so, what semantics
should we assign to such notions in the preferential context? To address
the first question we present some examples to make it evident that humans
often do make defeasible equivalence and defeasible disjointness statements.
4.7.1 Defeasible Equivalence
In the area of advertising, many companies and business analysts use the
terms digital marketing and online marketing interchangeably. In other
words, they usually refer to the same principle. Considering that digital
marketing refers to advertising through digital media channels, it is clear
that online marketing (for example through social media) is a form of digital
marketing. On the other hand, it may be contentious to state that all digital
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marketing takes place through the Web.
Television and Radio advertising is usually propagated through digital
media and, although it is sometimes transmitted online as well, the tradi-
tional “offline” channels remain the ones reaching the majority of customers.
It therefore makes sense to say that the concepts DigitialMarketingCampaign
(DMC for short) and OnlineMarketingCampaign (OMC for short) are usually
equivalent.
Now, in the framework of ranked model semantics, what semantics can
one assign to such a statement? We recall that we interpreted a defeasible
subsumption C @∼D as “typical C’s are D’s”. Seeing as classical equivalence
corresponds to the rendering of subsumption in both directions for the given
concepts, we experiment with such an approach in the defeasible context to
study its semantic intuition.
Reversing the direction of this subsumption, we arrive at “typical D’s are
C’s” (or the subsumption D @∼ C). Advocating both these subsumptions to
define defeasible equivalence seems to give back an intuitive semantic repre-
sentation for defeasible equivalence. Essentially these subsumptions together
restrict our view to the models in which the typical C’s and typical D’s
coincide.
That is, where the typical C’s are typical D’s are classically equivalent. Of
course, we can only study the merit of this semantic definition by examining
how it relates to our intuition in real-world examples. In the digital vs. online
marketing example, it certainly does make sense to talk about typical digital
marketing campaigns and typical online marketing campaigns coinciding.
However, only one direction of this defeasible subsumption relationship is
contentious from an intuitive perspective.
That is, it is clear that online marketing falls within the jurisdiction of
digital marketing, but the converse constraint may have exceptions. In other
words, we should only enforce that typical digital marketing campaigns are
online marketing campaigns. Formally speaking, we agree upon the following
definition for defeasible equivalence:
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Definition 53 (Defeasible Equivalence) Two concepts C and D are de-
feasibly equivalent (written as C ∼
=




Besides its intuitive merit, this representation borrows a useful correspon-
dence from the classical case. That is, the semantic relationship between
defeasible equivalence and defeasible subsumption is analogous to the rela-
tionship between classical equivalence and classical subsumption.
In other words, given the semantics we have assigned, defeasible equiva-
lence can be represented in terms of defeasible subsumption. Therefore, for
our marketing example the statement DMC ∼
=
OMC is logically equivalent
to DMC @∼ OMC, OMC @∼ DMC collectively.
The proof demonstrating the reduction of defeasible equivalence to de-
feasible subsumption is straightforward and we therefore do not specify it
here.
4.7.2 Defeasible Disjointness
Recall from Section 2.1 that one can express that two concepts C and D are
disjoint (they cannot share any elements), and we denote this by C ‖ D. For
example, we know that birds and plants are disjoint (Bird ‖ Plant), married
men are disjoint with bachelors (Man u ∃marriedTo.> ‖ Bachelor) etc. Is
there a case for defeasible disjointness?
We feel that there is, and we give an interesting example as a case in point.
In describing human physiology, it may make sense to add a constraint to our
knowledge that people whose eye irises are blue are disjoint with those whose
eye irises are green. However, there are exceptions to this constraint and one
example of this is expressed through the condition known as Heterochromia3.
The condition defines cases in which people have distinct colours either in
one eye iris, or in the irises of each eye. In light of this condition, and other
conditions like it, it seems useful to be able to represent that two concepts
3nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003319.htm
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are usually disjoint, thereby avoiding logical incoherence and inconsistencies
caused by exceptions.
Whereas the typical C’s and D’s coinciding seemed an appropriate def-
inition for defeasible equivalence, for defeasible disjointness the typical C’s
and D’s being distinct seems a compelling definition. That is, the typical C’s
and D’s are disjoint:
Definition 54 (Defeasible Disjointness) Two concepts C and D are de-
feasibly disjoint (written as C o o D) in a ranked interpretation R if:
min≺R(C
R) ∩min≺R(DR) = ∅.
For our Heterochromia example, Definition 54 on Page 229 essentially holds
that: blue-eyed people are usually disjoint with green-eyed people, if and
only if, typical people with blue eyes, and typical people with green eyes, are
distinct.
The question now arises if defeasible disjointness is actually syntactic
sugar or do we need to enrich the expressivity of defeasible DLs to be able
to capture this principle? A study of the semantics given in Definition 54 on
Page 229 as well as ranked model semantics gives us a clue as to a represen-
tation of defeasible disjointness in terms of defeasible subsumption.
That is, we arrive at the following defeasible subsumption rendering: typ-
ical blue-eyed people and typical green-eyed people will be disjoint, if and
only if, the most typical objects in our domain that are either blue-eyed or
green-eyed are not both blue and green-eyed. This reduction is quite intuitive
and lends more credibility to the semantics of Definition 54 on Page 229.
We give a proof for the reduction of defeasible disjointness to defeasible
subsumption here because it is perhaps not as straightforward as it is for
defeasible equivalence.
Lemma 23 (Defeasible Disjointness w.r.t. Defeasible Subsumption)
For any ranked interpretation R, R  C oo D if and only if R  CtD @∼ ¬(Cu
D).
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Proof: =⇒ we pick a ranked interpretation R s.t. min≺R(CR) ∩ min≺R(DR)
= ∅. We assume thatR 6 CtD @∼ ¬(CuD) and try to derive a contradiction.
We know there is an x ∈ min≺R(CR ∪DR) s.t. x ∈ CR ∩DR. This means
that there is no y ≺R x s.t. y ∈ CR and similarly there is no z ≺R x s.t.
z ∈ DR. This clearly implies that x ∈ min≺R(CR) and x ∈ min≺R(DR). I.e.,
x ∈ min≺R(CR) ∩ min≺R(DR). This is a contradiction with our assumption
that min≺R(C
R) ∩ min≺R(DR) = ∅. 2
⇐= we pick a ranked interpretation s.t. R  C t D @∼ ¬(C u D) and we
assume that min≺R(C
R) ∩ min≺R(DR) 6= ∅. We try to derive a contradic-
tion from this. From the latter assumption we know that there is an x ∈
min≺R(C
R) ∩ min≺R(DR). Therefore, there can be no y ≺R x s.t. either
y ∈ CR or y ∈ DR. This advertently means that x ∈ min≺R(CR ∪ DR)
which, given our selected R, implies that x 6∈ CR ∩ DR. This is clearly a
contradiction with the fact that x ∈ min≺R(CR) ∩ min≺R(DR). 2
Finally, we conclude this section by pointing out that our notion of defeasible
disjointness, while a reasonable characterisation, is possibly not the only
reasonable notion one can devise. There may be other sensible notions within
the preferential framework, and we ourselves have considered two possible
definitions borrowed from classical disjointness.
In classical disjointness we know that the axiom C ‖ D can be equivalently
represented by the subsumptions C v ¬D or C uD v ⊥.
In principle, the defeasible counterparts of these statements can be used to
expression a notion of defeasible disjointness. However, the defeasible coun-
terpart of the latter statement would not be suitable to capture defeasible
disjointness.
That is, the ranked interpretations satisfying the statement C u D @∼⊥
are the same as those satisfying C uD v ⊥ (classical disjointness).
The other possibility, namely C @∼ ¬D, is more interesting. It says that
typical C’s should not be D’s. Because typicality is restricted only to the
LHS with defeasible subsumption, this notion does not treat C and D sym-
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metrically.
That is, the statements C @∼ ¬D and D @∼ ¬C are not logically equivalent
(whereas their classical counterparts are). Thus a sensible notion of defeasible
disjointness needs to take into account both these defeasible subsumptions
in some way. Nevertheless, we leave such an investigation as future work.
4.8 Discussion
In this chapter we have presented how the principle of concept exception-
ality can be reduced to classical entailment (Section 4.1). This base result
paves the way to be able to characterise and compute the core structure
of all our preferential reasoning paradigms - the exceptionality ranking of a
defeasible KB (Section 4.2). The subsequent algorithmic constructions we
gave (Sections 4.3 to 4.5) essentially varied only in the notion of maximal
C-compatibility of the ranking that they subscribe to.
In the case of Lexicographic Closure 4.4 we also gave a semantic charac-
terisation in terms of ranked models which corresponds to our presented pro-
cedure. We showed that Lexicographic Closure is an inferential extension of
Rational Closure, while Minimal Relevant Closure is an inferential extension
of Basic Relevant Closure (though the latter two procedures are non-rational
in the KLM sense). We also defined a type of Relevant Closure called the
Lexicographically-Relevant Closure which corresponds exactly with Lexico-
graphic Closure, and defines an optimised procedure for computing the latter.
In the next chapter we show which requirements (argued for in Chapter 3)
are satisfied by each of the constructions in this chapter. We also perform
similar evaluations for some of the non-preferential proposals mentioned in
Chapter 2.
Finally, as a matter of philosophical interest, since the procedures we
have presented are meant to address monotonicity of classical entailment,
they must be nonmonotonic in nature. However, we have shown that these
procedures actually reduce to classical entailment. Some readers may in-
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quire at this point how to intuitively understand this. One could consider
the following explanation: suppose I am an agent who cannot comprehend
defeasible statements. That is, I can only reason about strict statements (like
our presented reasoning procedures). Then I can still adhere to a defeasible
reasoning paradigm when reconciling my knowledge, using the principle of
selective ignorance.
In other words, if I accept as fact that students don’t pay taxes (strict
information), but I later encounter a specific student (for example an em-
ployed one) who does pay taxes, then I have a choice: I can either choose to
ignore this latest finding so that I can still accept my previous finding. Or, I
can choose to ignore the previous finding to accept the latter one. Of course,
the presented procedures in this chapter adhere to the latter paradigm (more
specific knowledge is more important).
Chapter 5
Evaluating the Inferences of
Defeasible Reasoning
In Chapter 3 we made a case for the satisfaction of the KLM postulates by
arguing that a defeasible reasoning mechanism, in the context of DLs, should
at the very least satisfy these properties in order to guarantee sensible reason-
ing behaviour. This chapter evaluates the preferential reasoning algorithms
presented in Chapter 4, and the applicable alternatives in Chapter 2, against
these formal properties motivated in Chapter 3.
We first evaluate our preferential algorithms against the formal KLM
properties given in Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3. Thereafter, we consider the
alternative defeasible reasoning approaches mentioned in Chapter 2 against
the same requirements. We conclude with a short discussion about the sig-
nificance of the results.
5.1 Preferential Algorithms
In Chapter 2 we have presented overviews of various defeasible reasoning for-
malisms that address the exception problem in DLs. Among those presented
proposals, we chose to further develop the preferential approach towards the
pragmatic goals of this thesis.
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The main reasons we chose the preferential approach were 1) its general-
ity as a framework for defeasible reasoning and 2) the structural properties
that it respects. These characteristics make the inferential behaviours of en-
tailment regimes built on top of the framework, have a more clearly defined
“shape” or “structure”.
The framework as a whole is also arguably more conceptually simple
and elegant than other formalisms, in part because it handles the matter of
priorities internally without need of user input. Notwithstanding, restricted
refinement of priorities is still permitted in the framework (see Section 4.2).
In this section we evaluate the preferential reasoning algorithms (pre-
sented in Chapter 4) against the advocated KLM properties motivated in
Section 3.2.1. Since preferential DLs introduce a new notion of subsumption
( @∼ ) in the language, and it has a clear ranked model semantics, it is very
easy to substitute this notion for ; defined in Section 3.2.1 and evaluate it
against the postulates.
Examining current literature concerning the preferential approach (as ap-
plied to DLs) it is surprising to note that there is no explicit demonstration
that @∼ , when interpreted in any ranked interpretation, actually satisfies all
the KLM postulates. This is of course the object-level perspective of the
relation. This result is expressed in the following lemma, the proof of which
is fairly straightforward:
Lemma 24 (Defeasible Subsumption Satisfies KLM Postulates) Let
R be a ranked interpretation. Then, for any three concepts C, D and E:
1. R  C @∼ C (Ref)
2. If R  C ≡ D and R  C @∼ E then R  D @∼ E (LLE)
3. If R  C @∼D and R  C @∼ E then R  C @∼D u E (And)
4. If R  C @∼D and R  E @∼D then R  C t E @∼D (Or)
5. If R  C @∼D and R  D v E then R  C @∼ E (RW)
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6. If R  C @∼D and R  C @∼ E then R  C uD @∼ E (CM)
7. If R  C @∼D and R 6 C @∼ ¬E then R  C u E @∼D (RM)
Proof: 1. R  C @∼ C if and only if min≺R(CR) ⊆ CR and the latter follows
by definition of the function min≺R (see Definition 7 on Page 85).
2. (LLE) follows easily as well: If R  C @∼ E (the minimal C’s are all E’s)
and R  C ≡ D (C and D correspond to the same set of elements) we can
deduce that the minimal C’s are equivalent to the minimal D’s and hence it
follows that R  D @∼ E (the minimal C’s are D’s).
3. (And) is straightforward: If R  C @∼D (the minimal C’s are all D’s)
and R  C @∼ E (the minimal C’s are also all E’s) then R  C @∼D u E
(the minimal C’s are in the intersection of D and E). In other words, if
min≺R(C
R) ⊆ DR and min≺R(CR) ⊆ ER then min≺R(CR) ⊆ DR ∩ ER.
4. Assume that R  C @∼D and R  E @∼D but that R 6 C tE @∼D. There
is an x ∈ min≺R((C t E)R) s.t. x 6∈ DR. There are three cases:
Case 1: x ∈ CR and x 6∈ ER. By definition of min≺R , there is no y ≺R x
s.t. y ∈ (C t E)R. That is, for each y ≺R x, y 6∈ CR and y 6∈ E)R. This
means that x ∈ min≺R(CR). But from our assumption that R  C @∼D it
means x ∈ DR. This is a contradiction with our assumption that x 6∈ DR.
Case 2: x ∈ ER and x 6∈ CR (Symmetric to Case 1).
Case 3: x ∈ CR and x ∈ ER. By definition of min≺R , there is no y ≺R x
s.t. y ∈ (C t E)R. That is, for each y ≺R x, y 6∈ CR and y 6∈ E)R.
Therefore, x ∈ min≺R(CR) and x ∈ min≺R(ER). From both our assumptions
R  C @∼D and R  E @∼D we derive that x ∈ DR. Again, we arrive at a
contradiction with our assumption that x 6∈ DR.
5. R  C @∼D implies that min≺R(CR) ⊆ DR. R  D v E implies
that DR ⊆ ER. By transitivity of ⊆ (subset inclusion), we obtain that
min≺R(C
R) ⊆ ER. I.e., that R  C @∼ E.
6. Assume that R  C @∼D and R  C @∼ E but that R 6 C u D @∼ E.
There is an x ∈ min≺R((C u D)R) s.t. x 6∈ ER. We know obviously from
x ∈ min≺R((C uD)R) that x ∈ (C uD)R). There are two cases:
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Case 1: x ∈ min≺R(CR). From R  C @∼ E we know that x ∈ ER. This is a
contradiction with our assumption that x 6∈ ER.
Case 2: x 6∈ min≺R(CR). There is a y ≺R x s.t. y ∈ min≺R(CR). We pick
such a y. Therefore, from R  C @∼D we know that y ∈ DR. But this
contradicts with x ∈ min≺R((C u D)R) which says that there is no z ≺R x
s.t. z ∈ CR ∩DR.
7. Assume that R  C @∼D and R 6 C @∼ ¬E but that R 6 C u E @∼D.
Our second assumption implies that there is an x ∈ min≺R(CR) s.t. x ∈ ER.
From our third assumption, there is a y ∈ min≺R((C u E)R) s.t. y 6∈ DR.
We have three cases:
Case 1: x ≺R y. From R 6 C @∼ ¬E we know that x ∈ min≺R(CR) and
x ∈ ER. This contradicts with y ∈ min≺R((C u E)R) (i.e., that there is no
element more minimal than y also belonging to both C and E).
Case 2: y ≺R x. Contradicts with x ∈ min≺R(CR) because y ∈ CR (from
y ∈ min≺R((C u E)R)).
Case 3: rkR(x) = rkR(y). From R  C @∼D we know that x ∈ DR. But if x
is of equal rank to y and x is contained in min≺R(C
R) then it must be the
case that y ∈ min≺R(CR). From our assumption that R  C @∼D it means
y ∈ DR. This contradicts with our earlier assumption that y 6∈ DR. 2
Lemma 24 on Page 234 shows that, restricting ourselves to a single ranked
interpretation, the semantics of defeasible subsumption satisfies all the KLM
postulates.
Unfortunately, the literature also does not demonstrate definitively which
defeasible entailment regimes (induced by defeasible subsumption) satisfy
which postulates. I.e., to the best of our knowledge, the proofs for this meta-
level consideration of the KLM postulates are not explicitly provided.
Even though the majority of these proofs are fairly straightforward, we
provide them here for completeness and ease of reference. It must be em-
phasised though that the results for Rational and Lexicographic Closure are
accepted and known by the preferential reasoning community in general.
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We start off by showing that both Rational Closure and Lexicographic
Closure induce rational consequence relations. In other words, they each
satisfy all the formal KLM postulates.
It turns out that we do not need involved proofs to show this. In fact this
result follows from Lemma 24 and the fact that both Rational and Lexico-
graphic Closure can be characterised in terms of single ranked models (see
Definitions 23 and 38 on Pages 97 and 185 respectively). Furthermore, we
have shown Lexicographically-Relevant Closure to be an equivalent construc-
tion to Lexicographic Closure (see Lemma 19 on Page 221). This means that
Lexicographically-Relevant Closure also computes a rational consequence re-
lation.
Within the preferential reasoning algorithms, this leaves us with the Basic
and Minimal Relevant Closures. We have stated in Section 4.5 that these
constructions do not define rational consequence relations. I.e., they do not
satisfy all the KLM postulates. Here we demonstrate which of the postulates
they do in fact satisfy, as well as provide applicable counter-examples to show
which of the postulates they do not satisfy.
Theorem 2 (The Relevant Closures w.r.t. KLM Postulates) The Ba-
sic and Minimal Relevant Closures satisfy the properties (Ref), (And), (RW)
and (LLE) and do not satisfy the properties (Or), (CM) and (RM).
Proof: we show that for any defeasible KB K: 1. (Ref) - for any concept
C, C @∼ C will be in the basic and minimal Relevant Closures of K. By Def-
inition 47 on Page 205, this is the case if and only if C v C is classically
entailed by the classical counterpart of the maximally-relevant C-compatible
subset of the ranking for K (both notions of maximal relevance apply here for
each closure). In other words, our procedures reduce to classical subsump-
tion checking. By the semantics of classical subsumption, we know that any
set of elements is a non-strict subset of itself, therefore both closures satisfy
(Ref).
2. (And) - if C @∼D and C @∼ E is in the a basic (resp. minimal) Relevant
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Closure for K, then C @∼D u E is also in the basic (resp. minimal) Relevant
Closure for K. But the premises of this argument imply that the maximally-
relevant C-compatible subset of the ranking is s.t. C v D and C v E are
both classically entailed by its classical counterpart. Because the (And) rule
is satisfied by classical entailment we obtain that C v DuE is also classically
entailed by its classical counterpart. Therefore, both closures also satisfy the
(And) property.
3. (LLE) - if C @∼ E and C ≡ D are in the basic (resp. minimal) Relevant
Closure for K, then D @∼ E is also in the basic (resp. minimal) Relevant Clo-
sure for K. The first premise means that C v E classically follows from the
maximally-relevant C-compatible subset of the ranking for K. The second
premise can be understood as follows: all our preferential reasoning algo-
rithms imply that any strict query such as C ≡ D will be in the selected
defeasible closure of the KB if and only if it follows classically from the TBox
(strict information) in the KB alone. By monotonicity of classical entailment
we would also have that C ≡ D follows classically when adding the classical
counterpart of the maximally-relevant C-compatible subset of the ranking to
the TBox. Thus, from both our derivations C ≡ D and C v E, as well as
classical reasoning, we can easily infer D v E. Therefore, both closures will
satisfy (LLE).
4. (RW) - if C @∼D and D v E are in the basic (resp. minimal) Relevant Clo-
sure for K, then C @∼ E is also in the basic (resp. minimal) Relevant Closure
for K. A similar argument to (LLE) is used. D v E can be derived classically
from the strict information alone. From the union of this strict information
and the classical counterpart of the maximally-relevant C-compatible subset
of the ranking we can classically derive C v D. By monotonicity of classical
entailment we can derive both the above conclusions from this latter union
of sets. Using classical reasoning it is easy to see we can derive C v E via
transitivity of classical subsumption. Therefore, (RW) is also satisfied by
both closures.
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We now give counter-examples for the unsatisfied properties:
5. (Or) - consider the defeasible KB K = { A @∼B, B @∼ C, A @∼ ¬C, A @∼D,
G @∼D, D @∼ E, G @∼H, H @∼ ¬E, G @∼ E }. The ranking for K is: D0 = { B @∼ C,
D @∼ E, H @∼ ¬E }, D1 = { A @∼B, A @∼ ¬C, A @∼D, G @∼D, G @∼H }. We can
derive both A @∼ E and G @∼ E, using basic and minimal Relevant Closure,
from K. The former conclusion can be inferred by noting that there is a
single A-justification: { A @∼B, B @∼ C, A @∼ ¬C }, and the latter conclusion
can be inferred by noting that the G-justifications are: { G @∼ E, G @∼H,
H @∼ ¬E } and { G @∼D, G @∼H, D @∼ E, H @∼ ¬E }. Finally, it is clear that
we cannot derive A t G @∼ E because the A t G-justifications are: { A @∼B,
B @∼ C, A @∼ ¬C, G @∼ E, G @∼H, H @∼ ¬E } and { A @∼B, B @∼ C, A @∼ ¬C, G @∼D,
G @∼H, D @∼ E, H @∼ ¬E }.
6. (CM) & (RM) - consider the defeasible KB K = { E @∼ ¬G, H @∼ E, B @∼ ¬D,
C @∼D, C @∼B, C u D @∼G, C @∼H, C u D @∼H }. The ranking for K is: D0
= { E @∼ ¬G, B @∼ ¬D, H @∼ ¬E }, D1 = { C @∼D, C @∼B, C uD @∼G, C @∼H,
C u D @∼H }. There is only one C-justification { B @∼ ¬D, C @∼D, C @∼B }
and it is clear from this that one can derive both C @∼D and C @∼ E, using
both basic and minimal Relevant Closure. However, we have three (C uD)-
justifications { B @∼ ¬D, C @∼D, C @∼B }, { C u D @∼G, C u D @∼H, H @∼ E,
E @∼ ¬G } and { C u D @∼G, C @∼H, H @∼ E, E @∼ ¬G }. Clearly, one cannot
derive C uD @∼ E after removing the (C uD)-basis axioms from D0. 2
5.2 Non-Preferential Algorithms
In this section we evaluate whether the main alternative formalisms for de-
feasible reasoning in DLs satisfy the KLM properties or not. It is critical to
point out that, by design, most of these alternatives cannot be directly com-
pared to the preferential approach, nor directly evaluated against the KLM
properties discussed in Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3.
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This is because in many cases the applicable formalism has been designed
towards addressing different concrete reasoning problems than our preferen-
tial reasoning approaches. Therefore, we have to evaluate some of the for-
malisms by first placing some restrictions and underlying assumptions on the
representations we choose, so that they can be directly evaluated against the
KLM consequence relation postulates introduced in Chapter 3.
We address the formalisms in order of how directly they can be evaluated
against the KLM postulates (i.e., how many restrictions do we need to place
on the formalism before it can be directly evaluated). We start with the
formalism which can be most directly evaluated - overriding (Section 2.9).
We do not consider DLs of MKNF and Defeasible Logic in this evalu-
ation. The main reason for eliminating DLs of MKNF is that they differ
quite considerably from the aforementioned formalisms in terms of their rep-
resentational goals (they are more general formalisms allowing one to express
epistemic statements in addition to default statements). We also eliminate
Defeasible Logic because, when integrated into DLs, it is too dissimilar in
terms of its approach, to the aforementioned formalisms.
5.2.1 Overriding
The most recent approach currently to defeasible reasoning for DLs, is the
one by Bonatti et al. [27] on overriding (see Section 2.9). It is specifically
targetted at DLs and is, representationally speaking, most similar to the
preferential approach.
The central representational element introduced is the notion of a de-
feasible inclusion vn relation (analogous in spirit to @∼ ). Because of this
correspondence, we can consider vn to induce a consequence relation on DL
concepts in an analogous way to @∼ .
We recall that a major difference between preferential reasoning, and
other defeasible formalisms for DLs, is that specificity (see Example 12 on
Page 62) is internalised in the mechanism of preferential reasoning (i.e., speci-
ficity is natively respected). Whereas, in other formalisms, priorities between
CHAPTER 5. INFERENCES OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING 241
defaults can either be user-specified or be assumed to be defined by speci-
ficity [137, 12, 33].
The version of overriding we talk about here is the one which assumes
that priorities among defeasible inclusions are defined by specificity. Bonatti
et al. have made our work much easier by evaluating their formalism against
the KLM rationality properties themselves [27, Theorem 8, p30].
However, there are two issues we have identified with their evaluation
that need to be addressed in this thesis. The first is that the authors have
not considered the (And) property in their presentation. The second is that
the authors have considered, for some KLM properties, two possible formu-
lations of these properties and evaluated them in both. Here will extend
the insight of Bonatti et al. by demonstrating whether or not the (And)
property holds for overriding. For the latter issue we will make clear which
KLM properties have more than one formulation for overriding and which
of these formulations are applicable for our evaluation. The (And) property
can formulated as follows in the setting of overriding:
(And)
C vn D, C vn E
C vn D u E
We now demonstrate that (And) is actually satisfied in general by overriding:
Lemma 25 (Overriding w.r.t. KLM Postulate (And)) Overriding sat-
isfies (And).
Proof: We have to show that, given a DLN KB K and concepts C, D and
E, if K |≈ C vn D and K |≈ C vn E then K |≈ C vn D u E. We assume
that the premises hold but that K 6|≈ C vn D u E. We try to derive a
contradiction from this. We pick a model I for K s.t. I 6 C vn D u E.
From Definition 25 on Page 104 we know that there is a normality concept
NX s.t. NX does not override C vn D u E in I and that there is an x ∈
NXI s.t. x ∈ CI but that x 6∈ (D u E)I . Because NX does not override
C vn D u E in I we know from Definition 24 on Page 101 that there is a
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pre-model J for K s.t. NXJ 6= ∅, for each x ∈ NXJ , x ∈ (¬C t (D uE))J ,
and for all higher priority DIs condition 3 of Definition 24 also holds. But
we also know that I  C vn D and I  C vn E because I is a model
for K and K |≈ C vn D and K |≈ C vn E. By Definition 25 on Page 104
we know that for each normality concept NY either NY overrides C vn D
(resp. C vn E) in I or each x ∈ NY I is s.t. x ∈ (¬CtD)I (resp. (¬CtE)I).
Suppose that NX overrides C vn D (resp. C vn E) in I. This means that
there is no pre-model J ′ for K s.t. all the conditions of Definition 24 are
satisfied for these DIs w.r.t. NX in I. But it is clear that (¬Ct (DuE))J ⊆
(¬C tD)J and (¬C t (DuE))J ⊆ (¬C tE)J (i.e., the first two conditions
are satisfied for these DIs w.r.t. NX in J ). Therefore it must be the case
that the pre-model J does not satisfy the third condition for overriding for
these DIs w.r.t. NX in I. This means that there is a DI δ′ which is of higher
priority than these DIs which is sacrificed even though it is not explicitly
overridden in I. But the DIs that are of higher priority than C vn D and
C vn E are the same as those that are of higher priority than C vn D u E
(because priority is defined by specificity of the DI antecedents). But this
would mean that condition 3 of Definition 24 does not hold for C vn D uE
w.r.t. NX in I. This is a contradiction with our assumption that there is a
pre-model J for K satisfying all the overriding conditions for C vn D u E.
Therefore, there is no such pre-model and C vn D uE is satisfied in I, and
hence K |≈ C vn D u E. 2
Finally, we can clarify that, although Bonatti et al. claim that (LLE) is not
satisfied in general by overriding [27, Theorem 8, p30], this result holds for
the following formulation of the KLM property:
(LLE1)
C vn E, C ≡ D
D vn E
That is, in the above formulation of (LLE), C ≡ D is interpreted as defeasible
consequence rather than as a classical consequence of the (strict part of the)
CHAPTER 5. INFERENCES OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING 243
KB. Another possible interpretation of this property is to treat C ≡ D as
a classical consequence of the strict component of the KB (just the classical
subsumptions). The property can then be formulated as follows.
(LLE2)
C vn E, |= C ≡ D
D vn E
It turns out that (LLE2) is satisfied in general by overriding [27, Theorem
10, p35]. In an analogous way, one can also formulate two versions of the
(RW) property for overriding. However, in that case, neither version holds
in general for overriding and a counter-example is given to show this [27,
Theorem 8, p30]. The following theorem consolidates the evaluation results
for overriding (where priorities among DIs are defined by specificity).
Theorem 3 (Overriding w.r.t. KLM Postulates) Overriding satisfies
the properties (Ref), (Or), (And) and (LLE2) but does not satisfy (LLE1),
(RW), (CM) and (RM).
5.2.2 Circumscription
As there are a variety of semantics for circumscription in DLs, and there are
no standardised circumscription patterns, we have to choose a representative
semantics and pattern which can be evaluated against the KLM postulates.
Here we subscribe to the semantics of Bonatti, Lutz and Wolter [32]
because it defines a basic, intuitive and representative semantics for circum-
scription in DLs. We have stated the semantics in Section 2.4.1 which ex-
presses three conditions for determining if a model I for a circumscribed KB
is more preferred or more minimal than another model J for the KB.
In that same section we talked about a fourth possible condition for when
we would like to fix the extension of certain predicates. Here we do not
consider this fourth condition. In fact, in terms of circumscription pattern,
we are not going to consider varying or fixing predicates. We only introduce
abnormality predicates that are to be minimised during reasoning.
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We are going to evaluate this version of circumscription against the KLM
postulates regardless of varying or fixing other predicates. This is helpful
because we can get a more general perspective of the inferential character of
circumscription independent of user-specified circumscription patterns.
From a representational perspective, in order to formulate the KLM pos-
tulates within this setting we have established, we define a translation of
defeasible subsumptions of the form C @∼D to circumscription defaults of the
form C v D t AbC .
Definition 55 (Circumscription Default) A circumscription default is
a subsumption of the form C v D t AbC where C and D are ALC concepts
and AbC is a concept name representing the abnormal instances of C.
Of course, we do not claim that circumscription defaults capture the same se-
mantics as C @∼D (indeed circumscription defaults are interpreted in classical
DL interpretations while defeasible subsumptions are interpreted in ranked
interpretations). Rather, we believe that the notion of circumscription de-
fault is a natural analogue of defeasible subsumption in the circumscription
setting and intuitively captures a similar meaning in the latter context.
Therefore, even though circumscription does not introduce a defeasible
subsumption relation in the language like @∼ (preferential reasoning) and
vn (overriding), we can actually interpret v in the circumscription default
C v D t AbC as defining a notion of defeasible subsumption because we
are going to minimise AbC during reasoning. That is, this syntactic form
of subsumption statement represents a similar intuitive meaning to C @∼D
and hence allows us to reformulate the KLM postulates for this new notion
of defeasible subsumption, and to evaluate consequence in circumscription
against these postulates.
However, before we formulate the KLM postulates in this context, we
have to define the kinds of KBs we are interested in for this version of cir-
cumscription, as well as the general circumscription pattern we consider. For
the former, we are going to focus on circumscribed defeasible KBs:
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Definition 56 (Circumscribed Defeasible KB) A circumscribed defea-
sible KB is a structure of the form 〈T ,D〉 where T is a classically consistent
set of subsumptions of the form C v D s.t. C and D do not contain any
abnormality predicates, and D is a set of circumscription defaults (Defini-
tion 55 on Page 244).
Given a circumscribed defeasible KB, when performing reasoning, we only
consider a very general circumscription pattern. As we discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.2, we define a partial order on the abnormality predicates ocurring
in D determined by specificity. Specificity in this context means that an
abnormality predicate AbC1 is given minimisation priority during reasoning
over another predicate AbC2 if: T ∪ D |= C1 v C2 and T ∪ D 6|= C2 v C1.
That is, we admit only the following circumscription pattern (called a basic
circumscription pattern):
Definition 57 (Basic Circumscription Pattern) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a circum-
scribed defeasible KB and δ a circumscription default. Then, the basic cir-
cumscription pattern w.r.t. 〈T ,D〉 and δ is the structure 〈M,≺M〉 whereM
is the set of all abnormality predicates AbC appearing in D together with the
one in δ, and ≺M is a strict partial order on the elements of M defined by
specificity. The elements of M are to be minimised during reasoning and
≺M defines the minimisation priority among the predicates of M.
Notice that we do not allow the minimisation of roles in this form of circum-
scription. Bonatti et al. [32] refer to this kind of circumscription as concept
circumscription. Entailment in circumscription is defined in terms of mini-
mal models. That is, given a circumscribed defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉, there is an
ordering <min placed on the standard DL models of T ∪ D. The ordering is
defined by the three conditions mentioned earlier in this section and in Sec-
tion 2.4.1. A model I for 〈T ,D〉 is thus a minimal model for 〈T ,D〉 if there
is no other model J for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. J <min I. The notation of entailment is
presented in the following definition:
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Definition 58 (Entailment in Circumscription) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a circum-
scribed defeasible KB and δ a circumscription default. Then, δ is entailed by
〈T ,D〉, written as 〈T ,D〉 |=circ δ, if each minimal model for 〈T ,D〉 is a
model for δ.
We can now reformulate the KLM postulates within this setting:
Definition 59 (KLM Rationality Postulates for Circumscription)
The KLM rationality postulates for circumscription are as follows:
(Ref) |= C v C t AbC
(LLE)
|= C ≡ D, |= C v E t AbC
|= D v E t AbD
(And)
|= C v D t AbC , |= C v E t AbC
|= C v (D u E) t AbC
(Or)
|= C v E t AbC , |= D v E t AbD
|= C tD v E t AbCtD
(RW)
|= C v D t AbC , |= D v E
|= C v E t AbC
(CM)
|= C v D t AbC , |= C v E t AbC
|= C uD v E t AbCuD
(RM)
|= C v E t AbC , 6|= C v ¬D t AbC
|= C uD v E t AbCuD
It proves to be quite straightforward to evaluate the form of circumscription
we have defined, which we shall call basic circumscription, against the prop-
erties formulated in Definition 59 on Page 246. The result is demonstrated
by the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 4 (Basic Circumscription w.r.t. KLM Postulates) Basic cir-
cumscription satisfies the properties (Ref), (LLE), (RW), (And) and (Or) but
does not satisfy (CM) and (RM).
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Proof: we show that for any circumscribed defeasible KB K = 〈T ,D〉 and
concepts C, D and E:
1. (Ref) - K |=circ C v C t AbC . This is clearly straightforward because CI
⊆ CI ∪ AbCI for any interpretation I for any KB and C.
2. (And) - if K |=circ C v D t AbC and K |=circ C v E t AbC then
K |=circ C v (D u E) t AbC . We pick a K, C, D and E s.t. the premises
are satisfied. Picking a minimal model I for K, since I  C v D tAbC and
I  C v E t AbC , we know that I  C v (D t AbC) u (E t AbC). By
the distributive law of set algebra, we can therefore conclude that I  C v
(D u E) t AbC and therefore that K |=circ C v (D u E) t AbC .
3. (LLE) - if T ∪ D |= C ≡ D and K |=circ C v E t AbC then K |=circ
D v E t AbD. We pick a K, C, D and E s.t. the premises are satisfied. We
also pick a minimal model I for K. We know that I  C v E t AbC and
I  C ≡ D. I.e., that CI ⊆ EI ∪ AbCI and CI = DI . We have to show
that DI ⊆ EI ∪ AbDI . In other words, it would be sufficient to show that
AbC
I ⊆ AbDI . Assume that AbCI 6⊆ AbDI . This means there is an x ∈ AbCI
s.t. x 6∈ AbDI .
Case 1: x ∈ CI . Therefore, x ∈ DI because CI = DI . Also, x ∈ EI ∪
AbD
I because DI ⊆ EI ∪ AbDI . From our assumption that x 6∈ AbDI it
must be the case that x ∈ EI . But this means that I is not a minimal model
for K because even if x 6∈ AbCI , I will still be a model for K. This is a
contradiction with our assumptions.
Case 2: x 6∈ CI . This also means that I is not a minimal model for K
because even if x 6∈ AbCI , I will still be a model for K (because CI ⊆ EI
∪ AbCI). This is a contradiction with our assumptions. Therefore, AbCI ⊆
AbD
I and hence DI ⊆ EI ∪ AbDI . Finally, K |=circ D v E t AbD.
4. (RW) - if T ∪ D |= D ≡ E and K |=circ C v D t AbC then K |=circ C v
E t AbC . We pick a K, C, D and E s.t. the premises are satisfied. We also
pick a minimal model I for K. It is clear that CI ⊆ DI ∪ AbCI and DI ⊆
EI . Hence, by union of sets, it is clear that CI ⊆ EI ∪ AbCI . Finally, we
can conclude that K |=circ C v E t AbC .
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5. (Or) - it must be said that (Or) is not satisfied in general for arbitrary
priority relations among abnormality predicates. To see this, consider the
following circumscribed defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 = 〈{> v (C tE)u¬D}, {C v
DtAbC , E v DtAbE}〉 and the circumscription default CtE v DtAbCtE.
Let I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 be an interpretation s.t. ∆I = {x} and ·I is defined s.t. CI =
AbC
I = {x} and EI = DI = AbEI = AbCtEI = ∅. It is clear that I is a
model for T ∪D and, if we fix the non-abnormality predicates, it is also clear
that there is no J <min I s.t. J is a model for T ∪ D. In other words,
it is clear that the extension of AbC could not be empty in J because this
would violate the default C v DtAbC . Therefore, I is a minimal model for
〈T ,D〉, I  C v D t AbC , I  E v D t AbE but I 6 C t E v D t AbCtE
because x ∈ (C t E)I and x 6∈ DI and x 6∈ AbCtEI . However, in the
given counter-example, specificity is not respected during minimisation of
abnormality predicates. Since we are interested only in priority relations
defined by specificity we can demonstrate that (Or) is satisfied with this
restriction. We have to show that if K |=circ C v D t AbC and K |=circ E v
DtAbE then K |=circ CtE v DtAbCtE. We pick a K, C, D and E s.t. the
premises are satisfied. We also pick a minimal model I for K. It is clear that
I  C v D t AbC and I  E v D t AbE. But we also know, because of
specificity, that AbC
I ⊆ AbCtEI and AbEI ⊆ AbCtEI . Let us assume that I
6 C t E v D t AbCtE. We will derive a contradiction from this. It means
that there is an x ∈ (C t E)I s.t. x 6∈ DI and x 6∈ AbCtEI .
Case 1: x ∈ CI . This means that x ∈ AbCI because I  C v DtAbC and x
6∈ DI . But specificity tells us that AbCI ⊆ AbCtEI (because C v C tE is a
tautology) and therefore that x ∈ AbCtEI . This is a contradiction. Therefore
it must be the case that x ∈ EI
Case 2: x ∈ EI . We follow an analogous argument to Case 1 to find that x
∈ AbCtEI and derive a contradiction again.
We therefore have to conclude that I  C tE v D tAbCtE and hence that
K |=circ C t E v D t AbCtE.
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We now give counter-examples to demonstrate that basic circumscription
does not satisfy (CM) and (RM). The strategy is that, for each property,
we identify a circumscribed defeasible KB s.t. the premises of the property
are entailed by this KB and the conclusion is not (using Definition 58 on
Page 246).
6. (CM) - Consider the circumscribed defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 = 〈{> v C u
E u ¬D}, {C v D t AbC , C v E t AbC}〉 and the circumscription default
C u E v D t AbCuE. Let I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 be an interpretation s.t. ∆I = {x}
and ·I is defined s.t. CI = AbCI = EI = {x} and DI = AbCuEI = ∅. It
is clear that I is a model for T ∪ D and it is also clear that there is no
J <min I s.t. J is a model for T ∪ D. In other words, it is clear that
the extension of AbC could not be empty in J because this would violate
the default C v D t AbC . Therefore, I is a minimal model for 〈T ,D〉 and
I 6 C u E v D t AbCuE because x ∈ (C u E)I and x 6∈ DI and x 6∈ AbCuEI .
7. (RM) - Consider the circumscribed defeasible KB 〈T ,D〉 = 〈∅, {C v
D t AbC}〉 and the circumscription default C u E v D t AbCuE. Suppose
we minimise AbC and AbCuE and fix the rest of the predicates. It is clear
that K |=circ C v D t AbC and that K 6|=circ C v ¬E t AbC . We show
that K 6|=circ C u E v D t AbCuE. Consider the following interpretation
I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 where ∆I = {x, y} and ·I is defined s.t. CI = EI = {x, y},
DI = {x}, AbCI = {y}, AbICuE = ∅. Clearly, I is a model for K. Assume
that I is not a minimal model for K. This can only mean that there is a
model J for K which is the same as I except for the extension of AbC . That
is, s.t. AbC
J ⊂ AbCI , or more specifically, s.t. AbCJ = ∅. But this cannot
be the case because such a J would no longer satisfy C v D tAbC , because
y ∈ CJ and y 6∈ DJ and y 6∈ AbCJ .Therefore, I is a minimal model for K
and it is clear that I 6 CuE v DtAbCuE because y ∈ (CuE)I and y 6∈ DI
and y 6∈ AbCuEI . Hence, K 6|=circ C u E v D t AbCuE. 2
CHAPTER 5. INFERENCES OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING 250
Even though we do not explicitly take priorities among abnormality pred-
icates into consideration in our proofs, the properties that hold in general
would also hold even if prioritisation is defined by specificity. This is because
we have given a very general definition for minimising abnormality predi-
cates (i.e., for minimal models of a circumscribed KB). Therefore, by taking
a view independent of circumscription pattern, we are allowed to substitute
any such pattern to define a notion of minimal model. This means that
we consider all possible minimal models in the broadest sense of the word
all. When we incorporate priorities, some minimal models will obviously no
longer be minimal and hence we are considering a subset of these. That is,
if our results hold for all minimal models it will hold for a subset of these.
For properties (CM) and (RM) that don’t hold, our counter-examples
are also applicable when considering priorities defined by specificity. This
is because the given counter-models are still minimal models when consider-
ing the priorities among abnormality predicates. Thus the results we have
obtained still apply to cases of prioritisation among abnormality predicates.
5.2.3 Default Reasoning
For classical default logic, the broad focus has always been on applying a set
of defaults to a set of first-order logic formulas to extend this set with new
first-order formulas representing defeasible inferences that one can make from
the default theory. As we demonstrated in Section 2.5, current adaptations
of Reiter’s default logic to the DL case define an analogous mechanism [11].
The representational differences are that our default theory in the DL case
consists of normal defaults of the form C:D
D
where C and D are DL concepts,
and our set of first-order formulas is replaced by a set of DL axioms (either
TBox or ABox).
However, the issue with these approaches concerns the reasoning question
being asked. That is, these approaches only consider extending the DL KB
with ABox information. I.e., they define a way to apply the defaults to
the given DL KB in order to defeasibly derive ABox statements from this
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KB. Since our focus in this thesis is purely on TBox defeasible reasoning, an
evaluation of the current default logic approaches for DLs against the KLM
postulates is irrelevant.
Therefore, to make such an evaluation relevant, we have to generalise
the mechanism of default logic so that we can apply normal defaults to a
DL TBox to extend this TBox with more classical subsumption statements
representing the defeasible inferences one can make from this TBox. We
believe this scenario to be the most natural adaptation of default logic to
derive TBox knowledge from application of defaults. Nevertheless, we have
to be careful not to define an approach that is too far removed from the
natural mechanism of default logic because our goal is to evaluate the general
default reasoning mechanism and not invent a novel variant of default logic.
We will now adapt the definitions for the main constructs in default logic
to be able to derive TBox information from our default theories. Thereafter,
we consider how to evaluate the reasoning mechanism against the KLM pos-
tulates. We adopt the same definition of normal DL default that Baader et
al. [11] subscribe to. That is, a normal DL default is one of the form C:D
D
where C and D are DL concepts and the statement intuitively means that if
an object is known to have property C, and it is consistent to believe that it
has property D also, then it has property D. This leads us to define what a
DL default KB is in our setting:
Definition 60 (DL Default KB) A DL default KB is a structure 〈T ,D〉
where T is a consistent and finite set of classical DL subsumption statements
and D is a finite set of normal DL defaults.
Now the core principle in the reasoning mechanism for default logic is the
notion of extension of a default KB. Here we reinterpret this notion in the
context of DL Default KBs and call it a DL default extension:
Definition 61 (DL Default Extension) Let 〈T ,D〉 be a DL default KB.
Then, T ′ ⊇ T is a DL extension of 〈T ,D〉 if: T ′ is deductively closed and
for each C:D
D
∈ D, if > v C u ¬D 6∈ T ′ then C v D ∈ T ′.
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Reiter also gives an operational definition for extensions in terms of fixed
points. Baader et al. [11], in their extension of defaults to DLs, also adopt this
definition. We give the natural interpretation of this constructive definition
for our context here:
Definition 62 (DL Default Extension as Fixed Points) Let E be a set
of classical DL subsumption statements, and 〈T ,D〉 a DL default KB. We
define E0 = T and for all i ≥ 0: Ei+1 := Ei ∪ {C v D | C:DD ∈ D and
> v C u ¬D 6∈ E }. Then, E is a DL default extension of 〈T ,D〉 if:
E =
⋃
i≥0 Th(Ei) where Th(S) stands for the deductive closure of the set
of classical DL subsumptions S.
To define entailment in default logic one has to consider the skeptical ap-
proach and at least two versions of a credulous one. The skeptical approach
defines that a default C:D
D
defeasibly follows from (is logically entailed by)
a DL default KB 〈T ,D〉 if C v D appears in each DL default extension of
〈T ,D〉. We shall write this version of entailment as 〈T ,D〉 `s C:DD . The most
obvious credulous approach is to logically entail C:D
D
if it appears in at least
one extension of 〈T ,D〉. We write this version of entailment as 〈T ,D〉 `c C:DD .
Yet another credulous approach is to pick an arbitrary extension and take
this extension to define entailment. We do not consider this latter form of
entailment in our evaluation because it requires us to consider the choice of
this extension and this is not appropriate if we want to get a more general
perspective of the inferential behaviour of default logic. Therefore, from here
on we assume the term credulous to refer to the former (more popular) notion.
Skeptical Entailment: Interestingly, for the version of default logic we have
presented, we find that skeptical entailment (what follows in each extension)
is monotonic. This is because a DL default extension of any DL default
KB 〈T ,D〉 is the deductive closure (over |=) of a superset of T . Clearly,
because |= is monotonic, skeptical entailment in our version of default logic
is also monotonic. This is perhaps not surprising if we recall the goal of
the underlying mechanism of default logic and the notion of extension itself.
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That is, essentially we are constructing all supersets of a classical theory that
are internally consistent (by using a set of default rules as generative agents
to catalyse this process).
Implied by this is the fact that, if we take the union of any two extensions
of a default theory, we will get an inconsistency [161, Theorem 3.3]. Indeed,
they are separate extensions exactly because of this fact. Because of this gen-
eral situation, it is very straightforward to verify that this version of default
logic satisfies all the KLM postulates and so we omit proofs for this case. But
as our above discussion points out, this result is not necessarily a positive
aspect of skeptical entailment in default logic seeing as it is monotonic.
Credulous Entailment: The credulous approach only requires one extension
to contain the inference under consideration. This view of entailment is not
necessarily monotonic and we can formulate and evaluate the KLM proper-
ties w.r.t. this entailment relation. The results of this evaluation are demon-
strated by Theorem 5 on Page 253:
Theorem 5 (Default Logic w.r.t. KLM postulates)
Skeptical Default Logic is monotonic and satisfies all the KLM postulates, and
Credulous Default Logic is monotonic and satisfies all the KLM postulates
except for (And) and (Or).
Proof: The skeptical case is trivial, we prove the credulous case. We show
for any DL default KB 〈T ,D〉 and concepts C, D and E:
1. (Ref) - 〈T ,D〉 `c C:CC . In other words, we have to show that there is a
DL default extension T ′ for 〈T ,D〉 s.t. C v C ∈ T ′. Since T ′ is deductively
closed and C v C is a tautology it follows that (Ref) is satisfied.




a 〈T ,D〉 s.t. 〈T ,D〉 `c C:DD we can see that there is a DL default extension
s.t. C v D is contained in this extension. The second premise T |= C ≡ E
clearly demonstrates that C ≡ E is contained in all extensions because every
extension T ′ for 〈T ,D〉 is s.t. T ′ ⊇ T . Therefore it is clear that E v D will
be in the extension that C v D (and C ≡ E) appears in.
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3. (RW) - an analogous argument to the one for (LLE) can be used to prove
that (RW) alo holds.
4. (M) - We will now show that credulous entailment in our default logic is
actually monotonic, and therefore satisfies (CM) and (RM) as well, because
these are weakened versions of classical monotonicity. Notice that for any
C v D ∈ T ′ where T ′ is a DL default extension, it must be the case that
C uE v D ∈ T ′ for any E because T ′ is a deductively closed set of classical
DL subsumptions and classical DLs satisfy monotonicity.
We now give a counter-example for the (And) property:





There are two extensions for 〈T ,D〉, namely, E1 = Th({E v ¬D})∪{C v D}
and E2 = Th({E v ¬D}) ∪ {C v E} where Th(S) denotes the deductive
closure of the set of sentences S. Of course, it is clear that C v DuE is not
an element of either extension.





}〉. There are two extensions for 〈T ,D〉, namely, E1 = Th({> v
(Eu¬D)t(Cu¬D)}) ∪ {C v D} and E2 = Th({> v (Eu¬D)t(Cu¬D)})
∪ {E v D} where Th(S) denotes the deductive closure of the set of sentences
S. Of course, it is clear that C v D and E v D do not both occur in any
particular extension. 2
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter we showed that, apart from Lexicographic Closure, Ratio-
nal Closure and Lexicographically-Relevant Closure, all other preferential
and non-preferential formalisms studied in this thesis do not satisfy all the
KLM postulates. We found that the Relevant Closures, overriding and basic
circumscription do not satisfy (CM) and (RM). In addition, (Or) is not satis-
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fied by the Relevant Closures although overriding and basic circumscription
both satisfy (Or) when the priority relations among DIs (resp. abnormality
predicates) are defined by specificity. Overriding, however, does not sat-
isfy standard (LLE) and (RW) as well. In our opinion, such properties are
more important to be satisfied by defeasible entailment since they contain
tautologies as part of their premises.
We presented a natural interpretation of the mechanism of default logic
for generating TBox statements (subsumptions) by applying DL defaults to
a classical DL TBox. This version of default logic was found to define a
monotonic entailment relation for both skeptical and credulous entailment.
In the former entailment regime all the KLM postulates are satisfied, while
in the latter (And) and (Or) are not satisfied in general.
It is important to note that the monotonicity of credulous entailment
is quite different from the monotonicity of skeptical entailment in default
logic. We notice that the former is monotonic on the meta-level (entailment
level) but it is nonmonotonic on the object level. For example, given the DL
default KB 〈T ,D〉 = 〈{Penguin v Bird}, {Bird:∃hasAbility.Flying∃hasAbility.Flying }〉 we can derive
an extension T ′ of 〈T ,D〉 containing Penguin v ∃hasAbility.Flying. Even after
adding Penguin:¬(∃hasAbility.Flying)¬(∃hasAbility.Flying) to D, T
′ still remains an extension because we
cannot apply Penguin:¬(∃hasAbility.Flying)¬(∃hasAbility.Flying) to extend T
′ further. However, if we
apply Penguin:¬(∃hasAbility.Flying)¬(∃hasAbility.Flying) to penguins and not
Bird:∃hasAbility.Flying
∃hasAbility.Flying we will
derive that penguins do not fly, which overrides the flying ability of birds.
This is clearly nonmonotonic behaviour on the object level. For skeptical
entailment such behaviour is not allowed.
Of course, an interesting (though undesirable) behaviour of the credu-
lous approach to default logic is that conflicting beliefs are allowed to co-
exist. For example, in the above KB 〈T ,D〉, we can derive both 〈T ,D〉 `c
Penguin:¬(∃hasAbility.Flying)
¬(∃hasAbility.Flying) and 〈T ,D〉 `c
Penguin:∃hasAbility.Flying
∃hasAbility.Flying because there is an
extension containing Penguin v ∃hasAbility.Flying, one containing Penguin v
¬(∃hasAbility.Flying) and none containing Penguin v ⊥.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Reiter advocates the intended ap-
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plication of default logic as determining one consistent set of beliefs about
the world [161, Section 2.2]. That is, the intention is to pick a single exten-
sion and to reason within this extension until evidence forces one to switch
to another. This scenario differs from the skeptical vs. credulous notions of
reasoning we investigated in the previous section. It is clear that reasoning
within this single extension is monotonic and satisfies all the KLM postulates
but it is not clear as to how to choose such an extension (i.e., it appears to
be a user-specified decision with no clear guidelines as how to choose it).
Chapter 6
Evaluating the Performance of
Defeasible Reasoning
An important question that we ask of our defeasible reasoning algorithms,
from a practical perspective, is: how much does one pay for the additional
expressivity of defeasible subsumption in terms of practical reasoning per-
formance. We have shown that the worst case computational complexity of
Rational Closure is not higher than reasoning with the underlying classical
formalism that we extend (see Section 4.3). This is good news, but does not
guarantee good performance in practice.
On the other hand, we have also shown that Lexicographic Closure and
its equivalent construction Lexicographically Relevant Closure are in the 2-
exptime complexity class. The same result holds for the Basic and Minimal
Relevant Closures. In these cases, it would be interesting to observe whether
this high complexity translates into exceptionally slow inferences in practice.
In this chapter we present experiments which attempt to answer these
questions. The idea behind these experiments is to give a preliminary under-
standing of the practical performance one can expect from defeasible reason-
ing algorithms, when employed on “real world” ontologies. Also, as stated
earlier, we wish to get a sense of how much more expensive (computationally
speaking) defeasible reasoning is than classical reasoning for DLs.
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, we have a significant problem when evalu-
ating the performance of defeasible reasoning because there are no naturally
occurring ontologies with defeasible features. That is, because the represen-
tation of defeasible knowledge is not yet natively supported by standard-
ised ontology languages such as OWL, the accompanying tools for editing
and maintaining ontologies also do not facilitate the representation of such
knowledge.
We have thus chosen two approaches to generate ontologies with defeasible
features for our evaluation. The first is a fully automated method to con-
struct TBoxes (and DTBoxes) containing exceptions using random sampling
techniques to construct subsumption statements from generated concept and
role names. The second approach considers a principled manner in which to
modify existing real world ontologies without defeasible features, to include
such features. We report separately on the results for each of these datasets.
The algorithms that we evaluate are the ones presented in Chapter 4
namely Rational Closure, Lexicographic Closure, Basic Relevant Closure,
Minimal Relevant Closure and Lexicographically Relevant Closure.
6.1 Artificial Data
We start off by reporting on the results conducted on artificially synthesised
ontologies. While this approach is susceptible to biases in the generation
strategy, it has been agreed upon to be a sensible preliminary methodology
to obtain data for evaluation [30, p756-757], since there are no naturally
occurring ontologies with explicitly modelled defeasible features.
6.1.1 Data Generation Model
Before we detail the actual method we use to generate our artificial ontologies
and suitable entailment queries, we need to discuss some requirements that
we have of the resulting data. In developing our methodology for generating
synthetic ontologies we focus on two broad categories of parametrisation for
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influencing the generation of an ontology: global and local parameters.
Global parameters are those that pertain to the overall metrics of the ontol-
ogy such as the number of axioms, classes, roles etc., while local parameters
consider the structure of individual axioms (and class expressions) in the
ontology. The latter parameters include factors such as nesting depth of
expressions and the length of conjunctions and disjunctions.
We first discuss the global and local parameters chosen for generating
ontologies and thereafter we consider the generation of axioms to be used
as entailment queries in our evaluation. In the following subsection, we
begin with the global parameters for ontologies and then move to the local
parameters, concluding with a basic flow chart and overview of the ontology
generation process.
Global Parameters
Firstly, one of the main goals of our evaluation is to obtain a preliminary
indication of how “hard” defeasible reasoning would be in real world ontology
development settings.
Therein lies a significant problem because we are not really in a position
to accurately predict what these ontologies would look like when defeasible
technologies become more widely adopted. One of the fundamental consider-
ations, which we do not know a priori, is what percentage of the subsumptions
in a real world ontology would users make defeasible?
Anecdotal evidence and our rudimentary lexical analysis of real world on-
tologies (see Chapter 3) suggests that the proportion of defeasible vs. strict
information in real world ontologies would likely be lower than 25%. However
there are various factors which could render this figure unreliable. For ex-
ample, ontology engineers may have learned over time to avoid representing
defeasible information in the meta-data of their ontologies because standard-
ised ontology languages such as OWL and accompanying editing tools do
not support the expression of defeasibility. In fact, the Marine Top Level
Ontology [194] is an example of an application ontology that abides by the
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monotonicity property as a matter of design practice [24, Page 9].
A positive aspect of generating our data is that we do not have to select
a single value for the proportion of defeasible statements. We can actually
consider a range of possible values. Therefore, our first decision for the ar-
tificial data is that we consider ontologies with varying ratios of defeasible
to strict axioms and bin these ontologies into categories. We consider 10
categories for our evaluation. Each category represents a different percentage
defeasibility (ratio of the number of defeasible vs. number of strict subsump-
tion statements in the ontology) in increments of 10 from 10 to 100. We
point out that the zero percent case of defeasibility means that defeasible
reasoning is no longer applicable and therefore the case is omitted from our
evaluation. For simplicity we only generate subsumption statements (either
defeasible or strict) in our ontologies. That is, we do not generate syntactic
sugar statements such as equivalence and disjointness statements. There is
evidence to confirm that the number of subsumption statements far outweigh
other forms of axioms in real world ontologies [97]. In any case, all of these
latter axioms can be rewritten as subsumption statements.
Apart from the proportion of defeasible statements, we conjecture that
it seems reasonable to assume that the remaining structure of real world de-
feasible ontologies might be very similar to that of existing non-defeasible
real world ontologies. Therefore, in order to inform the parameterisation
of our ontology generation method, it seems prudent to analyse some non-
defeasible real world data to gather some metrics to use in our strategy. We
use data from the recently established Manchester OWL Repository (MOWL-
Rep) [135] for this purpose. The main motivation behind the establishment
of the repository was to address biases in OWL empirical research where
experiments are performed on cherry picked data or data lacking sufficient
variety. The goal is to provide a platform for sharing high quality data with
emphasis on variety for OWL empirical evaluations. We further motivate the
use of MOWLRep for our investigations in Section 6.2.
Returning to our current concerns with generating artificial ontologies,
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another factor to decide is the size of the ontologies to generate. Again, we
can consider a range here. However, the emphasis with this first investigation
is to give a very general sense of how defeasible reasoning would perform with
ontologies of “reasonable” size. I.e., with “non-toy” examples. Research in
classical DL reasoning optimisation is still grappling with the problem of
reasoning with large-scale ontologies [89, 134], what then to speak of our
defeasible reasoning algorithms which have to perform more work over the
underlying classical reasoning steps? Therefore, for our purposes of gaining
a preliminary insight into the performance of defeasible reasoning, we argue
that it is not yet necessary to tackle large-scale ontologies in depth1.
Although we do not generate large-scale ontologies we would still like
to be somewhat representative of real world, non-defeasible ontologies in
terms of the ontology sizes that we consider. Performing an analysis of
the ontologies in MOWLRep, we found that the median ontology sizes in
this dataset were around 3, 800 axioms (including non-TBox axioms). When
restricting attention to TBox axioms the median ontology size obtained was
2, 200 axioms. Therefore, we choose to generate ontologies whose maximum
sizes are capped at a figure within this range. In our resulting data the
maximum ontology sizes we generated were approximately 3, 500 axioms.
Such sizes are representative of numerous real world application ontologies
in corpora outside MOWLRep as well (such as the SWEET corpus [157]).
In each percentage defeasibility category we would also like to have a
minimum size for the generated ontologies. From our practical experience
working with application OWL ontologies (i.e., those not built purely for
demonstrational or educational purposes), the minimum sizes we have en-
1It is notable that the size of the ontologies in our dataset cannot be considered large-
scale in comparison with some bio-medical ontologies such as those stored in the NCBO
BioPortal corpus [196]. For example, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) thesaurus [181]
appears in this corpus and has versions which contain more than 110, 000 axioms. At the
same time, the concept hierarchies of most of these large bio-medical ontologies are rather
shallow, making them less interesting from the standpoint of reasoning complexity. These
ontologies also generally do not make use of all the expressive features available in ALC.
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countered of such ontologies have ranged between 150− 250 axioms. A good
example of a small ontology (roughly 150 axioms) that is used for semantic
web applications is the Friend of a Friend (FOAF) vocabulary2. We therefore
choose 150 axioms as our lower bound for ontology size in each percentage
defeasibility category. Recall that, even though we do not generate ontologies
of large-scale size, one of our goals is still to present harder (yet not patho-
logical) cases for our reasoner. In terms of isolating what makes reasoning
hard for contemporary DL (and OWL) reasoners, there has been work done
in prediction of classical OWL reasoner performance which suggests that
the overwhelmingly dominant indicator of reasoning performance is ontol-
ogy size [171]. Since our defeasible reasoner is built upon classical reasoning
steps, it stands to reason that ontology size would be the primary indicator of
performance in our context as well. Therefore, there is no reason to generate
ontologies of smaller size than 150 axioms because there is no evidence to
suggest that these cases would be harder for our algorithms.
In summary we generated 35 ontologies in each percentage defeasibility
category, varying uniformly in size between roughly 150 and 3, 500 axioms.
We argue that the number 35 is appropriate to give us a good spread of
ontology sizes between 150 and 3, 500. The DL ALC is used to generate
each ontology because the theoretical foundation of our algorithms has been
explicitly investigated in the context of ALC (although, in principle, the re-
sults are applicable to a wide class of DLs up to the expressivity of SHIQ).
In terms of concrete syntax and format we express the generated ontologies
using OWL with OWL/XML syntax. Since DLs are the logical underpin-
ning of OWL, using data in the OWL format preserves the relevance of this
evaluation. The main reason for using the OWL format, as opposed to a DL
format, is the far superior availability of ontology data and tool support.
Our dataset thus consists of a total of 350 ALC ontologies with no ABoxes
(our algorithms are specialised for TBoxes only at this stage). In order to
represent defeasible subsumption in OWL ontologies (it is not included in the
2foaf-project.org
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OWL specification) we “mark” relevant classical subsumption statements in
the ontology as defeasible using meta-data constructs in OWL called OWL
annotations3. Such constructs can be associated with specified OWL axioms
and, using OWL processing tools such as the Java-based OWL API [95], one
can programmatically identify the defeasible axioms in an OWL ontology.
Another global parameter which we consider for ontology generation is
called ontology signature size. An ontology signature is the set of concept
and role names mentioned explicitly in the ontology. We therefore have to
consider the number of class names and role names to generate per ontology
(relative to the number of axioms we wish to generate per ontology). Again
consulting our analysis of MOWLRep we found that the number of concept
names (respectively role names) per ontology were roughly 40% (respectively
1.5%) of the number of axioms in the ontology. Therefore these values are
used in our ontology generation procedure.
The last global parameter that we consider for ontology generation is
what we call DL constructor distribution. This is basically the proportion of
axioms in the ontology which contain a particular DL construct (ALC con-
struct in our case). That is, for each of the main ALC concept constructors:
negation, disjunction, conjunction, existential and universal role restrictions,
we are interested in the percentage of axioms in an ontology that contain each
construct (whenever the ontology actually does contain the construct). This
is the core variable or local parameter for our ontology generation method-
ology and, when examining the metrics of MOWLRep ontologies, we found
the average values 6.2%, 26.6%, 21.1%, 4.3%, 14% and median values 1.5%,
17.8%, 11.1%, 2.2%, 4.3%, for negation, existential role restrictions, conjunc-
tion, disjunction and universal role restrictions, respectively.
Local Parameters
The structure of individual axioms in our generated ontologies can be in-
fluenced by many parameters. We reiterate that we simplify our task by
3w3.org/TR/owl2-syntax, Section 10.2
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only generating subsumption statements in our ontologies. A subsumption
statement has a left hand side (LHS) class expression and a right hand side
(RHS) class expression. The structure, then, of a subsumption statement is
defined by the structure of its LHS and RHS class expressions. We focus
on two main parameters influencing the construction of a class expression:
nesting depth and conjunction or disjunction length.
Nesting depth refers to the number of sub-class expressions in a given
class expression. For example, the class name A has a nesting depth of 1, the
expression ∃R.A has a nesting depth of 2 (consisting of A and ∃R.A) and the
expression ∃R.(A u B) has a nesting depth of 4 (consisting of A, B, (A u B)
and ∃R.(A u B)). Syntactic analysis of ontologies in MOWLRep reveals that,
on average, the nesting depth of class expressions in real world ontologies is
just 1. That is, the majority of classes in real world ontologies are names.
However, even though the average nesting depth is just 1, we have en-
countered isolated cases in MOWLRep where this number reaches 188 (and
even one ontology where it reaches 1, 707). However, the majority of these
larger nesting depths occur in the larger ontologies in MOWLRep (which are
much larger than the ontologies in our synthetic dataset), so we opt for a
lower maximum nesting depth for our synthetic data. We omit the strange
case of 1, 707 from consideration because it is a single occurrence in the
22, 000 ontologies of MOWLRep. The next highest nesting depth is 188 and
the accompanying ontology sizes for such occurrences is in the order of tens
of thousands of axioms, whereas we have decided that the ontologies of our
dataset should have a maximum of 3, 500 axioms. Therefore, we choose to
cap the maximum nesting depth at 19 (one tenth of 188) for our ontologies.
Conjunction and disjunction length refers to the number of conjunct
classes or disjunct classes in a particular level of nesting for a given class
expression. For example, the top level disjunction length of the class expres-
sion At (∃R.BtD)tC is 3 even though the sub-expression (∃R.BtD) has a
further 2 disjuncts. When examining class expressions (that actually contain
conjunction and disjunction) in the ontologies of MOWLRep, we find that
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the average conjunction length is around 2 and the average disjunction length
is around 2.5. Just like in the case of nesting depth, the maximum values en-
countered are much larger. We encountered a maximum conjunction length
of 85 in MOWLRep and we therefore choose a maximum conjunction length
of 9 for our data. The maximum disjunction length is 194 and the next
highest is 143 but these two cases are the odd ones out in the data (an order
of magnitude larger than the remainder of maximum values in MOWLRep).
Therefore, we choose the next highest value of 63 (a maximum disjunction
length of 6) for our synthetic data.
Ontology Generation
We feed our selected global and local parameter values into a basic ontology
construction procedure. The procedure consists of four main phases (a flow
chart of this process is depicted in Figure 6.1). We give a brief description
of each phase here.
Input global and local parameter values














Figure 6.1: Basic flowchart of artificial ontology generation.
1. Input global and local parameter values: We first provide the input pa-
rameter values for the procedure. The main global parameters consist of the
number of axioms to generate for the current ontology, the number of concept
and role names to use in the construction of these axioms, the percentage of
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the axioms to make defeasible, and the distribution of DL constructors across
the axioms of the ontology. The local parameters are also given, namely, the
maximum nesting depth and maximum conjunction or disjunction length of
a class expression.
2. Generate ontology seed signature: The first main step of the procedure is to
generate a set of concept and role names which would be the building blocks
for constructing complex concepts and eventually subsumption statements
in later steps of the process. If n (respectively m) is the number of concept
names (respectively role names) to generate, then we generate concept names
A1, . . . ,An and role names R1, . . . ,Rm. We divide the concept names into two
equally-sized disjoint sets representing LHS concept names and RHS concept
names. The intention with this is that the concept names in each respective
set are predominantly used as either LHS concepts or RHS concepts (and not
both). We introduce a 98% chance that we do not use a concept name in the
LHS set as a RHS concept name (and vice versa) in atomic subsumptions.
As we shall see in later phases, this is necessary to ensure that we minimise
the syntactic equivalences between concept names in our generated ontology.
3. Generate complex concepts: For each concept name in the LHS and RHS
sets of Phase 2, we generate three complex concepts containing this concept
name. The generated expressions are not divided into LHS and RHS ex-
pressions. This results in a total number of concepts that are sufficient to
construct all the axioms in the ontology (recall that we are required to gen-
erate 2.5 times more axioms than concept names for the ontology). We use
our provided maximum nesting depth and maximum conjunction and dis-
junction lengths to construct the complex concepts. Since the occurrence of
the maximum values are very isolated in real world data, we also introduce a
very small chance (around 0.01%) to generate expressions having values close
to the provided maximums. We use the values obtained for DL constructor
distribution to determine the chance of generating a class expression of a
particular type. For example, the chance to generate a concept containing
a universal restriction on a role would be around 4%. If we have to gener-
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ate an existential or universal role restriction then we randomly select from
the given set of role names in Phase 2. When we have to generate conjunc-
tions or disjunctions, the conjuncts and disjuncts are randomly selected from
the union of the LHS and RHS class name sets as well as newly introduced
complex expressions.
4a. Construct Subsumptions: Analysis of real world ontologies such as those
found in MOWLRep reveals that the majority of axioms describe relation-
ships between names (class names). Therefore, we introduce a large chance
(60%) to generate such axioms (a name is randomly selected from the LHS
and RHS concept name sets from Phase 2, to define each axiom). In modern
ontology editing systems, the perspective of ontologies is largely concept-
centric (rather than axiom-centric). That is, editing is centred around spec-
ifying the subsumption relationship between concept names and concept ex-
pressions in the ontology (the subsumption relationship between a partic-
ular class name and other names or expressions is called its “definition”).
More specifically, the definition of a concept name in editing tools is basi-
cally the enumeration of the set of concepts that are either a sub-concept of,
super-concept of, equivalent with or disjoint with the given concept name.
Therefore, in these tools the axioms that are defined using such interfaces
are mostly of the form A v B or A v C (where A and B are concept names
and C is a complex concept). As mentioned earlier we impose a 60% chance
of generated axioms of the form A v B. A 35% chance is assigned to gener-
ate axioms of the form A v C. For the remaining 5% of cases we allow the
generation of axioms of the form C v D (where both C and D are complex
expressions). These latter types of axiom (also called general class axioms)
are by far in the minority in real world ontologies. Constructed axioms are
added three at a time to the ontology. The reason for this becomes clear in
the optional Phase 4b which functions in tandem with Phase 4a.
4b. Introduce Exception Cluster: In order to present challenging reasoning
cases to our defeasible reasoner, we have to ensure that there are excep-
tions in our generated ontologies. Our methodology thus far may or may
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not “organically” introduce exceptions in the ontology, but, to make sure
that there are exceptions we assign a small chance to introduce an excep-
tion cluster into the ontology. An exception cluster is a set of 3 axioms
that represent classic defeasible inheritance example patterns. Take the
running student example in this thesis: students generally don’t pay taxes
(Student @∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice)), but there are specific types of students
that do generally pay taxes, i.e., employed students (EmployedStudent v
Student, EmployedStudent @∼ ∃receives.TaxInvoice). The general pattern is C @∼D,
E v C and E @∼ ¬D. A variant of this pattern is C @∼D, CuE @∼ ¬D. We can
also have exceptions-to-exceptions so we can extend both patterns to C @∼D,
E v C, E @∼ ¬D, F v E, F @∼D and C @∼D, C u E @∼ ¬D, C u E u F @∼D
respectively. The concepts C, D, E and F are randomly selected from the
generated signature and complex expressions. We impose a 20% chance to
introduce an exception cluster each time 3 axioms have been added to the
ontology in Phase 4a.
Whenever we generate three axioms (that do not represent an exception
cluster) in Phase 4a, we only add them as strict axioms to the ontology.
Defeasible axioms are mainly introduced when we add exception clusters.
Once we reach the target percentage defeasibility of the ontology we stop
introducing exception clusters. If after generating the ontology the desired
percentage defeasibility is still not met, we randomly select the remaining
required number of axioms to be defeasible and “toggle” them to be such.
To summarise the data generated using the above methodology, we give some
relevant metrics of the ontologies in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b.
Entailment Query Generation
In addition to the ontologies we also randomly generated a set of defeasible
subsumption statements (entailment queries) for each ontology using terms
in their signatures (concept and role names in the ontology). The number of
queries we generated per ontology was 1 percent of the ontology size. In other
words, we chose to vary the number of generated queries proportionately
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(a) Global and local metrics of generated ontologies.
(b) Average ALC constructor distribution per generated ontology.
Figure 6.2: Relevant metrics and characteristics of the artificial ontologies.
according to the size of the ontology. This was to increase the chances of
a generated query set being more “representative of”, or “relevant to”, the
corresponding ontology as a whole (in terms of signature). All generated
queries were stored to file together with their corresponding ontologies.
We claim that the value of 1 percent of ontology size (for the number of
queries) is appropriate to give fairly representative average query times, while
still guaranteeing termination of our experiments in reasonable time. For the
LHS class expressions of the entailment queries we randomly selected from
the exceptional LHS classes of defeasible subsumptions in the ontologies. This
is to provide interesting and meaningful queries to our reasoner. If we ask
queries with non-exceptional LHSs then defeasible reasoning reduces exactly
to classical reasoning (only one classical entailment check is required) and
the results would be less interesting for our purposes.
For the RHSs we would like to select expressions that are at least “rel-
evant” to the LHS expression so that it makes sense to actually pose the
queries to our reasoner. If the terms in the RHS expression are completely
unrelated to the terms in the LHS expression then it is not meaningful to pose
such queries to the defeasible reasoner. Therefore, we use the notion of mod-
ularisation (see Section 4.6) to achieve this. We extract a module (subset)
of the ontology that is relevant to the terms in the LHS expression and then
collect the terms in this module. The RHS expressions are then randomly
generated from these terms. The generated subsumptions are all defeasible
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because we are purely interested in the performance of “core” defeasible rea-
soning. Of course our algorithms themselves do support strict entailment
queries but these queries follow from the ontology if and only if they follow
via classical entailment from the strict axioms in the ontology. Therefore the
performance of such reasoning tasks are irrelevant for our evaluation.
There are, obviously, a variety of ways to generate defeasible entailment
queries. For example we could have used a strategy to generate the LHS
expressions as well. We could have also randomly selected class expressions
from the relevant module to stand as RHS expressions for our queries. How-
ever, we conjecture that our strategy represents a sensible first method for
an investigation such as ours. Our test data (both ontologies and entailment
queries) are available as a public download4.
6.1.2 Experiment Setup
In this section, we give a description of our experimental conditions, the tasks
that we execute, the important results we wish to report, and our hypotheses
about how the algorithms would perform on the data.
Test Setup and Hardware
The first task was to generate the ranking for each of the ontologies in the
dataset. We recorded the average time it took to generate a ranking (accord-
ing to Procedure ComputeRankingB in Section 4.2) for the ontologies of each
percentage defeasibility set. The rankings were all stored to file so that they
would not have to be recomputed at a later stage.
The second set of tasks were to execute the generated set of entailment
queries, using the Rational, Lexicographic, Basic, Minimal and Lexicographi-
cally Relevant Closures. We group our results for Rational and Lexicographic
Closure together because they have a clear skeptical vs. credulous inference
relationship. We group the results for Basic, Minimal and Lexicographically
4krr.meraka.org.za/~kmoodley/ontologies/Synthetic.zip
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Relevant Closures together because these mechanisms all employ the use of
justifications. We recorded the average time to compute an entailment using
each of these procedures over the dataset.
In terms of optimisations, we use two main techniques described in Sec-
tion 4.6 for ranking compilation and entailment checking. For ranking com-
pilation the core optimisation is represented by Lemma 20 on Page 222. That
is, if a LHS expression is not unsatisfiable (w.r.t. the classical counterpart of
the ontology) it can never be exceptional (w.r.t. its defeasible form). There-
fore, we only need to test exceptionality of class expressions that are unsatis-
fiable. For entailment checking, we can prune away axioms from the ranking
that are irrelevant to the terms in the query being asked. Modularisation, as
described in Section 4.6, is used for this purpose.
All experiments were executed on an Intel i7 Quad Core machine run-
ning Windows 10, with 8GB of memory allocated to the JVM (Java Virtual
Machine). Java 1.7 is used with 3GB of memory allocated to the stack for
running threads. For loading and analysing the ontologies of our dataset, we
use version 3.5.4 of the popular and well-supported Java OWL API [95].
As we have shown in Chapter 4, our defeasible reasoning algorithms are
built upon classical entailment checks. Thus, we would need to select an
existing DL reasoning implementation to perform these classical entailment
checks from within our defeasible reasoner. While running our evaluation
with multiple implementations would have been interesting for comparison,
such an investigation is not necessary to ascertain the price we pay for rea-
soning with defeasible (in addition to classical) subsumption. We therefore
chose to utilise a single DL reasoner for our evaluation. In particular, we
would ideally like to use the fastest and most robust implementation.
Consulting the latest results of the OWL Reasoner Evaluation Workshop5,
we identified the top three OWL 2 DL (expressive DL) reasoners for the stan-
dard reasoning tasks of: classification, consistency checking and satisfiability
testing (in terms of performance and robustness). Robustness was measured
5dl.kr.org/ore2014/results.html
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as the number of ontologies that were successfully processed in the allotted
time. The top reasoners were Konclude6 [185], HermiT7 [79], MORe8 [167],
Chainsaw9 [193], FaCT++10 [192] and TrOWL11 [190].
Modern DL reasoners are optimised for classification whereas various
other reasoning tasks such as identifying unsatisfiable class names (inco-
herence) are usually performed by first classifying the ontology, and then
“reading” the relevant information from the results.
Thus, we chose to focus on the reasoners which performed best in OWL
2 DL classification. These were respectively, Konclude, HermiT and MORe.
Konclude, unfortunately, does not yet have a direct interface to the OWL
API. Therefore, our choice was to select the next best reasoner - HermiT.
Hypotheses
The main insight we wish to gain from our evaluation is a general sense
of the performance of defeasible reasoning (ranking compilation time and
entailment query time) as well as clues as to where the major bottlenecks lie
in this kind of reasoning. Our hypotheses are thus centered around these two
insights. The first obvious hypothesis is that ranking compilation would be
a much slower affair than entailment checking because there would be many
more exceptionality checks in the former process.
The major bottleneck for ranking compilation should lie with the filtering
out of hidden strict inclusions, and the main factor influencing the perfor-
mance of this subprocess would be the number of iterations of the repeat
loop (recursions) of Procedure ComputeRankingB. Note here that the major
factor is not necessarily the number of hidden strict inclusions, but rather in
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TBox. Another factor that should influence perfomance is the length of the
exception-to-exception chain for a particular ontology (the number of ranks
in the ranking).
For Rational Closure we expect the main bottleneck to lie in computing
the rank of C for a query C @∼D. The higher the rank of C the more excep-
tionality checks are required to find C-compatibility. We also expect Rational
Closure to be the best performing of the five entailment regimes because its
worst case computational complexity is lower than the other regimes. The
major bottleneck for Lexicographic Closure should be the identification of
the LAC and the major factor influencing the performance of this subpro-
cess is the size of the problematic rank. Recall that, in the worst case, the
LAC has an exponential number of disjuncts (in the size of the problematic
rank). Therefore, we expect the performance of Lexicographic Closure to
drastically degrade when or if the problematic rank size increases drastically
in the data.
For the Basic, Minimal and Lexicographically Relevant Closures we ex-
pect the majority of computation time to be taken by computation of justi-
fications. The bottlenecks for these algorithms would then inherit the bot-
tleneck of justification computation which is the construction of the hitting
set tree (the major performance factors are the number of nodes in the tree
and the number of justifications per entailment). We expect all the Relevant
Closures to be slower than Rational Closure because they are in the double
exponential time complexity class (worse than Rational Closure).
Because Lexicographically Relevant Closure combines mechanisms from
Lexicographic Closure and Minimal Relevant Closure, it would inherit the
bottlenecks from both. I.e., computation of justifications as well as comput-
ing the LAC. We have promoted the potential of Lexicographically Relevant
Closure as a possible optimisation for Lexicographic Closure because of its
potential to decrease the problematic rank size (by removing C-basis axioms
from it). However, its success as an optimisation will then depend on justifi-
cations being much quicker to compute (than the LAC) and the C-basis size
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being large relative to the problematic rank size (large portions of the prob-
lematic rank will then be pruned away making the LAC easier to compute).
Finally, since Lexicographic Closure and the Basic, Minimal and Lexico-
graphically Relevant Closures have the same worst case complexity we ex-
pect their performances to be more comparable with each other than with
Rational Closure. We also expect Lexicographic Closure to be worst per-
forming over the data (which means we anticipate many occurrences of large
problematic rank sizes in the data). Basic and Minimal Relevant Closures
would likely perform very similarly given their almost identical procedures.
Although, we do anticipate that these procedures would perform significantly
better than Lexicographic Closure over the data. Essentially we are antic-
ipating that justification computation would be easier to perform than the
computation of LACs in our data.
6.1.3 Ranking Compilation Results
It is important to note that we view the compilation of the ranking as an
“offline” process prior to performing defeasible inference. That is, the ranking
can, and should, be precompiled and stored to file whenever there is a stable
version of the ontology. When reasoning needs to be conducted then the
ranking is loaded and entailment queries can be posed with this ranking (the
ranking should not be computed as part of every entailment query).
That being said, the ranking times we obtained for our data seem very
reasonable considering that we have implemented only one optimisation for
Procedure ComputeRankingB. As a point of reference, the average ranking
times we observed in our data are comparable to the average times to compute
all justifications for an entailment in the BioPortal corpus of ontologies [94,
Figure 6.1, Page 99]. The percentile plot in Figure 6.3 gives a summary of
the ranking times.
Percentile plots are chosen to represent the data because they give a good
general picture of the performance for the majority of the data, and it also
helps to reveal the outlier cases more clearly. For example, if we obtain
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Figure 6.3: Average time to compute the ranking for the artificial ontologies.
a value of 5 seconds for the 90th percentile (P90) then it means that 90%
of ontologies in the dataset could be ranked in 5 seconds or less. By this
definition we note that the 50th percentile is actually the median value for a
given dataset and P100 is the maximum value obtained.
Looking at the percentile plot of the ranking times in Figure 6.3, it seems
that ranking compilation gets harder exponentially as the percentage defea-
sibility increases (the ontology sizes, including strict axioms, are roughly the
same across the percentage defeasibility categories). This behaviour is to be
expected since as percentage defeasibility increases, the proportion of defea-
sible axioms increases, and with this, the number of LHS class expressions
(of defeasible subsumptions) that could potentially be unsatisfiable. Recall
that for the ranking procedure, we have to perform an exceptionality check
w.r.t. the ontology for each of these class expressions.
In addition, as we anticipated, the general trend is that ranking times
increase with the number of ranks (also called the ranking size or the length
of the exception-to-exception chain). Figure 6.4 illustrates this trend.
We observe that there is a dip in the curve between the ranking sizes of
5 and 10 and also between 15 and 16. The reason for these breaks in the
trend is that these portions of the data coincide with brief declines in the
percentage defeasibility of ontologies (percentage defeasibility is the other
CHAPTER 6. PERFORMANCE OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING 276
(a) Average ranking time versus the num-
ber of ranks in the ranking.
(b) Ranking sizes encountered together
with their frequencies.
Figure 6.4: Influence of the ranking size on the ranking compilation performance. The
Y-axis in Figure 6.4b denotes the number of ontologies in our data that have the indicated
ranking size.
major factor influencing ranking compilation time). The other important
factor is the number of times we have to recurse on the ranking procedure
to filter out the hidden strict subsumptions. It is sensible to anticipate that
when this recursion factor increases, our ranking times will also increase.
This is confirmed in Figure 6.5.
(a) Ranking time vs recursion count. (b) Recursion count frequencies.
Figure 6.5: Influence of the recursion counts on the ranking compilation performance. The
Y-axis in Figure 6.5b denotes the number of ontologies in our data that have the indicated
recursion count.
We have two dips in the curve of Figure 6.5a. One between recursion counts
4 and 5 and another between 6 and 7. The dips coincide with declines in
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percentage defeasibility (from 72% to 64% and 83% to 67% respectively).
It must also be mentioned that the reliability of the curve shape in Fig-
ure 6.5a is greater between recursion counts 0 and 5. These are the most
frequent counts found in the data (see Figure 6.5b) and thus the correspond-
ing average values for the ranking time are more reliable in this range. The
same can be said of the ranking size range between 3 and 5 for Figures 6.4a
and 6.4b. We conclude this section with a summary of average metrics per-
taining to the ranking compilation over the entire dataset (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: Average metrics pertaining to the ranking compilation per ontology. From left
to right: number of defeasible axioms, ranking size, number of hidden strict subsumptions,
size of the first rank (containing the non-exceptional defeasible axioms), number of axioms
in a general rank, number of exceptionality checks to compute a ranking, number of ex-
ceptional LHS concepts of defeasible subsumptions, number of unsatisfiable LHS concepts
of defeasible subsumptions and time to compute a ranking.
6.1.4 Entailment Checking Results
For entailment checking, we report first on the results for Rational and Lex-
icographic Closures. Recall that the main goal is to get a general idea of the
practical performance of these algorithms as well as insights into where the
main bottlenecks lie for these inference mechanisms.
Rational and Lexicographic Closure
The performance results for both reasoning algorithms are encouraging. For
Rational Closure the picture is especially bright even though the performance
degrades by roughly one order of magnitude as the percentage defeasibility of
the ontologies increase. For Lexicographic Closure the performance degrades
more considerably (roughly 3 − 4 orders of magnitude) as the percentage
defeasibility increases. Nevertheless, for Lexicographic Closure, the median
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values up to the 50% defeasibility case stay below the 1 second mark which
is very reasonable performance for a largely unoptimised procedure. The
overall results for the two algorithms are depicted in Figure 6.7.
(a) Average entailment checking times for Rational Closure.
(b) Average entailment checking times for Lexicographic Closure.
Figure 6.7: The average performance of Rational and Lexicographic Closure across our
artificial dataset.
It is noteworthy that the average defeasible inference times using Rational
Closure range between just 11ms and 43ms across the dataset (the maximum
average time taken to compute an inference for any individual query in the
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dataset, using Rational Closure, was 313ms). For Lexicographic Closure the
performance is much slower, ranging between 25ms and 65s on average.
Although, looking at the median values for the latter, we find that the
inference times drop considerably to between 13ms and 17s. This shows that
there is wider variance in the inference times for Lexicographic Closure. That
is, there are very hard cases and very easy cases also in the data. We will
try to isolate where the hardness for these cases lie (for both Rational and
Lexicographic Closure) later in this section.
For now we are in a position to give an answer to one of our questions
at the start of this chapter (i.e., how much more intensive, on average, is
defeasible reasoning than classical reasoning?). We plot the average number
of classical entailment checks we use per defeasible entailment check for both
Rational Closure and Lexicographic Closure. The results are illustrated by
the graph in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Average and maximum number of classical entailment checks per defeasible
entailment check using the Rational and Lexicographic Closures. RC stands for Rational
Closure and LC stands for Lexicographic Closure.
As we can see the graph depicts how many classical entailment checks it takes
(on average) to compute a single defeasible entailment check. It is interesting
that this value stays fairly consistent around the 3.5 mark for Rational Clo-
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sure across the different percentage defeasibilities. Since classical entailment
checks are the most computationally intensive components of our procedures
for Rational Closure, we can make the generalisation that Rational Closure
would likely take roughly 3.5 times as long as classical inference for ALC (for
real world ontologies having sizes represented in our dataset).
Looking at the number of entailment checks for Lexicographic Closure we
can see that they are not drastically more than Rational Closure. In fact,
it takes roughly only one more entailment check to compute Lexicographic
Closure (its average number of entailment checks stays consistently around
4.5). However, the very similar numbers of classical entailment checks belie
the large discrepancy in performance between Rational and Lexicographic
Closure. Therefore we have our first clear indication that the main perfor-
mance factor Lexicographic Closure is not the number of classical entailment
checks. Hence, we cannot make the generalisation that Lexicographic Closure
takes roughly 4.5 times as long as classical entailment for ALC.
Returning to Rational Closure, our hypothesis was that its major bottle-
neck would lie with the computation of the rank of the antecedent concept
of the query being posed. Examining the graph depicted in Figure 6.9a, we
find little evidence to support this hypothesis.
(a) Query time vs. the rank of the an-
tecedent for RC.
(b) Query time vs. number of axioms in
the C-compatible subset for RC.
Figure 6.9: Potential and actual main performance factors for Rational Closure.
Judging from the data points in the graph there seems to be no consistent
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increase in query times as the average rank of the antecedent increases. What
we can observe is that the average rank of query antecedents in our dataset
lies predominantly between 2 and 3. Nevertheless, there is considerable vari-
ance in query time for this range of average antecedent ranks, from roughly
2ms to 150ms (Figure 6.9a depicts a logarithmic scale). Therefore, our hy-
pothesis was false and there must be another variable which is contributing
more to Rational Closure query time.
As mentioned earlier, the most computationally intensive components of
the Rational Closure procedure are its classical entailment checks (each one
is an exptime-complete problem for ALC). Figure 6.8 has illustrated that
the number of classical entailment checks does not vary very much around
3.5 (not enough to warrant the large variance in query times between the
antecedent ranks of 2 and 3). Therefore, it stands to reason that it is likely
that the individual classical entailment checks themselves are taking longer
than usual to compute for the hard cases. In other words, our hypothesis
shifts to the suspicion that we are inheriting the main performance factor for
classical entailment checking - which is well known to be ontology size.
This suspicion is actually confirmed by the correlation shown in Fig-
ure 6.9b. I.e., in this graph we can see that as the number of axioms in
our C-compatible subset of the ranking increases, the query times also in-
crease. The increase is quite dramatic until the C-compatible subset size
is between 50 and 100 (the scale is logarithmic), thereafter the query times
actually start to taper but still increase (although the number of occurrences
of C-compatible subset sizes above this range also decreases dramatically).
It is worth mentioning, then, that ontology size (specifically the number of
defeasible axioms in the ontology) will always be a significant factor on per-
formance for all our defeasible reasoning algorithms.
For the Lexicographic Closure we recall that our expectation was that
the problematic rank size will be the major deciding factor for performance.
We also anticipated “high” problematic rank sizes occurring quite frequently
in our data. Figure 6.10 confirms the first expectation.
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Figure 6.10: The main performance influencer for Lexicographic Closure in our dataset is
problematic rank size.
Figure 6.10 also helps us to define what constitutes a “high” problematic
rank size. The query times that fall below the 1, 000ms (1 second) mark
are very acceptable for this relatively unoptimised implementation of Lexico-
graphic Closure. We thus choose to assign the corresponding average prob-
lematic sizes for these cases as “low” problematic rank sizes. In our data this
translates to values between 1 and 25. For queries that take between 1 and
100 seconds to terminate, we term the corresponding problematic sizes as
“medium-sized” (the values range roughly between 25 and 125. Finally, for
any queries that take longer than 100 seconds to terminate we consider the
corresponding problematic rank sizes as “high”. For our dataset this value
is any number greater than roughly 125.
Therefore, it is sensible for those interested in keeping Lexicographic Clo-
sure performance very practical, to minimise the problematic rank size as
far as possible. Outside the scope of optimisation techniques, an obvious
design practice for defeasible ontologies to minimise problematic rank size is
to reduce the number (or ratio) of defeasible axioms in the ontology.
In summary, we can extrapolate that the time to compute Lexicographic
Closure (using our current algorithm) ranges between two times as long as
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Rational Closure (in the 10% defeasibility case) to 3 orders of magnitude
higher than those for Rational Closure (in the 100% defeasibility case). We
can surmise, then, that Lexicographic Closure should range roughly between
7 and 3, 500 times as long as classical entailment for defeasible ontologies of
similar size to those in our dataset (recall that Rational Closure takes 3.5
times as long as classical entailment).
Basic, Minimal and Lexicographically Relevant Closure
For the Relevant Closures we notice, interestingly, that the performance for
all three algorithms are almost identical. The performance discrepancy be-
tween Basic and Minimal Relevant Closure is just 0.01% and this is consistent
with our hypothesis. Lexicographically Relevant Closure is around 0.18%
faster than both Basic and Minimal Relevant Closure. We encountered iso-
lated queries in the data that required inordinate reasoning times and thus,
for pragmatic reasons, we had to impose a timeout of 1, 000 seconds for each
query to be able to terminate our experiments in reasonable time. We plot
the general results for Basic Relevant Closure in Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11: Overall performance of Basic Relevant Closure on the data. We omit the
graphs for Minimal and Lexicographically Relevant Closures because their performance is
almost identical with Basic Relevant Closure.
It is interesting to note that there is no marked increase in reasoning time
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as the percentage defeasibility of ontologies increases. This is in contrast
to what we witnessed with Rational and Lexicographic Closure. Since the
computation of justifications is known to be an intensive procedure (relative
to classical entailment checking), it is not surprising that the justification
computation stage of the algorithms consumes over 99% of reasoning time.
Our results also indicate that the performance of computing justifications
is not majorly affected by percentage defeasibility in our dataset. This is in-
teresting and we conjecture that the reason for this is that the “relevant
modules” for each query remain fairly consistent in size across the different
ontology sizes. That is, justification computation makes use of modulari-
sation to prune away axioms from the ontology that are irrelevant to the
entailment. Therefore, it stands to reason that the size of these modules per
entailment query stays consistent even when the ontology sizes change.
Looking at the maximum reasoning times obtained as compared to the
90th-percentile we can see there is a significant difference between the two.
This means that there are a few isolated queries where the corresponding
justifications were very hard to compute. We conjecture that the very high
maximum reasoning times are responsible for elevating the mean times sig-
nificantly above the median times as well.
Given the predominance of justification computation in the algorithms,
the Relevant Closures should then, in principle, inherit the main performance
factor for justification computation - the size of the hitting set tree (HST)
generated. That is, the number of nodes in the HST tree. Horridge [94,
Section 3.3.4] has explained that justification overlap (the degree to which
justifications share common axioms) is a major factor in the practical perfor-
mance of justification computation. That is, the more justifications actually
share common axioms, the smaller the hitting set tree becomes and the faster
it is to actually complete the tree construction - yielding all justifications.
Conversely, the less overlap there is between justifications, the more
branches (or “repair paths”) need to be generated from the combinations
of unique axioms in the justifications, for the hitting set tree. In the worst
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case, when there is no justification overlap whatsoever, the number of nodes
in the hitting set tree grows to 2(n+1) − 1 where n is the number of justifica-
tions for the given entailment.
The hypothesis, then, that HST size will have a considerable effect on
reasoning performance for the Relevant Closures holds true for our data.
Figure 6.12 depicts a constant and linear increase in reasoning time as the
HST size increase (both axes are represented using a logarithmic scale).
Figure 6.12: Influence of HST size on Relevant Closure performance.
As one can imagine, the justifications for the entailments in an ontology are
very much determined by the modelling factors during ontology construction.
The sheer variety in these modelling decisions causes variation in the makeup
of justifications for entailments in the ontology. In fact, there is an entire sub-
area of ontology research which deals with the justificatory structure [22, 23]
of ontologies. This area is concerned with the analytical study of various
aspects of justifications in ontologies from the theoretical side, from the per-
spective of practical computation, as well as from a user comprehension (or
cognitive) perspective. Therefore, in pursuit of considerable optimisations
for the Relevant Closure algorithms, it is likely that one would have to gain
decent insight into the justificatory structure of real world ontologies.
It must also be mentioned that we did not perform such a study in order to
inform our parametrisation for our generated ontologies in this dataset. In
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other words, it is not known how the justificatory structure of the ontologies
in our dataset compares with that of real world ontologies. However, we have
logged three key metrics for our data that we can compare with real world
data: the average number of justifications computed, the average size of each
justification and the HST size.
We also logged the average C-basis and minimal C-basis sizes encountered
in our Basic and Minimal Relevant Closure algorithms. The values are shown
in Figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13: Average (rounded off to the nearest whole number) metrics for computation
of the Relevant Closure on the artificial data.
The values for the timed out cases in Figure 6.13 are those logged at the
cut-off time i.e., at the 1, 000 second mark. It is interesting to note the very
large difference between the average HST sizes of the non timed out cases
and the timed out cases. The queries which could not be processed within
1, 000 seconds had to construct hitting set trees with 1, 000, 000 nodes on
average. For the cases that terminate we could construct HST sizes up to
266, 387 (the 99th-percentile was 35, 334) in the allotted 1, 000 seconds.
In terms of comparing the average performance of the Relevant Closures
with the Rational and Lexicographic Closures, we obviously find that Ra-
tional Closure has, by far, the best performance on our data. Of course,
this is consistent with our hypothesis considering also that Rational Closure
generally removes more defeasible axioms from the ontology (and is thus
inferentially weaker than the remaining algorithms). A performance com-
parison graph for the mean and median times of all algorithms is given in
Figure 6.14.
The main extrapolations we can make from the graphs in Figure 6.14 are that
Rational Closure is by far the reasoning paradigm with the strongest perfor-
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(a) Mean times.
(b) Median times.
Figure 6.14: Mean and median times for all closures in the evaluation for the artificial
data.
mance (around 2 to 3 orders of magnitude lower than the other algorithms).
The Basic, Minimal and Lexicographically Relevant Closures are virtually
identical in performance. In relation to Lexicographic Closure we find that
the Relevant Closures are faster overall (on average over the entire dataset,
Lexicographic Closure takes 4 times as long as the Relevant Closures).
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However, this last fact can be misleading because we also notice that
the mean performance of Lexicographic Closure is actually better than the
Relevant Closures for the 10% to 40% defeasibility categories (LC takes ap-
proximately half the time of the Relevant Closures in this range). Thereafter,
the performance of Relevant Closure overtakes that of Lexicographic Closure.
The main reason is that from 10% to 40% defeasibility we have low problem-
atic rank sizes (see Figure 6.15). From 50% to 100% the mean sizes increase
slowly but the max sizes increase more dramatically which is perhaps to
blame for the degradation in performance for LC.
Figure 6.15: Average problematic rank sizes occurring in each percentage defeasibility
category.
Another question we wished to answer at the start of this evaluation was if
Lexicographically Relevant Closure is faster than (an optimisation for) Lex-
icographic Closure. The results that we obtained cannot definitively answer
this question but they suggest that Lexicographically Relevant Closure excels
(is faster than Lexicographic Closure) when the number of defeasible axioms
(percentage defeasibility) increases above 50% for our dataset. Between 10%
and 40% (for low problematic rank sizes) it is clear that Lexicographic Clo-
sure is without need of optimisation by way of computing justifications (as
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Lexicographically Relevant Closure does).
6.1.5 Discussion
In summary for our artificial data, we believe that our results are sufficient
grounds from which to claim that Rational Closure would be a viable defeasi-
ble reasoning formalism to be used in future real world ontologies containing
defeasible features. What we mean here by viable is in terms of reasoning
performance (reasoning times) using similar reasoner interaction paradigms
to those used for classical DL reasoners in real world ontology editing tools.
A reasoner interaction paradigm is a manner in which users of modern
ontology editing tools actually invoke the accompanying reasoners to derive
knowledge from their ontologies. For example, classification is a very popular
reasoning task in modern ontology editing software. The process of iteratively
classifying an ontology to derive the main results for the users purposes is
a typical reasoner interaction paradigm. In other words, we believe that
Rational Closure would perform reasonably well in computing the defeasible
subset or superset relationship between class names in a defeasible ontology
(if or when a rudimentary non-naive algorithm for this is developed).
Another interaction paradigm would be for a user to supply as input an
axiom, and for the reasoner to answer in the affirmative if the axiom is a
logical entailment of the ontology, or in the negative if this is not the case.
In essence this is the simplest task conceivable for defeasible reasoning and
our evaluation results indicate that Rational Closure would perform very well
for this kind of interaction.
Yet another interaction paradigm is embodied in the software plug-in for
the ontology editor Protégé called the DLQueryTab12. In the DLQueryTab
the user specifies a class expression and the main task of the plug-in is to
invoke the reasoner to compute the set of all class names in the ontology that
are either a subclass or superclass of the given expression. Again, considering
that this task is related to the task of classification, we claim that Rational
12protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/DLQueryTab
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Closure would also perform reasonably well at computing the defeasible sub-
classes or superclasses for the given expression.
Our main conclusion is that Rational Closure would give back inferences in
times that can be considered “on-demand” using similar reasoner interaction
paradigms to those mentioned above. Our confidence in this conjecture is
based on the performance obtained in our evaluation of the artificial data
(Rational Closure takes just 3.5 times as long as classical entailment) as well
as the fact that we currently use only one optimisation for its computation
(i.e., modularisation).
When we examine the results for Lexicographic Closure and the Relevant
Closures we cannot make the same claims about their performance as for
Rational Closure. Even though we have also used only modularisation as
an optimisation for these algorithms, there is some doubt as to whether
they would be useful (from a performance perspective) using similar reasoner
interaction paradigms to those discussed above.
That is, whereas one might be willing to wait a few seconds or even up
to a couple of minutes for the reasoner to determine if a specified axiom is
defeasibly entailed by the ontology or not, whether it is feasible to wait 15
minutes (we even encountered some cases which take much longer) remains
to be seen. However, if we consider the interaction with a defeasible reasoner
to represent a completely different interaction paradigm to classical reasoning
then perhaps one would be willing to wait that long. For example, waiting
2 or 3 minutes to compute all justifications for an entailment seems very
reasonable on the whole (Horridge [94, Page 99] has shown that it sometimes
takes close to 15 minutes for entailments in BioPortal ontologies).
Therefore, if defeasible reasoning were to be seen by users as embody-
ing a different reasoner interaction paradigm (similar to the computation of
justifications) then Lexicographic Closure and the Relevant Closures might
still hold significance as useful forms of defeasible reasoning. It must also be
reiterated that there is very little currently in the way of optimisations for all
algorithms. Hence, the picture may be considerably brighter for these latter
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algorithms when more sophisticated optimisation strategies are introduced.
6.2 Modified Real World Data
In this section, we take a step further than using purely synthetic ontologies.
We describe a principled way of introducing defeasible subsumption into
real-world ontologies. We then perform an evaluation of the performance of
defeasible reasoning (analogous to that in Section 6.1) on the resulting data.
Previously, in terms of data for the evaluation of defeasible reasoning per-
formance, the norm has been the use of automatically generated ontologies
with defeasible features. The most notable attempt at a benchmark of syn-
thetic defeasible ontologies is LoDEN13. LoDEN is however not applicable for
our purposes because the focus in this benchmark is on low complexity DLs,
whereas we are interested in ontologies that are at least of ALC expressivity.
Naturally, there are obvious shortcomings with artificially generated on-
tologies, such as possible biases in the generation methodology. However,
there is no question of finding representative data because there are virtually
no naturally occurring ontologies with intended defeasible features.
We instead choose a middle-ground approach, taking advantage of the
rich set of (classical) OWL ontologies that we have on the Web in vari-
ous repositories and corpora. Since DLs form the logical underpinning of
OWL, this data is immediately applicable for our purposes. The basic idea
of our approach is to “toggle” selected subsumptions in these ontologies to
be defeasible subsumptions, thereby making these ontologies useful as data
to evaluate our defeasible reasoning algorithms.
Of course, this is to be done with care to generate cases challenging for the
reasoner. For example, we need to ensure cases where there are more than
one rank in the ranking of the ontology (Procedure ComputeRankingB). Our
method is given in Section 6.2.2, together with its strengths and weaknesses.
13loden.fisica.unina.it
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6.2.1 Data Curation Methodology
For our initial data, we sample some classical OWL ontologies which we can
later pass through our procedure for the introduction of defeasible features.
The natural choice is to select the same data that is traditionally used to
evaluate the performance of existing classical DL reasoners.
However, even in such a setting, there is no precise consensus on what
data to use. The result is that data is generally curated manually by choosing
“well-known” ontologies and corpora from which to sample, or arbitrarily
selecting from the variety of respectable corpora on the web.
Choice of Corpora
While there are bona fide ontology benchmarks available such as LUBM [88]
and its extension UOBM [129], it was pointed out that there are shortcomings
in manual selection of ontologies and ontology corpora for evaluation of DL
reasoning performance [133]. In particular, the main limitation with such
selection procedures is that they result in datasets lacking sufficient variety.
Thus the results of evaluations can be heavily skewed or biased towards
the particular benchmarks being used. The Manchester OWL Repository [134]
is an effort to address this issue. The Repository is a framework for shar-
ing ontology datasets for OWL empirical research. The current version
of the repository contains three core datasets, namely versions of NCBO
Bioportal14 [148, 196], The Oxford Ontology Library (OOL)15 and MOWL-
Corp16 [133].
While Bioportal and OOL are already established ontology corpora that
are actively used in DL reasoner evaluations, MOWLCorp is a recent gather-
ing of ontologies through sophisticated web crawls and filtration techniques.
We obtain a recent snapshot of the Manchester OWL Repository as the
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the Bioportal, OOL and MOWLCorp corpora respectively.
Filtration Process and Choice of DL Reasoner
For loading and analysing the ontologies of our dataset, we use the popular
and well-supported Java-based OWL API [95].
As we have shown in Chapter 4, our defeasible reasoning algorithms are
built upon classical entailment checks. Just as in Section 6.1, we chose to
utilise a single DL reasoner to perform these checks: the fastest and most
robust implementation at the time - HermiT.
Given our choice of tools for manipulating and reasoning with the on-
tologies in our dataset, we filtered out the ontologies that could be loaded
and parsed by the OWL API (each within an allotted 40 minutes). The re-
maining ontologies were then tested to determine if they were classifiable by
HermiT within an additional 40 minutes each. Those ontologies which did
not pass this test were also removed from the data.
In order to remove some of the cases which are very likely to be easy
for our reasoner, we elected to remove ontologies with less than 100 logical
axioms (ignoring annotations and other axioms carrying meta-information).
This is justifiable because ontology size is proven to be an overwhelmingly
dominant factor in reasoning performance [171] (see Section 6.1 for a more
involved motivation of the number 100). Finally, we stripped the ontologies
of ABox data because our defeasible reasoner is currently purely equipped
with (D)TBox entailment procedures. This leaves us with 252, 440 and 2335
ontologies in Bioportal, OOL and MOWLCorp respectively.
6.2.2 Introducing Defeasibility into the Data
In this section, we describe a systematic technique to introduce defeasi-
ble subsumptions into the ontologies of our dataset, thereby making them
amenable to defeasible reasoning evaluation.
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Methodology
Our approach hinges upon an important relationship between concept excep-
tionality (Definition 14 on Page 91) and classical concept unsatisfiability. We
rephrase this relationship (captured in Lemma 20 on Page 222) to be more
intuitive for this setting:
Lemma 26 If a concept C is exceptional w.r.t. a knowledge base 〈T ,D〉 then
C is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T ∪ D′, where D′ is the classical translation of D.
Lemma 26 on Page 294 states that if a class is exceptional in a defeasible
ontology then it will necessarily be unsatisfiable in the classical translation
of the ontology. This result is useful because we can use it to narrow down
the search space for identifying exceptional classes in classical ontologies.
Taking the contrapositive of Lemma 26, we obtain the result that if a class
is satisfiable w.r.t. a classical ontology then it is necessarily not exceptional
w.r.t. any defeasible translation of the ontology. Therefore, we can elimi-
nate ontologies from our dataset without LHS-classes of subsumptions that
are unsatisfiable, because these could never become exceptional by turning
classical subsumptions into defeasible ones.
The next definition is a generalisation of standard incoherence to axioms
with complex left hand side (LHS) concepts:
Definition 63 (Classical LHS-coherence) A classical TBox T is LHS-
coherent if each C v D ∈ T is s.t. T 6|= C v ⊥. T is LHS-incoherent if it
is not LHS-coherent.
Eliminating all ontologies from our dataset that are LHS-coherent leaves us
with 11, 46 and 77 ontologies in the Bioportal, OOL and MOWLCorp cor-
pora respectively. Thus, in total we have 134 ontologies for our performance
evaluation. The task is to “relax” some of the subsumptions of our ontolo-
gies to be defeasible. The obvious näıve approach to introducing defeasibility
would be to convert all subsumptions to defeasible ones. Naturally, this is not
likely to be the general approach of defeasible-ontology engineers in practice.
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The other extreme would be to develop an approach to identify the minimal
(for some defined notion of minimality) amount of defeasibility to introduce
into the ontology in order to successfully “cater for all the exceptions”. The
latter approach would be interesting, and we are currently investigating such
an approach; however, we propose that a reasonable approximation of such
a procedure yields meaningful data for performance evaluation.
The approach that we discuss here is in the spirit of such an approxima-
tion. We illustrate the problem by means of an example:
Example 30 Consider the following TBox T :
1. Mechanic v ∃hasWorkshop.>,
2. Mechanic v ∃hasSpecialisation.>,
3. MobileMechanic t GeneralMechanic t CarMechanic v Mechanic,
4. MobileMechanic v ¬∃hasWorkshop.>,
5. MobileMechanic u ¬∃status.OnStandBy v ∃hasWorkshop.>,
6. GeneralMechanic v ¬∃hasSpecialisation.>,
7. CarMechanic v ∃hasSpecialisation.Car

MobileMechanic, GeneralMechanic and the class expression MobileMechanic u
¬∃status.OnStandBy are unsatisfiable w.r.t. T . An intuitive analysis of T tells
us that the ontology engineer probably intended to model that mechanics usu-
ally have a workshop (Mechanic @∼ ∃hasWorkshop.>) and usually specialise in
certain types of equipment that they repair (Mechanic @∼ ∃hasSpecialisation.>).
This translation of Axioms 1 and 2 in Example 30 on Page 295, is a
minimal and intuitive way to introduce defeasibility into T , catering for
exceptional types of mechanic - i.e., mobile and general mechanics.
However, we also have an exceptional type of mobile mechanic in T (an
“exception-to-an-exception”). That is, mobile mechanics who are no longer
“on standby” or “on call” (MobileMechanic u ¬∃status.OnStandBy). These
mechanics would then be assigned a workshop for their repair tasks.
To cater for such mechanics we would have to relax Axiom 4 as well of
Example 30 on Page 295 to express that mobile mechanics usually don’t have
a workshop (MobileMechanic @∼ ¬∃hasWorkshop.>).
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We now define a general defeasible translation function (DTF) for converting
classical subsumptions to defeasible subsumptions in classical ontologies.
Definition 64 (DTF) Let T be a set of classical subsumptions of the form
C v D, then F : T → {C @∼D | C v D ∈ T } ∪ T is a DTF for T .
We also have to formalise what we mean when a particular DTF “caters for
all exceptions” in the TBox. We call such a function a safe DTF.
Definition 65 (Safe DTF) Let T be a set of classical subsumptions, let F
be a DTF for T and let D be the special DTF that translates all subsump-
tions in T to defeasible ones. Then, F is a safe DTF for T if C is totally
exceptional w.r.t. D(T ) if and only if C is totally exceptional w.r.t. F (T ),
for each C v D ∈ T .
We try to define a safe DTF that places a small upper bound on the subset
of axioms to relax using the well-known notion of justification [94].
If we compute the justifications for T |= MobileMechanic v ⊥ (the con-
cise reasons for MobileMechanic being unsatisfiable and possibly exceptional)
we obtain a single justification {1, 3, 4}. Relaxing these axioms would be
sufficient for catering for mobile mechanics (in fact, it is only necessary to
relax Axiom 1 as mentioned earlier). Similarly, we arrive at {2, 3, 6} to cater
for general mechanics and {4, 5} for mobile mechanics no longer on call.
The basic idea is thus to take the union of the justifications for the un-
satisfiable LHS-classes and relax these axioms to defeasible ones. We obtain
that {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} should be relaxed in Example 30 on Page 295, which is
admittedly a large proportion of our TBox. However, as we discover later in
this section, the proportion is much smaller in practice on larger real-world
ontologies.
However, while computing all justifications has been shown to be fea-
sible in general on real-world ontologies, black-box (reasoner-independent)
procedures are known to be exponential in the worst case [94]. To avoid
this potential computational blowup, we obtain a small upper bound of the
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(union of) justifications by extracting a star locality based module [170] for
the ontology in question, w.r.t. the set of unsatisfiable LHS-classes.
A module of an ontology w.r.t. a signature (set of terms from the ontology)
is a small subset of the ontology that preserves the meaning of the terms in
the signature. We specifically choose star locality based modules because
of two key properties: (i) they preserve all justifications in the ontology for
all entailments (or axioms) that can be constructed with the given signature
(depleting property [169, Section 3]), and (ii) they are smaller in size relative
to other modules which have the depleting property. The pseudocode of our
method is given in Procedure RelaxSubsumption.
Procedure RelaxSubsumption(O, C)
Input: LHS-incoherent TBox O, C = {C | (C v D ∈ O for some
D) ∧ (O |= C v ⊥)}
Output: Defeasible ontology 〈T ,D〉
1 T := ∅; D := ∅;
2 M := extractStarModule(O, sig(C)); T := O\M;
3 foreach X v Y ∈M do
4 D := D ∪ {X @∼ Y };
5 return 〈T ,D〉;
Line 2 of Procedure RelaxSubsumption is responsible for extracting a hope-
fully small set of axioms from the ontology which preserves the meaning of
the set of terms in C (the function sig(C) extracts the signature or set of class
and role terms in the set C). Finally, it can be shown that our procedure
defines a safe DTF for knowledge bases.
Theorem 6 (Safety of our DTF) Let F be the DTF defined by Procedure
RelaxSubsumption, and O a classical TBox. Then F is a safe DTF for O.
Proof: By Definition 65 on Page 296, we have to show that, for any concept
C, C is totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O) if and only if C is totally exceptional
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w.r.t. F (O) (where D is the special DTF which translates all subsumptions
to defeasible ones).
“ =⇒ ”: Suppose that, for some C v D ∈ O, C is totally exceptional
w.r.t. D(O) but C is not totally exceptional w.r.t. F (O). We show that
this leads to a contradiction. From our supposition that C is not totally
exceptional w.r.t. F (O) we have two cases: either C is not exceptional at
all w.r.t. F (O) or C is normally exceptional w.r.t. F (O).
Case 1: C is not exceptional w.r.t. F (O). From our supposition that C is
totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O) we can infer thatO |= C v ⊥ from Lemma 26
on Page 294. Let J1, . . . ,Jn be the justifications for O |= C v ⊥. Because
we know that C is totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O) it must be the case that
for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ n, C is totally exceptional w.r.t. D(Ji). We can
easily see from the depleting property of star locality based module that
D(Ji) ⊆ F (O). Therefore C is totally exceptional w.r.t. F (O) because
there is a justification for this in F (O). This is a contradiction and therefore
it cannot be the case that C is not exceptional w.r.t. F (O).
Case 2: C is normally exceptional w.r.t. F (O). This is impossible because
we have shown in Case 1 that there is a justification Ji for O |= C v ⊥ s.t. C
is totally exceptional w.r.t. D(Ji). Therefore D(Ji) ⊆ F (O) and it must be
the case that C is totally exceptional w.r.t. F (O).
“ ⇐= ”: Suppose that, for some C v D ∈ O, C is totally exceptional
w.r.t. F (O) but C is not totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O). We know there
is a justification J ⊆ F (O) s.t. C is totally exceptional w.r.t. J and J ′ |=
C v ⊥ where J ′ is the classical counterpart of J (Lemma 26 on Page 294).
Assume there is a classical statement in J . This is impossible because F is
defined s.t. each α ∈ F (O) where α′ (classical counterpart of α) is part of a
justification for the unsatisfiability of C, has to be part of the star locality-
based module we consider. This means α′ will be translated to defeasible
in F (O). Therefore, it must be the case that D(J ) = J . Then there is
a justification for C being totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O) because D(J ) ⊆
D(O). Hence it must be that C is totally exceptional w.r.t. D(O). 2
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Discussion
There are two conflicting issues with the procedure we have presented for
introducing defeasibility into OWL ontologies: (i) minimality of modification
to the original ontology and (ii) the representative quality of the resulting
defeasible ontology as something that might be built by an ontology engineer
with access to defeasible features.
While (i) and (ii) would be a useful goals for a methodology automating
the introduction of defeasible features into OWL ontologies, our approach
does not yet meet such desiderata. It is clear that the minimal axioms to
relax in Example 30 on Page 295 would be {1, 2, 4}, yet we relax {3, 5, 6} as
well.
The resulting ontology should also ideally resemble a naturally occurring
ontology with defeasible features introduced where explicitly needed by the
ontology engineer. For instance, in Example 30 on Page 295, it does not make
sense (from an intuitive point of view) to relax MobileMechanic v Mechanic
(all mobile mechanics are mechanics) to MobileMechanic @∼Mechanic (typical
mobile mechanics are mechanics). Such constraints should ideally remain
strict.
Furthermore, a critical observation is that logical incoherence in classical
ontologies may be caused by erroneous modelling. In ontology development
tools, large emphasis has been placed on debugging incoherence by making
modifications to the ontology to remove the “unwanted” entailments such
as C v ⊥. This is likely to have prevented many developers publishing
incoherent ontologies.
Given the above main shortcomings of our approach, we do not argue
that ours is the ideal methodology. Rather, we hope that it serves as a
stepping stone from purely synthetic approaches to investigate and develop
more suitable methodologies. Our modified real world ontologies are available
as a public download17.
17krr.meraka.org.za/~kmoodley/ontologies/NonSynthetic.zip
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6.2.3 Experiment Setup
Our setup, methodologies and design choices for the experimental evaluation
can be summarised as follows:
Data Summary
The input data for our experiments are 134 LHS-incoherent ontologies (cu-
rated as described earlier in this section) from the Manchester OWL Repos-
itory. The ontologies are divided across three corpora: 11, 46 and 77 in
Bioportal, OOL and MOWLCorp respectively. The DL expressivity distribu-
tion of the data ranges from variants of ALC all the way up to SROIQ [99].
There are 35 DL variants in total represented in the data. Figure 6.16 pro-
vides some average properties of the ontologies in our dataset.
Figure 6.16: Ontology metrics for the LHS-incoherent cases in the dataset.
We also give an illustration in Figure 6.17 of how much defeasibility our
methodology has introduced in to the curated ontologies. The average ratio
of defeasible to strict axioms in each ontology is 6%, the median being 1%,
the minimum ratio being 0.01% and the maximum being 98%.
It is very interesting to note that the percentage defeasibility of most on-
tologies in the data stay well below 10%. It would be interesting to see if
our reasoning performance for the 10% defeasibility category of the artificial
data (Section 6.1) generalises to the current data as well. There are a number
of factors, though, which make the current data different from the artificial
data. The main one in terms of performance is probably ontology size. In
our current data we have far larger ontologies in general than the artificially
generated ones.
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Figure 6.17: Percentage defeasibility distribution across the modified real world ontologies.
In terms of the ALC constructor distribution, Figure 6.18 shows that for the
most part the distribution for the real world data closely matches that of the
artificial data (see Figure 6.2b). The only discrepancy is with universal role
restrictions which occur more frequently in the real world data than in our
artificial data. While this is not ideal, we conjecture that overall this would
not detract from the significance of the results for the artificial data.
Figure 6.18: Average ALC constructor distribution across an ontology in our modified real
world dataset.
In addition to the ontologies, we generated a set of entailment queries (de-
feasible subsumptions of the form C @∼D) for each ontology to present to our
defeasible reasoner. We follow a similar strategy to Section 6.1: for the C’s
we use the existing LHS-incoherent classes in the ontology. For the D’s we
take the ⊥-syntactic locality module of the ontology w.r.t. to the signature of
C (including ⊥) and randomly generate RHS D’s from the module signature.
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Tasks
The first task is to precompile the exceptionality rankings of each ontology
in the dataset. The rankings are then stored on file for later use in entail-
ment testing. It is important to note that the computation of the ranking
is considered as an offline, precompilation process for each stable version of
an ontology. Such a task is not meant to be executed on-demand during
defeasible entailment tests.
Lemma 26 on Page 294 is used as an optimisation in the ranking pro-
cedure. We only need to check exceptionality of C @∼D’s where C is unsat-
isfiable w.r.t. the classical translation of 〈T ,D〉 (see Lines 2 to 4 of Proce-
dure Exceptional in Section 4.2).
The entailment tests are then performed on the precomputed rankings
and the results of both tasks are recorded. I.e., we test if C @∼D is follows
from the ontologies using the various closures presented in Chapter 4. We
recorded the average time it took to compute the rankings, and to answer
entailment questions. The same optimisations were used as for the artificial
data evaluation.
Equipment
The evaluation was carried out on an Intel i7 Quad Core machine running
Windows 10. 8GB of memory is allocated to the Java Virtual Machine (Java
1.7 with 3GB of memory allocated to the stack for running threads). HermiT
is the underlying classical DL reasoning implementation.
Hypotheses
Our general predictions are analogous to those of the artificial data because
the ontology metrics (apart from ontology size, classical subsumptions and
percentage defeasibility distribution) of both datasets are somewhat simi-
lar. However, we expect the data to contain ranking sizes not more than
roughly 5. That is, we expect there to be very few cases where there are
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exceptions-to-exceptions (if any). The reason for this prediction is that on-
tology engineers would probably try to avoid introducing incoherences in
their ontologies which correspond to exceptions.
6.2.4 Ranking Compilation Results
It must be pointed out that the presentation of our results for this data is
going to be significantly different to that of the artificial data in Section 6.1.
The reason is that we do not have the ontologies binned into neat categories
w.r.t. percentage defeasibility.
The overall results for ranking compilation are quite promising. Fig-
ures 6.19 and 6.20 give an overview of results w.r.t. ranking compilation.
Figure 6.19: Ontology metrics and ranking compilation results for the modified real world
data.
Figure 6.20: Ranking compilation time per modified real world ontology.
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Examining the ranking times in Figures 6.19, we notice that on average over
the entire dataset, it takes 3 minutes to rank a single ontology. However,
the “median” column of the ranking times, shows us that the majority of
rankings were computed in less than half a second. The most intensive
ranking to compute was Ontology 134 which has 415, 258 TBox axioms of
which 6, 010 are defeasible (it took roughly 4 hours to compute).
As expected, we have very little variance in ranking size (between 1 and 3),
therefore we do not need to examine in detail the influence of ranking size on
the compilation time. However, the most challenging cases in theory for our
reasoner are the ones in which there are hidden strict inclusions in the DT-
Box. Examining the number of recursions we have to perform over the data,
we find that the need to recursively execute Procedure ComputeRankingB is
much less frequent than the artificial data (see Figure 6.21).
Figure 6.21: Number of recursions required to rank the modified real world ontologies.
Therefore, the number of recursions does not impact the hardness of rank-
ing compilation considerably because average recursion depth is 1.5 with the
maximum of just 4 (and very little occurrences of 2, 3 and 4 in the data). This
is also confirmed by the fact that the average compilation time for the cases
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with no recursions is by far the highest (255 seconds). Hardness, therefore,
is mainly determined by other factors. Since a naive ranking compilation
procedure has to check exceptionality of each defeasible axiom in the ontol-
ogy, in most cases we expect the number of defeasible axioms to be the main
contributor to hardness. However we also have an optimisation (Lemma 26
on Page 294) which says that we only need to check exceptionality of the
defeasible axioms with unsatisfiable LHSs.
Therefore, it stands to reason that the number of unsatisfiable LHSs in
the ontology would be the main contributor to hardness for our dataset. We
plot the number of defeasible axioms in the ontology that have unsatisfiable
LHSs against the ranking compilation time to reveal that this is indeed the
case (see Figure 6.22).
Figure 6.22: The performance of ranking compilation vs the number of defeasible axioms
in the ontology that have unsatisfiable LHSs.
Both the X and Y axes are represented in logarithmic scale and we can see
that from around 100 unsatisfiable LHSs the ranking times start to increase
dramatically. In summary the compilation times for the modified real world
data are, in general, comparable with those for our artificial data.
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The average time to compile a ranking in the artificial data was around 100
seconds, whereas in our modified real world data this figure is around 176
seconds. However, we have much smaller percentage defeasibility ratios in
the latter dataset than we do in the former. It would be interesting to see
in the future whether real world defeasible ontologies would have similar
percentage defeasibility ratios to those in our dataset.
An analysis of our algorithm, together with the results obtained in this
evaluation, reveals that the number of unsatisfiable LHSs (and to a lesser
extent the number of recursions) are the main contributors to hardness of
ranking compilation.
It must also be mentioned that one should not ignore the number of strict
axioms (i.e., overall ontology size with both defeasible and strict axioms) as
a contributor to reasoning hardness. As we have repeatedly stressed, our
algorithms are built upon classical entailment checks for which ontology size
is the dominant indicator of hardness.
In fact, we notice that the average number of defeasible axioms in our
real world dataset is only one third that of the artificial data, and yet we still
obtained some cases in the real world data where compilation is harder than
in the artificial data. We attribute most of this to the fact that ontology
sizes are much larger on average in the real world dataset (see Figures 6.19
and 6.16 for a comparison).
To conclude the ranking compilation analysis, we give some average met-
rics of this part of the evaluation in Figure 6.23.
Figure 6.23: Average metrics obtained during the evaluation of ranking compilation per-
formance for the modified real world data.
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6.2.5 Entailment Checking Results
As we did in Section 6.1, we report first on the results for Rational and
Lexicographic Closure and then on the results for the Relevant Closures. We
also give a brief comparison and discussion of the results for both groups of
closures at the end of this section.
Rational and Lexicographic Closure
For Rational Closure, all queries (except those for Ontology 134) in the mod-
ified real world data could be executed in less than a second. On average
over all ontologies the query time was around 80ms and 90% of all queries
could be executed in 200ms or less. For Lexicographic Closure the average
query time was much slower (around 18 seconds) but this is because of iso-
lated queries that were much slower than average. This is corroborated by
the median query time of around 250ms and the 75th percentile of 1.9 sec-
onds (75% of the queries could be executed in 1.9 seconds or less). The plot
of the average query times for both Rational and Lexicographic Closure are
presented in Figure 6.24.
The data therefore confirms our analysis and generalisations in Section 6.1:
that the performance of Rational Closure (even using our preliminary imple-
mentation) is feasible for TBox reasoning in modern ontology editing tools.
The vast majority of queries terminate within 100ms. There are, however, a
significant number of queries which take between 100 and 500ms to compute.
This is in slight contrast to the results for the artificial data which found that
less than 1% of all queries posed to the reasoner took longer than 100ms to
compute (extremely few queries even approached close to 100ms).
We hypothesise that the main reason for the queries between 100 and
500ms is the much larger ontology sizes obtained in our dataset. In fact,
we postulate that the sheer magnitude of ontology sizes in the data has the
largest impact on the performance of Rational Closure. Figure 6.25 lends
credence to this claim (both axes are of logarithmic scale).
However, even though the performance of Rational Closure decreases con-
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(a) Rational Closure performance in the modified real world data.
(b) Lexicographic Closure performance in the modified real world data.
Figure 6.24: Average performance of Rational and Lexicographic Closure in the modified
real world data.
siderably with the larger ontology sizes (the reason for this is that the perfor-
mance of classical entailment also decreases as ontologies become larger), the
performance still remains acceptable for practical reasoning tasks in ontology
editing tools.
For the Lexicographic Closure we find that the performance on modified
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Figure 6.25: Average Rational Closure performance vs. ontology size in the modified real
world dataset.
real world data is very similar to our artificial data (even considering the
much larger ontology sizes in the former dataset). This is quite interesting
because, considering that the major performance factor for Lexicographic
Closure is problematic rank size, it must be the case that the problematic
rank sizes encountered in the current dataset are comparable to those ob-
tained in the artificial dataset. We plot the performance of Lexicographic
Closure against problematic rank size in Figure 6.26 to illustrate this (the
reader may compare the graph with Figure 6.10).
To illustrate that the problematic rank sizes of both datasets in our evalu-
ation were very similar we give some figures: the mean values for the artificial
and modified real world data were roughly 39 and 36 respectively, the median
values 24 and 16, the 75th percentile values 58 and 39, the 90th percentile
values 102 and 109 and the maximum values 236 and 320. There was, how-
ever, one anomalous ontology (Ontology 134) in the latter dataset which,
for some queries, had a mammoth problematic rank of roughly 5900 axioms.
However, we excluded the results for these queries from consideration because
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Figure 6.26: The performance of Lexicographic Closure is predominantly determined by
problematic rank size for the modified real world data as well.
they require over 1, 000 seconds to compute.
Just like in Section 6.1 we would like to ascertain, for the current dataset,
how much more expensive the Rational and Lexicographic Closures are than
classical entailment. We find that, on average, the number of classical en-
tailment checks required to check a defeasible entailment (using Rational
Closure) is 2.7 and Lexicographic Closure is not much higher at 3.3. Since
the most intensive component, by far, of the Rational Closure algorithm is its
classical entailment checks, we can infer that Rational Closure takes roughly
2.7 times as long as classical entailment over the data.
For the Lexicographic Closure, just as in Section 6.1, the number of classi-
cal entailment checks is not much higher than Rational Closure. However, the
algorithm requires computation of the LAC (which is an exponential prob-
lem in the size of the problematic rank). This intensive component of the
algorithm means that we cannot base our comparison of Lexicographic Clo-
sure and classical entailment performance purely on the number of classical
entailment checks. Therefore, we first compare the performance of Lexico-
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graphic Closure to that of Rational Closure and then extrapolate an indirect
comparison with the performance of classical entailment.
The 10th percentile for Lexicographic Closure is 2.5ms while the same per-
centile for Rational Closure is 1.39ms (Lexicographic Closure takes roughly
twice as long). The 75th percentile value is 3 orders of magnitude higher
than that of Rational Closure. From this we generalise that, for the majority
of queries, the times for Lexicographic Closure are expected to be between
twice as long as Rational Closure, to 3 orders of magnitude higher than those
for Rational Closure. Rational Closure itself takes 2.7 times as long as clas-
sical entailment. Therefore, one can make the very general projection that
Lexicographic Closure would roughly take between 5.4 and 2700 times as
long as classical entailment (for the majority of queries).
Basic, Minimal and Lexicographically Relevant Closure
The results for the Relevant Closures follow a similar pattern to that of the
artificial data. All three closures have almost identical performance over
the data. Again, this is because justification computation forms the main
component of all three algorithms and it consumes 99% of the reasoning time
for each query. The overall performance is depicted in Figure 6.27.
Interestingly, whereas Lexicographically Relevant Closure was ever so slightly
faster in the artificial data than the other two Relevant Closures, here it is
slightly slower by a similar margin. We conjecture that the reason for this is
that the problematic ranks are slightly larger in this dataset. In other words,
after these problematic ranks are pruned (by removing the axioms from them
that appear in the minimal C-bases) their sizes are still slightly larger than
those in the artificial dataset.
We again imposed a timeout of 1, 000 seconds for each query and found
that roughly 2% of them did not terminate within the time limit. For all
cases it is no surprise that the major bottleneck for performance remains the
computation of the justifications. Specifically, the bottleneck for computation
of justifications is construction of the hitting set tree. We plot the query times
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Figure 6.27: The performance of Basic Relevant Closure on the modified real world data.
The other Relevant Closures have almost identical performance on the same data.
against the HST size in Figure 6.28.
Figure 6.28: The major influence on Relevant Closure performance, for the modified real
world data, is still the number of nodes in the hitting set tree.
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Figure 6.28 clearly demonstrates that HST size has a major impact on the
performance of the Relevant Closures. However, there are two outlier cases
when the HST size is at 9 and 32. The corresponding query times for these
cases are 51, 405ms and 24, 881ms respectively. The reason for these depar-
tures from the general trend is ontology size - these queries are executed on
Ontology 134 in the dataset which has in excess of 400, 000 axioms (6010 of
which are defeasible). This ontology is far larger than the vast majority of
the other ontologies in the dataset.
To give the reader a sense of the justificatory structure of the non timed
out cases, we plot the percentile occurrences of: number of justifications, size
of a single justification and HST size for these queries in Figure 6.29.
(a) Number of justifications per query. (b) Average justification size per query.
(c) HST size per query.
Figure 6.29: Justification metrics for the non timed out queries posed to the modified real
world data.
Figure 6.29 gives some important insight into the complexity of justification
computation that our algorithms are able to execute while still retaining
reasonable defeasible inference times. We believe that any defeasible infer-
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ence time of below 10 seconds (just higher than the 97th percentile value)
is acceptable for our preliminary implementation of the Relevant Closures.
Given this upper limit we can extrapolate that our algorithms would be able
to compute just over 20 justifications with maximum HST sizes around 1, 000
to stay within this reasoning time.
In other words, for more complex justification computation (computing
much more than 20 justifications and HST sizes closer to 10, 000 than to
1, 000) we cannot guarantee inference times lower than 10 seconds with the
current implementation for the Relevant Closures.
We conclude our analysis of the performance of the Relevant Closures
with an illustration of the justification metrics for the timed out queries in
the modified real world dataset (see Figure 6.30).
(a) Number of justifications per query. (b) Average justification size per query.
(c) HST size per query.
Figure 6.30: Justification metrics for the timed out queries posed to the modified real
world data.
The main discrepancies between the timed out cases and the non timed
out cases are the number of justifications and the HST size. On average
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the queries computed in excess of 300 justifications by the cut off time of
1, 000 seconds. In fact, we have one case in excess of 1, 000 justifications. In
addition, the HST sizes grow to the millions of nodes by the cut off time.
Interestingly, the average sizes of individual justifications stay very similar
to the non timed out cases (around a maximum of 20).
In terms of relating the performance of Lexicographically Relevant Clo-
sure with that of its equivalent construction the Lexicographic Closure, Fig-
ures 6.27 and 6.24 reveal that they have very similar performance overall in
the data.
In the artificial data, we witnessed that Lexicographic Closure was better
in performance for 10% to 40% defeasibility. For the remainder of cases,
the Relevant Closures (including Lexicographically Relevant Closure) were
considerably better in performance.
Our explanation as to why the Lexicographically Relevant and Lexico-
graphic Closures have more similar performances in this dataset, is that the
justificatory complexity of the ontologies in this dataset is higher than that
of the artificial data (we compute more justifications with larger HST sizes).
Nevertheless, the problematic rank sizes encountered here are still similar to
those in the artificial dataset. Therefore, the performance of Lexicographi-
cally Relevant Closure does not surpass that of Lexicographic Closure.
6.2.6 Discussion
We summarise the main observations and insights of our evaluation in the
following subsections:
Rational and Lexicographic Closure
Rational Closure is the best performing of our presented defeasible reason-
ing algorithms and is suitable, even in its current implementation, for use in
modern ontology editing tools. The data suggests that Rational Closure en-
tailment testing takes roughly 3 times as long as classical entailment testing.
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Specifically, the figures show that the mean times to test a defeasible entail-
ment, using Rational Closure, are roughly between 25ms and 1880ms across
both datasets. Therefore performance is well suited to reasoning in typical
ontology development environments even without sophisticated optimisation.
As one would expect with the much larger ontology sizes in the real
world dataset, the mean performance of Rational Closure increases from
roughly 25ms in the artificial dataset to roughly 81ms in the real world data.
Again, even though there is a considerable increase in query times in terms of
magnitude, even the slowest times in the real world data are still fast enough
to be considered suitable for modern ontology editing systems.
The major factor for Rational Closure performance has been shown to
be ontology size (as inherited from classical entailment). The only other
factor which could significantly affect Rational Closure is the length of the
exception to exception chain. This has been shown to be fairly short, relative
to the number of exceptions in the ontologies, in the artificial data (around
a maximum of 16) and much shorter in the real world data (maximum of 3).
Although we do not know how long this chain would be in practice when
real world defeasible ontologies become widely engineered, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the lengths would be wildly different to the ranges we
encountered in our datasets.
For the Lexicographic Closure we found that the data showed very large
variance in query times between the median and worst cases (3 to 4 orders of
magnitude). Therefore, it is harder to evaluate at this juncture how feasible
its performance would be for modern ontology editing systems.
The major performance factor was shown to be the size of the problematic
rank and we could extrapolate that, to keep its performance very practical
(say below 10 seconds per query), the problematic rank size should be kept
lower than roughly 100 axioms. A very effective way to curb the problematic
rank size is to not introduce too many defeasible subsumptions into the
ontology. In other words, to keep the defeasibility of the ontology very low.
This remains a major open question: what would the percentage defeasibility
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values be for real world defeasible ontologies to be engineered in the future?
If these values would be very low (say lower than 10%), and the overall
sizes of the defeasible ontologies are similar to existing classical ontologies,
then we project that Lexicographic Closure performance would be feasible
for the vast majority of data.
Even though we found Lexicographic Closure to be the worst performing
of our presented algorithms (as we anticipated), we saw that its overall per-
formance was hampered by isolated cases which were extremely hard (large
ontologies with high problematic rank sizes).
If we have to compare its performance with that of Rational Closure (the
highest average query times obtained with Rational Closure were around 1.9
seconds), we actually find that the 55th percentile value for Lexicographic
Closure is 1878ms (very close to 1.9 seconds). In other words, 55% of the
queries posed to Lexicographic Closure could be processed in times very
similar to Rational Closure overall.
Its performance was also quite consistent across both datasets: we found
that the mean times obtained in the real world data were roughly 5% faster
than in the artificial data.
The Relevant Closures
The performance of the Relevant Closures is almost exclusively determined
by the performance of justification computation. Since the performance of
justification computation is highly sensitive to justificatory structure, and the
latter is relatively unpredictable in real world ontologies, the performance of
the Relevant Closures should be similarly unpredictable.
The data also gives some insights as to what kinds of justificatory struc-
ture are complex for reasoning. We found that the performance of the Rel-
evant Closures is acceptable (below 10 seconds per query) if the maximum
number of justifications that we need to compute does not increase signifi-
cantly above 20 and the accompanying HST sizes do not grow considerably
above the 1000 mark.
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In fact, we found that the reasoning times reduce by around 80% when we
concentrate only on queries which have these justificatory structures. A
positive observation is that the majority of queries fell into this particular
justificatory structure bracket. In other words, the harder cases where we
had to compute more than 20 justifications with HST sizes much higher than
1000 occurred much less frequently in the data.
Interestingly, the mean times for the Relevant Closures were roughly 24%
faster in the real world data than in the artificial data.
Our results suggest that, overall, the Lexicographically Relevant Closure
is not a very effective optimisation for Lexicographic Closure. However, the
data shows that when the justificatory structure of the ontology is simple
(entailments have less than 20 justifications with HST sizes not much higher
than 1000) then the Lexicographically Relevant Closure mean times are re-
duced by 82% in the real world data and by 81% in the artificial data.
In the end it is difficult to evaluate the suitability of the Relevant Closures,
in terms of performance, for current ontology editing systems. The main
reason is the unpredictability of justificatory structure which is the major
influence in performance here.
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we find that Rational Closure is the hero in terms of perfor-
mance and the villains are the Lexicographic Closure and Relevant Closures.
The main question that needs to be addressed, before the latter algorithms
can be exonerated from (or bound to) their unfortunate title, is percentage
defeasibility. If we know how much defeasibility is going to be used in real
world ontologies, we would be in a better position to predict the performance
of these algorithms.
While Rational Closure is perfectly suitable even its current implemen-
tation for use in current ontology editing tools, one would like to ascertain
if its inferential caution is a drawback in practice. In other words there is
scope for another investigative thread in this area to study the trade off be-
CHAPTER 6. PERFORMANCE OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING 319
tween the inferential power of a defeasible entailment regime and its practical
performance.
Finally, regardless of percentage defeasibility and other factors influencing
reasoning performance, there is still a lot of scope for optimisation for all the
algorithms that we have presented in this thesis. We hope that this evaluation




In the previous chapter we showed that we do not pay an inordinate price for
the extra expressivity of defeasible subsumption and basic defeasible reason-
ing tasks (based on the preferential reasoning foundation). Even though our
algorithms still leave considerable room for optimisation, the performance of
Rational Closure in particular is perfectly acceptable to be used in current
ontology engineering environments, even in its existing state.
The performances of the Lexicographic and Relevant Closures are not as
promising as Rational Closure but they still appear sufficient to be used, at
least in an experimental manner, on small to medium-sized ontologies.
These algorithms can only benefit (in terms of optimisation) from im-
plementation and integration into widely used ontology editing tools, and
with a view towards faster implementations we have developed a plugin,
Defeasible-Inference Platform (DIP), for the ontology editor Protégé includ-
ing the aforementioned preferential reasoning algorithms.
In this chapter, we give an overview of DIP including its functionality,
architecture and user interface (UI) design. We first give a brief overview
of Protégé and the OWL API (the API Protégé uses to manipulate OWL
ontologies), after which we introduce DIP and its integration into Protégé.
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Finally, we give helpful instructions on how to access and use DIP in Protégé.
7.1 Protégé
Protégé is a free and open source ontology editor and knowledge base frame-
work, originally developed by the Stanford Center for Biomedical Informatics
Research at the Stanford University School of Medicine.
There are now four major versions, Protégé 3.x, Protégé 4.x, Protégé
Desktop1 (or Protégé 5) and WebProtégé2. Protégé 3.x is a legacy version of
Protégé providing support for working with older frame-based [114] ontolo-
gies along with ontologies expressed using the now dated OWL 1 standard.
Protégé 4 was developed as part of the “CO-ODE” project by the Uni-
versity of Manchester in collaboration with Stanford Medical Informatics
between 2007 and 2009. The Protégé 4.x versions do not allow frame-based
ontology editing and were tailored for the shift to the next version of OWL,
OWL 2 (which became a W3C recommendation in December, 2012).
Finally, incremental improvements to Protégé 4 between 2009 and 2013
eventually led to a new major release in 2014 - Protégé Desktop. When we
use the term Protégé, in the remainder of this chapter, we are referring to
the latest versions namely Protégé 4 and Protégé 5.
7.1.1 User Interface
Protégé makes use of a “tabbed” graphical user interface (see Figure 7.1).
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• Individuals
• Entities
Figure 7.1: Protégé 4 ontology editor.
The Classes tab offers a class or concept driven view of the ontology. Here,
the focus is on viewing the class hierarchy of the ontology, that is, the sub-
sumption relationship between class names added to the ontology by the
ontology engineer.
One can see an example of this hierarchy on the left hand side of Fig-
ure 7.1. The class names are arranged in a “‘tabbed” format to indicate
their subsumption relationship with other class names. That is, class names
that are aligned vertically are sibling classes. Those that are indented with
respect to others are subclasses of these others.
The “asserted” class hierarchy tab displays the taxonomy of the class
names in the ontology as specified by the ontology engineer, as opposed to
the “inferred” class hierarchy which is the (possibly) revised hierarchy after
inferences made by a reasoner are incorporated into the asserted hierarchy.
Class names in Protégé are indicated by a preceding tan-coloured circular
icon in the interface. The Object Properties tab displays the role names
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(object property is OWL lingo for role name) in the ontology and the relevant
information pertaining to them. Object properties are differentiated from
other entities in the ontology by a preceding blue-coloured rectangular icon.
The Individuals tab displays the ABox information about the instances or
individuals in the ontology. Individuals are indicated by a preceding purple-
coloured, diamond-shaped icon.
The Entities tab combines the previously discussed tabs so that all the
perspectives can be viewed and browsed simultaneously.
Protégé has support for a variety of ontology reasoners which can be
installed as plugins in the Protégé system and be accessed via the “Reasoner”
menu in the main toolbar.
To indicate inferences drawn from the ontology by installed reasoners,
Protégé makes effective use of color in the interface. For example, after the
reasoner classifies the ontology, the inferred subclasses, superclasses, equiva-
lent classes, ABox assertions are displayed against a pale yellow background
in each of the relevant tabs. Also, concept names which are found to be
unsatisfiable in the ontology are displayed using red text.
Since Protégé allows working with multiple ontologies simultaneously,
there is an “Active Ontology” tab displaying details and metadata about
the ontology currently being worked on. There are numerous manuals and
helpful resources on the Web for getting started with using Protégé3.
7.1.2 The OWL API
Since Protégé is built primarily for OWL ontologies, an API is needed for
loading, parsing and manipulating ontologies expressed in OWL.
The OWL API [95] is a Java-based API developed for creating, editing
and managing OWL ontologies. Version 4 (the latest as of writing) follows,
very closely, the OWL 2 structural specification recommended by the W3C.
Protégé itself has a very modular structure. In fact, it can be seen as set
of plugins that interact together to provide the functionality of the complete
3protege.stanford.edu/support.php#documentationSupport
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system. It includes, as one of its modules, the OWL API as its API of choice
for loading and manipulating OWL ontologies (though there are alternatives
available such as Jena4 and Sofa5).
The reader is reminded that DLs form the logical underpinning of OWL
languages and thus we can make some correlations between the constructs
in these languages. Figure 7.1 illustrates a few of these correlations.







Table 7.1: Correlation between OWL and DL syntax.
In the OWL API, ontologies are viewed as sets of axioms and annotations
(meta-information about entities in the ontology). The API serves as a set
of interfaces for manipulating and reasoning with OWL ontologies.
The OWLOntologyManager interface in particular, provide the means for
loading, editing and saving ontologies. The OWLOntologyManager also pro-
vides access to the OWLReasoner interface which, in turn, provides access to
inference services of a particular reasoning implementation (e.g. FaCT++).
To construct the building blocks (individuals, concept names and role
names) of an ontology, one can use the OWLDataFactory class, which can
also be accessed through the OWLOntologyManager interface.
Finally, the OWLOntology interface provides access to all the axioms and
entities in an ontology. It also allows for selective access to axioms by various
criteria such as axiom type (equivalence axioms, subclass axioms, disjointness
axioms etc.) or axiom signature.
4jena.sourceforge.net
5sofa.projects.semwebcentral.org
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7.2 Defeasible-Inference Platform (DIP)
DIP6 is a plugin for Protégé providing the capability of representing defeasible
subsumption statements in OWL ontologies, as well as reasoning with the
resulting defeasible ontologies using the algorithms presented in this thesis.
We discuss the aspects of DIP allowing us to represent defeasible sub-
sumption in OWL first, and thereafter we expand on the core functionality
- the defeasible reasoning engine.
7.2.1 Expressing Defeasible Subsumption
Of course, as we have stated numerous times in Chapter 6, OWL does not yet
natively support defeasible subsumption. To get around this issue, we employ
the use of OWL annotations which are metadata, non-logical constructs in
OWL, to indicate whether a selected classical subsumption in Protégé should
be treated as defeasible by DIP.
For example, in order to represent the defeasible subsumption Student
@∼ ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice), a modeller would add the classical subsumption
Student v ¬(∃receives.TaxInvoice) to the ontology in Protégé, and then “tog-
gle” this subsumption to be defeasible by pressing the button labelled “d”
on the widget housing this subsumption in Protégé (see Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2: The class description pane for the class name Student in Protégé. The button
labelled “d” in the figure is the extra feature added by DIP which allows one to toggle the
attached axiom as defeasible.
The mechanism by which this is achieved, is that an annotation is added
to (or removed from) the axiom which indicates that it is meant to be in-
6github.com/kodymoodley/defeasibleinferenceplatform
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terpreted as defeasible. If this annotation is present then DIP considers the
subsumption in its defeasible reading, if the annotation is not present then
the axiom is considered classical by DIP. The following snippet of text shows














In Figure 7.3 we see the graphical rendering of the above annotation in
Protégé. We point out that DIP extends Protégé’s axiom rendering capability
to display the “UsuallySubClassOf” keyword (as shown in the figure) but
this is purely a rendering tweak and, from the perspective of OWL and any
classical reasoning implementation, the axiom is still considered classical.
Figure 7.3: Graphical rendering of a defeasible annotation property in DIP.
Now that we have demonstrated how to represent defeasible subsumption in
Protégé using DIP features, we can move on to discussing the core reasoning
capabilities and features of DIP.
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7.2.2 Reasoning Facilities
The most popular inferential insight into classical ontologies is usually their
concept hierarchy (see Section 2.1). The reasoning service which computes
this artefact is called classification because it reveals the implicit subset and
superset relationships between all concept names in the ontology.
Classification typically requires many classical entailment checks. In fact,
the focus in optimisations for classification is how to reduce this number of
entailment checks from the worst case. Recalling that we need multiple
classical entailment checks to perform a single defeasible entailment check, it
becomes clear that classification for ontologies with defeasible subsumption
can become impractical with our relatively unoptimised defeasible reasoning
algorithms.
Furthermore, we cannot inherit many optimisations for classification from
the classical case because we do not have some desirable properties of classical
subsumption, like transitivity for example: if C @∼D and D @∼ E are in the
Rational Closure of a KB, it does not necessarily mean that C @∼ E is also in
the Rational Closure of the KB.
We promote a different reasoning task as the core reasoning service of
DIP - the querying for the defeasible subclass and (or) superclasses of a
given class expression. That is, given a user specified class expression C
constructed from the vocabulary of the ontology, DIP is used to compute all
(class) names A in the ontology s.t. either C @∼ A or A @∼ C follows from the
ontology (using a selected preferential reasoning algorithm).
This “interaction model” with the reasoner is actually used, in the classi-
cal case, by the popular Protégé plugin called the DL Query Tab7. The DL
Query Tab, which was developed by Matthew Horridge at the University of
Manchester, comes pre-installed in most current versions of Protégé.
Horridge’s tool is able to compute the set of all named classes in the
given ontology that are either subclasses, superclasses or equivalent classes
with the user specified class expression. It is also able to give the ABox
7protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/DLQueryTab
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instances of the given expression. For DIP we have chosen to focus purely
on defeasible subclasses and superclasses (the natural analogues to classical
subclasses and superclasses).
The reason for not considering ABoxes (as we mentioned earlier in this
thesis) is that ABox algorithms, in the preferential case, are not yet mature.
We hold that this task for preferential reasoning algorithms is still helpful
to gain insight into ontologies containing defeasible subsumption. For exam-
ple, it is quite natural, given an ontology describing species of birds, to ask
the reasoner which ones usually don’t fly.
This can be accomplished using DIP’s interaction model by supplying the
class expression ¬(∃ability.FlyingAbility) and then asking for all mentioned
class names A s.t. A @∼ ¬(∃ability.FlyingAbility) follows from the ontology.
DIP would then, for example, return class names such as Emu, Ostrich
and Penguin if such terms are appropriately described in the ontology. This
task returns the defeasible subclasses of the given expression.
In contrast, one might also want to ask for the defeasible superclasses of
a given expression. For example, one might ask for the typical attributes of
students (Student) in an ontology describing university students. DIP should
then return attributes such as NonTaxPayer, Poor and UnMarried (students
are usually non-tax payers, poor and unmarried).
We re-emphasise that DIP will return only (class) names as results. This
is mainly to ensure better performance because there are far fewer named
classes in an ontology, than there are complex class expressions that can be
constructed with the vocabulary.
Therefore, in ontologies which are appropriately designed for this purpose,
a reasoning task that is increasing in popularity is the querying for required
fillers (non-complex ones) of existentially quantified roles. Matthew Horridge
augmented the DL Query Tab with this functionality to address the demand
for such a reasoning service in Protégé8.
Recently, this service was exploited to aid in the taxonomic revision of
8github.com/protegeproject/existentialquery
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afrotropical bee species [143]. Here we devise an example setting of our own
to illustrate the usefulness of this reasoning task:
Example 31 Consider the following defeasible KB:
T =

Dish ≡ ∃hasIngredient.> u ∃hasTasteQuality.>,
SushiDish v Dish u ∃hasFilling.>,
VegMakimono t SweetSushi v SushiDish,

















Regarding the knowledge represented in Example 31 on Page 329, one can
pose the natural language question “what are the typical properties of sushi?”.
In DL terms this question can be answered by querying the KB for the de-
feasible superclasses of SushiDish.
Rational Closure will endorse that, structurally, sushi is usually composed
of an external wrapping and is usually also accompanied with condiments
(∃hasWrapping.> u ∃hasCondiment.>). It will also endorse that sushi usually
has a salty taste even though there is an exception to this - sweet sushi.
It will also endorse that sushi usually has the ingredients fish, ginger and
soy sauce even though there are two exceptional cases in the ontology - sweet
sushi and vegetarian makimono, which don’t contain fish.
However, since DIP (like the DL Query Tab) will only return named
classes as results, we will not return any results for the expression SushiDish
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because there are no named classes in the ontology that are defeasible super-
classes of SushiDish.
Rather, the user is encouraged to ask more specific questions such as:
“what are the typical ingredients of sushi?” or “what is the typical taste
of sushi?”. In essence the user is asked to supply a role name (for example
hasIngredient or hasTasteQuality) in addition to the query class expression.
In our example, we can identify the typical ingredients and taste of sushi
by asking DIP if the axioms SushiDish @∼ ∃hasIngredient.X and SushiDish
@∼ ∃hasTasteQuality.Y follow from our ontology (according to the selected
closure), for all named classes X and Y in the ontology.
The set of all X’s and Y’s returned by DIP will constitute the typical
ingredients and taste of sushi according the preferential closure algorithm
currently selected in DIP.
7.2.3 Interface
We have chosen to design the interface for DIP to closely resemble the DL
Query Tab by Matthew Horridge, i.e., by bundling most of its reasoning
functionality in a separate tab in the Protégé UI.
Classical DL reasoners are integrated into Protégé in a far less conspicuous
manner. Because most of these reasoners implement the standard OWLRea-
soner interface from the OWL API, Protégé communicates their reasoning
results to the user (in terms of the UI display) in the same way.
Since DIP is supposed to reason with the extra construct of defeasible
subsumption, it is not possible to implement the OWLReasoner interface
alone. One would have to also extend the OWL API to be able to distinguish
between classical and defeasible subsumption statements.
We decided that this is not a feasible undertaking at present, but it is a
worthwhile project for the future if defeasible reasoning becomes widely used
in practical settings. Therefore, we adopt the approach of the DL Query
Tab since the defeasible analogues of its reasoning tasks are potentially very
useful to gain insight into defeasible ontologies.
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In Figure 7.4 we give a screenshot of the DIP Tab in Protégé.
Figure 7.4: The control panel interface of the DIP tab in Protégé.
At the top of Figure 7.4 we see the text box labelled “Query (class expres-
sion)”. Here the user is required to specify a class expression constructed
from the vocabulary of the loaded ontology.
Below this text box there is a button labelled “Execute” for executing the
reasoning task and displaying the results in the two panels below this button.
On the right hand side of the execute button, there are two drop-down lists.
The first is the reasoning algorithm menu from which the user would select
the desired closure algorithm to use, i.e., either Rational, Lexicographic, or
one of the Relevant Closures.
The second drop-down list contains the role names (object properties
in OWL-speak) mentioned in the ontology. If desired, we can select a role
name from this list to focus our reasoning task specifically on the fillers of
this role which satisfy our provided class expression query (see Example 31
on Page 329).
The two results panels display the list of exceptions in the ontology and
the results of our query, respectively. The list of exceptions corresponds
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to the LHS concepts of the axioms in the exceptionality ranking that we
discussed in Chapter 4.
The panel labelled “Defeasible Properties” partitions the results of our
query into two sections: the strict subclasses (or superclasses) and the defea-
sible subclasses (or superclasses), of the provided class expression.
According to all the preferential reasoning algorithms presented in this
thesis, the strict results are those that follow (using classical reasoning) from
the TBox itself (excluding the DTBox).
On the far right hand side of Figure 7.4, we have two checkboxes for the
user to indicate whether he or she would like to see either the subclasses or
superclasses of the given query (or both).
For convenience, we have also provided two panels on the DIP tab to
display the list of defeasible and strict axioms in the ontology (see Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.5: Panels provided in the DIP tab to display the list of defeasible and strict
axioms present in the ontology.
The defeasible axioms are each rendered against a pink background, while
the strict axioms are each rendered against a light green background.
7.2.4 Architecture
One of the most attractive features of DIP is that its algorithms reduce
to classical reasoning procedures. Therefore, as long as there is a sound and
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complete classical DL reasoner selected in Protégé, DIP will use this reasoner
to perform the defeasible inferences it requires.
Here we give an informative diagram (Figure 7.6) which highlights DIP’s
interaction with a given classical reasoning implementation, as well as em-

















Figure 7.6: A high-level architectural view of DIP’s components and their interaction.
As we have pointed out in Chapter 4, concept exceptionality is a central
principle in preferential reasoning. Through concept exceptionality one can
discern an a priori exceptionality ranking (also discussed Chapter 4) of the
LHS concepts in the ontology. DIP thus has a “Ranking Generator” compo-
nent which computes this ranking for every stable version of the ontology.
Whenever the ontology is modified (i.e., logical axioms are added, edited
or removed), DIP recomputes this exceptionality ranking to reflect the changes.
The loaded ontology first has to go through a simple “Parser” component to
identify and separate the defeasible subsumption statements from the clas-
sical statements. Once the ranking is computed, it is stored to the ontology
file. Again, this can be accomplished by using the ever versatile OWL an-
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notation. Concretely speaking, DIP annotates each axiom in the ontology
with the number representing its rank in the computed ranking (if the axiom
actually appears in the ranking).
This feature is useful because when the ontology is reloaded from file at
a later stage, if the ontology has not been modified, then we do not have
to recompute the ranking. We need only load the ranking by analysing
the annotations of the defeasible axioms in the ontology. This behaviour of
serialising the ranking is represented by the arrow between the “Ranking”
and “OWL Ontology” components.
Here we also make clear that the ranking of the ontology is independent of
a query or reasoning task that needs to be executed. Therefore, the computa-
tion of the ranking is viewed as an “off-line” task. This is the reason why we
do not have an arrow connecting “Ranking Generator” to “C-Compatibility
Generator” in Figure 7.6.
When reasoning needs to take place, we require the ranking itself and a
query (for example a class expression) as input for the “C-Compatibility Gen-
erator” component. The implementation of this component is actually the
major differentiating factor between the preferential reasoning algorithms.
Here the algorithms try to identify the maximal subset of the ranking which
preserves that the query is not exceptional (or can be considered normal).
As we know from Chapter 4, the algorithms base their notions of “maximal”
on different principles.
For example, Rational Closure regards each rank in the ranking as the
most elementary “blocks” of knowledge to play around with when it decides
on the maximal knowledge to retain. Lexicographic Closure breaks these
blocks into smaller chunks and decides on which permutations of them to
retain. The Basic Relevant Closure only retains axioms that are known
not to contribute to the exceptionality of the query (by using justifica-
tions). The Minimal Basic Relevant Closure allows the retaining of axioms
that contribute to the exceptionality of the query, except those that are of
lowest rank in the ranking (i.e., the least exceptional ones). Finally, the
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Lexicographically-Relevant Closure combines the latter approach with Lexi-
cographic Closure for possible optimisation gains.
Once the C-Compatible subset of the ranking is identified, this artefact is
sent to a “Query Answerer” module which liaises with a classical reasoning
implementation (the currently selected one in the context of Protégé) to
answer the user-posed query. The “Query Answerer” component deals with
actually formulating the appropriate question (reasoning task) to ask the
classical reasoner based on the defeasible query posed by the user.
In the case of DIP we advocate the computation of the defeasible sub-
classes or superclasses of a given class and the latter task can, for example,
be formulated as a classification problem in terms of classical reasoning. In
other words, if we would like to identify the defeasible superclasses of a given
class C, then in essence we are asking for all names X in the ontology such
that C @∼X follows from the ontology, according to the selected closure.
We saw in Chapter 4 that, once the C-Compatible subset of the ranking is
obtained, then C @∼X follows from the original ontology if and only if C v X
follows classically from the classical translation of the C-Compatible sub-
set. Therefore, after classifying the classical translation of the C-Compatible
subset we can “read off” the superclasses of C as our results.
The defeasible subclasses are a bit more performance intensive to obtain
because, in the worst case, we have to obtain X-Compatibility for each name
X in the ontology (to determine if X @∼ C follows from the ontology).
The “Query Answerer” component is abstractly developed to cater for
the possible future development of defeasible queries that are different to
the subclass/superclass ones that we discuss above. In other words, the
reasoning task that we describe above is just one possible task that is useful
in the defeasible context. In future we may identify novel and interesting
reasoning tasks that give other useful insights into defeasible ontologies.
CHAPTER 7. DIP: DEFEASIBLE-INFERENCE PLATFORM 336
7.3 Discussion
We have presented DIP as a prototype tool for reasoning over the termi-
nological part of defeasible ontologies. We believe that it provides a core
reasoning service which is beneficial to use, at least experimentally, for ex-
amining and comparing the inferential character of preferential reasoning
algorithms. While DIP provides the core reasoning task of computing defea-
sible subclasses and superclasses of a given expression, there may prove to
be other compelling reasoning tasks giving insight into defeasible ontologies.
There are also a host of other features which one can imagine would be
complementary to DIP. For example, since defeasible subsumption is not
transitive in general (contraposition also does not hold in general), the prob-
lem of developing optimised classification algorithms in this context is a non-
trivial problem. Further to this, for the same reasons just mentioned, it is
not clear how to best visualise and display the defeasible class hierarchy to
an end user. Of course, a directed graph of some kind might suffice but the
necessary formalisation thereof still needs to be agreed upon.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
We conclude this thesis with a summary of the main contributions, a discus-
sion about some outstanding issues that could not be addressed as well as a
presentation of suggestions for interesting future work.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
We set out with a pragmatic mindset to make the first steps in taking the
state-of-the-art of defeasible reasoning theory (for DLs) into the practical
sphere. We chose to focus on the preferential reasoning approach in this
regard for a variety of reasons.
It has an elegance that speaks well to intuition without losing its strong
logical character. It also defines quite an abstract framework for defeasible
reasoning which gives it a certain robustness.
This generality in the formalism (and its outlook of studying the structure
of rational consequence relations) makes it useful as a lens through which one
can study other defeasible reasoning formalisms.
What we have essentially done in this thesis is motivate that the prefer-
ential reasoning approach is, in its current state, “ready” to be transferred
to the practical setting.
We do not claim that all theoretical aspects have been resolved yet. In
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fact we will show some of the main gaps still needing to be filled in this
regard in Sections 8.2 and 8.3.
Our main thrust in this thesis is to show that preferential reasoning (for
terminological knowledge) is practically viable in DLs from both a qualita-
tive and quantitative perspective (despite the already known, and slightly
disappointing, complexity results for some algorithms).
The main reason for promoting the application of preferential reasoning
in practical settings is to stimulate feedback from users of DL-based systems
on what areas need to be improved and investigated further, both from a
theoretical and practical perspective.
Ultimately, this relationship between the users of defeasible reasoning
formalisms, and the engineers of such formalisms, is going to be more intimate
than with classical reasoning formalisms. This is because there is generally a
much clearer consensus on what constitutes entailment in classical formalisms
with a precise model-theoretic semantics.
Defeasible reasoning systems, on the other hand, are more contentious
when it comes to entailment. Indeed, it seems likely that there is no single
“best” defeasible entailment regime. In practice, different regimes may be
suitable in different contexts.
With this spirit of breaching the divide between theory and practice
for defeasible reasoning in DLs, we actually contribute concretely with the
first known implementation of a system for preferential reasoning in DLs -
Defeasible-Inference Platform (DIP).
It is clear from the composition and content of the thesis that we have
taken a broad approach by addressing a variety of areas towards our ultimate
aim (although not being comprehensive in terms of depth in any one area).
We list more specifically the individual contributions we have made below,
together with their significances in the broader context of the thesis goals:
1. Starting out in Chapter 3 we have strengthened anecdotal arguments
expressing that there is a need for defeasible features in DL-based lan-
guages used in practical settings. There we performed a preliminary
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 339
lexical analysis of ontology documents to reveal quantitative evidence
supporting that, in general, there is a significant plea for defeasible
representation in real world ontologies.
2. KLM argued convincingly, that even after introducing their notion of
defeasible implication to propositional logic, that this relation should
still retain some inferential properties of classical implication (when
interpreted on the entailment level). However, their arguments have
not been generalised to the DL case. In Chapter 3 we motivated the
rationality of these postulates in the DL setting by taking into account
the added structure of DLs (we had to take into account the concept
semantics of DLs to supplement the arguments by KLM).
3. The central principle behind reasoning about exceptions in the prefer-
ential framework is the definition of concept exceptionality. The critical
theoretical contribution which paved the way for practical implemen-
tation of preferential reasoning for DLs, is the reduction of concept ex-
ceptionality to classical DL entailment. To this end we have provided
an alternative semantical characterisation for this reduction, using the
notion of disjoint union of ranked models. This is done at the start
of Chapter 4 and, even though the reduction is already expressed in
the literature, our proofs showing this reduction are unique and more
self-contained than others in the literature. A very strong advantage
of our preferential algorithms, over other nonmonotonic formalisms, is
that they all reduce fully to classical DL entailment allowing one to use
off-the-shelf DL reasoners to perform defeasible inference.
4. In Chapter 4 we also provide a semantical characterisation for Lexico-
graphic Closure for DLs, and a novel algorithm for computing it in this
setting. We also go on to define an alternative way to compute Lexi-
cographic Closure using the construction of Lexicographically-Relevant
Closure which may be an optimisation for Lexicographic Closure in
some practical settings.
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5. Although it does not exactly fit the “practical reasoning” theme of this
thesis, we have also contributed a defeasible notion of disjointness (as
well as equivalence) of class expressions (see the end of Chapter 4). We
have also motivated their intuition with examples and demonstrated
that they can be represented using defeasible subsumption.
6. We also gave a few preliminary optimisations for computing preferential
reasoning in DLs. In our experiments, the most impactful has been
the demonstration of the relationship between concept incoherence and
concept exceptionality (see Lemma 26 on Page 294). In other words
we were able to show that, considering the classical counterpart of the
ontology, only incoherent concepts have the potential to be exceptional
(w.r.t. to the defeasible counterpart of the ontology). If a concept is
not incoherent it can never be exceptional.
7. Chapter 5 gives the first evaluation of the major defeasible reasoning
formalisms for DLs against the KLM postulates. This contribution
makes the relationships between the inferential behaviours of the for-
malisms clearer. In particular, it highlights the attractiveness of the
Lexicographic Closure as a defeasible reasoning algorithm striking a
good balance between rational inferential behaviour as well as inferen-
tial strength.
8. In Chapter 6 we give a thorough performance evaluation of the rea-
soning algorithms presented in this thesis. The evaluation is only pre-
liminary in the sense that our data is not wholly naturally occurring,
and thus, one cannot be definitive in extrapolations from the data (al-
though we can make reasonably strong generalisations from it). We
found that the performance of Rational Closure is already well suited
to practical use in real world ontology development settings. We found
large discrepancies in performance between the average and worst cases
for the Lexicographic and Relevant Closures. This was the main neg-
ative that we found in the evaluation. However, the mean times and
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75th-percentile times for entailment checking using these closures were
well below the one second mark. We believe this is very encourag-
ing because (a) the algorithms use only two optimisations and (b) the
majority of data (both synthetic and modified real world) are not con-
siderably hard.
9. We have also identified the major bottlenecks and barriers to prefer-
ential reasoning performance in DLs. We found that all algorithms
inherited the main (and obvious) performance influencer from classical
reasoning - ontology size. In particular, we have uncovered a critical
question which would reveal the fate of preferential reasoning perfor-
mance if it were to be accepted in practical settings. This is the question
of percentage defeasibility of ontologies. What fraction of the axioms in
a real world ontology would contain defeasible statements? Answering
this question would go far to reveal how much more work one needs to
do (over and above classical reasoning) in order to perform defeasible
inference. Rational Closure does not have a major performance bottle
neck. We showed that its main performance influencer is the number
of defeasible axioms (which is proportional to the number of potential
exceptions in the ontology). The bottleneck for Lexicographic Closure
is the computation of the LAC whose performance is highly dependent
on problematic rank size. We found that, as this number increases close
to, and beyond, the number 100, the performance drastically degrades
to unacceptable levels. For the Relevant Closures we found that justi-
fication computation is by far the major performance influencer. For
justification computation itself we found the major bottleneck to be
the construction of the hitting set tree (the number of nodes in the tree
is mainly determined by the degree of overlap in the justifications).
10. While sourcing data for our performance evaluation in Chapter 6, we
provided a novel method for introducing defeasible features into OWL
ontologies [49] thereby enriching the quality of the data (and hence
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extrapolations from the data).
11. Our practical focus in this thesis culminated in the development of a
plugin tool for the ontology editor Protégé for representing and reason-
ing with defeasible subsumption in modern OWL ontologies. The tool
currently provides functionality for computing the defeasible subclasses
and superclasses of a user-specified class expression.
8.2 Outstanding Issues
While we have contributed significantly to making preferential reasoning
more practical for DLs, there are some areas that we could not address for
pragmatic reasons. We list the most relevant issues not addressed here:
1. The most glaring omission of this thesis is the topic of preferential rea-
soning for the ABox. Although there are a number of proposals for the
semantics of ABox preferential reasoning [50][71, Section 3.3], there are
a number of issues which still need to be solidified both from a theo-
retical and practical perspective. In particular, the current algorithms
require one to consider all possible orderings (sequences) of individu-
als explicitly mentioned in the ABox in order to construct preferential
extensions of the ABox. The procedure has an exptime-complete
worst case complexity but it is clear that when a large number of indi-
viduals are mentioned in the ABox, the performance of the algorithm
would drastically degrade.
2. While the theoretical foundation of our work assumes that we are work-
ing with the ALC concept language, our results are, in principle, ap-
plicable to a wide class of DLs ranging from ALC all the way up to
SHIQ [74]. We have, however, not discussed in detail how our results
are able to generalise to more expressive DLs than ALC. Although
there have been independent efforts to explore preferential reasoning in
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low complexity DLs [73, 70, 53], we ourselves have not yet investigated
this problem in detail.
3. The fact that we have not considered ABox reasoning in detail meant
that we could not comprehensively compare alternative forms of defeasi-
ble reasoning for DLs. As we saw in Chapter 5, some major formalisms
started off considering the problem of deriving defeasible ABox-like in-
ferences from some defeasible background knowledge. In other words,
considering some object of the domain, and some incomplete knowledge
about this object, one can use some defeasible background knowledge
about the domain to assign some additional plausible attributes to this
object. For example, if I know of a student named John and I know
that students usually don’t pay taxes (and if I know nothing else), then
one can plausibly derive that John does not pay taxes. In contrast,
preferential reasoning took a different initial outlook: given some de-
feasible background knowledge about some domain of a terminological
nature, what other defeasible knowledge (also of a terminological na-
ture) can I derive from this knowledge? For example, if I know that
students usually don’t pay taxes, and I know that employed students
are types of student, what should I conclude about the tax paying
status of employed students in general?
4. Daniel Lehmann presented some informal properties of defeasible infer-
ence that he felt should be satisfied in general [116]. We ourselves have
also motivated the sensibility of these properties in our particular gen-
eralisation of them to the DL case (see Chapter 3). However, Lehmann
mentioned that these properties appear to have no purely formal rep-
resentation. Because of the inability to formalise these properties, we
have not been able to evaluate the formalisms mentioned in this thesis
against them. However, if it is indeed the case that these properties
have no formal representation, then we question the usefulness of stat-
ing and discussing them in the context of automated reasoning. In
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other words, if we cannot make design decisions in the development of
a defeasible formalism which can guarantee that these properties are
satisfied, then what use are they? The only obvious use appears to
be that, provided we agree that they are intuitive properties, we can
show by counter-examples when a particular formalism does not sat-
isfy them. However, we are more interested in formally demonstrating
when a particular formalism would satisfy these conditions as well as
designing formalisms from the ground up to respect them. Therefore,
we believe there must exist either a formal, or at least semi-formal, way
to represent these properties, and this still remains to be investigated.
5. On the subject of performance, we have left clues in Chapter 6 as to
where possible optimisations for preferential reasoning might lie. We
ourselves have used just two optimisations in this thesis: (a) ignorance
of knowledge that is irrelevant to the query being posed (using mod-
ularisation), and (b) when identifying exceptions, ignoring knowledge
that does not have the potential to contain exceptions (Lemma 26 on
Page 294). However, despite these, our algorithms remain very mod-
estly optimised compared with classical reasoning implementations.
With regards to the compilation of the exceptionality ranking of an
ontology, there is also tremendous scope for techniques to avoid näıve
recomputation of the ranking every time the ontology is modified.
6. With regards to evaluating the performance of preferential reasoning,
in Chapter 6 we devised a method for introducing defeasibility into real
world ontologies. The method worked by identifying the potentially ex-
ceptional axioms in the ontology by identifying its classically incoherent
concepts. We tried to “cater” for all these exceptions by converting all
axioms related to the signature of the incoherent concepts, to defeasible
axioms. This was not the most laconic way to introduce defeasibility
because we may unnecessarily require that an axiom be defeasible. An
interesting problem remains to be solved of whether we can introduce
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 345
a “minimal” number of defeasible axioms to the ontology in order to
cater for all potential exceptions.
8.3 Future Work
Section 8.2 showed the areas that need to be addressed towards the goals of
this thesis (i.e., within the scope of the broad “vision” of this thesis). Apart
from earmarking these issues for investigation in future work, we also identify
areas outside of the scope of this thesis (although related in topic) that would
be interesting to address.
Defeasible Quantifiers: In this thesis we focused purely on one notion of de-
feasibility introduced into DLs - defeasible subsumption. In principle, one
could also introduce notions of defeasibility for other constructs in DLs. Re-
cently there has been a proposal by Britz et al. [43] for defeasible versions of
the existential (∃) and universal (∀) role quantifiers in DLs.
Borrowing from the authors work, we have the example concept expres-
sion Lawyeru∀hasClient.PayingClient which describes the set of all entities in
our domain representing lawyers, all of whose clients are paying clients.
However, if we would like to refer to those lawyers who normally defend
only paying clients, the above representation is too strong. We need an alter-
native representation capturing this latter intuition using defeasible universal
role quantifiers (∀•∼).
Similarly, the representation Lawyer u ∃hasClient.PayingClient refers to
those lawyers each of which has at least one paying client. However, with
classical existential role quantifiers it is difficult to be able to capture: all
those lawyers whose normal clientelé includes at least one paying client.
We wish to explore the integration of (∀•∼) and (∃•∼) into DLs with defeasible
subsumption and the associated effects on reasoning.
Additional Inferential Postulates: In Chapter 3 we argued that the ratio-
nality postulates of KLM should be the minimal requirements of a rational
defeasible entailment regime. However, we also remarked that there may be
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other rules that may be suitable in various defeasible reasoning contexts.
One particular effort in this area is by Bezzazi et al. [26] who have ex-
plored, amongst other properties, variants of Rational Monotonicity and
weakened versions of transitivity and contraposition, together with the infer-
ential relationships between these properties.
Performance Benchmarking and Comparison: It would be highly beneficial
for defeasible reasoning research if there could be a way to standardise a
benchmark of ontology data that could be used across (or easily converted
for) different defeasible reasoning formalisms.
This would enable the possibility of comparing the practical performance
of different formalisms which, again, would be highly beneficial to the defea-
sible reasoning community.
For this to happen, three main issues need to be addressed: firstly, one
needs to establish a comparison of current defeasible reasoning formalisms
in terms of expressive power. Once the expressivity relationships between
formalisms is clear, one can isolate the “intersection” of this expressive power.
That is, what kinds of knowledge can all of these formalisms express.
The second issue is to identify how to represent the same piece of knowl-
edge in each formalism (i.e., how to translate between different representa-
tions). This would pave the way for establishing benchmark ontologies.
Finally, to compare the performances of the different formalisms, one
would also need to provide up-to-date implementations for each of them.
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